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PREFACE 
...la philosophie: sagesse de l’amour au service de l’amour. 
—E. Levinas1 
1 Questions 
As an academic endeavor, a dissertation should provide a contribution—ideally 
an original one, but realistically a fairly ordinary one often enough will do—in a given 
field of knowledge on a given subject matter. 
But when the field of knowledge is philosophy, when the subject matter of the 
academic endeavor is love, and when within this endeavor the ultimate object of love is 
argued, if seldom experienced, to be an infinite “erotic”2 power—the power of love: love 
as the greatest and simplest power—from which originates the whole of reality, can there 
be much doubt about the insufficiency of even the purest form of knowledge not so much 
to grasp such an object cognitively, but to relate to it correspondingly, or as the nature of 
the object itself requires? How can knowledge constitute the veritable path—the 
privileged μέθοδος—to that which, in order to be approached for what it is, by its own 
nature does not withdraw from intelligibility altogether, but rather demands that 
intelligibility be rooted in love? Can it be that when that which comes under investigation 
                                                 
1 
Levinas (1978, 253), translated in Levinas (1981, 162): “Philosophy is the wisdom of love at the service 
of love.” 
 
2
 From this point on, the adjective “erotic” (and the related adverb “erotically”) will be used to mean 
“pertaining to eros” in the broad Platonic (and Plotinian) sense of the term, a meaning which may include 
but is not restricted to the sexual sphere. 
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is love and, with it, its ultimate intentional object, or the summum desideratum as both the 
origin and the end of all loving, the lucidity of detached vision—an unaffected vision: a 
vision without love—falls short of the very intelligibility which vision claims to bear as 
its proper fruit? 
Conversely, a love that remains unquestioned, soberly uninquisitive with regard to 
its own nature: how sincere can it be about what it loves (or merely claims to love)? 
Should we take into consideration a love which in principle refuses reflectively to 
distance itself from the factual immediacy of its own propensity toward a beautiful 
object? What are we to think of a love that impatiently shrinks from pondering whether 
the immediate object of its passion is ultimate? And even a love that somehow has come 
to realize or merely to be persuaded that the infinity of its truly final object requires love 
itself to become infinite: can it still be called love if at the same time it shuns the duty—a 
lover’s duty, doubtless—of constantly purifying itself for the sake of the beloved; if it 
indefinitely postpones the task of perseveringly renewing the awareness of its own 
limits—the ever insufficient drive of its erotic conatus—with regard to its final object; if 
it continues to ignore the necessity—a paradoxical necessity but a necessity 
nonetheless—of having to diminish in breadth and grow in intensity as it gradually draws 
closer to its desideratum? 
Does a love which, once achieved its end, stops loving, truly achieve its end? 
2 Plan of the Reconstruction 
I maintain that Plotinus’ reflection is, among other things, an argumentatively 
sustained answer to these many questions. The goal of the present study is to show that 
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what I merely maintain to be the case may actually be the case. In order to determine 
this, the obvious method is to examine the available evidence, that is, to investigate, 
within the limits of my abilities, Plotinus’ arguments in his writings, what have come to 
be known as the Enneads. 
My claim is not that Plotinus’ understanding of love—of ἔρως, hence his 
“erotics”3—is immediately available as a system to the cursory reader with little effort, 
nor that is free of all (apparent?) contradiction. The unusual difficulty of the Enneads—
unusual not in comparison to the relative ease of ordinary readings, but to the ordinary 
difficulty of the average philosophical text—precludes this categorically. Thus, the claim 
is rather that if one can speak at all of a Plotinian erotics, this can emerge only as a 
laborious interpretive reconstruction from a plurality of arguments and statements which, 
despite their thematic heterogeneousness and prima facie lack of consistency, can be 
found to form a generally coherent picture,
4
 or a system.
5
 The present study is an attempt 
at such an interpretive reconstruction. 
My treatment of the subject will unfold in two steps, comprising a total of four 
chapters. The first step (Chapter One and Chapter Two) investigates Plotinus’ connection 
to Plato with regard to our main theme, eros. The second step (Chapter Three and 
                                                 
3
 “Erotics”: like “logic,” “physics,” “ethics,” “metaphysics,” etc.—and, in Plotinus, encompassing them all. 
From now on, I will simply transliterate the term ἔρως (simplified without the long quantity: eros). 
 
4
 I wrote “generally coherent,” rather than simply “coherent,” because I am not fully persuaded that 
Plotinus’ understanding of lower matter (at once viewed as the necessary substrate of the sensible 
universe, as the necessary end point of the process of derivation, and as radical evil), and particularly the 
thorny issue of its generation, has been met by an interpretation that does away with all the difficulties. 
On this topic see Subsection 3.4.3, where I address some of the most relevant interpretations of the status 
of lower matter and try to support the plausibility of my doubts textually and argumentatively. 
 
5
 On the use of the term “system” see Chapter One note 61. 
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Chapter Four) is my systematic reconstruction of Plotinus’ view of eros as a key to 
understand his metaphysics. 
Chapter One (Plato: The Ascent of Love in the Symposium and Some Related 
Texts) introduces virtually all the elements that will be found relevant in Plotinus’ 
assessment of love through a reading of Socrates’ speech in Plato’s Symposium and some 
related texts from the Platonic corpus. These texts may be understood as the soil from 
which Plotinus’ reflection will eventually sprout. Since the dialogical form of Plato’s 
works seems to be intrinsically resistant to attempts at constructing a system out of the 
dialogues
6
 and since Plotinus’ own reading of Plato is often quickly dismissed as 
fantastic or at best inaccurate, Section 1.2 will introduce my direct analysis of the 
relevant Platonic texts with a general discussion of two questions. First—the thorny 
question of Platonic hermeneutic—how should we read Plato’s writings? Second, can we 
say that Plotinus’ reading of Plato presents in any way an accurate or fair interpretation of 
what takes place in the dialogues? The next three sections of Chapter One (i.e., 1.3, 1.4, 
and 1.5) provide an interpretation of Socrates’ speech in the Symposium (with particular 
emphasis on the so-called Ascent Passage) and a few other texts from the dialogues that I 
believe are closely related to it. The main point of this interpretation is to highlight some 
of the elements that will be central to Plotinus’ understanding of eros and which, I 
suggest, may be already dormant in Plato’s text (in particular the hierarchical division of 
reality and the necessity for the soul to ascend through the levels of this hierarchy in 
order to come to face Beauty or the Good). 
                                                 
6
 See Chapter One note 4 on the meaning of the term “dialogues.” 
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Chapter Two (Plotinus as Interpreter of Plato: A reading of Enneads III.5 [50] On 
Eros) is rather analytic in character, in the sense that it aims at presenting a relatively 
close reading of a relatively short Plotinian text. The chapter opens with a brief 
discussion of how Plotinus reads Plato in general, and (Platonic) myths in particular 
(Section 2.2), a discussion that should be read in connection with Section 1.2. This 
discussion is followed by an overview of treatise III.5 [50] of the Enneads, which is 
entirely dedicated to the interpretation of Plato’s understanding of eros, with particular 
focus on the story of Eros’ birth in the Symposium (Section 2.3). The chapter closes with 
some observations on the nature of eros as presented in Enneads III.5 [50] (Section 2.4). 
Notably, I will argue that for Plotinus human experience affords several qualitatively 
different manifestations of love (summarily classified as pure, mixed, and deviant eros), 
but what is most proper to the essence of eros in its pure form as presented in this treatise 
is its directedness to the Good. 
I put forth my tentative systematic reconstruction of Plotinian erotics—the second 
step—in the remaining two chapters of this study, Chapter Three and Chapter Four. In 
contrast with Chapter Two, the nature of these two chapters is synthetic. This means that 
instead of providing a close reading of a single text, I draw and interpretively rearrange 
material for my conclusions from the entire Plotinian corpus. The main goal of these 
chapters is to show how the notion of eros is operative through the whole of Plotinus’ 
metaphysics both in the process of derivation of all reality from one single source—the 
One—and in the soul’s journey of ascent or return to it.7 For this reason, Chapter Three 
                                                 
7
 A similar thesis was cautiously adumbrated by Armstrong (1967, 261–262). To my knowledge, besides 
the precise commentaries on treatise III.5 [50] On eros by WOLTERS (= Wolters 1984) and HADOT (= 
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and Chapter Four should be taken as two parts of the same diptych with eros as their 
guiding theme and the One as both the origin and terminus of all eros. 
Chapter Three (Plotinus’ Metaphysics of Love: The Derivation of all Reality from 
the One As Erotic Procession) opens with a treatment of the issue of the derivation of 
multiplicity from a single simple source, which for Plotinus is the One. Eros is employed 
as a key concept to understand this issue. I argue that according to Plotinus, both the 
derivation of all reality from one single principle and its unfolding are regulated by eros. 
More specifically, the source of the procession of all reality is understood as a simple 
“erotic” power: an eros which the One bears to itself and only to itself, and at the same 
time is productive of otherness. The derivation of reality is thus conceived as an 
overflowing of eros productive of eros. However, while in the One eros is self-contained, 
or aims at nothing other than itself, in all derived reality eros brings with itself a 
directedness to something other than itself, namely to the One understood as the Good. 
The communication of all eros from the One is also what allows derived reality to 
structure itself hierarchically in the fully formed hypostases of Intellect and Soul, and in 
the sensible universe. The unfolding of each hypostasis is itself understood as a threefold 
erotic process: first, the superabundance of erotic energy proceeding from the higher 
hypostasis; second, the erotic reversion to the generating hypostasis; third, the 
communication of (increasingly diminished) erotic energy that will constitute the first 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hadot 1990), of which I will make abundant use in Chapter Two, there are only two monographs on eros 
in Plotinus, both in French: Lacrosse (1994) and PIGLER (= Pigler 2002). Lacrosse (1994), to which I will 
occasionally refer, focuses on the type of eros that is proper to each hypostasis. PIGLER focuses on the 
systematic role of eros in the process of derivation of all reality from the One, or, as she puts it in the 
subtitle of her book, the structuring of the intelligible world. I will refer to Pigler’s insightful work 
frequently in Chapter Three. 
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stage of the next hypostasis, until with lower matter the erotic power of reversion comes 
to a halt. 
Chapter Four (Plotinus’ Metaphysics of Love: The Return of the Soul to the One 
As Erotic Ascent) shifts the focus of the discussion to the movement inverse to the 
process of derivation: the traditional theme of the return of the soul to the One qua Good, 
here conceived of as the universal final cause. This theme is again investigated from the 
perspective of eros. In particular I will argue that for Plotinus the very possibility of 
being erotically directed toward a universal final cause (as found, for example, in 
Aristotle) remains unintelligible unless one views the final cause as also the origin of the 
eros directed toward it. Thus, the One is the Good not only because it is universally 
desired but because it is at the same time the origin of the eros by which it is so desired 
(Section 4.2). The remainder of the chapter is dedicated to investigate the process of 
attunement of the individual soul to the Good. This process, technically referred to as the 
Ascent, takes place as a fundamental disciplining of the soul’s affective commitments, or 
of its eros. The goal of the Ascent, whose major presuppositions, features, and stages I 
present in the sections following 4.2, is increasingly to narrow the gap that separates the 
individual soul from the final aim of its desire, the Good, until this gap is reduced to a 
bare minimum and the soul, transformed into pure eros for the One, comes in contact 
with its desideratum. 
In the Epilogue of this study I sketch the outline of two possibly problematic 
aspects of Plotinus’ thought and quickly breach the question of the relevance of his 
philosophy for the present. 
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3 Practical Indications 
Before I turn to the work itself, in this last section of the Preface I will provide 
some practical indications for the reading of the material ahead. 
(1) Divisions of the text and internal references. The text of this study is variously 
divided in chapters, sections, and subsections. I will reserve the terms “chapter,” 
“section,” and “subsection” to indicate these divisions of the text precisely. Although 
such divisions may on occasion reflect the argumentative flow of the material, typically 
within a given chapter, their main purpose is merely that to facilitate internal reference. 
Examples of internal references are “Section 2.1” and “Subsection 1.5.2,” where the first 
number indicates the chapter, the second, the section within that chapter, and the third, 
the subsection within that section. 
(2) Footnotes. References to footnotes include the chapter number (e.g., Chapter 
Three note 9), unless the footnote is located in the same chapter in which the reference 
occurs, in which case only the number of the footnote is given (e.g., note 112). 
(3) Abbreviations. All abbreviations I used are listed at pages xxi-xxii below. 
(4) Bibliographical references. Directions on how to find references to all sources 
used in this study are given in the opening Notice of the Bibliography on page 496. 
(5) Plato’s works: citations, editions, translations. Unless otherwise indicated, the 
Greek text of Plato is that of Burnet (1899–1907), cited according to the traditional 
Stephanus pagination (Estienne 1578) and Burnet’s line numbering; the numeration of 
the Epigrams follows Cooper (1997). The translations are mine, unless stated otherwise. 
References to all editions and/or translations of Plato’s works used in this study are listed 
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in the section of the Bibliography titled “Plato.” In Chapter One the works of Plato are 
usually cited without the name of their author (thus, Symposium 202a3 = Plato, 
Symposium 202a3); elsewhere, Plato’s name is added. 
(6) Plotinus’ works: citations, editions, translations. Unless otherwise indicated, 
Plotinus’ Greek text is cited from the editio minor of P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer 
(HS2), and the English translation is by A. H. Armstrong (ARMSTRONG);
8
 the translation 
of Porphyry’s Life of Plotinus (VP), which is included in most complete editions and 
translations of the Enneads, is also from ARMSTRONG, while the Greek text is the one 
found in the volume edited by L. Brisson, J.-L. Cherlonneix, and others.
9
 The text of the 
Enneads is quoted according to the traditional numeration of ennead, treatise (first in 
Porphyry’s order, and then in chronological order within square brackets), chapter, and 
Brehiér’s lines10 (e.g., I.1 [53] 1.1–2).11 References to all editions and/or translations of 
                                                 
8
 Notably, in Chapter Two the translations of passages from Enneads III.5 [50] On eros are mine, unless 
otherwise stated. 
 
9
 Brisson et al. (1992). 
 
10
 Bréhier (1924–1938), followed by Henry and Schwyzer in both of their critical editions, HS1 and HS2. 
 
11
 Creuzer (1835, III, 200, 202), followed by Guthrie (1918), inverts the chronological order of the two first 
treatises of the fourth Ennead, thus labeling “IV.1 [4]” what in HS1 and HS2 is IV.1 [21], and “IV.2 [21]” 
what in HS1 and HS2 is IV.2 [4] (cf. Cilento 1947–1949, II, 475). Analyses of the manuscript evidence 
for treatises IV.1 [21] On the essence of the soul 2 and IV.2 [4] On the essence of the soul 1 have 
established that these two treatises should be read in reverse order (according to information provided by 
Porphyry in VP 25.12–15, 4.28–29, 63–65, and as the titles just assigned to them indicate). Therefore, 
treatise 21 in the chronological order should be, not the first, but the second treatise of the fourth Ennead: 
IV.2 [21] On the essence of the soul 2; vice versa, treatise 4 in the chronological order should be, not the 
second, but the first treatise of the fourth Ennead: IV.1 [4] On the essence of the soul 1. Accordingly, 
HS1 and HS2 print IV.1 [21] and IV.2 [4] in reverse order, but maintain the traditional numeration of the 
treatises. By contrast, some later editions renumber them as IV.1 [4] and IV.2 [21] (e.g., Cilento 1947–
1949; ARMSTRONG). For practical reasons, in my references I will follow the traditional numeration 
maintained by HS1 and HS2 (cf. the introduction to IV.1 [21] in IGAL); thus, as already indicated in this 
note, the full labels of these two treatises are: IV.1 [21] On the essence of the soul 2, and IV.2 [4] On the 
essence of the soul 1. For further details on this issue see Henry (1938, 16), the notes ad loc. for the titles 
of these treatises in HS1 and HS2, and the introductions to these treatises in virtually all editions and/or 
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Plotinus’ works used in this study are found in the section of the Bibliography titled 
“Plotinus.” A chart with Porphyry’s traditional arrangement and titles of the Enneads and 
their chronological order as they appear in his Life of Plotinus 4–6 and 24–26 is provided 
in Appendix A for the reader’s convenience. In Chapter 2, beginning with Section 2.3, 
Ennead III.5 [50] On eros is usually cited only by chapter and line number (thus, 2.3 = 
Plotinus, Enneads III.5 [50: On eros] 2.3); in Chapters 3 and 4 Plotinus’ Enneads are 
generally cited without author and title (thus, VI.9 [9] 1.5 = Plotinus, Enneads VI.9 [9: 
On the Good or the One] 1.5); everywhere else the name of the author is added (thus, 
Plotinus IV.3 [27] 3.3 = Plotinus, Enneads IV.3 [27: On difficulties about the soul 1] 3.3). 
(7) Pre-modern sources: citations, editions, translations. Unless otherwise 
indicated, the text of pre-modern works is cited according to the editions and translations 
listed in the section of the Bibliography titled “Pre-modern Authors.” When more than 
one translation of a given work is listed in that section of the Bibliography, each time I 
will indicate which translation I am using. 
(8) Citations of passages in Greek. In reporting Greek texts verbatim, I capitalize 
the first letter of the word immediately following the Greek period (“.”) and question 
mark (“;”) for no other reason than that I find this to be easier on the eye, particularly in 
longer passages (for a similar practice with Plotinus’ text, cf. Henry and Schwyzer’s 
editio maior: HS1). Line numbers of longer passages cited in Greek are given in square 
brackets within those passages. In the translations of these passages, line numbers are 
also provided in square brackets, but obviously they correspond only approximately to 
                                                                                                                                                 
translations of the Enneads cited in the first subsection of the section of the Bibliography titled 
“Plotinus” published after and including Bréhier (1924–1938). 
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the division of the text in the original; when the word order of the translated text departs 
considerably from that of the original, line numbers are omitted in the translation. 
(9) Untranslated material. Translations of material from works in modern 
languages other than English and unavailable in English are mine; this material is left in 
the original when appearing only in the footnotes. 
(10) Strings of references. In strings of references to Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, 
typically appearing in the footnotes (e.g., Plotinus I.7 [54] 1.13–15, I.8 [51] 2.4–5, III.8 
[30] 11.11, V.5 [32] 12.40–50, 13.1–5, VI.7 [38] 24.13–16, 29.9–10, 41.28–31), these 
references are given in accordance with the order of Thrasyllus’s canon for Plato (cf. 
Burnet 1899–1907; Cooper 1997), of the traditional order found in the commentators of 
the first six centuries A.D. for Aristotle (cf. Bekker 1831–1870, I–II; Barnes 1995), and 
of Porphyry’s thematic division for Plotinus (cf. Appendix A). In the rare cases in which 
I do not follow these orders, references appearing first in a given sequence are considered 
more relevant to the point under discussion than those appearing later (with the exception 
of sequences occurring in terminological queries, in which the terms are usually listed 
alphabetically and each term constitutes a separate sequence). 
(11) Capitalization of some technical terms. Throughout this study, I capitalize 
several English terms (e.g., Beauty, One, Intellect, Principle of Prior Simplicity, etc.) 
when these are used somewhat technically. Here is a list of the places where I indicate 
matters of capitalization: in Chapter One, pages 32 and 48 and note 161; in Chapter Two, 
notes 27 and 46; in Chapter Three, notes 9 and 10, and pages 224 and 236; in Chapter 
Four, pages 290 and 334 and note 62. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This study is an attempt at a systematic reconstruction of Plotinus’ understanding 
of eros or love in two basic steps, corresponding to Chapters One–Two and Three–Four 
respectively. 
The first step highlights Plotinus’ connection to Plato. In Chapter One, first I 
argue that Plotinus’ way of reading the dialogues is faithful to Plato’s intention insofar as 
it is an active engagement in the practice of philosophy advocated in the dialogues; I then 
try to show that some important elements of Plotinus’ understanding of eros, most 
notably the differentiation of levels of reality in the soul’s ascent to Beauty and the view 
of goodness as self-diffusive, are already present, somewhat implicitly, in Plato. Chapter 
Two is a focused overview of Plotinus’ treatise on eros (Enneads III.5 [50]), the text in 
which he offers a threefold classification of love as pure, mixed, and deviant through a 
sustained interpretation of Plato’s views on the topic, with particular focus on the myth of 
Eros’ birth in the Symposium. 
The second step is my systematic reconstruction of Plotinus’ view of eros as a key 
to comprehend his metaphysics. In Chapter Three I show how the notion of eros is 
essential to understand both the derivation of all reality from a unique simple principle or 
universal efficient cause (the One) and its structuring in decreasing levels of unity and 
intensity of eros (the hypostases of Intellect and soul, the sensible world, and pre-cosmic 
matter). What the One gives to all derived reality is love for the One qua other, an energy 
  xxiv 
which decreases as its distance from its desideratum increases. Similarly, in Chapter Four 
I focus on the importance of eros to understand the inverse process: the return or gradual 
ascent of the individual soul to the One, now viewed as the Good or universal final cause. 
At each stage of the ascent (purification, intellification, and union), the individual soul 
experiences an increase in both unity and intensity of eros, until at the end of the journey, 
stripped of all that is alien to it, the soul is transformed in one single reality: eros for the 
One. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
PLATO: THE ASCENT OF LOVE IN THE SYMPOSIUM 
AND SOME RELATED TEXTS 
Τὸ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ 
πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί· [...] τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον 
κινδυνεῦσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν—καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος...  
 
Τὴν ψυχήν, Ἀγάθωνα φιλῶν, ἐπὶ χείλεσιν ἔσχον· 
ἤλθε γὰρ ἡ τλήμων ὡς διαβησομένη. 
—Plato1 
1.1 Introduction 
Socrates’ speech in the Symposium is one of the seminal texts that shaped 
Plotinus’ view of what I will be referring to as love or desire. For this reason, I thought it 
appropriate to begin this study with an introductory chapter dealing, not so much with a 
general account of Plato’s understanding of love (if there ever was one, and if we will 
ever be in a position to grasp it adequately), as with a tentative interpretive sketch of 
some of the basic ideas about love which I believe may be safely derived from Plato’s 
writings, particularly the Symposium. Prospectively these ideas are also an anticipation of 
some of the elements which will become central to my reconstruction of Plotinian 
                                                 
1
 Plato, Phaedo 114d1–2, 4–6: “No reasonable man would insist that these things are as I have described 
them: [...] but for the one who thinks in this way, I believe this is fitting and a thing worth risking—for 
the risk is a noble one.” Plato, Epigrams 6 (= Anthologia Palatina V.78): “When I kiss Agathon, my soul 
is on my lips; | for it comes, the poor thing, hoping to cross over to him” (translation by J. M. Edmonds 
and J. M. Cooper, in Cooper 1997, slightly modified). For indications on how to read the references to 
editions and/or translations of Plato’s works see Section 3 of the Preface. 
 
  
2 
“erotics” (cf. Preface note 3) in the next three chapters. Parts of Socrates’ second speech 
in the Phaedrus and of books VI and VII of the Republic are also particularly 
instrumental to this end and will be included in the discussions of this chapter. I begin my 
account with some general remarks on the complex issue of Platonic hermeneutics (i.e., 
how should we read a Platonic dialogue?) and the related question of whether Plotinus
2
 
provides us with a sound interpretation of Plato’s writings (1.2). The main purpose of the 
first section is to clarify in what sense I think Plotinus’ reading of Plato, while obviously 
far from meeting the standards of modern philology, may still be considered a 
philosophically acceptable interpretation. Some preliminary clarifications about Plato’s 
choice of the term ἔρως and the mythical figure of Eros in the Symposium (1.3) and a 
sketch of the argument of Socrates’ speech in that dialogue (1.4) will follow. I put forth 
the main argument in the last section of the chapter (1.5) through a series of critical 
observations on the so-called Ascent Passage which I deem particularly relevant to our 
main topic. 
1.2 Reading the Dialogues: Is Plotinus Misinterpreting Plato? 
We may frame the broad issue of Platonic hermeneutics in the terms of the incipit 
of Sextus’ Hypotypōseis: “The natural result of any investigation is that the investigators 
either discover the object of search or deny that it is discoverable and confess it to be 
inapprehensible or persist in their search.”3 Relatively little effort is required to see how a 
                                                 
2
 The same question can be asked of other figures in the tradition of Platonism, including Aristotle (cf. 
Gerson 2005a). 
 
3
 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.1: Τοῖς ζητοῦσί τι πρᾶγμα ἢ εὕρεσιν ἐπακολουθεῖν εἰκὸς ἢ 
ἄρενησιν εὑρέσεως καὶ ἀκαταλεψίας ὁμολογίαν ἢ ἐπιμονὴν ζητήσεως.  
 
  
3 
writer of essays or of treatises could fit this classification. But Plato wrote dialogues; 
and while he does speak to his readers insofar as he is the author of the dialogues,
4
 it is 
not immediately clear where he stands on many issues.
5
 It was probably also this lack of 
immediate transparency
6
 that grounded, from antiquity, two major lines of interpretation 
                                                 
4
 In the case of spurious works, sometimes included in collections of Plato’s works (e.g., Burnet 1899–
1907; Cooper 1997), insofar as he is the inspiration behind them. To avoid equivocation, the term 
“dialogues” here indicates, besides Plato’s works written in the dramatic dialogue form, those in which 
the dialogue form is either rather marginal (i.e., Menexenus, and more so Timaeus, Critias, and the very 
likely spurious Clitophon and Epinomis), or absent (i.e., Letters and Epigrams). 
 
5
 If for obvious reasons we exclude likely genuine letters from this calculation, whichever they may be, we 
find Plato explicitly referring to himself only three times in the entire Platonic corpus, that is, twice in the 
Apology (34a1 and 38b6) and once in the Phaedo (59b10). A remark by Simmias reported by an 
anonymous commentator well captures the likely condition of the readers of the dialogues: “Plato 
himself, too, shortly before his death, had a dream of himself as a swan, darting from tree to tree and 
causing great trouble to the fowlers, who were unable to catch him. When Simmias the Socratic heard 
this dream, he explained that all men would endeavor to grasp Plato’s meaning; none, however, would 
succeed, but each would interpret him according to his views, whether in a metaphysical or physical or 
any other sense” (Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy I.1.29–35). We find Montaigne still 
toying with the same idea of the anonymous commentator as late as 1575, in his famous Apologie de 
Raimond Sebond: “Voyez demener et agiter Platon. Chacun, s’honorant de l’appliquer à soi, le couche du 
costé qu’il le veut. On le promeine et l’insere à toutes les nouvelles opinions que le monde reçoit; et le 
differente l’on à soy-mesmes selon le different cours des choses. On faict desadvouer à son sens les 
meurs licites en son siecle, d’autant qu’elles sont illicites au nostre. Tout cela vifvement et puissamment, 
autant qu’est puissant et vif l’esprit de l’interprete” (Essais II.12 = Montaigne 1962, 571). In a similar 
way, but while remaining open to the possibility of explaining Plato, Plotinus (IV.8 [6] 1.26–28) writes: 
“What, then, does this philosopher say? He is obviously not saying the same thing everywhere, so that 
one can easily know what his intention is.” 
 
6
 Some may consider the expression “lack of immediate transparency” as either simplistic or euphemistic. 
Tigerstedt, in an excellent study on the general interpretation of Plato to which I owe a significant portion 
of the information gathered in this section, soberly remarks that “there is no agreement among scholars as 
to the real nature of Platonic philosophy”; and as he laments the tendency of some Plato scholars to read 
the dialogues while dogmatically assuming to know already what Plato thought, he concludes: “As so 
often, the outcome of individual dogmatism is skepticism” (Tigerstedt 1977, 21). Today, almost forty 
years later (Tigerstedt 1977 was actually ready for publishing in 1973), consensus on how to read Plato 
(and hence on his philosophy) is still lacking. This is not unexpected, but the situation seems at least less 
murky than it used to be. Recently, in his introduction to a collection of previously published studies, 
Thesleff (2009, xiii) remarked that despite the interpretive chaos characterizing modern Platonic 
scholarship, certain common trends can be observed. In particular, he emphasizes six major shifts: (i) the 
importance attributed to their literary and dramatic character; (ii) skepticism concerning the possibility of 
establishing a fixed chronology; (iii) awareness of oral discussions within the Academy which are likely 
reflected in the dialogues; (iv) the possibility of a “coherent doctrinal basis in the oral discussions”; (v) 
the question surrounding the dialogue form and Plato’s audience; (vi) the reciprocal benefit gained by 
“historicist” (focusing mainly on the context) and “modernist” (reading the dialogues with modern 
philosophy in mind) interpreters of Plato. I will briefly and loosely touch on all these points in what 
follows. 
  
4 
of the Platonic text which we may conventionally agree to call doctrinal (or dogmatic) 
and aporetic (or skeptical) respectively.
7
 Briefly, in their extreme forms, the former 
approach takes the dialogues to express Plato’s genuine views (transmitted not in 
straightforward statements or in treatises, however, but precisely in dialogical form, 
which, one may argue, for Plato is the form or genre particularly fitted to philosophical 
discourse
8
), while the latter reads them as mere attempts to explore any given issue 
without Plato ever committing himself to expressly endorse a definitive position. 
Intersecting these two major hermeneutic poles, doctrinal and aporetic, we find a 
number of what we might refer to as reading strategies. Four such strategies are worth 
mentioning. The first is stylometry, a method of text study that aims at ascertaining the 
authorship of a given text (and more often, in the case of the dialogues, its chronological 
position in Plato’s literary production) through the statistical analysis of its style.9 The 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
7
 This denomination is generally accepted in contemporary Plato scholarship (e.g., Tigerstedt 1977, 13; 
Irwin 1995, 5–7; Cooper 1997, xxi–xxv) and is attested by Sextus Empiricus, who writes: “Plato has 
been described by some as ‘dogmatic’ [δογματικὸν], by others as ‘aporetic’ [ἀπορητικόν], and by others 
again as partly dogmatic and partly aporetic” (Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.221; R. G. Bury’s translation, 
slightly modified). Cf. also Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers III.51. 
 
8
 See Tigerstedt (1977, 97–98). An ancient source supporting this view is the fifth century A.D. Anonymous 
Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy V.14.208–15.210; cf. also Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent 
Philosophers III.47–48. I will come back to this point later in this section. 
 
9
 See L. Campbell (1867), Dittenberg (1881), Lutosławski (1897, especially 64–193), Ryle (1966); critical 
works on this method are those by Thesleff (1982; 1989; see also 2009, xiv), Ledger (1989), and 
Brandwood (1990). The appearance of computers enhanced the practice of stylometric analysis, though 
not necessarily the quality of its results. For instance, stylometric studies by Morton and McLeman 
(1966, 93–94) concluded that among the writings traditionally referred to as the fourteen Pauline epistles 
of the New Testament, Paul wrote only four (i.e., Galatians, 1 Corinthians, and most of Romans and 2 
Corinthians), while six other hands are detectable for the remaining ten letters. However, more recent 
studies show a fundamental lack of consensus on this point, not only among New Testament scholars, but 
more significantly among specialists in stylometric analysis (cf. Brown 1997, 587–588). This is not 
surprising, since every statistical analysis, regardless of the quantity and accuracy of the data collected, 
depends heavily on the kinds of questions one asks of these data (see Gadamer 1995, 301; for a similar 
point raised specifically about Lutosławski’s research on Plato, see Tannery 1899, 168–169). The 
  
5 
second strategy, often heavily dependent on stylometry, is a theory of historical 
development of the dialogues (the so-called genetic or developmental approach), whose 
main contention in relation to Plato is that he changed his mind over time about certain 
issues, and that the dialogues naturally make better sense if we take such development 
into account.
10
 The third strategy is what may be called a dramatic setting theory, mainly 
insisting that each dialogue is not only a work of philosophy but also a drama, and that as 
a dramatic unity it should be understood as having relatively little relation to other 
dialogues. Different authors disagree about the extent of this relation and about the 
degree of priority that the dramatic aspect should have over the philosophical aspect or 
vice versa.
11
 Fourthly, one can read Plato simply by focusing on the arguments presented 
in the dialogues, often regardless of the context in which these arguments occur.
12
 This 
                                                                                                                                                 
usefulness of stylometric analysis notwithstanding (particularly as we learn to ask better questions), I 
believe Robin’s judgment on this method as applied to Plato’s dialogues is balanced and still valid: “Elle 
permet seulement de constituter, d’une façon d’ailleurs approchée, des groupes de dialogues d’après les 
indices de parenté que paraît donner l’étude de la langue” (Robin 1964, 63). For a survey and assessment 
of the differing conclusions of stylometric analysis in the field of Platonic studies see Thesleff (1982, 67–
96) and Brandwood (1990). Cf. also note 34 below. 
 
10
 See Hermann (1839), Susemihl (1855–1860), Grote (1888); see also Vlastos (1991, especially 45–80). 
For an excellent presentation of the genetic approach, its chief representatives, and the main issues 
surrounding it, see Tigerstedt (1977, 25–51). 
 
11
 For instance, Press (1993) espouses a dramatic view coupled with a non-dogmatic interpretation of the 
dialogues; Arieti (1991; cf. also Arieti and Barrus 2010, 1–31) supports a more radical version of the 
dramatic setting theory, resolutely giving priority to the dramatic over the philosophical aspect of the 
dialogues (see my note 28 (2) below and Appendix E.2). For a more moderate position, explicitly arguing 
for an integration of the dramatic and the philosophical facets of the dialogues, see Blondell (2002, 
especially the first two chapters, where Blondell outlines her overall approach); cf. also Randall (1970, 
1–5). To a certain extent and in different ways, Rosen (1987) and, partially, Corrigan and Glazov-
Corrigan (2004) are fruitful examples of the practice of this strategy as applied to the Symposium. 
 
12
 I am not aware of any author who has worked out this strategy systematically, and understandably so 
perhaps, for working out a coherent system from what is often taken to be a collection of relatively 
disconnected arguments would require a good deal of imagination. The procedure of isolating arguments 
from their context, however, is more or less implicitly carried out by many, whether with respect to an 
individual argument of a dialogue taken independently of the rest of the dialogue (e.g., the arguments for 
a tripartite view of the soul in Republic IV, as showed by Roochnik 2003, 10–30, especially 14–18), or 
  
6 
last strategy is not altogether unconcerned with historical questions and issues of style 
and dramatic setting, but the treatment of these problems is resolutely subordinated to the 
investigation of the argumentative coherence and, to a lesser extent, the originality of 
each work. 
As I hinted above, when these strategies variously intersect the two major 
approaches to Plato’s text (i.e., doctrinal and aporetic) and combine with each other, they 
produce a wide array of more nuanced readings. So, for instance, Terence Irwin endorses 
a doctrinal view of the dialogues (mostly on the basis of Aristotle’s testimony) while 
maintaining a developmental approach to the same on the basis of a relatively fixed 
chronology.
13
 Others strongly criticize the findings of stylometry, the theory of historical 
development, as well as a clear-cut doctrinal reading, and suggest instead that Plato 
reproduced in writing what Socrates undertook orally, namely the open-ended practice of 
dialectic in which both the conclusions and the presuppositions of a given standpoint are 
constantly questioned for the sake of the reader’s philosophical growth.14 Charles Kahn’s 
approach is again doctrinal and favors a chronological order over others; but instead of 
explaining this order in terms of development, Kahn offers what he calls an ingressive 
interpretation, namely the notion that Plato did not alter his views in radical ways and that 
                                                                                                                                                 
with respect to all the arguments of a dialogue considered independently of the rest of the Platonic corpus 
(a tendency which one might detect in some supporters of the dramatic setting theory, explicitly 
supported, for instance, by Press 1993, 111–112). On a side note, I would like to think that we have 
overcome readings of Plato such as Robinson’s (1953, vi), who espouses a strictly evolutionary view of 
logic, leading him to assume that he knows in advance what Plato could and could not understand. For a 
critique of Robinson’s and of like-minded positions, see Tigerstedt (1977, 22–24); cf. also Appendix E.3 
for further critical remarks; Gonzalez (1998) can be read as a reversal of Robinson’s thesis (cf. Appendix 
E.5). 
 
13
 Irwin (1995, especially 3–16). See also Kraut (1992). 
 
14
 See for instance Nails (1995); cf. also Gonzalez (1998), on which see Appendix E.5. 
 
  
7 
what is said in (allegedly) earlier, more aporetic dialogues (e.g., Lysis) can be 
adequately grasped only in light of (allegedly) later, more doctrinal ones (e.g., 
Symposium and Phaedrus).
15
 A more decidedly doctrinal approach is the esoteric one put 
forth by the so-called school of Tübingen. It sharply differs from other doctrinal 
approaches, however, in that it claims that these views cannot be distilled from the 
dialogues alone but, against Schleiermacher’s insistence,16 must be supplemented by 
Plato’s famed unwritten doctrines,17 of which the dialogues are mere reminders for an 
inner circle of “disciples” rather than straightforward expositions for the public.18 
                                                 
15
 Kahn (1996, especially 59–65). Robin’s reading of Platonic love as it unfolds from what he takes to be 
the earlier Lysis to the later Symposium and Phaedrus would partly fit Kahn’s ingressive reading (Robin 
1964). Interpretations of the dialogues favoring the overall speculative coherence of the Platonic corpus 
(although differing, and at times radically so, on other issues) have also been called “unitary” (Kahn 
1996, 38). Its major modern representatives include: Schleiermacher (1836, especially 1–47), von Arnim 
(1967), Shorey (1933), Robin (1935), Friedländer (1958), the school of Tübingen (see note 18 below); 
for a concise, helpful account of this approach to the dialogues see Tigerstedt (1977, 52–62). Recently, 
the unitary thesis has been made more nuanced, notably by Kahn (1996) himself and, most recently, by 
Zuckert (2009). Zuckert suggest that many of the apparent inconsistencies found in Plato can be made to 
cohere if we follow, not the alleged chronological order of composition of the dialogues (see note 34 
below), but their dramatic dates which, she argues, can be safely derived from both internal evidence and 
the works of philologists, philosophers and archeologists (see Zuckert 2009, 1–48; at pages 8–9 Zuckert 
provides a handy table of the dramatic chronology of the dialogues spanning from 460 through 386 B.C., 
with the Laws as the earliest work and the Apology as one of the latest). 
 
16
 Schleiermacher (1836, 9–13). In the past century, the view that if Plato can be understood at all, this must 
be done through the dialogues and only through the dialogues, had in Cherniss (1945) its most 
determined representative. 
 
17
 The unwritten doctrines (ἄγραφα δόγματα) are referenced once by Aristotle (Physics IV.209b15) and 
indirectly attested by other writers, for instance in Aristoxenus’ brief mention of Plato’s (in)famous 
lecture on the Good (Elements of Harmonics II.30.7–9; cf. also Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Physics 453.19–455.14). There is little doubt that these doctrines were an integral part of every 
Neoplatonist’s reading of Plato, as virtually all adherents to the esoteric reading (cf. next note) point out 
(see also Gerson, in Wallis 1995, ix; Reale 2008, VIII, 57). For a full account of the sources of the 
esoteric thesis, both external and internal to the dialogues, see Reale and Richard (2008). 
 
18
 Gaiser (1968; 1984, 31–54 for a concise treatment); Krämer (1959; 1990; 1998 for a more recent and 
shorter statement). There are notable convergences between the studies of these authors and the research 
of J. N. Findlay (1974, particularly the two appendices). The esoteric approach has found eager followers 
also beyond Tübingen, most notably in Milan (see particularly Reale 1997b). Again, Tigersted (1977, 
63–91; cf. also 1974, 69–70) offers a most helpful overview of the esoteric approach. However, his 
critique of this approach is, if not outdated, at least partial, in that it is unable to take directly into account 
  
8 
This enumeration of particular approaches to the dialogues could continue, but I 
trust that the samples given thus far will suffice for our purpose. Remarks on other 
individual approaches can be found in several of the footnotes of this section (see 
particularly note 28, note 29, note 48, and note 63 and in Annotations 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of 
Appendix E).  
My main goal in the remainder of this section is, not to try to settle the dispute on 
which of the two major approaches, doctrinal and aporetic, is more faithful to Plato’s 
mind,
19
 nor to show what reading strategies are more appropriate to understand his 
                                                                                                                                                 
later work done by Szlezák (1992; 1993 for a concise account of his position), who argues that 
significant confirmations of the system which the esoteric thesis derived mainly from the “unwritten 
doctrines” can be found in the dialogues themselves in the form of clues that are intelligible to those 
familiar with those doctrines (cf. also the volume by M.-D. Richard, in Reale and Richard 2008). Frede 
(1993, lxxvii) hints at a middle position, holding that “the alleged unwritten doctrines can be traced back 
to the Philebus.” She may be correct; but if Szlezák (1992; the first edition in German is from 1985) can 
legitimately be considered a representative of the esoteric approach, Frede’s judgment that according to 
the esotericists “certain doctrines were not put into the dialogues as a matter of principle” (Frede 1993, 
lxxvii) overlooks the fact that at least for Szlezák the doctrines were indeed put into the dialogues; they 
were just not immediately available to any reader (for example, they did not seem to be readily 
comprehensible to the audience of Plato’s lecture on the Good mentioned in my previous note). The 
question remains as to whether the reconstructions proposed by the “esotericists,” if they constitute a fair 
representation of Plato’s unwritten system, would be possible at all without the written dialogues, for if 
they would not, then the dialogues may contain more than most supporters of the esoteric thesis would 
normally allow. At the same time one may wonder whether the promising parallels between the contents 
of the dialogues and those of the unwritten doctrines (such as are advocated by Frede’s “middle position” 
with respect to the Philebus) would be possible at all without the ancient testimonies about the unwritten 
doctrines themselves and, perhaps, without the modern reconstructions of the content of such doctrines. 
Thus, it seems that the issue of our understanding of the relationship between Plato’s written dialogues 
and unwritten doctrines is a typical case of a hermeneutic circle, in which the understanding of the 
dialogues is enhanced by the comprehension of the doctrines, and vice versa. 
 
19
 Could the dispute be settled, anyway? I am inclined to think that a doctrinal approach reflects the facts 
less inaccurately than an aporetic one, although one should constantly be on guard against the temptation 
of having understood exactly what the doctrines in question are (cf. Tigerstedt 1977, 103–105). 
Moreover, reading Plato doctrinally does not imply that he never changed his mind about anything; 
conversely, not all variations in the dialogues are necessarily a sign of a radical change or even of a 
development in his views. Similarly, my giving factual preference to a doctrinal approach does not imply 
that Plato never entertained genuine puzzles. However, in my opinion to claim that all that he ever 
entertained were puzzles, and unresolved puzzles at that, seems to contradict even the most superficial 
reading of the dialogues. This topic, while central to any serious work on Plato, lies beyond the scope of 
the present study. 
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works, but only to state my position about the extent to which Plotinus’ approach may 
constitute a fair reading, or at least not a downright misinterpretation, of the Platonic text. 
Very generally, and in connection with what I have said thus far about Platonic 
hermeneutic, we may safely acknowledge three basic tenets in Plotinus’ way of reading 
Plato. First, his interpretation is resolutely doctrinal. Second, he takes Plato’s thought to 
be a systematic unity—a unity whose systematic character, however, is mostly implicit, 
and as such is in need of (much) explication (see Chapter Two note 9 and especially note 
11). And third, virtually none of the reading strategies outlined above were part of 
Plotinus’ hermeneutic repertoire.20 Assuming that this sketch is correct, we may ask 
again: Does Plotinus provide us with a fair reading of Plato? 
The mere fact of asking such a question would seem like an otiose exercise, 
particularly after the broader Neoplatonic
21
 reading of Plato was emphatically laid to rest 
                                                 
20
 Plotinus’ way of reading Plato may be said to resemble the fourth strategy mentioned above (i.e., focus 
on arguments) insofar as he extrapolates Plato’s statements and molds them creatively to fit his own 
ends. His goal, however, is always to prove that Plato—his Plato—was correct about a certain issue by 
explaining or making explicit some of the more obscure utterances in the dialogues (see Chapter Two 
note 11). His extrapolations, moreover, are hardly ever of entire arguments, but are often restricted to 
short citations or allusions (see Chapter Two note 21), or to doctrines generally taken to represent Plato’s 
genuine views. 
 
21
 Dillon and Gerson (2004, xiii) call the term, “Neoplatonism,” “an artifact of 19th-century Germanic 
scholarship.” (Obviously this applies also to its cognates “Neoplatonist” and “Neoplatonic,” used to 
describe such authors as Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, Damascius, and others, whether taken 
individually or collectively as a philosophical school.) As a matter of fact, Theophilus Gale already used 
the expressions “New Platonicks” and “New Platonists” in 1670 (Gale 1669–1677, II, 247, passim). 
More than a century later, in 1791, Tiedemann speaks of “Neu-Platoniker” (Tiedemann 1791–1797, I, 
xxiv; cf. also III, 134), and in the same year C. S. von Seidlitz uses the adjective “neuplatonische” in a 
letter to Kant (Brief 490 = Kant 1900–1910, XI, 298; cf. also XVIII, 435 and 512, where the same term 
appears even earlier in Kant’s own handwritten notes on metaphysics). According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary (2011, s.v. Neoplatonism), the English term “Neoplatonism” appears for the first time in 1831 
(the now obsolete “Neoplatonician” is found a year earlier, perhaps after the French “néo-platonicien”), 
in a translation of the third (1829) edition of Tennemann’s Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie 
(these terms already appear in German in the fourth volume of Tennemann’s twelve-volume Geschichte 
der Philosophie in 1803: Tennemann 1798–1819, IV, 165; cf. also VI, vii, 398 and passim). Whatever 
the first appearance of this set of terms might be, I share Dillon’s and Gerson’s (2004, xiii–xiv) judgment 
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by E. N. Tigerstedt.
22
 My purpose is, not to attempt an improbable revival of a 
Plotinian (or broadly Neoplatonic) interpretation of the dialogues, and even less to argue 
directly that this interpretation is the correct or the definitive one, but rather to reflect, 
briefly, on what it means for an interpretation of the dialogues (in fact, for an 
interpretation of any text) to be fair. I will touch on the more specific issue of Plotinus’ 
reading of Plato in the next chapter (Section 2.2); at this juncture, I would only like to 
offer some comments on the question itself. 
What does it mean for a text to be read fairly, or accurately? Mainly one thing, I 
take it: to be understood as much as possible in accordance with the intention of its 
author, the mens auctoris that simultaneously shines through and is obscured by the 
text.
23
 The fact that the author is for the most part absent does not reduce the text to a 
                                                                                                                                                 
as they write: “Although the prefix ‘neo-’ is intended to suggest that something significantly new is to be 
found in the thought of this period, it is worth stressing that Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Proclus 
would all have probably preferred to identify themselves as ‘paleo’-Platonists; that is, as non-innovating 
expositors and defenders of Platonic philosophy.” Whenever the word “Neoplatonism” and related terms 
appear in this study, one should read them while mindful of the contents of the present note. Cf. also 
Chapter Two note 9. 
 
22
 In his monograph, with the programmatic title The Decline and Fall of the Neoplatonic Interpretation of 
Plato, Tigerstedt (1974, 70) declares that this interpretation was “destroyed once and for all in the 
nineteenth century.” Surely enough, at least the supporters of the esoteric reading (cf. note 18 above) 
would disagree with this. 
 
23
 The intention of the author shines through the text because if it were not for the text, he or she probably 
would not (or no longer, in the case of dead authors) be heard. Conversely, the text clouds or obscures 
the intention of the author because even the clearest of texts never conveys the intention in full 
transparency, and the author is not always (or no longer) available to speak on behalf of his or her 
intention. Speaking on behalf of one’s intention does not only mean to restate the intention verbatim; 
more often it actually means to clarify it, to modify it, or else to admit that one no longer supports it. 
These observations point to the fact that an accurate or fair reading of a text already implies the 
awareness, on the part of the reader, that in particular when the author is unavailable to speak on behalf 
of his or her text (as in the case of Plato and of all ancient authors), neither the author nor the author’s 
intention are completely exhausted in the text, and as a consequence it would be naïve to think that we 
will ever be able fully to unravel the mens auctoris. Therefore, one should avoid the extreme of thinking 
to be able to shed full light on the intention behind a text, or of literally “understanding an author better 
than he understood himself,” to borrow an expression reported by the father of modern hermeneutics, F. 
E. D. Schleiermacher (Über den Begriff der Hermeneutik 362 = Schleiermacher 1834–1864, part 3, 
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mere collection of signs, but only makes the hermeneutic task harder.
24
 When the text 
is made absolute, when we have nothing but text (pure self-referential textuality, 
including intertextuality), the very phenomenon of writing disappears. And this for a 
simple reason: because a text is always already accompanied by an intention
25—a vague 
                                                                                                                                                 
III.362); cf. Kant (Critique of Pure Reason A314/B370), who made a similar remark specifically about 
Plato and was the likely source of Schleiermacher. But one should also avoid the opposite extreme, 
namely the renunciation of all hope to shed any light on the mind of the author, for after all the very 
existence of the text bears witness, no matter how partially and obscurely, to an intention. What I believe 
is of fundamental importance, however, is that the intention itself should not be understood as a self-
contained item: its conceptual boundaries cannot be determined unequivocally without reference to the 
context in which the intention emerges through the text. In particular, I maintain that partially to 
understand the mind of the author means primarily to understand the position of the author on a given 
theme, and therefore the task of grasping the author’s intention cannot be undertaken independently of 
the understanding of the particular theme about which the author expressed his or her mind. In the 
language of H.-G. Gadamer, the father of contemporary philosophical hermeneutics, this means that if 
we are to grasp anything at all about the mind of the author, first we ought to understand the particular 
question or set of questions which are inherited within a broader tradition and to which the author’s 
position happens to be an answer (see Gadamer 1995, 362–379). Moreover, it means that since our own 
reading, too, occurs in a context, any understanding of the question or theme presented in the text will 
never be entirely neutral, but as Dilthey, Heidegger, and in particular Gadamer gradually clarified, it will 
always take place as a historical encounter between at least two different contexts, traditions, sets of 
presuppositions, etc., or again, in Gadamer’s own language, as a “fusion [Verschmelzung] of horizons” 
(see particularly Gadamer 1995, 302–307, 374–375). Finally, and perhaps most importantly (particularly 
in Plato’s case, as we shall see), to understand the mind of the author means that the attempt at such a 
comprehension should include the awareness that the author’s answer is one particular answer given to 
the question in one particular milieu, and that in order to comprehend this answer one is already called to 
become engaged in the question to which the answer is essentially related, or to become involved in the 
task of appropriating that answer which is found most compelling by applying (Anwendung) it to the 
particular situation in which we find ourselves (see Gadamer 1995, 307–311, 315–316; cf. also 329–341. 
For a concise treatment of the issue see Grondin 1994, 106–123, especially 115–117). It is fair to infer 
that the interpretive attempt at understanding the mind of an author is more painstaking in the case of 
authors who do not explicitly alert us with regard to the nature of their intention (e.g., in general, authors 
of novels and dramas) than it is in the case of those who do (e.g., in general, authors of treatises and 
essays). Although normally one would expect to find Plato, as a philosopher, in the latter category, he 
actually belongs to the former, as the difficulty in dealing with the hermeneutics of the dialogues might 
confirm. (Thanks to Tiziano Tosolini for a helpful conversation on this point.) 
 
24
 It is when the intention of the author is particularly hard to determine that one more often resorts to 
interpretation. And yet, despite this difficulty, interpretation should always aim at tracing the intention 
behind the text. Moreover, interpretation always ought to display a double movement, of approaching 
and of distancing: of approaching, insofar as a reference to the text is always necessary (alternately, what 
takes place is not interpretation but fancy); and of distancing, insofar as the interpreter says something (at 
least slightly) different from what is found in the text (if not, we would be speaking, not of interpretation, 
but of mere repetition). Cf. Peperzak (1986, 121–124). 
 
25
 A reader favoring a hermeneutic of suspicion (I here have in mind what Ricoeur called the masters of 
suspicion: Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud; see Ricoeur 1970, 32) will argue that all our readings (and, for 
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and nearly indecipherable intention perhaps, but an intention nonetheless.
26
 If this were 
not the case, the question of a fair or accurate reading of the dialogues would not even 
arise. 
Now, what is the intention behind Plato’s text? What does he want to tell his 
readers? The answer to this question already presupposes a minimal understanding of 
what Plato is trying to do in or through the dialogues, an understanding that I take to be 
common to the two major approaches, aporetic and doctrinal, to the Platonic text. Plainly 
put, Plato wrote the dialogues in order to draw his readers into the activity of 
philosophizing in the conviction that this activity will improve one’s life:27 this, I 
                                                                                                                                                 
that matter, Plato’s own writing) are: (i) subject to the powerful anonymous influence of a collective 
structure (Marx); (ii) inescapably expressing a subterranean will to power (Nietzsche); (iii) ultimately 
tainted by wholly or partially unconscious motives passing themselves off as truth (or, in the case of 
Plato’s intention, as Plato’s intention) (Freud). The issue obviously exceeds the scope of this study. Here 
I will limit myself to observing that (i), (ii), and (iii) are important critical points that any serious reader 
should bear in mind constantly: the universal truth of a suspecting and skeptical attitude, I maintain, is at 
least pedagogical and at best heuristic (cf. note 28 (1) below). However (and what follows is so obvious 
that it is often overlooked precisely because it is obvious), if these critical points are meant to be 
absolute, then they should be self-applicable, in which case they would immediately call into question 
their own claim to absoluteness. If, on the other hand, they are meant to be absolute but not self-
applicable, one may ask what standard is used to allow for the exception. Until this standard is provided 
(and duly supported by argument), all we are left with is an attitude of suspicion radically suspecting 
everything except itself. For a similar remark cf. Tigersted (1977, 36). A stimulating discussion of this 
topic, focusing specifically on the issue of truth in the history of philosophy, can be found in Peperzak 
(1986, 103–119, especially 110–119). 
 
26
 This is no less true of a strictly private journal or diary, for which the only intended reader is the writer, 
that is, the writer qua reader, hence qua other, or qua aim of an intention. And even when a text is written 
in an unknown language, deciphering that language is not an end in itself, but only the first step toward 
grasping the intention that gave rise to the text and of which the language is (merely) a vehicle. 
 
27
 Unsurprisingly, I was unable to find a single passage in the dialogues in which Plato, speaking for 
himself (cf. note 5 above), explicitly states that his goal in writing dialogues is to draw his readers to 
philosophy. If this fact alone suffices to assert beyond doubt that we are utterly blind as to the nature of 
Plato’s intentions, I will content myself with the dubious pleasure of wandering in the dark. However, 
that to inspire his readers to practice philosophy was Plato’s reason for writing the dialogues might be 
established (safely, if tentatively, I maintain) from a multitude of passages, among which we may 
mention: Alcibiades’ speech in the Symposium (215a–222b); the entirety of Alcibiades I (whether 
spurious or not), especially 124b–135e; Socrates’ sketch of the philosopher-king in books V–VII of the 
Republic; Socrates’ own (youthful) pursuit of wisdom as he put himself at the school of Anaxagoras in 
the Phaedo (97b–98d), at the school of Diotima in the Symposium (201d–212c), of Theaetetus and 
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contend, is the major feature shared by both a doctrinal and an aporetic
28
 approach.
29
 
To be sure, an intention of this sort is not a prerogative of Plato, but belongs to the entire 
Greek philosophical tradition, including
30
 Plotinus.
31
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Timaeus in the homonymous dialogues, and of the Eleatics in the inquiries of the Parmenides, the 
Sophist, and the Statesman; the awe inspiring portrait of Socrates still engaged in philosophical activity 
even in the face of death sketched in the Crito and the Phaedo; Socrates’ concern that Hippocrates 
choose the right teachers in the Protagoras (309a–314b); this list could continue. 
 
28
 That this is the case for a doctrinal or dogmatic approach seems out of the question (but see point (1) of 
the next note). As for the supporters of an aporetic or skeptical approach, we might distinguish between a 
mild and a more resolute brand of it. 
(1) Supporters of a mildly aporetic approach emphasize that although Plato does not clearly indicate 
his definitive views on most issues, the dialogues are not the burial ground of all hope to find a solution 
to the puzzles presented in them (if they did, they would be dogmatic), but rather a feasible and 
stimulating starting point for investigating these puzzles further. In doing so, these authors metabolize the 
meaning of the Greek σκέπτεσθαι (“to look around carefully,” “view,” “examine,” “consider”: LSJ, s.v.; 
cf. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.3). Thus, Stefanini (1949, I, especially xxviii–xxxiv) 
speaks of a Platonic scepsis, which is “constructive” (costruttrice) and whose symbol is Eros, who is 
“sapiente della sua ignoranza che tende continuamente a superare; è ignorante della sua sapienza che 
aspira incessantemente a conquistare” Stefanini (1949, I, xxxiv). But as Tigerstedt (1977, 106–107) 
already pointed out, Stefanini ends up judging the dialogues with a standard, that of Christianity, which is 
foreign to Plato, much like Susemihl judged them through Aristotelian lenses. (Of course, the question 
remains as to whether Plato would have been able to appreciate these standards. To assume that he would 
have not: is it not already to judge him with a standard that is also foreign to him, that is, the standard of 
the modern method of historical criticism, or, worse, of a reductive way of practicing this method?) 
Tigerstedt, while rejecting a purely aporetic reading of the dialogues, emphasizes the historical 
importance of skepticism as a reaction to (excessively) dogmatic readings (Tigerstedt 1977, 103–105), 
and hence its pedagogical value. 
(2) A more resolutely aporetic approach is the one voiced by Cooper (1997, especially xviii–xxv) in 
his introduction to the latest complete collection of Plato’s works in English, an approach based on what 
he calls “a spirit of open-ended inquiry” (Cooper 1997, xxv). More recently, this approach has been 
defended by Corlett (2005), on which see Appendix E.1. 
 
29
 In fairness to the question, there is a twofold alternative even to this minimal understanding of what Plato 
is trying to accomplish through his writings. 
(1) The first branch of this alternative is to interpret the dialogues dogmatically, but negatively. In 
other words, what Plato is trying to do in the dialogues (excluding the Letters) is (perversely?) to mislead 
his readers. However, I am not aware of anyone who espouses such an extreme position and attempts to 
support it through a thorough analysis of the dialogues.  
(2) The second branch of the alternative is represented by Arieti (1991, particularly 1–17) and, more 
recently and concisely, Arieti and Barrus (2010, 1–31), who read the dialogues primarily as dramas. 
Critical remarks on Arieti’s position can be found in Appendix E.2. 
 
30
 The following selection of references to ancient philosophers should suffice to support the view that in 
antiquity philosophy was understood primarily as a way of life: Pythagoras (in Isocrates, Busiris XI.28–
29 = DK 14.4; Plato, Republic X.600a9–b5 = DK 14.10; the whole of Iamblichus’ On the Pythagorean 
Way of Life, particularly Pythagoras’s speech on philosophy at XII.58–59); Plato (cf. note 27 above and 
note 33 below; see also the last definition of φιλοσοφία given in the spurious Definitions 414b8–9: 
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ἐπιμέλεια ψυχῆς μετὰ λόγου ὀρθοῦ); Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics X.1177a12–1178a6; Politics 
VII.1326b16–33); Cynics (cf. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers VI.38–39, 103); 
Epicureans (Epicurus: Letter to Pythocles 85 = EPICUREA 36.1–4; Letter to Menoeceus 128 = EPICUREA 
62.12–20; Principal Doctrines 5 = EPICUREA 72.10–14 = Gnomologium Vaticanum Epicureum 5; 
EPICUREA fragment 221, 169.14–17 = Porphyry, Letter to Marcella XXXI.124.8–12; cf. also Lucretius’ 
praise of philosophy, or as he calls it, doctrina sapientium, in De rerum natura II.1–61); Stoics (SVF I, 
351 = Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers VII.160; SVF I, 352 = Stobaeus, Anthologium 
II, 1.24, 8.13; SVF I, 353 = Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica XV.62 = PG 21, 1405b–d; Epictetus, 
Enchiridion, especially 22, 46, 48.1, 52, where the terms φιλόσοφος and φιλοσοφία are used repeatedly; 
Marcus Aurelius, To Himself, particularly I.17.8, II.17, V.9, VI.12, VIII.1, IX.41, and XI.7 for the same 
reason); Skeptics (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.8); Platonists (Alcinous, Didaskalikos I–
III.152.1–154.9; Atticus, fragment 4); Neoplatonists (Plotinus: see Chapter Four of this study, especially 
Section 4.6; Porphyry, Sententiae XXXII, the entire Letter to Marcella, particularly III.103.2–3, 
V.107.11–12, VIII.109.21–22, XXXI.124, where right or true philosophy is openly mentioned and 
praised; Iamblichus, the entirety of the Protrepticus, particularly passages where philosophy is described 
as a way to happiness, such as V.61.9–11, VI.70.20–71.12, XX.121.20–21, 123.2–6; Proclus, 
Commentary on Plato’s Alcibiades I 48.8–9, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides V.1015.38–1016.3); 
compare also the 288 schools of philosophy, each representing a certain way of life, listed in Varro’s lost 
work De philosophia as reported by Augustine in De civitate Dei XIX.1. The view that philosophy in 
antiquity was understood primarily as a way of life is well argued and thoroughly documented by Hadot 
(1995 and 2002), who also shows how the list of primary sources cited in this note could be extended 
well beyond the ancient Greek tradition (for a partially critical assessment of Hadot’s views see Hankey 
2003). For an earlier and shorter statement of a view similar to Hadot’s on several points, see de Vogel 
(1970, 3–24); for an approach emphasizing even more forcefully the view of philosophy as a way of life 
by insisting on the close connection of philosophy with theurgy and other ascetic and ritual practices, see 
Uždavinys (2008; 2010). On this point the meaning and purpose of the Western tradition of philosophy 
(at least before the modern turn) are not unlike those of the Eastern traditions, whatever one might think 
about the historical possibility of “crossfertilization” between the two (cf. Chapter Two note 4 on this 
issue in relation to Plotinus). 
 
31
 A word of clarification on the meaning of philosophy, or on the identity of the philosopher, in this 
context is in order. The difference between a scholar and a great thinker is well expressed by Leo Strauss 
(1995, 305–306), who, alluding to a distinction drawn by Kant in the opening lines of the Prolegomena 
(IV, 255), stresses the ability of the great thinker to change the familiar horizon of thought, whereas the 
scholar merely reflects on the change after this has already taken place (or as it takes place). A further 
distinction, one which I borrow from Hadot (2002, 1–6) and which by intersecting Strauss’ distinction 
between great thinker and scholar gives rise to a wide array of different characters, is that between the 
person who chooses and practices a way of life, and the one who also “renders explicit the theoretical 
presuppositions implicated in this way of life” (Hadot 2002, 76). As Hadot points out, the two poles of 
this distinction are also the two branches of philosophical activity as understood within the Socratic-
Platonic model. Therefore, neither (good) scholars, nor great thinkers, nor unreflective practitioners of a 
way of life are, just by being what they are, philosophers. According to this view, what makes a 
philosopher a philosopher is the fact that he or she embodies in the same person the activity of reflection 
(which is proper to the scholar and, to a heightened degree, the great thinker) and the practice of a way of 
life, which is at the same time the object that his or her reflection aims at making explicit in its theoretical 
presuppositions (again, in the words of the spurious Definitions 414b8–9 cited in the previous note: 
ἐπιμέλεια ψυχῆς μετὰ λόγου ὀρθοῦ). Hadot and Strauss are not the only ones who have emphasized the 
idea that at least before modernity philosophy was understood primarily as a way of life, or a life 
discipline. In recent decades this idea has found expression in the slogans “care of the self” by Michel 
Foucault (1988, especially Part II, pages 37–68, entitled “The Cultivation of the Self”), and “care of the 
soul,” perhaps most radically and pervasively, by Jan Patočka (2002; 1996, 82–84, 103–105). 
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At first, this minimal approach to Plato would not seem to sit too well with a 
fairly widespread view of philosophy mainly understood as the proper name of an 
academic discipline which is taught professionally by scholars in most universities and, 
less commonly, some high-schools. In this view of philosophy, concerns about logic and 
epistemology are generally considered central in properly assessing the work (and worth) 
of a philosopher. This, however, is only partially the case with Plato. In saying this, I am 
not claiming that Plato is uninterested or incompetent in matters of logic and 
epistemology, but that in the dialogues, much like in the works of other Greek thinkers, 
these matters are hardly ever dissociated from his concern for the cause of philosophy 
understood as a fundamental practice aimed at bettering human life as a whole in the 
pursuit of happiness (εὐδαιμονία).32 Thus, in reading Plato, the question is not primarily 
whether what he wrote is epistemologically valuable or logically acute, but whether it is 
capable of drawing the reader into the very activity of philosophizing in view of 
improving one’s living.33 In any event, if, as I am inclined to think, what Plato wrote is in 
                                                 
32
 It does not follow that different philosophers completely agreed about the particular nature of happiness, 
but simply that philosophy was understood, rather than only as a (relatively) logically consistent set of 
propositions and the rational study of nature, also (in fact, primarily) as a means to promote the best 
possible living for a human rational being, or as itself the activity coinciding with such best possible 
living (see note 30 above for references). In his commentary on the Symposium, Rosen writes: 
“Philosophy is a condition of the psyche and so a way of life, rather than solely a system of true 
propositions. The mode of writing peculiar to philosophy is the dramatic portrait of individual human 
types confronted by a disguised Socrates” (Rosen 1987, xlviii). And he adds about the dialogues: “As 
both a drama and an exercise in dialectic, each dialogue begins with the opinions of particular 
individuals. [...] Platonic dialogues show men of varying kinds acting out the consequences of their 
ignorance” (Rosen 1987, xlix). “By portraying the emergence of philosophy from opinion, the dialogue 
imitates the whole of human existence, which is to say that it imitates the whole simply. [...] The 
dialogue is the dramatic representation of the synoptic nature of dialectic” (Rosen 1987, 1; cf. Republic 
VII.537c7). See also Zuckert (2009, 6–7). 
 
33
 Perhaps the clearest example of this attitude in Plato is found in the Parmenides, in which we should 
certainly subject the complex arguments of the sages from Elea to careful scrutiny in matters of logic and 
epistemology, while at the same time not losing sight of the fact that these very arguments are valuable 
primarily as (very difficult) exercises geared toward attaining the truth (Parmenides 135c5–136c5; the 
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fact epistemologically valuable and logically acute, this is so not independently of its 
usefulness for personal improvement. 
The same reasoning can be applied to readings of Plato that emphasize a theory of 
historical development of the dialogues, mostly on the basis of stylometric analysis (see 
notes 9 and 10 above). Once again, I am not trying to undermine the relevance of the 
results achieved by stylometry and the genetic approach, but rather calling attention to the 
possibility that the results of these reading strategies add relatively little to the 
philosophical understanding both of each dialogue taken as a dramatic unity and of the 
dialogues as a whole.
34
 This is not to say that allegedly earlier and later dialogues (for our 
topic Lysis, Phaedrus, and Republic in particular) are of no consequence to the 
conclusions of the Symposium, but that if they add something to it, they do so while 
foreshadowing (in the case of likely earlier dialogues) and furthering (in the case of likely 
later dialogues) such conclusions. 
Thus, to claim that each dialogue ought to be taken as a dramatic unity does not 
immediately exclude reference at least to other dialogues in which the same topic comes 
                                                                                                                                                 
terms γυμνάζω and γυμνασία, variously inflected, appear some five times in this passage. Cf. also 
Theaetetus 153b6, 169c1, Alcibiades I 132b1, Timaeus 90b7, and Phaedo 81a1–2, the passage on 
philosophy as μελέτη θανάτου, preparation for death). 
 
34
 Rosen (1987, lxii) puts it sharply: “the significance of a given dialogue is entirely independent of its 
place in the development of Plato. Although scholars are widely agreed that the Symposium is a work of 
Plato’s middle period, no one has ever suggested that its merits are superseded by the results of the later 
period.” Whatever the case may be, there is not enough external evidence (or, for that matter, internal, as 
Owen remarked in regard to the Laws: Owen 1953, 79 note 4, 93 note 3) to settle the question about the 
order of the dialogues conclusively (cf. Thesleff 1989, 25–26; Irwin 1995, 2; Zuckert 2009, 3–5). Things 
become even less definite if we take the testimony of Dionysius of Halicarnassus as reliable: “Plato did 
not cease, when eighty years old, to comb and curl his dialogues and reshape them in every way [πάντα 
τρόπον ἀναπλέκων]” (On Literary Composition XXV.265.21–24). It follows that even the best 
stylometric evidence remains inconclusive, and virtually every chronological list of the dialogues is at 
best tentative (see Thesleff 1982, 71, 83–87; 1989, 7). 
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under consideration.
35
 Therefore, while every detail in the Symposium, in order to be 
understood correctly, has to be considered both in relation to all the other details and to 
the central question(s) of the dialogue as this unfolds dramatically, I take it that one is 
encouraged, rather than forbidden, to look for Plato’s assessment of the central issue of 
love in other dialogues.
36
 And while it is important to emphasize that the arguments and 
conclusions of a given dialogue should be assessed primarily with reference to the 
dramatic setting within which they are put forth,
37
 it is at least likewise important to be 
mindful that there are other settings (that is, other dialogues or portions of dialogues) in 
which the same subject matter is investigated. I found nothing in Plato explicitly or 
implicitly suggesting that a careful comparison of the same topic as it is presented in 
different dramatic settings should be categorically rejected as either deleterious or 
useless. On the contrary, it is common practice, both for ancient authors and for a 
substantial number of modern representatives, not only to approach Plato’s writings 
doctrinally, but also to take it as expressing, through the (at least prima facie) 
                                                 
35
 If such reference were to be excluded, one would likely end up attributing to Plato at least as many 
philosophies as there are authentic dialogues (see Kahn 1996, 37), or else simply giving up all hope of 
approximating Plato’s mind in any way through the dialogues as we presently have them (as Corlett 2005 
argues; cf. note 28 (2) above, and Appendix E.1 for my critique). 
 
36
 The classic treatment in this sense is Robin (1964). 
 
37
 In the Symposium this setting includes, among other things, a certain place (Agathon’s house), a dramatic 
date (416 B.C.), an occasion (the party thrown by Agathon to celebrate his first prize victory in the 
tragedy contest at the Lenaea: see Brisson 1998, 12–13; Hammond and Scullard 1970, s.v. “Agathon” 
and “Lenaea”; Nails 2002, 361), as well as certain people (both explicitly mentioned and unknown, as in 
the case of those who gave the speeches forgotten by Aristodemus: Symposium 180c2), and moreover 
these people taken at a particular time in their life (e.g., Alcibiades is no longer the promising youth 
whose soul can be won over to philosophy, but a grown man who, having failed to win over Socrates by 
physical beauty, as it appears from Symposium 219e5, has become enslaved to his own inability to effect 
the kind of self-improvement that he and Socrates promised to each other: Symposium 219a8–b2; cf. 
notes 269 and 271 below). 
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multifarious and unsystematic form of the dramatic dialogue, a fairly unitary and 
systematic thought (see note 15 above). As I already pointed out on page 9, Plotinus is no 
exception to this practice.
38
 
Therefore, if we are sufficiently justified in maintaining that the intention of the 
dialogues is to draw their readers to philosophy, we might provisionally conclude that 
Plotinus fulfills this intention to the extent that he reads them in view of personal 
improvement, or of living a happy life, which for him, much like for all ancient thinkers 
(see notes 27, 30, 31, and 32 above), remains the very end of the philosophical endeavor. 
It is precisely in this respect that his reading of Plato is not only fair, but fundamentally 
faithful to Plato’s spirit, purpose, or intention.39 
But can we go so far as to claim that the Plotinian interpretation of Plato is 
philologically and historically accurate (i.e., that it grasps not only Plato’s general 
intention for writing, but also what he is actually saying through his characters in the 
dialogues)? Very unlikely, or perhaps only occasionally (cf. Chapter Two note 11). 
Does this mean, then, that to study Plotinus is irrelevant for a philosophical 
understanding of Plato? Or, to broaden the question, must we read Plato independently of 
the history of his interpreters in order to understand him better? The answer to this 
question depends on whether one will allow problems and assumptions that were not 
                                                 
38
 In doing this, Plotinus carefully selects the passages or elements from Plato which are most instrumental 
to the construction of his own philosophical system (see Section 2.2). 
 
39
 I want to stress that the slogan “faithfulness to x’s spirit” does not imply an immediate grasp of the mens 
auctoris, which as such is possibly available only in presentia auctoris (as also Socrates implicitly 
observes in the famous passage on speech and writing at the end of the Phaedrus). Simmias’ remark 
about Plato’s dream quoted earlier (note 5) may be particularly true of Plato, but it does not except any 
author who is dead or otherwise absent. 
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Plato’s own to shed light on what Plato wrote.40 Simply because Plato did not raise a 
problem explicitly (and the level of explicitness of a given problem within the dialogues 
is itself highly debatable), it does not mean that he was unaware of it or, even if he was, 
that he meant for that problem to go unnoticed or to be left unexplored (or, if explored, to 
be explored without reference to the dialogues). Similarly, simply because Plato does not 
seem to provide explicit solutions to some of the puzzles he raises, it does not mean that 
these solutions are without doubt absent in the dialogues; it is in this context that Plato’s 
(alleged?) reluctance to write about the highest matters,
41
 as well as the relevance of the 
so-called unwritten doctrines (see note 17 above), cannot and should not be minimized. 
Finally, simply because Plato did not mean something (and establishing beyond doubt 
what he did in fact mean is beyond doubt a formidable task), it does not follow that he 
would have rejected later developments and solutions, Plotinian or otherwise, to some of 
the problems which he too either raised or developed from a tradition older than him (cf. 
note 56 below). An example might help to illuminate my point. 
L. P. Gerson claims that a distinction developed only later in the history of 
philosophy, the one between essence and existence,
42
 is already implicitly operative both 
in Plato and in Plotinus.
43
 D. L. Ross criticizes this claim as it is applied to Plotinus.
44
 
                                                 
40
 This condition applies particularly to Plato because of the peculiar nature of the dialogue form, in which 
the author’s position is considerably harder to uncover than in, say, a treatise or a set of lecture notes. It 
does not mean, however, that it applies exclusively to Plato and the dialogue form; other literary forms 
are not immune to this condition. 
 
41
 Letters II.314a1–c6, VII.341c4–5, 344c1–d2; cf. also Phaedrus 278d8–e2. 
 
42
 For a historical account of this distinction see Gilson (1952, 74–107), MacIntyre (1967). 
 
43
 The degree of implicitness is admittedly higher in Plato than it is in Plotinus. For an account of the 
distinction between essence and existence in Plato see Gerson (1990, 40–52); for an account of the same 
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The main point of Ross’ critique is that Gerson’s solution is “ahistorical,” by which he 
means that Plotinus is “force-fit” into an intellectual milieu that is not his.45 There is 
some truth to this, and my purpose here is not that of dismissing all of Ross’ particular 
criticisms of Gerson’s suggestion.46 What I would like to point out in this context are 
only the limitations of a purely historical approach to what is a distinctively 
philosophical issue. In other words, I wonder whether the genuinely historical 
understanding of a given philosophical problem, or of an idea, must positively exclude 
the thought that certain subsequent appropriations of that doctrine (i.e., what one might 
call its tradition), may be rooted in the doctrine itself, and as such are neither deleterious 
nor irrelevant to a proper understanding (even to a properly historical understanding) of 
it. I wonder, moreover, whether to see the relation of an idea to its historical 
developments may take more than an understanding of the historical milieu in which this 
idea happened to sprout, and more than a philological knowledge of the manuscript(s) in 
which this idea happened to be committed to writing. 
Thus, that the distinction between essence and existence was not fully worked out 
and explicitly formulated by Plotinus (and Plato, whose works were for the most part 
                                                                                                                                                 
distinction in Plotinus see Gerson (1990, 185–226, especially 201–212; 1994, 5–14). See pages 168–171 
below for further remarks on this issue. 
 
44
 See D. L. Ross (1996), the focus of whose critique is Gerson (1994).  
 
45
 D. L. Ross (1996, 197). A similar point could be made about Plato. 
 
46
 At times some of these criticisms do appear to be at least partial, however. For instance, when D. L. Ross 
(1996, 198–199) insists that the Plotinian argument for the existence of the One is “an application of the 
data of his aesthetics to the data of inner experience,” he is in part correct, but he also seems to forget 
those passages in the Enneads where the One is explicitly said to bestow existence (οὐσία, τὸ εἶναι, 
ὑπόστασις) on things (e.g., Plotinus VI.6 [34] 16.50, VI.7 [38] 42.11, VI.8 [39] 13.56–57, 21.32–33, VI.9 
[9] 2; cf. Chapter Three note 47 for further references), passages to which Gerson (1994, 5–14) duly 
refers in the context of his argument. 
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probably unavailable to those who explicitly developed this distinction) is beyond 
doubt, and to this extent Gerson is reading into Plotinus (and Plato) something that will 
be explicitly developed only later in the history of thought.
47
 However, if Plotinus’ (and 
Plato’s) own line of questioning invites a solution that was gradually and painstakingly 
clarified, however partially, only centuries later, and if this solution proves generally 
adequate to meet a good number of objections moved to Plotinus (and to Plato), is it not 
possible that (at least part of) the subsequent tradition understood, not necessarily the 
historical milieu of those texts (and even less their textual situation, if manuscripts were 
in fact unavailable), but rather their distinctively philosophical character,
48
 or the 
fundamentally philosophical questions and challenges that they raised?
49
 (These are the 
eternal questions and challenges that are at the very heart of Platonism—of philosophy 
proper, in fact—and whose solutions are often hard and perhaps impossible at times to 
extract merely from the empirical contingences of the historical milieu in which they 
emerged.
50
) If it is not impossible for the subsequent tradition to grasp the distinctively 
                                                 
47
 Gerson does so wittingly, by the way (cf. Gerson 1994, xvii, 9). 
 
48
 Part of the task of the historian of philosophy is to show if and how the subsequent appropriations of a 
given philosophical problem are sound interpretative developments of it or mere fantasy. This already 
implies that not all interpretations are the same; if they were, the very meaning of the text as bearer of an 
intention and, with it, all possibility of interpretation (and, for that matter, of misinterpretation) would 
disappear (cf. notes 24 and 23 above). Robinson (1953, 1–6) rightly points out five major kinds of 
misinterpretation in relation to the dialogues, but I think his overall interpretive approach is flawed by a 
misguided presupposition; see Appendix E.3. 
 
49
 By framing my views both interrogatively and conditionally, I highlight their tentative character. My 
concern is not with denying the tentative nature of my position, which I admit gladly, but rather with the 
tendency I sometimes perceive to separate a philosophical and a historico-philological reading as if the 
two had little in common and, more importantly, to dismiss genuinely philosophical readings as simply 
irrelevant when these do not seem to square with the results of philology and historiography. 
 
50
 We might recall that even someone generally reluctant to interpret Plato through Neoplatonic lenses such 
as F. M. Cornford resorts to a fragment of the lost part of Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus (III, 
357.10–358.3 = John Philoponus, On the Eternity of the World XI.11.364.11–365.3; cf. also I, 233.24–
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philosophical character of questions raised (much) earlier and to propose 
philosophically sound answers to them, is it then fair to call “ahistorical” a solution 
which, pace all invitations to historical and philological precision, may (painstakingly) 
guide us to the philosophical heart of the matter?
51
 I believe that Plato’s dialogues are 
invitations to philosophize first, and to do philology and historiography only for the sake 
of better understanding the philosophical issues that emerge in the text. It can even 
happen that an invitation to be philologically responsible sometimes may foster the 
tendency to be philosophically sterile,
52
 if only unintentionally and/or inadvertently; 
mere historical and philological accuracy at times may coincide with the loss of 
philosophical thoughtfulness.
53
 
                                                                                                                                                 
29, 419.28–420.2, and  II, 25.9–23) in order to make sense of the identity of the contents of the receptacle 
in Timaeus 50a–c (Cornford 1937, 183–184), and to Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 
(VI.1039–1043) for his interpretation of the hypotheses about the One in the notoriously difficult second 
part of that dialogue (Cornford 1939, 100 note 1). 
 
51
 This is not to say that the solution is necessarily correct, but that it does direct us to a key problem that is 
at least implicitly present in the text. Those who deny this categorically come close to the position of the 
ones who already think to know in advance what Plato had in mind, only that now they think to know in 
advance what Plato did not have in mind. 
 
52
 This, I am sure, is not Ross’ purpose for criticizing Gerson. 
 
53
 Although this is no argument in favor of the soundness of a Plotinian reading of Plato (cf. note 48 above), 
one may say that if Plotinus had yielded to the standards of philological precision, probably the Enneads 
would have never seen the light. (We could say the same of Plato, for instance his portrayal of Socrates’ 
less than philologically accurate reading of Simonides’ poem in Protagoras 338e–347b, although in his 
case the literary form of the dialogue perhaps already shelters him against the charge of philological and 
historiographical irresponsibility.) Instead, by listening to Plato’s provocation less as a philologist than as 
a philosopher, Plotinus did not only produce a true philosophical classic, but, I maintain, was both 
faithful to Plato’s spirit for doing philosophy (cf. note 39 above) and was able to further some of the 
issues that were only dormant in the dialogues. Again, one might object that the point here is not whether 
Plotinus’ Enneads are a philosophical masterpiece, but whether they are a fair (i.e., philologically 
accurate) representation of Plato’s mind. If to understand Plato’s mind means to understand neither more 
nor less than what Plato understood, then there is probably little doubt that Plotinus’ reading of Plato fails 
to provide a fair interpretation of some of the problems raised in the dialogues. But if to understand 
Plato’s mind means primarily to heed the invitation to become involved in the process of bettering our 
lives through the practice of philosophy, is it so obvious that the interpretive relation of the Enneads to 
the dialogues is off the mark? Would it be so odd to imagine Plato saying “What Plotinus says is not 
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If all this is plausible, there is nothing to prevent us from considering Plato, not 
as a self-contained thinker nor as the end point of Greek philosophical speculation, but as 
one of the most brilliant innovators of this tradition, whose pioneering observations not 
only could but begged to be interpreted and, hopefully, clarified. (Could we not read the 
dialogical form of Plato’s philosophy as pointing also to this intention and hope?) This 
process of interpretation and clarification started with those who studied under Plato, 
Aristotle in primis, and continued in the subsequent tradition. Thus, there is nothing to 
prevent us from considering Platonism (or philosophy?) as a movement in a synoptic 
way,
54
 that is, despite its more or less obvious internal differences, as the ongoing 
commitment to studying, clarifying, and practicing an ideal of life which found its best 
expression and primary inspiration in Plato’s writings.55 Needless to say, philosophically 
Plotinus is one of the major voices in the development of this commitment.
56
 
                                                                                                                                                 
what I said, but hearing what he says makes me ponder again what I said,” or to imagine Plotinus saying 
something similar of Avicenna and Aquinas? But I am aware that imagining voices will not (and should 
not) appease the hardcore philologist and historian, so I will leave it at that. 
 
54
 For an enlightening attempt at describing the nature of Platonism through an overview of some of the 
features shared by virtually all Platonists, see Gerson (2005b; see also 2005a, 44–86). For relatively 
different lists of such features see Merlan (1969, 1 note) and Reale (2004, IX, 275). 
 
55
 One can make a similar claim about Plato’s relation to Socrates. While it may seem that Socrates’ views 
presented in the dialogues do not always coincide with those of the historical Socrates (arguably more so 
in the so-called later dialogues than in allegedly earlier ones) and that Plato worked out for himself 
conclusions that Socrates might have never actually reached, a conspicuous element of continuity in the 
dialogues is Plato’s commitment to further the ideal of philosophical life that he and many of his 
generation and after him saw embodied in the person of Socrates. 
 
56
 I chose Gerson’s controversial suggestion of finding the distinction between essence and existence as 
already operative in Plato and Plotinus, first because this distinction spans across the history of Western 
philosophy beyond the Greco-Hellenistic milieu, and second because, if correct, it has the advantage of 
not being explicit in our two authors (hence its controversial character). I could have opted for a more 
focused and less controversial sample, one in which no later distinction is taken as implicit in an earlier 
text, but one which simply traces the conceptual development of a given set of distinctions on a given 
topic. One such account can be found in two studies by Denis O’Brien (1995; cf. also 1999a) on the 
notion of non-being (τὸ μὴ ὄν) in Parmenides, Plato’s Sophist, and Plotinus. See Appendix E.4. 
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This line of reasoning may be applied also to the question of whether we are 
supposed to find a system in the dialogues. In his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 
Hegel rejects the notion of an esoteric philosophy applied to Plato but thinks that if the 
notes that were taken from Plato’s oral teaching had been still available to us (as he 
believes they were to Aristotle), we would possess Plato’s philosophy in systematic 
form.
57
 Is this historically feasible, or is it mere fiction? Isn’t Hegel treating the dialogues 
as a mirror in which to stare at the reflection of his own system? Or, as Tigerstedt argues 
both gracefully and pungently, is it not the case that we do not find Hegel’s claim about 
Plato’s philosophy “ridiculous” only because “a great thinker is talking about his 
equal”?58 In short, is it true that there is no system whatsoever to be found in Plato? I 
would rather argue that there is, but in a qualified way. 
It is not so much that Plato, like every great philosopher, must have had a 
system,
59
 as that he must at least have aimed at having a system. The fact that the 
dialogues do not display an explicit system does not necessarily mean that Plato did not 
intend to build a system, or even that he might not have actually built one implicitly 
(although admittedly a very hard one, or perhaps even impossible, to decipher). 
But surely, it will be objected, what is the point of a system that either is available 
only as a desideratum or, perhaps worse, that is merely implicit and impossible to 
decipher? The question is legitimate, and yet I take that the (alleged) system I am arguing 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
57
 Hegel (1892–1896, II, 10–12). 
 
58
 Tigerstedt (1974, 69). 
 
59
 As also the great historians of philosophy Brucker, Tennemann, and Zeller claimed in the wake of Hegel 
(cf. Tigerstedt 1974, 59, 64–69; 1977, 16–17, 66–67). 
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for is not futile; for what I think Tigerstedt and others overlook by insisting only on the 
failures of the many who attempted to construct a system out of the dialogues, is the 
fundamental importance of being systematic for philosophy, even for philosophy 
understood as a dialogical unfolding.
60
 The very dialogical procedure, I maintain, aims at 
uncovering a system. Posing questions is for the sake of finding answers; and finding 
answers is for the sake of building an all-encompassing network of interconnected 
answers, to wit, a system. (Is a question that does not aim at an answer truly a 
question?)
61
 To renounce trying to construct a (yet un-constructed) system, even if one 
                                                 
60
 I take Tigerstedt to express a moderate position on the issue; for this reason I spoke of “overlooking” 
rather than plain denial. For an openly non-systematic (and non-doctrinal) interpretation, see Gonzalez 
(1998, 1–16, and especially 6–10, where his position is stated clearly). I briefly assess Gonzalez’s 
position in Appendix E.5. 
 
61
 Is the term “system” taken to mean the representation of a totality of mutually dependent elements, 
oblivious of the possibility that this totality might depend, in turn, on an element which, free of all 
dependence, is not a part or an element of the totality but is that because of which and/or for the sake of 
which all elements of the totality hold together in a system? If it is, this is not what I understand by 
“system.” That is, if a system, in order to be a system, ought to disavow the possibility of this 
“transcendent” element, then this is not what I have in mind when I use the term. What I am thinking of 
is rather the idea that the dialectic of question and answer staged by Plato in the dialogues aims at 
constructing a system understood as a totality of interdependent elements, or a totality of 
interdependently answered questions. However, this totality is not in principle closed off to the 
possibility of an element that does not depend on the totality; in fact, the totality, precisely qua system, 
and its elements, precisely qua elements of a system, might be envisioned as pointing to this 
“transcendent” element, which from the point of view of the totality is grasped as the very condition of 
possibility of the totality in all its parts. (Similarly, when I ask whether a question that does not aim at an 
answer is truly a question, the term “question” means more than the mere statement or elucidation of a 
theme. It may very well be that the fundamental question behind all questions is one that does not aim at 
an answer understood thematically, but rather a more fundamental appeal to the one who is questioned, 
an address in which the addresser presents himself or herself as the most important element in the 
dialectic of question and answer: the unquestionable behind the question asked, the unthematizable 
behind the theme presented for discussion.) Plotinus’ One, the God of natural theology in Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam, Descartes’ idea of the infinite, Kant’s unconditioned, Levinas’ understanding of 
the Other, and perhaps Plato’s Good and even the notion of ἀρχή in Presocratic speculation (cf. Gerson 
1990, 5–14, 15): despite their important differences, I take all these as instances of the same fundamental 
insight, that that because of which and/or for the sake of which the totality exists can be reduced neither 
to one or more of its elements nor to the totality itself (nor for that matter, to mere representation). Am I 
then fiddling with the term “system” and using it pointlessly to mean something that is foreign to its 
concept? This is an objection similar to the one leveled against Gaiser (1968, 9, 336 note 1; 1980, 49), 
Krämer (1968, 140; 1994, 7), and others by Tigerstedt (1977, 89–90) and Gonzalez (1998, 9; cf. 
Appendix E note 12). Or am I just squabbling over words? I would rather hope that I am trying to make 
  
26 
will never succeed in actually constructing it, is to renounce a central aspect of 
philosophy (although to attempt such a construction obviously is no guarantee of 
success), for as Plato has Socrates argue at Republic V.474c–476e, philosophy is love for 
the whole of wisdom, not only for some of its parts, and the dialectician—the 
philosopher—is the one who possesses the view of the whole.62 But if this is the case, 
that is, if Plato did, qua great philosopher, at least intend to build a system, why can’t the 
history of the interpretation of the dialogues be understood also as an attempt at fulfilling 
the intention of their author? Why does the aut-aut of a systematic versus an 
unsystematic Plato have to be the only available alternative?
63
 Why should we be unable 
to say that Plato, precisely qua philosopher, aimed at constructing a system, and this even 
while conscious, perhaps, that he might not have lived to see the end of his work?
64
 
If this line of reasoning is at least not entirely implausible, then the more 
                                                                                                                                                 
myself clear. 
 
62
 Republic VII.537c7: ὁ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός. 
 
63
 A radically anti-systematic position is defended by Gonzalez (1998), on which I express my reservations 
in Appendix E.5. 
 
64
 Clearly, this would be illegitimate if by a system we understood a purely abstract construction, thus 
dissociating it from the kind of lifestyle that is necessarily connected with or implicated by it. For the 
Socrates of the Republic, the grasp of the Idea of the Good is not a matter of abstract knowledge, but the 
endpoint of a process of education which is at the same time a lifestyle, an ethos; thus, readings of the 
Republic which emphasize the purely cognitive aspect involved in grasping the Good miss the all-
important condition that makes this grasp possible, if not necessary (for an enlightening sample of a 
critique of one such reading, that by Heidegger, see Peperzak 1997, 57–111). Beierwaltes (2005, xi) 
makes a very similar point about the most explicitly systematic of the Neoplatonists, Proclus: “Sarebbe 
un fraintendimento esiziale del filosofare procliano se gli elementi [...] della sua comprensiva teoria 
dell’Uno venissero racchiusi e irrigiditi in un sistema costruito astrattamente. Bisogna piuttosto 
riconoscere che nel pensiero di Proclo pensiero e vita sono intensamente legati l’uno all’altra, che alla 
speculazione metafisica di ampia portata corrisponde o necessariamente consegue una forma di vita che 
anche al presente—sia pure in modo nuovo e a partire da prospettive mutate—esige un concentrarsi 
dell’uomo sulla propria interiorità e sul fondamento e l’originale di essa, senza per questo abbandonare il 
mondo e senza ritirarsi dai compiti che gli vengano richiesti.” 
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important question is not whether Aristotle, Plotinus, Philo, Augustine, or Ficino (to 
mention but a few) understood Plato, but whether Plato can be understood at all 
independently of the tradition which he, volens nolens, contributed to shape. That is, the 
question is whether the history of Platonism—the history of philosophy—could itself be 
understood synoptically as an ongoing conversation which had its (relative) beginning in 
Plato.
65
 To answer this question with a dogmatic “no” may reveal that one has already 
misunderstood or rejected the dialogical nature of Plato’s philosophy. 
One might want to stress that even if Plato himself firmly believed that the 
dialogue form should be espoused as the ad hoc form of philosophical discourse (and 
even to take this as given is not a matter of recording an open statement made by Plato 
but an interpretation of Plato’s fairly obvious fondness of Socrates’ method of question 
and answer), such an exchange is the living conversation of real persons, and not the 
Platonic written dialogues. In fact, we may say of the dialogues, precisely qua written 
dialogues, what Plato has Socrates say of all written words: “you would think that they 
were speaking as if they themselves understood something, but if you question something 
of what they said because you wish to learn, it always signifies only one and the same 
thing.”66 
An esoteric reading of the dialogues (see notes 17 and 18 above) takes the 
                                                 
65
 In this context, A. N. Whitehead’s often quoted remark—that “the safest general characterization of the 
European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato” (Whitehead 1978, 
39)—can perhaps be rephrased to state that the individual philosophers sharing in this tradition are 
participants in a conversation which, if not started by Plato, certainly gained in speculative depth and 
liveliness thanks to the great Athenian. 
 
66
 Phaedrus 275d7–9: [7] δόξαις μὲν ἂν ὥς τι φρονοῦντας [8] αὐτοὺς λέγειν, ἐὰν δέ τι ἔρῃ τῶν λεγομένων 
βουλόμενος [9] μαθεῖν, ἕν τι σημαίνει μόνον ταὐτὸν ἀεί. Cf. Protagoras 329a2–4. 
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contrast between oral and written discourse quite literally. In this way, the “esoterists” 
or “esotericists” can argue that since the Platonic dialogues too are written word, if they 
are to be interpreted correctly, they need to be supplemented by external material, most 
notably an oral teaching that can be reconstructed on the basis of indirect (as well as 
direct, according to Szlezák and others) testimonies.
67
 Tigerstedt disagrees with this, 
arguing that the opposition between written and oral word is not to be taken literally 
(since “to Plato, as to any contemporary Greek, ‘reading’ meant listening, whether to 
one’s own voice or to that of somebody else”),68 but between a logos (whether written or 
spoken) which is mute, unintelligent, and unable to defend itself, and one which is true, 
“‘living and animate’, planted by a ‘dialectician’ in the soul of the learner,” and which 
requires the collaboration of the learner to be brought to fruition.
69
 
I am not unsympathetic toward Tigerstedt’s views on this point.70 But if his 
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 See for instance Szlezák (1992, 423–471; 1993). 
 
68
 If Tigerstedt is correct to argue that “reading” meant “listening” to ancient Greek ears, it must follow that 
the question of a literal versus a non-literal sense of these terms holds only for modern readers, although 
then one may wonder what expressions would have been used by Plato to describe the literal (in the 
modern sense) opposition between spoken and written word. Would it be possible to take the contrast as 
being open to both a literal and a non-literal interpretation? What I argue in note 70 below points to a 
positive answer to this question. 
 
69
 Tigerstedt (1977, 70); see also Tigerstedt (1969, 6–13). A longer passage from Tigerstedt (1969, 10–11) 
is worth quoting verbatim for the clarity with which the author expresses this point: “You cannot learn 
Platonic Philosophy by reading a book — even a book written by Plato — or by listening to a lecture — 
even a lecture given by Plato — but only, quite literally, by philosophizing with Plato, i.e., by 
participating actively in the διάλογος and, under the guidance of the λόγος and the inspiration of the 
ἔρως, finding in your own soul the truth you seek. This is what must have happened in the Academy. For 
it is the essence of Socratic-Platonic philosophy that it is ‘philosophizing together’, συμφιλοσοφεῖν [cf. 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IX.1172a5] — to use a term which Plato never used but which expresses 
what he intends.” 
 
70
 I should qualify my “sympathy” a little (and at the same time offer my answer to the question raised in 
note 68 above). Fundamentally, I agree with the idea that in order to start to understand the dialogues, the 
reader must become personally involved in them and must take on an active role in the conversation. I 
also agree with the view that the contrast between the two kinds of discourse (written and spoken, or 
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interpretation is correct, then “dialogue” does not necessarily mean the narrow Platonic 
dialogue form.
71
 (That the actual Platonic dialogues may still be—and de facto often 
were—conducive to such logos is pedagogically relevant but only incidental to my 
point.) Other forms of discourse, and rather diverse forms at that,
72
 can also be (and still 
                                                                                                                                                 
rather, written and the “living, breathing discourse of the one who knows” (Phaedrus 276a8: Τὸν τοῦ 
εἰδότος λόγον [...] ζῶντα καὶ ἔμψυχον) may not have to be taken literally (or in the modern sense). 
However, I am not sure that Tigerstedt’s non-literal rendering of this contrast should be taken strictly. He 
writes about Socrates’ (alleged) opposition of speaking and writing at the end of the Phaedrus: “It should 
be obvious that Plato here opposes passive reception to active collaboration, not the written word as such 
to the spoken one—in the modern sense” (Tigerstedt 1977, 70). Tigerstedt (1969, 10; 1977, 69–70) is 
quite adamant on this point and cites Polybius (Histories XII.27.1–4) as his main evidence that to ancient 
Greek ears reading meant listening (Tigerstedt 1977, 135 note 57). I reread Phaedrus 259b–279c 
(especially starting from 276b6) with Tigerstedt’s warning in mind, but I must admit that I still find it 
very hard to see what he says as “obvious.” This may very well be because I share in the modern bias 
about the meaning of “reading,” but it is not altogether clear to me from the text that things must be taken 
as strictly as Tigerstedt argues. Starting at Phaedrus 274b6, Socrates’ purpose for bringing up the story 
of the origin of writing (γραφή) is to determine when it is appropriate to employ writing. As it turns out, 
at the end of the story, writing is found to be a remedy not for memory but for reminding (275a5: οὔκουν 
μνήμης ἀλλὰ ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον), a remedy which most likely will lead to a fundamental 
forgetfulness (275a3: λήθην), since one who has learned to write will rely on it instead of committing to 
one’s soul what truly matters and be able to remember it without the help of external signs. But if 
forgetfulness is the outcome, instead of relying on writing one should foster another type of discourse 
(276a1: ἄλλον [...] λόγον), that is, the “living, breathing discourse of the one who knows” (276a8). Now, 
is it “obvious” that at this point “writing” stands for “passive reception” and “speaking” (or again, the 
living discourse of the one who knows) for “active collaboration”? Or is this not simply the stepping 
stone to the conclusion that “the one who has knowledge of things just, beautiful, and good” (276c3–4: 
Τὸν δὲ δικαίων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμας ἔχοντα), that is, the dialectician (276e5–6), will 
commit these to writing only as an amusement (276d2: παιδιᾶς χάριν), while earnestly looking for the 
appropriate soul (276e6: ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν) in which to sow them? It may be that written discourse 
and the discourse of the one who knows here may not have to be taken literally (in the modern sense); 
but is it really obvious that writing taken literally should be discounted as a possible interpretation? 
Could it not be that the spoken word here does not stand for “active collaboration” but for the 
dialectician’s instruction of a soul which is actively collaborative or shows potential for active 
collaboration (i.e., the “appropriate soul” of 276e6)? And could it not be that writing stands not for 
“passive reception” but for the refusal of the dialectician to commit “things of greater value” (τιμιώτερα: 
278d8) to something or someone that will be unable to assist them (275d4–e5; the verb for “assisting,” 
βοηθεῖν, is used repeatedly in this portion of the Phaedrus: see 275e4–5, 276c9, 277a1, 278c5, and 
compare it with 272c2–6, where Phaedrus declares Lysias’ inability to assist him in providing a shortcut 
to the art of rhetoric), that is, both to actual writing and to writing as a metaphor for a soul that is not 
“appropriate”? If sound, an interpretation of this kind will allow us both to heed Tigerstedt’s observation 
that to a Greek reading meant listening and not to sweepingly disavow the massive exegesis dedicated to 
this passage, an exegesis which is largely based on a literal (modern) understanding of speaking and 
writing. 
 
71
 As Tigerstedt (1977, 97–98) seems to imply. 
 
72
 Examples from the history of philosophy are not hard to find. I will limit my list to some well-known 
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are) considered fully philosophical insofar as they draw the “reader” into the lively 
activity of learning. What truly matters is that the “listener” becomes actively engaged in 
philosophy, the pursuit of wisdom.
73
 
If this interpretation is correct, then there is little doubt in my mind that Plotinus’ 
encounter with Plato’s dialogues was productive of a “living and animate” logos: the 
Enneads, both in their actual written form and in their oral anticipations and/or rehearsals 
before an audience of eager learners (cf. VP 13; 4.10–11). 
*            *            * 
I will briefly introduce some specific features of Plotinus’ approach to Plato later 
in Section 2.2, but for the time being I thought it was important to anticipate these general 
observations in order to clarify from the start that, while it is virtually impossible to deny 
that Plotinus’ reading of Plato often goes beyond what the latter actually said or likely 
meant, it is nonetheless a philosophically plausible approach insofar as his concerns are 
philosophical, and to this extent it is profoundly Platonic in spirit (cf. note 39 above).
74
 
                                                                                                                                                 
samples: Aristotle’s terse lecture notes, Plotinus’ turgid re-elaborations of actual conversations, 
Nāgārjuna’s relentless fourfold negations, Augustine’s rhetorically elaborate treatises, Proclus’ and 
Spinoza’s geometrical systems, Aquinas’ at once sober and monumental summae, Descartes’ condensed 
and crisp meditations, Kant’s transcendental inquiries, Hegel’s majestic deductions, Nietzsche’s piercing 
aphorisms, the quasi-oracular utterances of the second Heidegger, etc. 
 
73
 The necessity of personal involvement, coupled with the open list of names and styles mentioned in the 
previous note, may give the impression that ultimately what matters in reading Plato is simply to 
“philosophize,” independently of what kind of “philosophy” one espouses: in other words, a kind of 
subjectivism that has personal involvement and self-expression as its sole standard, regardless of what 
one is involved in and of what type of self one expresses. I cannot bring myself to agree with this view. 
Instead, what I take to be genuine Platonic doctrine in this regard are: first, a (naïve?) trust in the power 
of reason, ever vigilant against the danger of misology (see Phaedo 89d1; cf. Kant, Critique of Pure 
Reason A855/B883, and Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals IV, 395); and second, the conviction 
that what every individual philosopher, even Socrates (and even Plato), says ought to be confronted with 
the truth (see Phaedo 91a1–b1; Symposium 201c6–9, and cf. 198d3, 199a7, 199b3; Phaedrus 275b5–c1). 
Dialogue, I like to think, is the name and locus of this confrontation. 
 
74
 To dismiss Plotinus’ interpretation of Plato on the basis of his more or less established philological 
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As I mentioned in Section 1.1, what follows in this chapter is not part of the 
systematic reconstruction of the Plotinian “erotics” which is the chief goal of this study; it 
is rather an attempt at highlighting some of the main features of this reconstruction which 
will become central in the next three chapters (e.g., Beauty as the end point of eros’ 
ascent, the division of reality in levels, the Good, etc.). Since highlighting is already 
interpreting, I would be naïve to think that later interpretations of Plato left my judgment 
uninfluenced as I read the dialogues (in the present context, particularly sections of the 
Symposium, the Republic, and the Phaedrus). Whether this influence was for the better 
(i.e., for a better understanding of Plato) is for the one who knows Plato to determine. 
1.3 Plato’s Choice of the Term ἔρως in the Symposium, and Eros, the God of Love 
Before I turn to our main text, I will briefly consider Plato’s terminology of love 
and desire, particularly in the Symposium (Subsection 1.3.1), and give a sketch of the 
background that the speakers in the dialogue were likely to have in common as they were 
praising Eros, the god of love (Subsection 1.3.2). 
1.3.1 Terminological Remarks: Plato’s Choice of the Term ἔρως 
Some of the most common Greek words for desire are: ἐπιθυμία (and its cognate 
θυμός), ἔφεσις, ὄρεξις, ὁρμή, πόθος, ἵμερος, βούλησις (and its cognate βουλή), δίωξις. 
Plato employs all these words (or at least their verbal and adjectival cognates, as in the 
case of ὄρεξις), but the crucial term at issue in the Symposium is ἔρως, generally 
                                                                                                                                                 
inadequacy would amount to a misreading of both his work and partly, I maintain, of Plato’s intentions 
for writing the dialogues. When this dismissal is granted, an artificial aut-aut, so typical of superficial 
judgments of Plato’s relation to Plotinus and to Platonism in general, is wrongfully established, namely: 
either Plotinus read the dialogues accurately (where by “accurately” one generally means historical and 
philological accuracy) or he did not; there is no other choice. This rigid alternative is displaced, I 
contend, precisely because it fails to consider the possibility of a kind of accuracy that is simply other 
than strictly historical and philological. 
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translated with “love” and customarily capitalized75 when referring to Eros, the god of 
love.
76
 
When Agathon and his guests agree to give speeches in praise of Eros, Plato had 
other words at his disposal to denote love, most notably φιλία, the term of choice of the 
Lysis.
77
 Why did he choose ἔρως, other than for the fact that this was the proper name of 
the god of love?
78
 A later form of the poetic ἔρος,79 the term ἔρως typically denotes 
sexual passion,
80
 but also, more generally, the love or desire for someone
81
 or 
                                                 
75
 With regard to Plato’s text, the issue of capitalization concerns, of course, not its oldest extant papyri, 
which are written in uncial and survive only in fragments, but its minuscule manuscripts posterior to 895 
A.D., the year in which John the Calligrapher completed the oldest surviving copy of the Platonic corpus, 
containing only the first six tetralogies. See Irwin (2008, 71–74). 
 
76
 Following is a merely quantitative, alphabetically arranged list of the terms just mentioned as they occur 
in Plato (cf. Radice and Bombacigno 2003), with the addition of φιλία, ἀφροδίσιος, and ἀγάπη, which I 
will briefly consider below (numbers in parentheses refer respectively to the occurrences of the term in 
question and to those of its immediate verbal, adjectival, and substantive cognates): ἀγάπη (0, 88); 
ἀφροδίσιος (29, 1); βούλησις (34, 1113) and βουλή (32); δίωξις (2, 86); ἐπιθυμία (226, 232); ἔρως (149), 
Ἔρως (127), and their adjectival and verbal cognates, ἐρωτικός (49) and ἐράω (194); ἔφεσις (2, 30); 
θέλησις (0, 533); θυμός (79, 52) and its cognate προθυμία (29, 135); ἵμερος (12, 3); ὄρεξις (0, 14); ὁρμή 
(19, 77); πόθος (17, 18); φιλία (99, 855). Composite nouns (e.g., φιλοσοφία) are not included in this 
calculation. Notice that not all occurrences of the cognates of the terms listed here have strictly 
desiderative meaning (e.g., Crito 52a2 in the case of ἐφίημι; Phaedo 117b2 in the case of ὀρέγω). The 
term στοργή (love or affection, typically of parents and children, though rarely it may indicate sexual 
love: cf. LSJ, s.v.) never appears in Plato (although the verb στέργω does some 15 times) or in Plotinus; 
it occurs four times in Aristotle (De Anima I.404b15 and Metaphysics III.1000b6), but always in what 
appear to be verbatim quotations from Empedocles (DK 31.B109); cf. the analogous cases of θέλησις and 
ὄρεξις indicated above. See Chapter Two note 42 for a parallel list of these terms in Plotinus. 
 
77
 Terminological clarifications follow closely entries from LSJ; on Plato in particular see Ast (1908); on 
the Symposium see Dover (1980, 1–3), Kahn (1996, 262–264), Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan (2004, 44–
46). 
 
78
 E.g., Anacreon 357.1, 358.2 (in D. A. Campbell 1982–1993, II, 54, 56); Theognis 1275, 1277 (in Gerber 
1999a, 368); Sophocles, Antigone 791; Euripides, Hippolytus 525, 538. 
 
79
 E.g., Homer, Iliad XIV.315, Odyssey XVIII.212; Hesiod, Theogony 120, 910; Sappho 44A.11, 47,159 (= 
D. A. Campbell 1982–1993, I, 90, 92, 166), Alcaeus 296.2 (in D. A. Campbell 1982–1993, I, 334); 
Ibycus 286.6, 287.1 (in D. A. Campbell 1982–1993, III, 254, 256); Sophocles, Electra 198; Euripides, 
Medea 151. Cf. Chapter Two note 117. 
 
80
 E.g., Aeschylus, Coephorae 600; Sophocles, Antigone 792; Euripides, Hippolytus 32. 
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something.
82
 As the god of love, Eros is often depicted as deceptive, tyrannical, and 
causing humans to lose their wits,
83
 although in the Symposium he does not possess any 
of these features and is described, by and large, in positive terms.
84
 
In contrast with ἔρως, φιλία generally means friendship. It differs from ἔρως in 
the same way as amicitia differs from amor in Latin.
85
 Primarily, it suggests affectionate 
regard and fondness rather than sexual passion,
86
 although rarely it can be used, like 
ἔρως, to denote sexual love.87 As such, the term covers a wide range of relations in which 
affectionate regard is found among different parties:
88
 gods and humans,
89
 states,
90
 family 
members,
91
 superiors and dependents,
92
 and more generally among equals.
93
 At times 
                                                                                                                                                 
81
 E.g., Sophocles, Trachiniae 433; Aristotle, History of Animals IX.631a10. 
 
82
 E.g., Aeschylus, Agamemnon 540; Euripides, Ion 67; Plato, Laws VI.782e3; Herodotus, Historiae V.32; 
Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War VI.24. 
 
83
 E.g., Hesiod, Theogony 121–122, 910; Sophocles, Antigone 796–797; Apollonius Rhodius, Argonautica 
III.275, 297, IV.445–451. 
 
84
 However, Plato is well aware of the more disturbing side of ἔρως, as in Republic IX.573b–c (see 
Subsection 1.5.3 below, especially notes 232 and 233). The positive account of Eros is also supported in 
the tradition prior to Plato, particularly in the Presocratics, for instance Parmenides (DK 28.B13), 
explicitly mentioned in the speeches of Phaedrus and Agathon (Symposium 178b11), and Empedocles 
(DK 31.B17 = Plutarch, Amatorius 13: Moralia IX.756d; B27 = Plutarch, De facie in orbe lunae 12: 
Moralia XII.926d–927a). 
 
85
 LSJ, s.v. 
 
86
 E.g., Xenophon, Symposium 8.15; Plato, Symposium 179c1, Phaedrus 237c8, 255e2. 
 
87
 E.g., Proverbs 5:19 (Septuaginta); Xenophon, Symposium 9.6. I have been unable to find a single 
occurrence in Plato in which φιλία is used to indicate strictly sexual passion, although in the Lysis, as 
Kahn rightly observes, “the conversation on friendship is set within a narrative frame that depicts erotic 
infatuation” (Kahn 1996, 259). 
 
88
 Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics VIII–IX can be considered a summula of this. 
 
89
 E.g., Plato, Symposium 188d1. 
 
90
 E.g., Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War V.5, VI.34.78. 
 
91
 E.g., Xenophon, Hiero 3.7; Aristotle, Poetics 1453b19, 31. 
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φιλία is used to indicate mere kindliness, or amiability, without any particular affection 
attached to it,
94
 as well as the liking of particular things.
95
 Unlike ἔρως, φιλία does not 
name any divine or godlike being, although it does identify (rather metaphorically, it 
would seem) the power which in nature harmonizes contrasting elements.
96
 
As we can see, while ἔρως contains an overt and primary reference to sexual love, 
this is not the case for φιλία. And yet, sexual passion is not all that ἔρως denotes. If 
Plato’s purpose was strictly to talk about the nature of love in its sexual component, the 
semantic scope of ἔρως could have been restricted by easy recourse to an unambiguous 
term for sexual pleasure, τἀφροδίσια,97 which moreover had the advantage of containing 
an immediate reference to the goddess Aphrodite.
98
 Conversely, one wonders whether 
Plato might have operated an unambiguous “restriction” in the opposite direction, namely 
through the excision of all that is merely appetitive in the phenomenon of love by 
recourse to the term ἀγάπη. This word is not found in the dialogues, but Plato does use its 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
92
 E.g., Xenophon, Anabasis I.6.3; Isocrates, The Team of Horses 28.352b. 
 
93
 E.g., Theognis 306 (in Gerber 1999a, 216); Xenophon, Memorabilia II.6.29. 
 
94
 E.g., Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.1108a28, IV.1126b11–1127a12. 
 
95
 E.g., Plato, Republic IX.581a3; Aristotle, On the Heavens III.306a12. In this acceptation, φιλία comes 
close to one of the meanings of ἔρως (see notes 81 and 82 above) as well as to the main sense of 
ἐπιθυμία. The three terms are brought together by Plato in Lysis 221e4. 
 
96
 E.g., Empedocles (DK 31.A37 = Aristotle, Metaphysics I.985a21–b3; A42 = Aristotle, On the Heavens 
III.301a14–20, De generatione et corruptione II.334a5–7; B35 [= several sources]; B53 = Aristotle, De 
generatione et corruptione II.334a1–8, Physics II.196a19–23); the terms in question here are two, though 
clearly related: φιλία and φιλότης). 
 
97
 Pindar, Nemean Odes 7.79; Semonides 7.48, 52 (in Gerber 1999b, 308); Plato, Philebus 65c6, Greater 
Hippias 298e1, Republic I.329a6 ff., Laws I.650a2. 
 
98
 See Dover (1980, 2). 
 
  
35 
verbal and adjectival cognates, ἀγαπάω99 and ἀγαπητός.100 However, in ancient usage 
the meaning of this cluster of terms almost coincides with that of φιλία and its 
cognates;
101
 so why not simply choose φιλία?102 
The reason, I believe, is that in all probability this term too, like τἀφροδίσια and 
ἐπιθυμία but in a different direction, would have unduly restricted the scope of Plato’s 
project. In other words, φιλία lacks the immediate reference not only to a divine or 
godlike being, but also to what in Plato is the first step of the so-called ladder of ascent, 
namely a beautiful body.
103
 Here too, as in the case of τἀφροδίσια and ἐπιθυμία, ἔρως 
seems to be the more inclusive of the terms that Plato had at his disposal.
104
 As such, he 
employed it as the most apt to express the affective continuum that permeates all the 
phenomena denoted by the other terms.
105
 
A further possibility for Plato was to focus the discussion on another of the 
desiderative terms listed earlier, particularly ἐπιθυμία and βούλησις, which with their 
cognates are by far the ones occurring most frequently in the dialogues (see note 76). As I 
                                                 
99
 E.g., Symposium 181c6, 210d2, Phaedrus 233e3, Alcibiades I 104e7, Lysis 215a1, Republic V.472c3. 
 
100
 E.g., Cratylus 430a1, Philebus 61e8, Timaeus 67a6. 
 
101
 For instance, the meaning of ἀγαπάω in Xenophon’s Memorabilia II.7.9 hardly differs from that of 
φιλέω. And in the references given in notes 99 and 100 above, none of the occurrences of ἀγαπάω and 
ἀγαπητός comes close to the meaning of Christian ἀγάπη. In passing, this does not necessarily mean that 
there is no connection whatsoever between Platonic and Christian love; it rather points to the fact that if 
such connection exists, it may have to be discovered elsewhere than in mere terminology. 
 
102
 For the use of the term ἀγάπη in Plotinus see pages 200–201 below. 
 
103
 Symposium 210a5–b6. See page 49 below. 
 
104
 Diotima makes clear that this is the case as she compares the ranges of the terms ἔρως and πόιησις, both 
of which are very wide but have been conventionally restricted to indicate a pars pro toto (Symposium 
205a5–d9). 
 
105
 See Cobb (1993, 12–13) for a similar view. 
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shall argue more extensively later (Subsection 1.5.3), while ἔρως in the Symposium 
includes ἐπιθυμία and βούλησις, it cannot be reduced to either of them. Stated differently, 
ἐπιθυμία and βούλησις are important aspects or moments of ἔρως, but not the whole of 
it.
106
 
In short, I think I can safely endorse Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan’s conclusion 
about Plato’s favoring of the term ἔρως, in the Symposium, over other available terms: 
for Plato’s purposes the choice of Erôs for praise has the advantages that 
the word (1) can designate the god or the superhuman force of love itself, 
(2) may signify the concrete experience of being in love with or falling in 
love with a particular individual while bearing a range of other cognate 
meanings, and (3) is distinguished from the common words for sex 
derived from the goddess, Aphrodite.
107
 
 
1.3.2 Eros, the God of Love
108
 
I already mentioned (page 32) that in its capitalized form, the term Ἔρως refers to 
the Greek god of love (the Romans’ Amor or Cupido). What most deserves attention for 
our purpose is the variety of accounts of Eros’ genealogy and especially his relation to 
Aphrodite, a variety which Daremberg and Saglio rightly indicate as a clear sign of the 
“travail de réflexion”109 surrounding this mythological character. 
Absent as a divinity in Homer (but see note 79 above), Eros is found for the first 
time in Hesiod, who, as Phaedrus confirms in the Symposium, counts him with Earth and 
                                                 
106
 This goes against Bury (1969, xxxvi–xxxvii), who conflates ἔρως and ἐπιθυμία, and partially also 
against Friedländer (1958, 50–51), in whom the conflation occurs between ἔρως and φιλία. 
 
107
 Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan (2004, 45–46). 
 
108
 My main sources for this subsection are: Daremberg and Saglio (1873–1919, I, 1595–1611); Pauly and 
Wissowa (1894–1980, VI.1, 484–544); Hammond and Scullard (1970, 407). 
 
109
 Daremberg and Saglio (1873–1919, I, 1595). 
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Tartarus as one of the primordial elements that came into being after Chaos.
110
 
According to the Orphics, Eros is the son of Cronus; for Sappho his parents are Uranus 
and Gaea, while for Simonides they are Aphrodite and Ares.
111
 Later, in the second 
century A.D., Pausanias reminds his readers of this plethora of contrasting accounts, but 
he abstains from telling us anything about a possible way of harmonizing them.
112
 
It is obviously beyond the scope of this work to try to trace a more or less 
coherent line of development between these contrasting bits of information, but it is 
important at least to notice that such discrepancy about Eros’ figure is well reflected (and 
reflected upon) in the Symposium. Besides the contrast between Phaedrus’ and Agathon’s 
accounts concerning the antiquity of Eros (see note 110), one may draw attention to 
Socrates-Diotima’s myth of Eros’ birth, in which the god is given an altogether new set 
of parents, Poros and Penia, and, stripped of his divine status, is made into a daimon.
113
 
Pausanias’ speech presents the idea of two Erotes, one common (or vulgar) and one 
heavenly, an idea that Eryximachus borrows and refashions for his own purposes,
114
 
                                                 
110
 Hesiod, Theogony 116–117, 119–120 (= Plato, Symposium 178b5–7). See also Aristophanes, Birds 693–
702. Hesiod’s account is followed in the sixth century B.C. by the lyric poet Ibycus (324, in D. A. 
Campbell 1982–1993, III, 278) and by the mythographer Acusilaus, also mentioned explicitly in the 
Symposium by Phaedrus as part of his praise of Eros for his antiquity (Symposium 178b8–9 = DK 9.B2). 
Agathon, on the other hand, denies that Eros is most ancient among the gods, but confirms Hesiod’s 
account insofar as Eros’ beauty is concerned (Symposium 195a–196b). 
 
111
 Simonides 575 (in D. A. Campbell 1982–1993, III, 458). 
 
112
 Pausanias, Description of Greece IX.27.2. According to Pausanias, Sappho’s own utterances about Eros 
are not even in harmony with each other. 
 
113
 Symposium 202b6–203e5. For lack of an adequate translation, I will resort to transliterating the Greek 
term δαίμων (simplified without the long quantity: daimon). For an overview of the use of the terms 
θεός, τὸ θεῖον, δαίμων, and τὸ δαιμόνιον in Plato see François (1957, 246–304). 
 
114
 Symposium 180c4–e2; 185e6–188e4. 
 
  
38 
while Aristophanes states that Eros is the god who most loves human beings, and 
supports his claim with an ingenious myth of his own.
115
 
The originality of Eros’ connection to Aphrodite, while well supported at least 
since the time of Hesiod, has been questioned.
116
 This connection is clearly presupposed 
in the Symposium;
117
 what does remain a matter of dispute in the dialogue is the nature of 
the connection. The major discrepancy seems to be that between the accounts of 
Pausanias and Socrates. On the one hand, Pausanias affirms the necessity of this 
connection, and goes on to distinguish a heavenly (Urania) from a common (Pandemos) 
Aphrodite, to which there corresponds a heavenly and a common Eros respectively.
118
 On 
the other hand, in Socrates’ speech Eros’ connection to Aphrodite seems weaker, since all 
that links them is the fact that the former was conceived on the birthday of the latter. And 
yet, Diotima does not fail to remark the unequivocal character of their association: “Eros 
was born to be the follower and servant of Aphrodite.”119 
It would be easy to gloss over the discrepancies about some major details of Eros’ 
character in the Symposium by arguing that, since each interlocutor is speaking for 
                                                 
115
 Symposium 189c8: θεῶν φιλανθρωπότατος. 
 
116
 Hesiod, Theogony 201. See Hammond and Scullard (1970, s.v. “Eros”). 
 
117
 Symposium 177e2, 180d3–e3, 196d1, 203c1–4. See also Phaedrus 242d9. 
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 Symposium 180d4: “there is no Aphrodite without Eros” (οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ Ἔρωτος Ἀφροδίτη). In what 
follows, we are told that Aphrodite-Urania is an older deity and is the motherless daughter of Uranus, 
while Aphrodite-Pandemos is a younger goddess, whose parents are Zeus and Dione (Symposium 180d6–
e3). Pausanias is silent about Eros’ genealogy; he simply calls him Aphrodite’s partner or coworker 
(συνεργὸν: 180e2). 
 
119
 Symposium 203c2: τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀκόλουθος καὶ θεράπων γέγονεν ὁ Ἔρως. 
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himself (for even Diotima is Socrates speaking for himself in disguise
120
), such 
differences are in no need of being harmonized at all. This is hardly the case, however, if 
the characters in the dialogue are speaking, not each for himself, but all for Plato, that is, 
if Plato’s voice, while ideally closer to Socrates’ stance, is fully heard only in the 
interplay of the various speeches. My goal here is not to shed light on the dynamics of 
this dramatic contexture,
121
 but simply to point to the fact that, even if this procedure 
does not fully correspond to Plotinus’ explicit way of reading the Symposium (and, for 
that matter, the entire Platonic corpus), his interpretive approach to Plato’s text offers 
relevant examples of how the voices of characters other than Socrates are a precious 
source of insight. Thus, in the next chapter we will see that in his treatise On Eros (III.5 
[50]), Plotinus’ conclusions are formulated and systematized not only on the basis of 
Socrates’ speech, but also in light of those of the other speakers in the dialogue.122 
1.4 A Sketch of the Argument of Symposium 198a1–212c3 
Socrates’ discourse is a complex dramatic unity preceded by five speeches of 
praise (encomia) on the same subject (i.e., Eros)
123
 and a double prologue, or double 
narrative frame,
124
 and followed by a final discourse by Alcibiades, in which the object of 
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 For support on this view about Diotima see note 132 below. 
 
121
 Rosen (1987) and Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan (2004) are fruitful, if different, examples of how this 
can be done. 
 
122
 E.g., he will endorse Pausanias’ distinction between Aphrodite-Urania and Aphrodite-Pandemos, as well 
as the distinction of Erotes derived from it (Plotinus III.5 [50] 2.14–4.9). 
 
123
 The speeches are by Phaedrus (178a–180b), Pausanias (180c–185c), Eryximachus (185e–188e), 
Aristophanes (189c–193e), and Agathon (194e–197e), supplemented by a triple interlude, before and 
after Eryximachus’ speech (185c–e, 189a–c), and after Agathon’s (193e–194e). 
 
124
 I.e., Apollodorus (172a–174a) and Aristodemus (174a–178a). 
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praise is no longer Eros but Socrates himself.
125
 My main contention about Socrates’ 
speech is that the image of ascent is the focal metaphor of the discourse, which in turn 
constitutes the axis of the entire dialogue, and as such includes (or, in hindsight, is 
reflected in) the other speeches as failures to complete the ascent due to an inadequate 
view of eros, or of what it means to love.
126
 In this section I will draw a sketch of 
Socrates’ main argument, limiting myself to highlighting some key transition in the text. 
Hence, in the next section (1.5) I will move on to offer some critical observations on this 
part of the Symposium, especially the so-called Ascent Passage, which are particularly 
relevant for this study. 
1.4.1 An Outline of Socrates’ Speech 
Broadly, Socrates’ discourse on Eros can be divided as follows: 
(1) 198a1–201c9: Critique of the method of the previous speeches 
(a) 198a1–199c2: Methodological critique: praise must be 
subordinated to truth 
(b) 199c3–201c9: Elenchos and homologia: Eros is the lover, not 
the beloved 
(2) 201d1–212c3: Socrates’ discourse; conversation with Diotima 
(a) 201d1–209e4: The Lesser Mysteries of love 
(i) 201d1–204c6: Eros’ nature: an intermediate/intermediary 
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 Alcibiades’ speech (215a–222b) is introduced by his own dramatic entrance (212c–215a) and followed 
by the epilogue of the dialogue as a whole (222c–223d). 
 
126
 My claim is not altogether unlike Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan’s (2004, 1), but my purpose is to 
pursue it further, rather than within the Symposium, in Plotinus. See also Reeve (2006, xxiii). For partial 
illustrations of the claim that the ascent metaphor is central to Socrates’ discourse and to the dialogues as 
a whole, see Subsection 1.5.4 below. 
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entity; not a god, but a δαίμων 
(ii) 204c7–206a13: Eros’ proper aim: the eternal possession of 
the good 
(iii) 206b1–209e4: Eros’ proper activity: to give birth in beauty 
for the sake of immortality 
(b) 209e5–212a7: The Greater Mysteries of love 
(i) 209e5–211b7: The ladder of love, or the Ascent Passage 
(ii) 211b7–d1: Synoptic view of the ladder of love 
(iii) 211d1–212a7: Beauty itself 
(c) 212b1–c3: Conclusion of Socrates’ discourse 
1.4.2 Symposium 198a1–201c9: Methodological Critique, Elenchos and Homologia 
The beginning of Socrates’ speech is a radical turn of perspective, or rather a shift 
of the focus of the encomium,
127
 namely: no longer praise, but truth (τἀληθῆ).128 As in 
other dialogues,
129
 Socrates allows himself to use his customary method of brief 
questions and answers in order to scrutinize the position of his interlocutor (in this case, 
the results of Agathon’s speech). The purpose of this scrutiny is twofold: to find out 
whether errors were made in the previous characterizations of Eros (i.e., the elenctic, or 
refutative, step proper), and to put forth some positive characterizations of it on which the 
                                                 
127
 On the genre of the encomium (ἐγκώμιον: 177b1) in general see Dover (1980, 11–12), Brisson (1998, 
38–39), Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan (2004, 46). 
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 Symposium 198d3, 199a7, 199b3; cf. also 201c8. Socrates will touch again on the issue of the genre of 
his speech in light of his primary concern for truth at 212b9–c3. 
 
129
 E.g., Gorgias 449b4–8, Protagoras 334c7–335a3, Crito 46b1–d7. 
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interlocutors may agree (ὁμολογία).130 
For Agathon, since Eros was a god incarnating all the qualities one would desire 
in an object of love (e.g., happiness, beauty, youth, gracefulness), he would have to be 
identified, not with the love, but with the aim of love, namely the beautiful. Socrates’ 
procedure completely reverses this position: Eros is not that which love loves, but the 
lover. This reversal is fleshed out in a manifold characterization of Eros. (i) Love is never 
simply love, but always love of something (199e–200a); in anachronistic terms: it is 
intentional (cf. Philebus 35b1–2). (ii) Love implies a lack of the thing desired; or: 
precisely because it tends to something, it does not possess it (200a–b).131 At this stage, it 
is clear that Eros means desire, or appetite, of which lack is an essential characteristic. 
However, Eros and lack do not coincide in their scope, for we do not desire everything 
that we lack, but we do lack everything that we desire. In other words, lack is part of the 
essence of desire, not vice versa. A crucial corollary to this: when we say that we love 
something we already possess (e.g., health or wealth), what we really desire is to have 
those things in the future as well (200b–e). Finally, (iii) Love is never for ugliness 
(αἴσχος) but only for beauty (κάλλος), and since all good things (τἀγαθὰ) are beautiful, 
Love loves good things (201a–c). 
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 The term ὁμολογέω occurs nine times in Symposium 198a1–201c9. Robin well synthesizes the purpose 
of ὁμολογία: “sans cet accord préalable (homologia), on risqué de se fourvoyer dans une controverse 
stérile, dont la source est un malentendu” (in Vicaire 1992, lxxiii). Elenchos and homologia are not ends 
in themselves; what guides them is the discovery of the truth. The elenchos is carried out methodically 
and directly only toward Agathon’s speech, but more or less overt elenctic remarks aimed at the other 
speeches occur all throughout Socrates’ discourse (e.g., at Aristophanes’ speech: see Subsection 1.5.4 
below). 
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 Cf. Lysis 221d7–e3, Philebus 35a3–4. 
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It is at this point that Diotima, a priestess from Mantinea,
132
 is introduced as 
Socrates’ guide into the so-called mysteries of love.133 
1.4.3 Symposium 201d1–209e4: The Lesser Mysteries of Love 
The first point of the Lesser Mysteries amounts to Diotima stripping Eros of his 
unqualified immortality, or his divine status (201e–203a). The argument is that if Eros 
were a god, he would lack nothing; he would have nothing to desire, hence to love, which 
goes against what Socrates and Agathon just agreed upon. Similarly, since Eros desires 
beauty, he must be lacking it. This does not mean, however, that he is either mortal or 
ugly, for just like correct opinion (ὀρθὴ δόξα) comes halfway between (μεταξύ) 
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 If, on the one hand, views about Diotima’s role in the Symposium differ (Cornford 1950, 71; Brès 1968, 
229–232; Wender 1973, 216–218; Dover 1980, 137; Halperin 1990, 257–308; R. E. Allen 1991, 46; 
Reale 1997a, 26–28, 135–147. For an overview and critique of some of these views see Cobb 1993, 71–
72; Brisson 1998, 27–31, 63–65; Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan, 2004, 111–118), on the other, 
commentators seem to agree that her and Socrates’ doctrines coincide (Bury 1932, xxxix; Friedländer 
1958, I.148; Levinson 1953, 32; Rosen 1987, 203, 221, 225; Anton 1974, 178). It seems safe to 
conjecture that Diotima stands for Socrates (who in turn stands for Plato), and that at least to this extent 
she is a fictional character (Reale 1997a, 26–28, 135–147; Zuckert 2009, 190 note 21). I am not denying 
that a historical person named Diotima, broadly matching the character we find in the Symposium, might 
have actually existed (see Taylor 1960, 224–225), and that Socrates might in fact have known her, 
although evidence for either claim is quite thin (Dover 1980, 10; Brisson 1998, 28), and as Nails (2002, 
138) observes, “[a]ll extant later references to Diotima are derived from Plato.” The point is rather that it 
seems highly unlikely, though not apodictically impossible, that Plato’s report in this dialogue is a 
faithful replica of (the allegedly historical) Diotima’s actual thought, let alone of her actual words. See 
Waithe (1987, 83–116) for a helpful overview of the scholarship surrounding the issue and an (ultimately 
inconclusive) argument in support of both Diotima’s historical existence and the presence of her actual 
thought (which moreover would be at variance with Socrates’, on which see also Neumann 1965) in the 
Symposium. 
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 On the language of the mysteries and their division in preparatory purification (μύησις), lesser mysteries 
(τέλεια), and greater mysteries (ἐποπτικά), see Vicaire (1992, 67 note 5), Reale (1997a, 162–164), 
Brisson (1998, 65–71). The whole of Socrates’ discourse could be interpreted as mirroring this pattern, 
with the elenchos and homologia (198a1–201c9) standing for the purificatory step, and Diotima’s Lesser 
(201d1–209e4) and Greater Mysteries (209e5–212a7) standing for their homonymous mystagogic stages. 
Cf. Clement of Alexandria’s testimony on this in Stromata V.11.373.24–374.4, VII.4.20.12–17; see also 
note 141 below. Marinus, the fifth century A.D. Platonist and author of a biography of Proclus, applies 
the same scheme and language of the mysteries to the reading of Plato and Aristotle; he calls Aristotle’s 
works “preliminary initiations and Lesser Mysteries [προτελειῶν καὶ μικρῶν μυστερίων],” while those of 
Plato are a “mystagogy [μυσταγογίαν],” and studying them leads to “a vision of truly divine initiations 
[θείας ὄντως τελετὰς ἐποπτεύειν]” (Marinus, Life of Proclus 13.5–6, 8–9; my translation). 
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knowledge and ignorance,
134
 so Eros stands halfway between beauty and ugliness, the 
mortal and the immortal condition.
135
 For this reason, Eros rather than a god is called “a 
great spirit” (Δαίμων μέγας: 202d13), whose nature, aim, and proper activity Diotima 
proceeds to illustrate. 
His intermediate nature is etiologically accounted for through a story (203a9–
204a7). We shall see that Plotinus has much to say about this story (Chapter Two). For 
now, let us only keep in mind that here Plato provides a brand new parentage for this god 
newly demoted to daimon (i.e., Poros and Penia), one which we do not find in the 
tradition (see Subsection 1.3.2). His parents explain his opposing qualities of poverty and 
lack (Penia) and of resourcefulness (Poros), while the fact that he was conceived on 
Aphrodites’ birthday explains why he is a lover of beauty (φύσει ἐραστὴς ὢν περὶ τὸ 
καλὸν: 203c3–4). An intermediate entity, Eros both does and does not possess what he 
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 202a2: μεταξὺ σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθίας. 202a9: μεταξὺ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀμαθίας. Cf. Lysis 218a2–b6. 
 
135
 The term μεταξύ (“in between”), already introduced in 202a2–b5 and clearly suggesting the 
intermediary character of Eros, occurs repeatedly in this portion of the text, most notably at 202d11 
(μεταξὺ θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου), 202d13–e1 (πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξύ ἐστι θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ), 204b1–2 
(μεταξὺ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων), 204b5 (μεταξὺ εἶναι σοφοῦ καὶ ἀμαθοῦς); cf. Epinomis 984d8–e3. To say 
that Eros is μεταξὺ θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου (202d11) does not imply that Eros is mortal, I take it, but that 
his immortality is unlike that of the gods, namely, that whatever good he possesses, he does not possess it 
permanently, as the gods do, but he has to strive continually to either keep it or regain it. Applied to 
human love, this dynamic is replicated in the process of reproduction as the mortal way of aiming at an 
immortality sui generis (cf. 206e8). R. E. Allen (1991, 94) does not seem to see this as he unqualifiedly 
states that Eros lacks immortality. If this were the case simply, or without qualification, then on the basis 
of the text Allen should add that Eros lacks mortality as well as immortality, but this does not seem 
possible—tertium non datur—unless one qualifies the terms mortality and immortality. In passing, it is a 
qualification of this kind that will allow Plotinus to claim that pure eros is an οὐσία and a ὑπόστασις 
intrinsically connected to the soul (III.5 [50] 2.32–39; see Subsection 2.3.2 below), although not identical 
with the soul tout court, as Allen (1991, 94) infers, mistakenly I believe. Along with μεταξύ, Plato uses 
also the expression ἐν μέσῳ (202e6, 203e5). What are we to make of Alcibiades complaining that 
Socrates is in between (ἐν μέσῳ: 227e2) himself and Agathon (the good!) and that he would rather have 
Agathon in between (ἐν μέσῳ: 227e7) himself and Socrates? If Socrates, qua philosopher, may be seen as 
representing Eros (204b4), is Alcibiades’ fuss about seating arrangements indicative of a certain 
confusion about the order of reality? 
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desires. Specifically, he does not possess it insofar as he desires it, but for the same 
reason he also possess it; not unqualifiedly, however, but precisely qua desideratum (see 
Philebus 35b6–7; cf. Chapter Four note 86). Moreover, the situation of those who love is 
analogous to that of Eros. This also holds for lovers of wisdom (οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες: 
204a8). And since wisdom is one of the most beautiful things and Eros loves beauty, he is 
accordingly called a lover of wisdom (φιλόσοφος: 204b4). 
Agathon and Socrates already agreed that Eros is love of what is beautiful. But 
what is his goal or proper aim in loving the beautiful? Diotima’s answer is unequivocal 
(204c7–206a13): what Eros longs for is nothing but to make the beautiful (τὸ καλόν), 
which Socrates quickly links to the good (τὸ ἀγαθὸν),136 his own. Once he obtains it, he 
reaches happiness (εὐδαιμονία). However, happiness would not be truly such if the final 
object of desire were not one’s own forever (ἀεὶ), hence Diotima’s threefold conclusion, 
immediately formalized in its application to Eros: “men love the good,” (206a3–4); “they 
love for the good to be their own,” (206a6–7); “and not only to be theirs, but also to be 
theirs forever” (206a9). Ergo: “love is for the good to be one’s own forever” (206a11–
12).
137
 Thus, immortality (ἀθανασία) is an aspect that belongs to the very essence of love. 
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 Symposium 201c1–5, 204e1–2 (cf. Lysis 216d2, Timaeus 87c4–5). The fusion of the two terms gives rise 
to the word καλοκἀγαθία (see Xenophon, Memorabilia I.6.14; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IV.1124a4; 
the most likely spurious Definitions 412e8). This noun is never found in Plato, but the two adjectives 
from which it is fused, καλός and ἀγαθός, occur together variously and very frequently (e.g., Laches 
192c8–9; Theaetetus 182b7, 185e4–5; Protagoras 315d8–e1; Greater Hippias 297b–c, 304a1; Republic 
III.402a1, IV.425d7, VI.507b5; Timaeus 88c6). As Dover remarks the aesthetic connotation of the term 
καλοκἀγαθία “is submerged in the usual moral application of the word” (Dover 1974, 41), and yet the 
term “differs from ‘good’ in taking account not merely of moral disposition (as manifested in courage 
and generosity) but also of attributes (e.g., wealth, good physique and skills) which enhance one’s value 
to the community” (Dover 1980, 143). For a guided tour through some relevant texts where the term 
appears between Aeschines and Aristotle, see Dover (1974, 41–45). On the relation between beauty and 
goodness in Plato, see Subsection 1.5.2 below. 
 
137
 Symposium 206a11–12: Ἔστιν ἄρα συλλήβδην, ἔφη, ὁ ἔρως τοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὑτῷ εἶναι ἀεί. Robin (1964, 
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But how do mortal beings go about achieving immortality? Or, what is Eros’ 
proper activity (ἔργον: 206b3) in mortal beings? The last part of the Lesser Mysteries is 
dedicated to provide an answer to this question (206b1–209e4), which Diotima offers 
once again in a nutshell: “it is to give birth in beauty, both in body and in soul” (206b7–
8).
138
 She then goes on to describe the process of animal reproduction (γέννησις) as 
precisely the means by which animals try to make themselves eternal.
139
 This is true of 
both body and of soul. That is, Love’s longing for immortality is expressed not only in 
the physical begetting of children, but also in more strictly spiritual activities (Diotima 
explicitly mentions the works of poets, creative inventors, and politicians
140
). And while 
most people turn to others in order to beget children, some are fecund according to the 
soul and put their effort in trying to give birth to virtues in beautiful and noble souls, with 
whom they accordingly will fall in love. 
                                                                                                                                                 
16) summarizes this point well: “la fin de l’amour, c’est l’immortalité.” I will return to this later 
(Subsection 1.5.4). 
 
138
 Symposium 206b7–8: ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τόκος ἐν καλῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν. 
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 Cf. Laws IV.721c2–8. In the Symposium reproduction is described as “what in the mortal is eternal and 
immortal” (206e8), or that through which “the mortal participates [μετέχει] in immortality” (208b3); cf. 
Aristotle, De anima II.415a25–b2. This process of immortalization does not immediately and exclusively 
take place at the level of the species, through the begetting of an individual of the same species, but starts 
at the level of what is taken to be a selfsame living unity (τὸ αὐτό, ὁ αὐτὸς: 207d5), or the individual 
itself, who never consists of the same things (τὰ αὐτὰ: 207d6), both in body and in soul (207d–208b). 
 
140
 Symposium 209a3–8. If I am correct to include the χειροτέχναι of Apology 22c9 among the τῶν 
δημιουργῶν ὅσοι λέγονται εὑρετικοὶ εἶναι of Symposium 210a5, then these are the same groups of people 
that Socrates scrutinized in the Apology (21b–22e) as he tried to disprove the Delphic oracle by finding 
someone wiser than himself. In this light, the Symposium presents a more positive view not only of 
poetry, as insightfully argued by Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan (2004, 215–220) in connection with 
Republic X.595a–608b, but of most human activities. The critique of these groups of people found in the 
the Apology still stands, however, to the extent that they failed to see that their wisdom is localized, or 
regional, one kind of wisdom and not the whole of it, and therefore limited. But in the Symposium their 
works are nonetheless erotic activities, works of love, insofar as they participate in Beauty itself (see the 
term for participation, μετέχειν, occurring at 208b3, 211a7, and especially at 211b2). 
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Here the preference accorded to pregnancy of soul over physical pregnancy 
already points at an ascending movement within the lower mysteries or things of love (τὰ 
ἐρωτικὰ). But it is through the final and highest mysteries (τὰ δὲ τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικά141) 
that Diotima’s attempts to lead Socrates, whether he can follow or not (210a2), to the 
apex of Eros’ ladder. 
1.4.4 Symposium 209e5–212a7: The Greater Mysteries of Love (the Ascent Passage) 
Words of ascent, most notably ἐπάνειμι (-εἶμι, ibo), occur repeatedly in the brief 
synoptic view of the so-called ladder of love (Symposium 211b7–d1).142 This term is 
anticipated by Apollodorus at the beginning of the dialogue: “Just the other day I was 
going up [ἀνιὼν] to town from my city in Phaleron...”143 This occurrence may be 
accidental; certainly it does not make for a strict argument when taken by itself; and yet it 
points at the importance of details in Plato. Specifically, if the ascent metaphor is central 
for understanding the dialogue as a whole, then the apparently unimportant or less 
speculative parts of the dialogue should become clear and found to be meaningful 
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 Symposium 210a1. Cf. Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride 77 (Moralia V.382d–e). See note 133 above. 
 
142
 Symposium 211b6 (ἐπανιὼν), 211c2 (ἐπανιέναι), 211c3 (ἐπαναβασμοῖς). As Rettig (1876, 309), Hug 
(1884, 162), and Bury (1932, 130) all point out in their notes to this passage, there are relevant parallels 
between the language and thought of ascent of Symposium 211b–c and that of Republic VI and VII, in 
particular VI.510b4–511c2, VII.517b5 (ἄνοδον), 521c7 (ἐπάνοδον), 531c3 (ἀνίασιν), 532b8 (ἐπάνοδος), 
532d6 (ἐπανιτέον). See Chapter Four notes 142–147 below for metaphors of ascent in Plotinus. 
 
143
 Symposium 172a2: καὶ γὰρ ἐτύγχανον πρῴην εἰς ἄστυ οἴκοθεν ἀνιὼν Φαληρόθεν. The translation is 
Cobb’s (1993), which I prefer to those which do not render the ascending movement denoted by ἀνιὼν, 
most notably Ficino (1590), Jowett (1892), Meunier (1947), R. E. Allen (1991), A. Nehamas and P. 
Woodruff (in Cooper 1997), and G. Giardini (in Maltese 1997). Translations rendering this movement 
include Lamb (1925), Apelt (1926), M. Joyce (in Hamilton and Cairns 1961), Martínez Hernández 
(1986), Vicaire (1992), Rowe (1998), Brisson (1998), Reale (2000), S. Benardete (in Benardete and 
Bloom 2001). See also ἵνα καλὸς παρὰ καλὸν ἴω (174a9) and ἀνιέναι (variant reading of ἂν ἰέναι at 
174b1): here not only the metaphor of ascent, but, if the καλὸν at 174a9 is Agathon (i.e., literally, Good), 
also a possible foreshadowing of the proximity of Beauty and Goodness (on which see Subsection 1.5.2 
below). An upward movement is present also in the closing lines of the dialogues (223d9): “Socrates got 
up [ἀναστάντα] and left.” 
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precisely in this light. 
Here is Diotima’s summation of the ascent, its trajectory stretching from one 
single beautiful body to Beauty itself (capitalized to avoid equivocation):
144
 
[b7] This is [the way] to proceed correctly, [c1] or to be led by another, 
into the matters of love: beginning [2] with these beautiful things here, for 
the sake of that Beauty, ever to ascend, [3] as if using the rungs of a 
ladder, from one to two [beautiful bodies], and from two [4] to all 
beautiful bodies, and from beautiful [5] bodies to beautiful practices, and 
from practices [6] to beautiful studies, and from the studies [7] one 
reaches
145
 that study, which is nothing other than [8] the study of that 
Beauty itself, until at last one comes to know [d1] Beauty itself. 
 
In the next section I will draw attention to some features of the Ascent Passage 
that are of fundamental importance for our main topic. 
1.5 Critical Observations on the Ascent Passage 
My remarks for this section are grouped under five headings: levels of ascent and 
levels of reality (Subsection 1.5.1); the relations between the Good, Beauty, and the Ideas 
(1.5.2); reason and desire in the ascent (1.5.3); illustrations of the connection between the 
Ascent Passage and other parts of the Symposium (1.5.4); appetitive, donative, and 
personal love (1.5.5). The goal of this section is to highlight some of the major elements 
                                                 
144
 Symposium 211b7–d1: [b7] τοῦτο γὰρ δή ἐστι τὸ ὀρθῶς ἐπὶ [c1] τὰ ἐρωτικὰ ἰέναι ἢ ὑπ’ ἄλλου ἄγεσθαι, 
ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ [2] τῶνδε τῶν καλῶν ἐκείνου ἕνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ ἀεὶ ἐπανιέναι, [3] ὥσπερ ἐπαναβασμοῖς 
χρώμενον, ἀπὸ ἑνὸς ἐπὶ δύο καὶ ἀπὸ [4] δυοῖν ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ καλὰ σώματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν [5] 
σωμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων [6] ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ μαθήματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν 
μαθημάτων ἐπ’ [7] ἐκεῖνο τὸ μάθημα τελευτῆσαι, ὅ ἐστιν οὐκ ἄλλου ἢ αὐτοῦ [8] ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ 
μάθημα, < ἵνα > καὶ γνῷ αὐτὸ τελευτῶν ὃ ἔστι [d1] καλόν. 
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 Symposium 211c7, c8: τελευτῆσαι, καὶ γνῷ: a major crux (see Bury 1932, Dover 1980). Variant reading: 
τελευτήσῃ, ἵνα γνῷ (or ἕως ἄν γνῷ; Bury 1932: ἵνα καὶ γνῷ). As from the text printed in the previous 
note, I read τελευτῆσαι (with Hug 1884; Usener, in Burnet 1899–1907; Bury 1932; Dover 1980; Vicaire 
1992; Rowe 1998) rather than τελευτήσῃ (against Burnet 1899–1907; A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff, in 
Cooper 1997). The manuscript tradition is certainly corrupted here (see also the ἵνα at 211c8), but as 
Rowe (1998, 200) rightly points out, none of the editorial solutions “makes much difference to the 
sense”. 
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of Plato’s views of love. As I anticipated, these elements will become central in my 
reconstruction of the significance of eros in Plotinus’ metaphysics carried out primarily in 
Chapter Three and Chapter Four. 
1.5.1 Levels of Ascent, Levels of Reality 
A first set of observations concerns the number and rationale of the levels or 
stages of the ascent. Commentators tend to agree that both in its long version (209e5–
211b7) and in the synoptic view I just cited, the upward movement comprises levels in a 
number between four and six. I propose the following division of levels (or stages, or 
steps, or rungs):
146
 
(1.a) A single body: ἕν σῶμα (210a4–8, 211c3) 
(1.b) All bodies: πάντα σώματα (210a8–b6, 211c3–4) 
(2.a) Souls: ψυχαί (210b6–c3) 
(2.b) Practices and laws: ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ νόμοι (210c3–6, 211c4–5) 
(3.a) Kinds of knowledge, studies: ἐπιστῆμαι (210c6–d6), μαθήματα 
(211c5–6) 
(3.b) The single knowledge, study: ἐπιστήμη μία (210d7), ἐκεῖνο τὸ 
μάθημα (211c6–7) 
(4) Beauty itself: αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν147 (210e1–211b7, 211c7–212a7)148 
                                                 
146
 The total number of levels is four. Small-case letters indicate distinct moments within the same level. 
Items at all levels are qualified as beautiful by Plato. 
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 Symposium 211d3, e1. I take this characterization of the apex of the ascent as the summation of the 
descriptions given at 210e6–211b7 and 211d1–212a7. Other such incisive summations include: 
“something wonderfully beautiful in nature” or “something beautiful, by nature wonderful” (τι 
θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν: 210e4–5); “that itself which is beautiful (αὐτὸ [...] ὃ ἔστι καλόν: 211c8–
d1); “divine Beauty itself” (αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον καλὸν: 211e3); “true Beauty” (τοῦ ἀληθοῦς [καλοῦ]: 212a5). 
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It will be noticed that in the parallel passages from the synoptic view of the 
ascent which I just indicated (i.e., 211c3–212a1), the first moment of the second level, 
that is, (2.a) is not stated explicitly. This should not trouble us excessively, however, 
since human activities and laws are the outcome of the beauty of soul. 
If my observation is correct, one may argue that the whole of (3) also belongs to 
the level of soul and should thus be labeled as (2.c). Against such a view, I maintain that 
(3) is rightly set apart as an independent level, and thus should not be relabeled. The 
reason for this is that the realm of knowledge is not a product of soul comparable to 
human activities and laws;
149
 it is rather that from which the soul draws its resources to 
                                                                                                                                                 
148
 This division roughly resembles those by Robin (1964, 17–19; and in Vicaire 1992, xcii–xcviii) and 
Reale (1997a, 201–221; 2000, 483), with the difference that they seem to take (2.a) and (2.b) as more 
emphatically distinct stages. This is also true of Cornford (1950, 126–128), who counts five levels: (i) 
individual beautiful body; (ii) all beautiful bodies; (iii) moral beauty; (iv) intellectual beauty; (v) the 
Beautiful itself. Rosen (1987, 263–277) indicates six levels as he thinks of (1.a) and (1.b) as distinct 
stages, and considers (2.a) not as itself a level but as a transition (for which Diotima gives no reasons); 
however he replaces (2.a) with another level (i.e., the level of beautiful speeches) and seems to take (2.b) 
as an independent stage, for a total of six levels. Roochnik (1990, 116–120) also recognizes six levels as 
he takes (1.a), (1.b), (2.a), and (2.b) as four distinct stages. Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan (2004, 148–
151) focus on the transitions rather than the levels as such, but it is safe to say that for them the levels are 
also six, since they seem to consider (1.a), (1.b), (3.a), and (3.b) as separate rungs. Moravcsik’s division 
is much more complex than any of the ones mentioned in this note, including smaller steps within each 
level (except the last), as well as a classification of each of these steps as either erotic, rational, or 
creative (respectively labeled as E-steps, R-steps, and C-steps), for a total of fourteen steps (see 
Moravcsik 1971, 286 for a detailed division of Symposium 210a7–e1). Nevertheless, he maintains the 
distinction of four major levels, roughly corresponding to the ones I outlined above. 
 
149
 In fact, it is not a product of soul at all. To be sure, we do manufacture books, newspapers, information 
technology, and archives of all sorts, through which knowledge is stored up and made readily available to 
the expert user. Knowledge itself, however, is not a product, but a discovery. That is, the truthfulness of 
what one comes to know is not merely asserted, but compared to and confirmed (or, in the case of error 
and falsity, invalidated) by a standard that was in place prior to the emergence of one’s particular 
knowledge. The affinity of soul (the rational element in it) and Ideas that Plato points out elsewhere 
(Phaedo 79d3: συγγενὴς; 80a3: ὅμοιον τῷ θείῳ; Republic VI.490b4: συγγενεῖ; see also Phaedrus 246d6–
e3; Letters VII.342d2: συγγενείᾳ καὶ ὁμοιότητι; VII.344a) is not due to the fact that the latter are 
products of the former; rather, this affinity is inferred from the observation that a soul’s greatest 
achievements in, say, geometry are immediately related to a pre-existing principle on whose basis alone 
such greatness may be certified. Thus, (i) to say that this principle is produced (and moreover produced 
as a matter of convention) is already to confuse production and discovery. And yet, (ii) to say that such a 
principle exists does not immediately imply that one already comprehends it fully, but rather that 
discovery is the gradual result of several factors, of which effort is not the least important. I take 
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fashion its beautiful products. At first this comprises a multiplicity of different studies 
and kinds of knowledge, i.e., (3.a), but ultimately it ought to be unified in a single study, 
i.e., (3.b), which in the Symposium amounts to the knowledge of that Beauty (ἐκείνου τοῦ 
καλοῦ μάθημα: 211c8) in accordance with which all other beautiful things are beautiful. 
This single μάθημα is the overarching grasp of the very principle that we recognize when 
we call beautiful the lovable things at the lower rungs of the ladder.
150
 
Knowledge of the principle, however, is not itself the principle. Put differently, 
the principle is not produced or generated as it is known. On the contrary, it is “there” to 
be known, to be approached; most importantly, in the context of the Symposium, it is 
there to be loved, for after all it is Eros’ ladder that we are discussing. Therefore, Beauty 
itself is not to be subsumed under the third step and re-labeled as (3.c), but it is presented 
as a distinct step. The ascent is an ascent to Beauty itself, not to a production of Beauty 
(nor is it itself Beauty). Moreover, Beauty itself is final not simply in the sense that it is 
the end point of the ladder, but, more importantly, because it is that for the sake of which 
the ascent is undertaken: not merely terminus, but ultimate purpose (or terminus qua 
ultimate purpose).
151
 Obviously, the level of Beauty itself is the ultimate level, the last 
stage, that beyond which one does not ascend, non plus ultra, for if one could ascend 
                                                                                                                                                 
Heidegger’s famous dictum in Sein und Zeit (226)—“Before Newton’s laws were discovered, they were 
not ‘true’” (Heidegger 1996, 208 = Gesamtausgabe 2, 226)—as pointing to the second of the last two 
statements (ii) while implicitly granting the first (i). 
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 Cf. Republic VI.503e–505a, especially 504a2 (μέγιστον μάθημα). To be sure, misinterpretations of what 
this knowledge amounts to are very common; more often than not, what we take to be Beauty itself is 
actually one of the beautiful things that participate in it. When this happens, the possibility of further 
ascent is compromised. Aristophanes’ discourse, among others, is exemplary in this regard (see 
Subsection 1.5.4 below). 
 
151
 Symposium 210a1: ὧν ἕνεκα; 210e5–6: οὗ δὴ ἕνεκεν; 211c2: ἐκείνου ἕνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ ἀεὶ. 
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further, then it would be neither terminus nor ultimate purpose.
152
 Finally, Beauty itself 
is that which allows us to account for the beauty of all beautiful things; in this sense, it is 
not a final point at all. It is, on the contrary, the starting point, the very origin or cause of 
beauty in things.
153
 The end of desire is here already its origin, for without it things could 
not be beautiful, and what lacks all beauty is not lovable or desirable.
154
 
A further observation concerns the status of this “epistemic” or “mathematic” 
relation to Beauty itself. In Diotima’s discourse, the lover who has reached the level of 
knowledge comes to realize that all that is generated at that level pertains to one single 
knowledge (ἐπιστήμην μίαν: 210d7), and this knowledge is of the Beauty that she is 
going to describe. On the basis of the text, therefore, there is little doubt that an epistemic 
grasp of Beauty itself constitutes one of the highest stages of the ascent. The question, 
however, is whether this knowledge is itself the end of the ascent, that is, whether it 
constitutes the ultimate way for the lover to relate to Beauty itself. A close reading of the 
text does not seem to afford a straightforwardly positive answer to this question. 
At Symposium 211b5–7, Socrates states that “when someone, ascending from 
things here, through loving boys correctly, starts to see that Beauty, he has almost 
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 Plato puts it well in the Lysis at the end of the argument on the “first friend,” or “first loved” (πρῶτον 
φίλον: Lysis 219d1, 4–5): “When we say that things are our friends for the sake of some other friend 
[ἕνεκα φίλου τινὸς ἑτέρου], manifestly we are only using the same word, while the real friend appears to 
be only that in which all these so-called friendships terminate. It appears to be so, he said. Therefore, 
isn’t the real friend a friend for the sake of nothing else that is a friend? [Οὐκοῦν τό γε τῷ ὄντι φίλον οὐ 
φίλου τινὸς ἕνεκα φίλον ἐστίν;] True” (Lysis 220a7–b5). 
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 Symposium 211b2–5: “but all other beautiful things participate in it in such a way that, even when those 
others come to be and pass away, this in no way increases or decreases, nor suffers anything” ([b2] τὰ δὲ 
ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα τρόπον τινὰ [3] τοιοῦτον, οἷον γιγνομένων τε τῶν ἄλλων καὶ 
ἀπολλυμένων [4] μηδὲν ἐκεῖνο μήτε τι πλέον μήτε ἔλαττον γίγνεσθαι μηδὲ [5] πάσχειν μηδέν). 
 
154
 However, Plato seems to view Beauty itself as a manifestation of an even higher reality, the Good (see 
Subsection 1.5.2 below). 
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reached the goal.”155 If “starting to see that Beauty” stands for the epistemic grasp of 
Beauty, then it is clearly stated that this is “almost” (σχεδὸν) the end, but not quite it. The 
claim here is not that Beauty itself cannot be the correlate of knowledge; it can: insofar as 
its beauty is a participation in Beauty, by knowingly gazing upon Beauty, it is not 
something other than Beauty that one grasps. In fact, one captures glimpses of Beauty 
also at the lower levels of the ascent, for here too it is Beauty that shines forth in beautiful 
bodies and practices. However, none of these levels captures Beauty itself by itself, but 
always presents it as mixed with something else that comes short of it pure and unmixed 
(καθαρόν, ἄμεικτον: 211e1). Knowledge is no exception to this and as such appears to be 
only a penultimate step for the one who truly wishes to attain to Beauty. As a 
consequence, reason’s role in the ascent is called into question as Socrates says that the 
one “who has come to the end of matters of love will see suddenly something 
wonderfully beautiful in nature.”156 As Moravcsik observes, the steps of the ascent are 
gradual and causally interrelated,
157
 and reason plays a crucial role at each level of the 
ascent.
158
 But when accessing Beauty the situation changes: there is no gradual 
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 Symposium 211b5–7: [b5] ὅταν δή τις ἀπὸ τῶνδε διὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς παιδεραστεῖν [6] ἐπανιὼν ἐκεῖνο τὸ 
καλὸν ἄρχηται καθορᾶν, σχεδὸν [7] ἄν τι ἅπτοιτο τοῦ τέλους.  
 
156
 Symposium 210e3–5: [e3] ...πρὸς [4] τέλος ἤδη ἰὼν τῶν ἐρωτικῶν ἐξαίφνης κατόψεταί τι θαυμαστὸν [5] 
τὴν φύσιν καλόν. Cf. Letters VII.341c7–d1. 
 
157
 Moravcsiki takes the triple ἵνα (“in order that”: 210c3–7), the term ἀναγκασθῇ (“that he may be forced 
to”: 210c3), and ῥωσθεὶς καὶ αὐξηθεὶς (“strengthened and nourished”: 210d6–7) as evidence of this 
causal connection, and then goes on to explain how causality plays out differently in R-steps, E-steps, 
and C-steps (Moravcsik 1971, 289–292, 295; see note 148 above). 
 
158
 Moravcsik (1971, 287–288) shows that what he calls R-steps are moves that imply two one-many 
relations: first, a common element is isolated from a plurality of instances in order to grasp a unity; and 
second, the unities at each level are related as species of the same Beauty. 
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“dianoetic” motion, but a sudden (ἐξαίφνης: 210e4159) leap. Thus, while at each level 
beautiful discourses are generated
160
 whose beauty refers the lover to Beauty, Beauty 
itself will appear as neither discourse nor knowledge (οὐδέ τις λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη: 
211a7). 
In order to see how this plays out in Plato’s thought, some explanations are 
needed on the connection between Beauty and two of the most debated issues in Plato 
scholarship: the Good and the Ideas or Forms. 
1.5.2 The Good, Beauty, and the Ideas 
To explain the relations between the Good, Beauty, and the Ideas or Forms
161
 in 
Plato is an enormous task. Here I will limit my exposition to the very general outlining of 
a possible solution. Let us briefly deal with the Ideas first by focusing on what I take to 
be their explanatory role. In what sense is a beautiful thing beautiful by participating in 
Beauty? That is, what does it mean to say that the reason of the beauty of a thing is 
Beauty? One could try to answer this question directly by saying what Beauty is. 
Socrates-Diotima does that at the end of Eros’ ladder, and the result is a description 
which, at first, would probably be puzzling to most: “itself by itself with itself, being 
always one in form,” “pure, unmixed,” “divine Beauty itself,” “one in form.”162 This 
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 Cf. Letters VII.341c7. Cf. Chapter Four note 265. 
 
160
 See Symposium 210a8 (λόγους καλούς), c1 (λόγους), d4–5 (πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς λόγους). 
 
161
 In order to avoid equivocation, the term “good” and other such words as “beauty,” “courage,” “idea,” 
“form,” etc. are capitalized when their referents are the Good of Republic VI–VII and the Ideas or Forms. 
Moreover, the terms “Idea(s)” and “Form(s)” are used synonymously. 
 
162
 Symposium 211b1–2: [b1] αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ μεθ’ αὑτοῦ μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ [2] ὄν; 211e1, 3, 4: [e1] καθαρόν, 
ἄμεικτον, [...] [3] αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον καλὸν [...] [4] μονοειδὲς. 
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direct description of Beauty itself may become less puzzling if one takes into account 
why it seems necessary to Plato to postulate the Idea. This can be done by simply 
uncovering the insufficiency of other factors to serve as explanations. 
Briefly, to account for the beauty of a given thing by pointing at its color, shape, 
or any other sensible feature which could very well account for another thing’s ugliness 
ultimately means not to account for its beauty. In a word, the Idea is the necessary factor 
to account for the way in which a thing manifests itself.
163
 Plato offers no such argument 
directly in the Symposium, but I maintain that the “theory” of Ideas is not “certainly 
excluded” from the dialogue, as Rosen argues.164 On the contrary, I believe that if such 
expressions as “x-itself” (αὐτό), “x-itself by itself” (αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό), and “x-here” (τῇδε) 
versus “true-x” (ἀληθές) indicate anything, this is precisely a connection between the 
descriptions of Beauty itself in the Symposium and passages from other dialogues—a 
connection, moreover, that is not merely a matter of linguistic convention, but of 
content.
165
 
                                                 
163
 As Rosen (2005, 257–258) rightly argues, this holds despite the critical irony with which Ideas are often 
met. The issue is well synthesized by Spade (1994, vii–viii), if in the different context of the medieval 
dispute on the universals. For further remarks on the notion of a primarily explanatory necessity, see 
Appendix B below. 
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 Rosen (1987, 272). Here Rosen is trying to show that the instantaneous vision of Beauty as described in 
the Symposium, taking place in the realm of genesis, is incomplete: “the initiate begins to see the end but 
cannot entirely grasp it” (Rosen 1987, 273). I sympathize with this view, but I fail to see how it entails a 
categorical denial of the presence of Ideas in the Symposium. That the “theory” of Ideas is not developed 
in the dialogue is beyond doubt. But does this necessarily imply that all (more or less implicit) reference 
to the Ideas is in principle absent? 
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 Symposium 210e2–211b7 and 211d1–212a7. Among the other passages where one may infer a 
connection of the Symposium description of Beauty to Plato’s views on Ideas, see especially Republic 
VI.507b, Phaedo 96d ff., Phaedrus 247b–250e, Euthyphro 6d9–e1, Parmenides 130b8. Particularly in 
Phaedo 99c–102a, the so-called “second sailing” (δεύτερος πλοῦς: 99c9–d1), this connection seems hard 
to deny. This text outlines Socrates’ own theory of causation, the locus classicus of Plato’s formulation 
of the “theory” of Ideas. I believe that Socrates clearly refers to Ideas in the formulas of “x-itself” (e.g., 
αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν: Phaedo 100c4–5) and “x-itself by itself” (e.g., καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ: Phaedo 100b6). 
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The issue goes well beyond the purpose of these pages, but I should at least 
point out that if the independence, or separation, suggested by the expression καθ’ αὑτό is 
taken at face value, all kinds of (artificial) problems arise. W. D. Ross clearly shows that 
Plato’s expressions emphasizing the transcendent aspect of Ideas are consistently 
counterbalanced by expressions stressing their immanence.
166
 The Ideas are levels of 
being rather than things alongside things (or above them, whatever it means for such a 
“thing” to be attributed spatial coordinates). Reale puts it well: 
the error of many interpreters is to have mistaken this distinction of levels 
and the differences between them, for an absurd and unwarranted 
‘separation,’ taking the Ideas to be, ‘superthings’ separated physically, 
rather than metaphysically, from things, as if they were simply invisible 
sensibles to be contrasted with sensibles. [...] With the Ideas Plato 
discovered the realm of the intelligible as the incorporeal and 
metaempirical dimension of being. It is true that this world of the 
incorporeal intelligible transcends the sensible, but not in the absurd sense 
of ‘separation,’ but as a meta-empirical cause as true cause, and as the true 
ground of the sensible.
167
 
 
It should be noticed that beauty cannot be equated to merely physical beauty. That 
this is undoubtedly the case can be easily seen in the Symposium, where the term 
“beautiful” (καλός) is used at all levels of the ascent (209e5–211d1: see Subsection 1.4.4 
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 W. D. Ross (1951, 228–230). Symposium 211b1–2 is a perfect example of both. On the basis of 
Parmenides 132b3–c8, later Platonists such as Iamblichus and Proclus (see for instance Proclus, 
Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides II.753.8–31, IV.891–901, VI.1054.25–37; cf. also Elements of 
Theology 161) will be more resolute in emphasizing that Ideas are really separate from sensible things, 
exist prior to sensibles and are responsible for their existence, although both separation and priority here 
are to be taken as logical rather than spatial. This is what Wallis (1995, 124–125) refers to as Iamblichus’ 
principle of Logical Realism. 
 
167
 Reale (1997b, 130). Gerson (2003, 176) writes: “There is no problem in viewing immaterial entities as 
‘separate’ from the sensible world so long as we understand separation basically as independence.” See 
also Irwin (1995, 154–162); Rosen (2005, 257–258). To deny that Forms have no existence simply 
because they cannot be seen would be almost as absurd as to deny that smells amount to nothing simply 
because they cannot be heard (cf. Plotinus V.5 [32] 12.1 ff.). I think that for Plato to demand of Ideas that 
they be sensible would amount to missing precisely what they are essentially, namely, intelligible. 
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and 1.5.1 above).
168
 As we saw, Socrates claims that good things are also beautiful.
169
 
One could be tempted to say that while it may be true that good things are beautiful, it 
does not necessarily follow that beautiful things are good. But this is unwarranted by the 
text since Beauty itself is described as the very apex of the ascent, and so, to say that 
something beautiful is, qua beautiful (i.e., as participating in Beauty: 211b2), bad, means 
to make Beauty itself the cause of badness. In fact, even if we were to restrict the sense of 
“beautiful” merely to what appears beautiful to the senses, and typically to sight, we 
would still be unjustified in making the beauty of a bad thing the cause of its badness. 
That is, we can certainly say that at least some things that are beautiful in this restricted 
sense happen to be bad, but nothing justifies us in claiming that it is their beauty that 
makes them bad. If I am not mistaken in my claim, and given the close connection of 
beauty and goodness drawn by Socrates, the issue is precisely to shed light on the nature 
of this connection. 
Two main factors may account for the difficulty in explaining the relation 
between Beauty and the Good. The first is well summarized by Brisson as he writes: 
“Beauty is probably the Platonic notion whose field of extension is the widest; there are 
beautiful objects, beautiful bodies, beautiful actions, beautiful souls, as well as an 
                                                 
168
 This can be observed also in Alcibiades’ discourse, in which he misunderstands Socrates’ temperate 
rejection of his beauty. Perhaps also because he was not present when Socrates gave his speech, 
Alcibiades remains at the lowest level of beauty (that of bodies) and fancies exchanging his physical 
beauty for Socrates’ other kind—and, if we are to trust the testimony of some of Socrates’ 
contemporaries about his physical appearance, the only kind (cf. Xenophon, Symposium 4.19, 5.5–7; 
Plato, Theaetetus 143e7-9)—that is, wisdom. But the two kinds of beauty are incommensurable and, as 
Socrates (ironically) made clear to Agathon earlier on, wisdom itself cannot simply be transferred from 
one soul to another through touch like water is transferred from a cup into another through a piece of 
yarn (175c2–e6). 
 
169
 Symposium 201c2: τἀγαθὰ οὐ καὶ καλὰ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι. Symposium 201c4–5: τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ καλά. 
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intelligible beauty.”170 Hence Socrates takes the lover of wisdom (φιλόσοφος) 
naturally to be coextensive with the lover of beauty (φιλόκαλος: Phaedrus 248d3). 
However, καλός and ἀγαθός, while extensively overlapping, do not simply coincide. Two 
differences in particular are worth noticing: first, καλός denotes, on the one hand, 
physical beauty and, on the other, something fine, noble, and admirable, which as such 
deserves praise from others;
171
 second, ἀγαθός, besides not denoting physical beauty, can 
often mean something that is circumstantially good to the individual without this thing 
necessarily being καλός.172 
The second, and perhaps more important, factor is that the other term of the 
equation, the Good, is treated all but extensively in the dialogues; Plato offers us a few 
hints and two brief accounts of it (i.e., Republic VI.504d–509c and Philebus 20b–22e), 
with doubts remaining, moreover, that these two accounts are of the same thing (cf. 
Philebus 64a1–3). I speak of a connection, or a relation, rather than of a coincidence 
because it is hard to establish, on the basis of the Symposium alone, whether Beauty and 
the Good are strictly equated. They are clearly not equated in the Republic, where 
Socrates does not merely distinguish them, but also orders them hierarchically, with the 
superiority of the Good emphatically established not only over Beauty, but also over 
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 Brisson (1998, 72): “Le Beau est probablement la notion platonicienne dont le champ d’extension est le 
plus vaste; il existe de beaux objets, de beaux corps, de belles actions, de belles âmes et même un beau 
intelligible.” See also Ast (1908, II, 133); Kahn (1996, 267–269). 
 
171
 E.g., the admirable risk (κίνδυνος) of believing in what Socrates said about the soul in Phaedo 114d1–7, 
despite his admission that things may not be exactly as he described them. 
 
172
 E.g., pleasure qua ἀγαθή in the Protagoras and the Philebus. See also note 136 above. 
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Knowledge or Truth.
173
 It is in the Phaedrus that the difference between Beauty and all 
the other Forms is forcefully brought into focus at 250b1–c1:174 
Now, there is no splendor in the likenesses of Justice and Temperance 
here, nor in the other things that are honorable for the souls; but only a 
few, approaching the images, contemplate with difficulty, through their 
dull organs, the origin of that which is imaged. Beauty, on the other hand, 
was radiant to see at that time, when with a happy choir we, following 
Zeus (while others followed other gods), enjoyed a blessed vision and 
contemplation, and were introduced into the mystery which we may 
rightly say is the most blessed... 
 
And further on, at Phaedrus 250c8–e1, Plato writes:175 
[c8] As for Beauty, as I said, [d1] it shone radiantly among those things as 
a being, and now that we have come down here, [2] we have grasped it 
glittering most vividly through the most vivid of our senses. [3] For vision 
is the sharpest of the sensations received [4] through the body, but 
Wisdom is not seen through it—since it would awaken [5] terrible 
passions, if reaching vision it offered a clear image of itself [6] such as the 
one offered by Beauty—nor are the other lovely things. But now [7] this is 
ordained for Beauty alone: to be the most manifest [e1] and the most 
loved. 
 
In this account, Beauty is described as an Idea, and what distinguishes it from 
other Ideas is the peculiar way in which it shines forth in the realm of the sensible. In 
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 Republic VI.505d–506a, 507b, 508d–509c, VII.517b–c. 
 
174
 Phaedrus 250b1–c1: [b1] δικαιοσύνης μὲν οὖν [2] καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τίμια ψυχαῖς οὐκ 
ἔνεστι [3] φέγγος οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ὁμοιώμασιν, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἀμυδρῶν [4] ὀργάνων μόγις αὐτῶν καὶ ὀλίγοι 
ἐπὶ τὰς εἰκόνας ἰόντες [5] θεῶνται τὸ τοῦ εἰκασθέντος γένος· κάλλος δὲ τότ’ ἦν ἰδεῖν [6] λαμπρόν, ὅτε 
σὺν εὐδαίμονι χορῷ μακαρίαν ὄψιν τε καὶ [7] θέαν, ἑπόμενοι μετὰ μὲν Διὸς ἡμεῖς, ἄλλοι δὲ μετ’ ἄλλου 
[8] θεῶν, εἶδόν τε καὶ ἐτελοῦντο τῶν τελετῶν ἣν θέμις λέγειν [c1] μακαριωτάτην... As G. R. F. Ferrari 
(1992, 260) explains, “the beautiful is thought of as the quality by which the good shines and shows itself 
to us.” Or in Plotinus’ terms: “We call that which is beyond this [i.e., Intellect] the nature of the good, 
which holds beauty before itself as a screen” (Plotinus I.6 [1] 9.37–39: [37] Τὸ δὲ ἐπέκεινα τούτου τὴν 
[38] τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λέγομεν φύσιν προβεβλημένον τὸ καλὸν πρὸ [39] αὐτῆς ἔχουσαν). 
 
175
 Phaedrus 250c8–e1: [c8] περὶ δὲ κάλλους, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, [d1] μετ’ ἐκείνων τε ἔλαμπεν ὄν, δεῦρό τ’ 
ἐλθόντες κατειλήφαμεν [2] αὐτὸ διὰ τῆς ἐναργεστάτης αἰσθήσεως τῶν ἡμετέρων στίλβον [3] 
ἐναργέστατα. ὄψις γὰρ ἡμῖν ὀξυτάτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος [4] ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεων, ᾗ φρόνησις οὐχ 
ὁρᾶται—δεινοὺς γὰρ ἂν [5] παρεῖχεν ἔρωτας, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἑαυτῆς ἐναργὲς εἴδωλον [6] παρείχετο εἰς 
ὄψιν ἰόν—καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα ἐραστά· νῦν δὲ [7] κάλλος μόνον ταύτην ἔσχε μοῖραν, ὥστ’ ἐκφανέστατον 
εἶναι [e1] καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον. Cf. Festugière (1950, 342–346). 
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Phaedrus 250c–252c, Socrates goes on to explain that what we call love (ἔρως) is 
precisely this experience of Beauty in beautiful things, which allows for an ascent to the 
Intelligible through recollection (ἀνάμνησις: Phaedrus 249c2). 
Beauty, however, does not completely coincide with the Good, but, as Robin 
argues extensively, is one of its two principal aspects, the other being Truth.
176
 Two 
major methods of ascent to the Good are therefore outlined, namely: love (the focus of 
the Symposium and the Phaedrus), which leads to the Good under the aspect of Beauty, 
and dialectic (emphasized particularly in the Republic), leading to the same goal but 
under the aspect of Truth.
177
 Robin writes: 
every Idea and the totality of Ideas participate in Beauty and in Truth, as 
well as in the Good. [...] In connection with these texts,
178
 I believe, one 
may infer, that the Good, together with Truth and Beauty, which after all 
are nothing but the aspects of the Good, forms a sphere of existence higher 
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 Robin (1964, 183–187). See Philebus 65a1–5: “[a1] Thus, if we cannot hunt down the good [τὸ ἀγαθὸν] 
with one idea, [2] grasping it with three, namely beauty, proportion, and truth, [3] we may say that this, 
as if it were one, can most rightly be held to cause the [4] things that are in the mixture, and since the 
cause is good, it makes the mixture itself [5] [good]” ([a1] Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μιᾷ δυνάμεθα ἰδέᾳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν 
θηρεῦσαι, [2] σὺν τρισὶ λαβόντες, κάλλει καὶ συμμετρίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ [3] λέγωμεν ὡς τοῦτο οἷον ἓν 
ὀρθότατ’ ἂν αἰτιασαίμεθ’ ἂν τῶν [4] ἐν τῇ συμμείξει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὂν τοιαύτην αὐτὴν [5] 
γεγονέναι). Doubts remain as to whether the “goods” of Philebus, Republic, and Symposium coincide, 
although it seems at least fair to say that they overlap to some extent. On the basis of the text just cited, 
the Good has three, rather than two, principal aspects, that is, not only Truth and Beauty, but also 
Measure (μετριότης) or Proportion (συμμετρία) (see Robin 1964, 189). Thus, a third ascent may be 
postulated on the basis of this and other such texts as Timaeus 69b2–5, 87c6–d8 and Philebus 64e5–
65a6, although in the Republic the disciplines dealing with the proportionate movements of heavenly 
bodies (astronomy) and the harmony of sounds (harmonics) are parts of the larger dialectical ascent to 
the Good (see Republic VII.528e–530c). Plotinus may have this in mind when he envisions three starting 
points from which one can undertake the ascent (i.e., music, love, and philosophy), but he subordinates 
music to both love and philosophy (I.3 [20] 1–3); cf. Subsection 4.4.3 below. See also Gadamer (1986, 
114–118). 
 
177
 The harmony of the two methods is well documented in Plato’s thought and in the oral teaching at the 
Academy, and it will be the object of reflection for Plotinus as well (see especially I.3 [20]; cf. 
Subsection 4.4.3 below). See Robin (1964, 186–187). 
 
178
 Among other texts, Robin (1964, 184–186) cites Philebus 64d–67a, Gorgias 507e ff., Symposium 202e, 
Republic VI.508e, 509b, X.597b–d, Phaedrus 246e. 
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than the very existence of an ideal world.
179
 
 
Having summarily established the status of Beauty among the Ideas, something 
remains to be said about the relation of the Good to the Ideas. In order to try to throw 
some light on this point, I will draw a connection between the ascent in the Symposium 
and the passage on the Divided Line in Republic VI.509d–511e.180 As given at Republic 
VI.511d8–e2, the four sections of the line are: imaging (εἰκασία), belief (πίστις), thought 
(διάνοια), and intellection (νόησις), the first two belonging among things of the visible 
kind, the latter two among the intelligible (τό τε τοῦ ὁρωμένου γένους καὶ τὸ τοῦ 
νοουμένου181). Now, while both thought and intellection belong to the intelligible, 
thought is only a penultimate way of aiming at the Ideas; that is, strictly, Ideas can be 
accessed only through intellection, and thus they remain beyond thought. This does not 
mean that thought is in no way related to the Ideas, but simply that its relation to them is 
instrumental: it is the hypothetical (ὑποθέσεις) by means of which one aims at the 
“unhypothetical” (ἀνυπόθετον).182 To conflate the two is to confuse two fundamentally 
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 Robin (1964, 185) writes: “toute l’Idée e la totalité des Idées participent du Beau et du Vrai, comme 
elles participent du Bien. [...] Du rapprochement de ces textes, on peut induire, je crois que le Bien forme 
avec la Vrai et le Beau, qui n’en sont d’ailleurs que les aspects, une sphère d’existence superieur à 
l’existence même d’un monde idéal.” Cf. Festugière (1950, 164–185). Another lifelong reader of Plato, 
H.-G. Gadamer (1995, 481), writes: “what distinguishes the beautiful from the good is that the beautiful 
of itself presents itself, that its being is such that it makes itself immediately evident [einleuchtend]. This 
means that beauty has the most important ontological function: that of mediating between idea and 
appearance. This is the metaphysical crux of Platonism.” 
 
180
 The Divided Line Passage should be read jointly with the simile of the sun (Republic VI.506e–509c), 
the image (εἰκών) of the cave (VII.514a–521a), and the rest of Republic VII, especially the description of 
dialectic (VII.531c–535a). For an enlightening account of the unity and relation of these passages of the 
Republic see Sinaiko (1965, 119–190). 
 
181
 Republic VI.509d8; see also VI.507b9–10. 
 
182
 Republic VI.511a3–d5; cf. Phaedo 96a–102a. 
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different ways of being related to the Intelligible, or, as Socrates puts it, two different 
“dispositions in the soul” (παθήματα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ: Republic VI.511d7). 
Let us now turn to the Symposium. Broadly, I maintain that the four sections of 
the Divided Line can be linked to the four levels of Eros’ ascent.183 For our purposes, the 
key parallels are those between the sections of thought (διάνοια) and intellection (νόησις) 
in the Line and the levels of knowledge/study (ἐπιστήμη/μάθημα) and the sudden contact 
with Beauty itself in the ascent respectively.
184
 I believe that the lack of discursiveness 
(λόγος) in the final rung of the ascent ladder justifies an interpretation of this level in 
terms that are other than dianoetic. 
This parallel may appear problematic in light of Plato’s rather loose usage of the 
word ἐπιστήμη in the Divided Line and the Ascent Passages. Plato, however, modifies his 
terminology at Republic VII.533c7–534a5, where he has Socrates affirm that earlier (i.e., 
in the Divided Line Passage) ἐπιστήμη and διάνοια were hastily conflated, while in fact 
διάνοια is clearer than opinion (δόξα) but darker than knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). One may 
infer that in a strict or technical sense ἐπιστήμη coincides with the νόησις of the Divided 
Line, and δόξα coincides with πίστις. However, νόησις is now used to designate the 
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 See Subsection 1.5.1 above; cf. Moravcsik (1971, 295). 
 
184
 Rosen (1987, 274) adds an important piece to the puzzle, namely the replacement of ἐπιστήμη with 
μάθημα at the end of the ascent because μάθημα “refers, not to scientific knowledge, but to an 
understanding, which is broader than science. The understanding of beauty includes an appreciation of 
bodies.” This, however, is true only of the synoptic version of the ascent, while in the longer version 
ἐπιστήμη remains the term of choice. Instead, appreciation of bodies is found in both versions. However, 
while Rosen is correct in claiming that the understanding of beauty includes “an appreciation of bodies,” 
we should notice that such an appreciation presupposes, in turn, an appreciation of beauty, for one would 
not even be in the position of desiring a body if this were not already appreciated as beautiful to some 
extent. Thus, even the desire of a single beautiful body already includes an appreciative adumbration of 
beauty; as such, it transcends the urge to merely sexual satisfaction and belongs already to the field of 
aesthetics (cf. Moravcsik 1951, 291–292). In any event, these two readings are not necessarily at variance 
with each other. 
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general disposition of the soul toward the upper part of the line (now called οὐσία), 
while δόξα names the general disposition of the soul toward the lower part (now called 
γένεσις), so that the revised version of the Line is as follows: (1) the sensible realm of 
becoming (γένεσις) is grasped through opinion (δόξα), which includes (a) imaging 
(εἰκασία) and (b) belief (πίστις); (2) the intelligible realm of Being (οὐσία) is grasped 
through intellection (νόησις), which includes (c) thought (διάνοια) and (d) knowledge 
(ἐπιστήμη). If I am correct, the meaning of ἐπιστήμη in the Ascent Passage (Symposium 
210c6–7, d7, 211a7) will have to correspond, not to the strict or technical sense of the 
same term in Republic VII.533c7–534a5, but to its loose usage in the earlier Divided Line 
Passage.
185
 These results are summarized in the following table.
186
 
Table 1. Parallels between the Line of the Republic and the Ascent of the Symposium 
Republic VI 
511d8–e2 
Visible kind 
(τὸ τοῦ ὁρωμένου γένους) 
Intelligible kind 
(τὸ τοῦ νοουμένου γένους) 
Imaging 
(εἰκασία) 
Belief (πίστις) Thought (διάνοια) 
Intellection 
(νόησις) 
Republic VII 
533c7–534a5 
Sensible realm of becoming 
(γένεσις) 
grasped through opinion (δόξα) 
Intelligible realm of Being (οὐσία) 
grasped through intellection 
(νόησις) 
= Republic VI = Republic VI = Republic VI 
Knowledge 
(ἐπιστήμη) 
Symposium 
210a4–212a7 
[Body (σῶμα)] [Soul (ψυχή)] 
Knowledge, study 
(ἐπιστήμη, 
μάθημα) 
Sudden contact 
with 
Beauty itself 
 
Now, how does the connection between beauty and goodness, quickly established 
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 Hyland raises a very similar point, but does not mention the Divided Line explicitly. He writes: “Insight 
into a form is non-discursive, or to put it more positively, it is noetic rather than dianoetic. Such insight is 
also not daimonstrable knowledge (episteme)” (Hyland, 2008, 58); cf. also Rosen (2005, 265–266). 
 
186
 I did not nor will try to justify the first two parallels from the Symposium (those of body and soul), 
which are included in the table only tentatively (hence my placing them in square brackets). For an 
analogous sketch of the parallels within the Republic, cf. Sinaiko (1965, 148). 
 
  
64 
by Socrates in the Symposium (201c1–5, 204e1–2), relate to the parallel between the 
sections of the Divided Line and the levels of the ascent? Plato refers to the Good as 
ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας (Republic VI.509b9).187 If in this context οὐσία can be legitimately 
taken as naming the intelligible realm, or the Ideas (Republic VI.507b5–7), and if the 
intelligible is the correlate of νόησις (Republic VII.534a3), then something other than 
knowledge or intellection
188
 (or at least along with it
189
) is required in order draw near to 
the Good. 
The point is controversial because of Plato’s usage of the expression ἡ τοῦ 
ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα (the Idea of the Good),190 from which it would seem fair to infer that the 
Good should be understood strictly as an Idea, and as such it would be the correlate of 
knowledge. However, this reasoning is inconclusive, since due to the semantic breadth of 
ἰδέα and εἶδος, ultimately one cannot offer a univocal qualification, let alone a single 
rendering, of these terms. It is at least doubtful, therefore, that τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα should be 
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 The “beyond” (ἐπέκεινα) indicates a radical difference of status rather than a brute negation. Thus, in 
Plato to be beyond οὐσία does not mean to be non-existent, as a contemporary of Plotinus (VP 3.29), the 
pagan Origen, seems to have thought (cf. Proclus, Platonic Theology II.4.31.8–21), and as Baltes (1997) 
shows in an impressively thorough article (see also Whittaker 1969). Similarly, for Plotinus to be beyond 
οὐσία means, not to be non-existent, but to “be” beyond the realm designated by οὐσία in its technical 
acceptation, namely Intellect (νοῦς): again, a radical difference of status rather than a brute negation. For 
references on this point in Plotinus see Chapter Three notes 68, 69, and 70.  
 
188
 Whether the νόησις of the first version of the Divided Line or the ἐπιστήμη of the revised version. 
 
189
 See Kanh (1987, 94). See Subsection 1.5.3 below. 
 
190
 Republic VI.505a2, 508e3, VII.517c1, 526e1, 534c1; cf. also Parmenides 134c1, Philebus 64a2. Εἶδος is 
never paired with ἀγαθόν in Republic VI, but the association does occur at Republic V.476a4–5 and 
Parmenides 130b8, 135c9–d1 (it is also found at Republic II.357c5, but in a different acceptation, much 
like ἰδέα at Cratylus 418e7). At Republic VII.540a9, the Good is also called παράδειγμα (i.e., pattern or 
model), a term often found in the context of the discussion of Forms or Ideas (cf. Euthyphro 6e4, 
Republic VI.500e3, Theaetetus 176e3, Timaeus 28a7, 29b4, 39e7, 48e5, 49 a1). 
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taken technically as a correlate of knowledge and of knowledge alone.
191
 I am not 
denying that there is—in fact, that there must be—a certain “epistemic” access to the 
Good. If the Good were not known in any way, could one even hope to access it qua 
Good? However, it is important to keep in mind that ἐπιστήμη of the Good is not itself 
the Good, although for (at least some) human rational beings it may be the best possible 
way to be somehow in contact with it. This claim needs to be qualified further. 
We can divide Plato’s statements on the relation of the Good and knowledge in 
the Republic in two groups: (a) those in which the Good is more or less explicitly said to 
be beyond knowledge;
192
 and (b) those in which the Good is said to be knowable in some 
way or another.
193
 The apparent contradiction between (a) and (b) disappears, I believe, if 
we take (a) to entail that knowledge is not a πάθημα that belongs to the Good itself, and if 
we understand (b) to mean that ἐπιστήμη is a possible way of accessing the Good (at least 
partially). 
Two separate questions are at work here. One is whether ἐπιστήμη actually grants 
us access to the Good. The other is whether ἐπιστήμη should be ascribed to the Good 
(that is, whether the Good itself exercises knowledge). If I am correct in my interpretation 
of Plato’s statements I just proposed, it seems fair to say that his answer to the second 
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 As Peperzak (1997, 245 note 91) rightly points out, when this happens, Plato’s usage of εἶδος and ἰδέα 
“is subjugated to a non-Platonic framework that tells us more about the conceptual or representational 
frameworks of the researchers than of Plato’s experiences and experiments.” 
 
192
 See Republic VI.508a11–b1, and the emphatic 508e1–509b10. 
 
193
 Besides the references to τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα and παράδειγμα given in note 190 above, the following 
passages from the Republic can be cited to support the view that the Good can be known: Republic 
V.476e4–477a5, 479d3–9, VI.504c9–d2, 504e4–505b1, 508b9–c2, 509d1–4, 510a9, VII.517b7–c5, 
519c8–d2, 526d7–e4, 532a5–b2, 534b3–d1, 540a8–9. 
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question is negative.
194
 As for the answer to the first question, it appears to be positive, 
but with two very important caveats: (i) “epistemic” access to the Good brings us as close 
as we can get to it, but the epistemic activity whereby proximity to the Good is achieved 
is not itself the Good;
195
 (ii) “epistemic” access to the Good is not independent of a 
previous overcoming of the dispositions (παθήματα: Republic VI.511d7) proper of the 
lower sections of the Line, or of the desire for beauties at the lower levels of the ascent.
196
 
This does not mean that all must start the dialectical ascent from the lowest section of the 
                                                 
194
 This will be the standard position of the tradition of Neoplatonism. 
 
195
 Thus, much like sight is not the sun but is called “sunlike” (ἡλιοειδής: Republic VI.508b3, 509a1), 
knowledge and truth are not the Good but are called “goodlike” or “boniform” (ἀγαθοειδής: Republic 
VI.509a3). Similarly, in Letters VII.342, we are given a distant parallel of the Line in which the 
knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) of a thing is said to be acquired through three instruments: its name (ὄνομα), its 
account (λόγος), and its image (εἴδωλον). What matters most is that Plato clearly states that the “thing 
itself which is known and truly is” (αὐτὸ... ὃ δὴ γνωστόν τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ἐστιν ὄν: 342a8–b1) is other than 
the knowledge of it, although reason (νοῦς) is closest to it in kinship and likeness (συγγενείᾳ καὶ 
ὁμοιότητι: 342d2). 
 
196
 I want to stress that here ἐπιστήμη does not mean knowledge that leaves the knower unaffected by what 
is known. As already pointed out earlier, ἐπιστήμη is a condition or disposition (πάθημα: Republic 
VI.511d7) of the soul (and so are εἰκασία, πίστις, and διάνοια), that is, an overall attitude of the soul 
toward the Good qua Truth. As such, it implies a radical turn (στρέφειν πρὸς, περιαγωγή, 
μεταστραφήσεται, συμπεριαγωγοῖς: Republic VII.518c7, d4, d5, 533d3) of the eyes toward the sun, or of 
the entire soul toward the Good. The education of the philosopher in the Republic refers precisely to this 
turning process (see Republic VII.518a–d, 527d6–e3, 529a9–b3, 533c7–d4). And if to this we add that 
things known (i.e., the Ideas) owe to the Good not only their being known, but also their very being (τοῖς 
γιγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε 
καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ’ ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι: Republic VI.509b6–8), it seems at least implausible to take 
the central books of the Republic as just a treatise in epistemology. As I hinted earlier (pages 12–16; note 
30 for references), for virtually all ancient philosophers the practice of philosophy, while essentially 
cognitive, does not coincide with a merely cognitive grasp of true information, but with the 
transformation of one’s soul in light of what is cognized. Knowledge in the strict sense, ἐπιστήμη, 
presupposes this transformation. Thus, to claim to know the Good while still confusing an image (εἰκών) 
with that of which it is an image already betrays the absence of knowledge understood, not as a mere 
cognitive grasp of things, but as a way of being of the soul (for that matter, it betrays the absence of 
διάνοια and πίστις as well, and certifies the presence of εἰκασία). Similarly, to claim to know the 
difference between noble and vulgar love while maintaining, as Pausanias does (Symposium 180e3–
181c2), that the same action can be derived interchangeably from either one of these kinds of love, means 
already to place oneself in an ambiguous position with respect to one’s claim (for a critique of Pausanias’ 
position, see Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan 2004, 56–62). Incidentally, the passages cited in this note are 
among those providing solid textual ground for such notions as purification and return which will be 
central to Plotinus’ system (see Subsection 4.6.1 below). 
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Line, but only that if one falls back on, say, εἰκασία, then he has not truly reached the 
section of πίστις (yet). Similarly, it does not mean that all must start the “erotic”197 ascent 
from the lowest rungs of Eros’ ladder, but only that if one still struggles to see beyond, 
say, the beauty of body, then she has not truly mastered (yet) the ability to see the 
superiority of spiritual beauty. An important corollary to this in connection with our main 
topic: ἐπιστήμη is not foreign to Love (cf. Subsection 4.3.2 for an analogous point in 
Plotinus). That is, insofar as Beauty is an Idea, my goal should be to access it 
epistemically. However, as we pointed out, unlike other Ideas Beauty has the privilege of 
shining forth most brilliantly in the sensible. For this reason, at least initially, the ascent 
of Love toward the Good qua Beauty, rather than that of dialectic toward the Good qua 
Truth, would seem to be the preferred path of the many, were it only for the greater 
“visibility” of Beauty comparatively to the other Ideas.198 
At this point one may wonder what the systematic role of the Good is, and what a 
way of relating to it could possibly look like. Concerning its systematic role, Socrates 
draws on his metaphor of the sun as he claims that the Good is what makes for the 
knowability and the very being of the Ideas in the same (metaphorical) way as the sun 
makes for the visibility, existence, and life of sensible things.
199
 Without the sun (the 
Good), there would be nothing to see (to grasp epistemically) not merely because light 
                                                 
197
 As pointed out in note 2 of the Preface, “erotic” and “erotically” should be taken to mean “pertaining to 
eros.” 
 
198
 But this does not necessarily mean that one never stops at lower desiderata by taking them as the end of 
the ascent, or rather, by more or less consciously being taken captive by them. The figure of the tyrant in 
Republic IX could be read as an extreme example of such captivity. See note 233. 
 
199
 Republic VI.508b9–509b10, VII.516b9–c2, 517b7–c5. See also my remarks in Chapter Three note 12. 
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(epistemic light) would be absent, but, more radically, because there would be 
nothing.
200
 
As for a possible way of relating to the Good, what I said above about ἐπιστήμη 
applies here. Only I would like to add that the sun (Good) causes things (Ideas) to be seen 
(known) without itself being seen (known). Republic VI.508b9–10 seems to warn us 
against this addition, however: “And thus the sun is not sight, but being its cause, is seen 
by sight itself, is it not?”201 I believe that a different, less immediately literal reading of 
these lines is possible if one allows for a thought experiment. What would it be to see 
light without there being any visible things around other than light itself? Could we still 
call “seeing” the kind of seeing in which there is nothing but light to be seen? Would 
light, pure and unmixed, be truly visible? Even admitting that it would, I must confess 
that I am having a hard time grasping such a concept of vision.
202—But as soon as light 
meets things, light itself is “seen.” That is, as soon as light illumines things, it is both 
grasped as the cause of sight itself and is itself visibly perceived in its intercourse with 
the seen. Thus, the condition in which Plato says that the sun is seen must be one in 
which other things are already in place. Without the sun, one would plunge into utter 
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 The issue requires an extensive treatment which would take us too far afield from our main topic. All I 
can do here is to hide behind four bibliographical references which I found particularly useful despite 
their differences: Friedländer (1958, 59–84), Sinaiko (1965, 119–144), Reale (1997b, 109–151), Gerson 
(1990, second chapter, in particular 57–66). 
 
201
 Republic VI.508b9–10: Ἆρ’ οὖν οὐ καὶ ὁ ἥλιος ὄψις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, αἴτιος δ’ ὢν αὐτῆς ὁρᾶται ὑπ’ αὐτῆς 
ταύτης; 
 
202
 All is seen in the light of the sun, whereby there is sight. But what does it mean to see the sun in its own 
light? What does vision become when all there is to see is light? What would be of knowledge and eros if 
the “screens” of Truth and Beauty were lifted from the Good? 
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darkness; without things, one would face pure light.
203
 The visibility of the sun, 
therefore, is always already a seeing-with. If the “-with” is removed, seeing goes with it, 
and one is left wondering about a way to envision this most peculiar face-to-face 
encounter with light.
204
 
But while wondering, things are seen in the light of the sun; while wondering, the 
Good beyond being (Republic VI.509b9), yet more prized than knowledge and truth 
(Republic VI.508e6–509a1), is approached from the hither side of things. One can 
become aware of it through its effects and, once our sight (the soul’s power to learn) has 
been properly redirected and our eyes (the soul’s eye, to be sure205) strengthened, we may 
begin to study it (Republic VII.515e1–c2, 518a1–519b6). And while in the central books 
of the Republic the ascent is accomplished through dialectic and the Good is thus 
approached under the aspect of Truth, in the Symposium the ascent occurs by way of 
Love, the Good being thus approached under the aspect of Beauty. 
Beyond being and more prized than knowledge and truth, the Good is not beyond 
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 If, that is, there could be a plunging or a facing “one.” The realm of vision, much like those of Truth and 
of Love, is an intermediate realm. 
 
204
 Analogously, the understanding of Truth is always already an understanding-with; were we to erase the 
“-with,” knowledge would be effaced with it, and we would be left other-than-knowingly wondering 
about this encounter with that which is the ground of knowledge. And so the love of Beauty is always 
already a loving-with; disposing of the “-with,” what would love become?—Is this the juncture at which 
knowledge would be replaced by an encounter that, while coinciding with none of the other sections of 
the Line, nor with utter darkness, one could describe only negatively as otherwise than epistemic? Is this 
where eros is transfigured into something which is neither impassibility nor lack, and becomes an 
encounter μόνου πρὸς μόνον (Plotinus VI.9 [9] 11.51)? Incidentally, the fact that the Good is beyond 
knowledge justifies a double trend in Platonic interpretation: “aporetic,” whereby direct knowledge of the 
principle is deemed impossible; and “mystical,” whereby the impossibility of accessing the principle by 
means of knowledge does not necessitate the impossibility of accessing it altogether. The two trends are 
not mutually exclusive. 
 
205
 Republic VII.519b3; see pages 139–142 below. Elsewhere Socrates remarks that if the art of dialectic is 
to bear fruit, it must be introduced to the right soul (ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν: Phaedrus 276e6). Cf. note 70 
above. 
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all contact. Beauty is precisely one aspect under which such contact is possible, if eros 
is followed correctly (ὀρθῶς: Symposium 210a2, 4, e3, 211b5, 7). For this reason, Beauty 
has a privileged status among the Ideas; in fact, I believe it can be safely maintained that 
the Beauty of the Symposium is coextensive with the Good of the Republic and that its 
transcendence, much like that of the Good, is superior to the transcendence of the other 
Ideas, as already observed in a stimulating study by Krüger.
206
 To draw again on the 
metaphor of light, one could envision Beauty as the very shadow of the Good, but given 
what I have been arguing in this subsection, I prefer to say that Beauty is like the shadow 
of the thing, and this for two reasons. First, because pure light is itself shadowless; and 
second, because by detaching Beauty from the beautiful thing, one may end up thinking 
of it, quite absurdly, as of a thing alongside or above things. Instead, Beauty would never 
appear without the beautiful thing. To think of it otherwise would be like taking taste, 
smell, and color as things alongside the tasted, smelled, and seen; what is the pleasant 
shade of a plane tree independently of that plane tree? Conversely, the beautiful thing 
would never be perceived as beautiful without Beauty: flavorless flavor, odorless odor, 
colorless color; could a plane tree along the Ilisus ever be separated from its pleasant 
shade? And yet, its shade belongs to the tree not like an item possessed: were it not for 
the light that illumines the tree, not only would the shade never appear; it would never be. 
As the light of the sun makes the pleasant shade of the tree exist and appear, so the Good 
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 Cf. Krüger (1963, 217): “kann es keinem Zweifel unterliegen, daβ das Schöne im ‘Symposion’, das ja 
mit dem Guten identisch ist (204e; o. S. 157 ff.), genau wie das Gute im ‘Staat’ eine Jenseitigkeit haben 
soll, die die der sonstigen Ideen ungeheuerlich überragt (509c).” Cf. also Gadamer (1986, 27–30). 
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makes Beauty shine in all things beautiful.
207
 
One final remark: it will be suspected that what I have put forward in the last two 
subsections already amounts to “neoplatonizing” or “plotinizing” Plato. Partially, it does; 
not because I am overtly attempting to distort Plato, however, but because I believe that 
what will come to be known as the hypostatic division of reality can already be detected, 
distantly and in outline, in the Platonic text, of which the Ascent Passage is but a 
sample.
208
 I am not insisting that Plato worked out this theory in all its details or that, 
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 This metaphor, like all metaphors, has its shortcomings. What is problematic in this particular case is 
that in Plato and in the Platonic tradition it is sensible things that are likewise metaphorically referred to 
as shadows (σκιά: Meno 100a2–5, Republic VI.510a1, e2, VII.515a–517e, 532b4–d1), images or 
representations (εἴδωλον: Sophist 234c6,236a6, 239d4, d7, 240a5, a7, 241e3, 260c8, 264c12, Statesman 
286a1, 303c2, 306d2, Symposium 212a4, Phaedrus 250d5, Republic VII.520c4, 534c5, X.598b8, 599a7, 
d3, 600e5, 601b9, Letters VII.342b2; εἰκών: Phaedo 99e1, Sophist 236a8, c3, 240b11, b13, 241e3, 
260c8, 264c12, Phaedrus 250b4, Republic VI.509a9, e1, 510b4, b8, e3, 511a6, Timaeus 29b2–3, c2), 
copies or imitations (μίμημα: Sophist 241e3, Republic X.599b), likenesses (ὁμοίωμα: Sophist 266d7, 
Parmenides 132d3, 133d1, Phaedrus 250a6, b3; ὁμοιότης: Phaedo 74a7, Letters VII.342d2), and 
appearances (φάντασμα: Sophist 236b–c, Republic VI.510a1, VII.532c1, X.598b3) of the real (that is, 
intelligible) world, and not vice versa (in the passages just cited the terms are often used in combination, 
almost synonymously, as in Sophist 241e3). In other words, it is Ideas that are thought to be the (formal) 
causes of sensible things, and not conversely, as my metaphor would have us infer, the sensible things 
that cause Ideas. See Appendix C (4) for an analogous use of many such terms in Plotinus; cf. also 
Chapter Four note 62. 
 
208
 How much of Plotinus or of the tradition of Platonism one is allowed to find in Plato is a matter of 
debate on which not even some of the best scholars seem to agree (see for instance the brief exchange 
between Aubenque and de Vogel in Aubenque 1971, 109). Sallis (1996, 3) points out that “it is necessary 
to insist most stringently that the project of a philosophical interpretation not become an excuse for 
philological irresponsibility.” And echoing Heidegger, he continues: “If we are to avoid the hopeless 
confusion involved in interpreting the foundation of the tradition in terms of the tradition that is founded, 
it is necessary that we seek to get behind this tradition” (Sallis (1996, 4). He is correct; but we should 
also avoid the opposite confusion, namely the notion that nothing of the tradition is faithful to its 
foundation (to be sure, Sallis does not claim this). In other words, merely to interpret Plato in terms of the 
tradition of which he is the foundation is unwarranted and confusing; but positively to avoid this tradition 
on the (confused and likewise unwarranted) premises that it will a priori cloud our comprehension of the 
foundation is itself positively clouding. One may be forced to suspect, in turn, that such a move is due 
either to ignorance of the tradition or else to merely ideological reasons. A more inclusive procedure (one 
that requires time and effort to be carried out, for the tradition is vast and in some cases simply 
unavailable to the Greekless reader) is to approach the tradition in light of the foundation, and only then 
to consider whether the foundation may be clarified in light of the tradition. Is this a vicious circle? 
Likely; but do we have a better approach? It is certainly no more “vicious” than disregarding the tradition 
on the assumption that it will hinder our understanding of the foundation, as if we had already gained the 
privileged standpoint from which an understanding of both the foundation and the tradition becomes 
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even if he did, his descriptions were not to some extent experimental. Rather, I am 
simply suggesting that at least a certain consistency can be extracted from the dialogues 
on these points, a consistency which the so-called Neoplatonists, Plotinus in primis, will 
work hard to defend in order to develop the dialogues into a full-blown system (see 
Section 2.2). In any event, a most important detail would still be missing in this outline of 
a reconstructed system, namely Plato’s own assent to such a reconstruction, given also 
his explicit mistrust of the appropriateness of putting the highest matters (τιμιώτατα, 
τιμιώτερα) in writing.209 
1.5.3 Reason and Desire in the Ascent 
In the previous subsection I tried to connect the Symposium ascent to the issues of 
Ideas and the Good, and I briefly argued that Love is the path whereby the Good is 
approached under the aspect of Beauty. But what is the work of eros in this journey of 
ascent? Is the goal of eros’ ascent a matter of mere spontaneity, with no effort required 
on the part of the lover? In what sense does Diotima call the highest mysteries τὰ ἐρωτικά 
(210e2, 211b7, 212b4)? At a very basic level, these words mean that the thing whose 
possession makes us happy (204e5–205a4)—the Good, Beauty, Truth, the “first friend,” 
or “first loved,” of the Lysis—is not immediately grasped epistemically, but at first it is 
desired or loved, and only “divined”210 as that which will grant us happiness. For this 
                                                                                                                                                 
possible. See also my earlier remarks in Section 1.2. 
 
209
 On Plato’s attitude toward writing see Letters VII.341a7–342a1, Phaedrus 274b–277a; cf. Statesman 
285d8–286b2, Letters II.312d3–e1. See also note 70 above. 
 
210
 In Aristophanes’ words at Symposium 192c7–d2: “[c7] But it is clear that the soul of each of the two 
wants something else, [d1] which it is unable to express, but [the soul] can divine what it wants [2] and 
say it in riddles” ([c7] ἀλλ’ ἄλλο τι βουλομένη ἑκατέρου ἡ ψυχὴ [d1] δήλη ἐστίν, ὃ οὐ δύναται εἰπεῖν, 
ἀλλὰ μαντεύεται ὃ βούλεται, [2] καὶ αἰνίττεται). 
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reason, Beauty (in the wide semantic scope of καλός) has such a privileged position 
among the Ideas, for it makes the ultimate desideratum nearer to the sensible condition, 
the condition we are in. It will be objected that when one has achieved eternal possession 
of the summum desideratum, this is, precisely qua stably possessed, no longer desired 
(although arguably still loved). I will return to this in Subsection 1.5.5. My concern for 
the moment is to show, very generally, that eros is a legitimate path for accessing the 
Good, and, specifically and more radically, that an erotic element is never absent even 
from cognition. 
What does eros do? Very simply, it orients and moves the soul toward the Good 
under the aspect of Beauty.
211
 If eros were lacking, the soul would be aimless, like the 
demagnetized needle of a compass, unable to find the North. One will immediately 
contest that even the magnetized needle of a compass often fails to indicate the North, for 
instance when someone wearing a belt with a large iron buckle is standing very close to 
the compass in a direction other than North, say eastward. Far from upsetting or even just 
weakening the simile, this objection strengthens it, for it is the same force that regulates 
the direction of the needle, whether toward the North or toward the large iron buckle; in 
fact, one could say that in this image the buckle plays the role of the North due to its 
proximity to the compass. Something similar happens to a soul imbued with eros: it is 
directed toward Beauty, hence the Good. Surely its direction can change due to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
211
 See the passages from the Phaedrus (250b1–c1) cited in Subsection 1.5.2. For this reason, eros cannot 
be understood, à la Freud, as some sort of raw energy, generally sexual in nature, aimed at furthering life, 
for bare life is already a secondary aim, much like the wholeness sought after by Aristophanes’ spherical 
creatures. As a consequence, there cannot even be a question of sublimation or of counter-sublimation in 
Platonic eros. Cf. Moravcsik (1971, 291); Roochnick (1990, 120); R. E. Allen (1991, 58–59). For a 
concise exposition of these concepts in Freud, see Laplanche and Pontalis (1973, 153–154, 431–434). 
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proximity of something partially or qualifiedly beautiful, but if eros were absent, 
directedness and motion would vanish altogether. To add to the metaphor, one could say 
that we do not need a magnetized needle to be directed toward the North, since this can 
be found by other means (e.g., by reasoning on the position of the sun or other stars in the 
sky). Similarly, the Good can be approached under other aspects and by means other than 
eros, for instance under the aspect of Truth by means of dialectic. However, this does not 
make eros superfluous, much like a sunny day or a starry night do not dispose of 
magnetism. On the contrary, when fog and clouds hide the sky from view, a functioning 
compass is a most welcome instrument to find one’s way, much like Eros is said to be the 
best coworker (συνεργὸν: 212b3) even when the failure to gaze upon Truth disconcerts us 
and makes us weary of our distance from the Good.
212
 
But let us leave this metaphor behind and ask rather what it can possibly mean 
that eros points to the Good (under the aspect of Beauty). Plato has Socrates say it 
repeatedly and variously: everyone desires the good and acts for the sake of the good.
213
 
The claim is outrageous on the face of it, given the not uncommon experience of clearly 
misplaced desires. Does this mean that Plato was unfamiliar with the experience of raw 
cravings, devoid of all deliberation? A terminological clarification is in place. Plato’s 
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 All this, it will be objected, again, is only an image, and images do not make for arguments. Of course, 
the purpose of images is not to replace arguments, but simply to show that experiential claims which at 
first I may find bizarre due to fact that I never had the experience myself (e.g., that all eros orients the 
soul to the Good) have analogues that can help me overcome the initial puzzlement and perhaps dispose 
me to lend a less incredulous ear to the arguments to come. 
 
213
 See Meno77b–78c, particularly 77c1 (τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν) and 78b3–4: (βούλεσθαί τε τἀγαθὰ); 
Gorgias 468a–c and 499e, especially 468b1 (Τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες), 468b7 (Ἕνεκ’ ἄρα τοῦ 
ἀγαθοῦ), 468c5 (τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα), 499e6 (Ἕνεκα γάρ που τῶν ἀγαθῶν), 499e9 (ἐκείνου [i.e., 
τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ] ἕνεκα); Republic VI.505d–e, in particular d8 (τὰ ὄντα [ἀγαθὰ] ζητοῦσιν) and d11 (τούτου 
[i.e., τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ] ἕνεκα); cf. also Charmides 167e4–5. 
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generic term for desire is ἐπιθυμία.214 In this he differs from Aristotle, whose generic 
term is ὄρεξις (never occurring in Plato), while ἐπιθυμία is reserved to denote non-
rational desire and is distinct from βούλησις (rational desire, often rendered as “wish”) 
and θυμός (emotion, or spirit).215 What is missing in Plato’s terminology according to 
Aristotle’s scheme is an analogue of Aristotelian ἐπιθυμία; but this does not mean that 
Plato does not recognize the phenomenon.
216
 
Now, what kind of desire is eros? Is it closer to Aristotelian ἐπιθυμία, to 
βούλησις, or neither? Since the terms ἔρως and ἐρᾶν are often associated to ἐπιθυμία and 
ἐπιθυμεῖν in Plato,217 one may be tempted to take his use of ἔρως as a close equivalent of 
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 The generic use of ἐπιθυμία in Plato is clear as the term variously indicates, for instance, the desire to 
leave the city (Crito 52b7–8), desires of the body (Phaedo 66c7, 82c3; Cratylus 404a1–2, Laws 
VIII.837c4), the innate desire of the cosmos (Statesman 272e6), desire for wholeness (Symposium 
192e10), desire of good things (Symposium 205d2), desire of pleasures (Phaedrus 237d8), desire for food 
and drink (Phaedrus 238a7–b1, Republic IV.437b–439b), good and bad desires (Lysis 221b5–6, Republic 
VIII.561c1), the origin of φιλία (Lysis 221d3), the desire to know (Greater Hippias 297e3), sexual desire 
(Republic III.390c1), dronish desires (Republic VIII.554a–555b), lawless desires (Republic IX.572b5), 
tyrannical desires (Republic IX.587b1), desire for immortality (Laws IV.721d8), incestuous desire (Laws 
VIII.838b4), desire of spiritual beauty (Laws VIII.841c4–6), desire to enter politics (Letters VII.325b1), 
desire for philosophy (Letters VII.328a2, 330b6, 338b6, 345d3–4). 
 
215
 For Aristotle’s tripartite division of desire see De anima II.414b2, III.432b4–7, Nicomachean Ethics 
III.1111a27–28, 1111b10–30, Politics VII.1334b22–28, Rhetoric I.1368b37–1369a7. This division is 
based on Plato’s own tripartite division of the soul in Republic IV.434d2–441c3. 
 
216
 One can see that this is the case from Plato’s famous argument for the distinction of the irrational 
appetitive (ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν) from the rational (λογιστικόν) “part” of the soul (Republic 
IV.439d4–8). Glaucon states at Republic IV.437e7–8: “[e7] Thus, each desire is itself only of that [8] 
particular thing of which it is by nature, while [desires] of this or that kind of thing are additional” ([e7] 
Οὕτως, ἔφη, αὐτή γε ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἑκάστη αὐτοῦ μόνον [8] ἑκάστου οὗ πέφυκεν, τοῦ δὲ τοίου ἢ τοίου τὰ 
προσγιγνόμενα). As Socrates exemplifies in the same passage, thirst is a desire for drink, while desire for 
a good drink is supervening on the desire for drink tout-court. This would seem to contradict the 
statement that everyone desires the good and acts for its sake. What it actually does is simply to tell us 
that, while we all desire (βούλεσθαι) good things, some desires (ἐπιθυμίαι) are indifferent to the intrinsic 
goodness of their objects as long as these objects are not perceived as bad. In other words, all βούλησις is 
for the good, while ἐπιθυμία, although not aiming at something openly perceived as bad, is “neutral with 
regard to judgments concerning what is good” (Kahn 1996, 245; see the whole section in Kahn 1996, 
243–247). 
 
217
 See Phaedo 66c2; Symposium 197a7, 200a3–201b2 (βούλεσθαι is also included), 207a7; Phaedrus 
237d5; Lysis 221b7–e4 (φιλεῖν is also included); Republic IX.573b–c, 578a11; Timaeus 91b3–4, c7–d1; 
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Aristotle’s use of ἐπιθυμία. However, it has been observed that in Diotima’s discourse, 
the term chosen to indicate the kind of eros Socrates has in mind (i.e., desire to possess 
the good forever) is βούλεσθαι, thus leading one to suspect that in the Symposium Plato 
was trying to work out a more consistent terminology by equating eros to rational 
desire.
218
 An equation of this kind would have the advantage of shedding light on the 
(henceforth only apparent) paradox of Socratic intellectualism insofar as “no one desires 
[βούλεσθαι] bad things.”219 For this reason, the equation is very attractive, were it not for 
the fact that βούλεσθαι sometimes occurs in association with ἐπιθυμεῖν.220 Ultimately, it 
seems fair to conclude that Plato offers only a relatively consistent terminology of desire 
in and after the Symposium (and before it only in hindsight), a consistency that makes the 
equation of ἔρως and βούλησις feasible, but not incontrovertible. Thus, we may say that 
every good we attain (even the apparent goods that turn out to be deleterious in the long 
run) is attained on the ground of a basic desire for the Good.
221
 When the Good is desired 
                                                                                                                                                 
Laws III.688b3, V.734a2–4, VI.782d10–783b1, IX.870a1–6. In the Symposium, Pausanias points out the 
duplicity of Eros in his speech (180e1–3 ff.). 
 
218
 Cf. Hyland (1968, 38–39). In particular, see Symposium 200a1–d7, 205a5–7. 
 
219
 Meno 78b1–2 (see the whole section 77b–78b). See Kahn (1996, 137–142, 243–253, 263). 
 
220
 In fairness to Hyland (1968), the association of βούλεσθαι and ἐπιθυμεῖν (and their cognates) does not 
occur in Socrates’ speech after Diotima has defined eros as the desire for the eternal possession of the 
good (206a11–12), although ἔρως and ἐπιθυμία are paired again at 207a7, and for the transitive law one 
might have to take this as an association of βούλησις and ἐπιθυμία. Moreover, a use of ἔρως clearly not 
coextensive with βούλησις occurs in dialogues likely posterior to the Symposium (e.g., Republic 
IX.573a2, b6–7, 586c2, X.607e4–7; Timaeus 69d4–5; Laws I.632a1, 649d5, VII.823e6, VIII.831c4, 
836b7, XII.941c6), a sign that Plato either abandoned his (alleged) plan for a more consistent 
terminology, or else that this served only the purposes of the Symposium. Similarly, the distinction of 
ἔρως and ἐπιθυμία (see note 217 above), and of βούλεσθαι and ἐπιθυμεῖν and their cognates are not 
sharply drawn even in dialogues likely posterior to the Symposium (e.g., Republic III.390c1–4, 
VIII.557e2–5; Laws III.687a8–b1, VIII.837c3–d6; Letters VII.331a1–2; see also Symposium 200b9–d6). 
 
221
 Those goods that are attained by chance are welcomed with a smile, a sign that we did, in fact, desire 
them, or would have desired them, had we reflected on the possibility of possessing them. 
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under the aspect of Beauty, this desire, at least in the Symposium and the Phaedrus, is 
called eros.
222
 
On this basis, we may wonder, on the one hand, whether even the raw cravings 
we mentioned above (see note 211) are altogether deprived of a rational element, namely 
the ability to distinguish their proper object: being thirsty, I aim at drink, not at, say, food 
or sexual pleasure. On the other hand, one may also ask whether reason itself is 
altogether deprived of a desiderative element. Commenting on Plato’s tripartite division 
of the soul in the fourth book of the Republic, Kahn distinguishes three senses in which 
reason, or the rational part (τὸ λογιστικόν),223 is said to rule the soul: (a) in the weakest 
sense, instrumentally, or as the means through which certain ends are achieved while the 
ends themselves lie beyond reason’s jurisdiction; (b) in a stronger sense, as determining 
also the ends of action; (c) in the strongest sense, as itself “the goal of human life through 
its own philosophical activity.”224 A desiderative element is present in all the three senses 
in which reason is said to rule the soul. As Kahn remarks, even in the weakest sense, it is 
not clear how reason as the power of deliberation and judgment can overcome such 
cravings as intense thirst unless reason were identical with or included in its essence “a 
primitive desire for the good, an irreducible, non-derivative urge to pursue what it takes 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
222
 On this point I am in general agreement with Kahn (1996, 263), who however is more emphatic about 
the association of ἔρως and βούλησις. 
 
223
 Republic IV.441e4–6: Οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ ἄρχειν προσήκει... 
 
224
 Kahn (1987, 87). Kahn observes that in the weakest sense, reason does not really rule the soul (or it does 
so only incidentally), while the distinction between the stronger and the strongest sense mirrors the 
distinction between pre-philosophic and philosophic virtue in Republic IV and V–VI respectively. 
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to be good and advantageous.”225 
Conversely, this description of reason can be legitimately tailored to fit eros, that 
is: eros includes reason in its essence insofar as it is “a primitive desire for the good, an 
irreducible, non-derivative urge to pursue what it takes to be good and advantageous.” In 
other words, eros includes reason in its essence in the sense that the love for partially or 
qualifiedly beautiful things is not taken at face value but, while cherished, is questioned 
with regard to the kind of beauty it is after.
226
 In other words, as soon as I reflect on the 
object of my love, I come to realize its intrinsic limitations, and while maintaining my 
assent to its relative attractiveness, I direct my erotic aim first to all things of the same 
kind,
227
 then to things which, while of a worthier kind, are nonetheless connected to those 
things left behind insofar as they are beautiful (καλὰ),228 and finally to that which is 
unqualifiedly beautiful: Beauty itself. This process of questioning, “abstracting,” 
“universalizing,” “ascending,” and so on, is not something other than eros; it is itself eros 
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 Kahn (1987, 89). On reason as including a desiderative element, or as itself a kind of desire (i.e., the 
highest desire), see Roochnik (1990, 108–109). This view seems to presuppose the quasi-Spinozistic 
stance that a desire can be overcome only by a stronger desire (see Spinoza, Ethics IV.p7). We need not 
deny this, as long as (i) we do not take the force of any given desire to be the same under all conditions, 
(ii) we admit that reason is itself a peculiar kind of desire, or a desire aimed at a rather peculiar kind of 
object (i.e., the Good), and (iii) we maintain that what is desired is desired because it is (to some extent) 
good, and not, vice versa, merely judged to be good because it is desired (contra Spinoza, Ethics III.p9.s; 
see Chapter Four note 12 for references to the issue in Plotinus. 
 
226
 The presence of reason in Eros’ ladder is clearly signaled by the following words: κατανοῆσαι (210a8), 
ἄνοια (210b2), ἵνα ἀναγκασθῇ αὖ θεάσασθαι (210c3), ἰδεῖν (210c4), ἵνα (210c5), ἀγαγεῖν, ἵνα ἴδῃ [...] 
ἐπιστημῶν [...] βλέπων (210c7), θεωρῶν (210d4), διανοήματα ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ (210d5–6) κατίδῃ τινὰ 
ἐπιστήμην (210d7), λόγους (210a8, c1, d5). 
 
227
 Symposium 210a8–b1: [a8] ἔπειτα δὲ αὐτὸν κατανοῆσαι ὅτι τὸ κάλλος [b1] τὸ ἐπὶ ὁτῳοῦν σώματι τῷ ἐπὶ 
ἑτέρῳ σώματι ἀδελφόν ἐστι. 
 
228
 Symposium 210b6–7: [b6] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὸ ἐν ταῖς [7] ψυχαῖς κάλλος τιμιώτερον ἡγήσασθαι τοῦ ἐν τῷ 
σώματι. 
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in its full trajectory.
229
 
Moreover, the very fact that the ascent is a process makes of eros not an 
accomplished feat, but a project, a task. This project indicates an ultimate aim, Beauty 
itself, as much as the necessity of transforming one’s erotic relations, and therefore 
oneself, in light of this aim. The aim of love is identified with beautiful things and is 
initially revealed through the senses, but it is not coextensive with these things (nor, for 
that matter, with any of the inferior rungs of the ladder). One ought to follow a path in 
order to reach that to which eros points. Hence, love correctly understood in its nature 
indicates not so much an object to grasp, as a task for the lover: an invitation to 
approximate the highest desideratum by a process of self-transformation (see note 196). 
Finally, the possibility of error in the ascent is hardly ever foreclosed. Diotima’s 
specification that one must proceed “correctly”230 into “erotics” implicitly warns us about 
the possibility of going astray while attempting the ascent. The same eros that points at 
the Good simultaneously constitutes the risk of misinterpreting the nature of the ultimate 
desideratum
231
 and may accidentally lead to the lover’s inability to leave behind lower 
                                                 
229
 If only to this extent, I find Moravcsik’s distinction of steps of Eros (E-steps) and steps of Reason (R-
steps) in the ascent as slightly off the mark, for the whole process is itself erotic, and therefore R-steps 
are already also E-steps (see Moravcsik 1971). An alternative to this is to relabel E-steps (say, as 
affective steps: A-steps) and to consider the erotic ascent as a unitary process, to which R-steps, A-steps, 
and C-steps (steps of creation) belong as equally important (and equally erotic) moments. 
 
230
 Symposium 210a2, 4, e3, 211b5, 7: ὀρθῶς. 
 
231
 The difficulty of correctly grasping the nature of the Good is often pointed out in the dialogues. See the 
whole of the Philebus, especially 20b–23b, on the question of trying to determine the nature of the kind 
of good that would bring happiness to human beings. Compare Socrates’ embarrassment when Glaucon 
asks him to discuss the Good: he admits that while the “Idea of the Good is the most important thing to 
study” (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα μέγιστον μάθημα: Republic VI.505a2), all he can do is to offer an approximate 
account of it, and in fact not an actual account of the Good, but only of its offspring (ἔκγονος), the sun 
(Republic VI.506d6–e5). All the so-called aporetic dialogues could also be read as expressions of the 
many difficulties involved in trying to understand the nature of virtue, which plays a very important role 
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desiderata due to habit,
232
 even to the point of turning the lover into the pathological 
slave of a particular desire.
233
 All cases, and the last one in particular, are indicative of 
the potential danger that constantly accompanies one’s journey into the things of love.234 
In order to better understand the kind of transformation entailed by an ascent 
called erotic in the sense outlined above, I will offer three illustrations of how Socrates’ 
speech, which itself contains a paradigmatic illustration of the truly erotic ascent, relates 
to other parts of the Symposium as a subtle critique of partial views of eros. 
1.5.4 The Ascent Passage in Relation to Other Parts of the Symposium: 
Three Illustrations 
The first illustration concerns the other speeches found in the Symposium. If 
                                                                                                                                                 
in the ascent (this will be true of Plotinus as well, as we shall see in the last chapter, Subsection 4.5.1). 
 
232
 In Phaedrus 253c–255e the madness of love is accompanied by the struggle of the charioteer to subdue 
the unruly horse; there is no guarantee that the charioteer will succeed in taming the horse. Even worse, 
in Republic VI.489d–495b the best souls, that is, those possessing an eros for the intelligible (Republic 
VI.485b1, 490b2), if badly nurtured, are those most exposed to the risk of becoming the worst: corruptio 
optimi pessima. The four constitutions and their corresponding souls described in Republic VIII–IX are at 
the same time failures to understand the nature of the Good and exemplary illustrations of what a politeia 
and its people may look like when the Good is replaced by some surrogate (i.e., honor in timocracy, 
wealth in oligarchy, license in democracy, and a single dronish desire in tyranny). 
 
233
 See the description of tyranny as a kind of slavery (Republic IX.577b–580c) and of the tyrannical soul 
as governed by a kind of Eros which is itself tyrannical (Republic IX.572b–575a). In particular, see the 
occurrences of ἔρως at Republic IX.572e5, 573a1, 578a11, 579b5, 586c2, and of Ἔρως at Republic 
IX.573b7, d4, e6, 574d8, e2, 575a1. 
 
234
 In this connection, we should not fail to notice Diotima’s reference to the possibility of being led by 
another in the ascent (Symposium 211c1). If there is any historical truth to her character and to Socrates’ 
association with her (see note 132), she might have played the significant role of Socrates’ guide into the 
“erotics” (Symposium 201d5: τὰ ἐρωτικὰ). The helpfulness of a guide, however, does not dispense with 
the individual soul’s responsibility nor does it guarantee success in the ascent. Alcibiades is a clear 
example of a failure to follow the guide that was available to him in the person of Socrates. Aristodemus 
may be read as an example of someone who followed his guide obsessively, an exaggerate admirer of 
Socrates rather than a true lover of that which Socrates indicates and only partially incarnates. Something 
similar could be said of Apollodorus, who eagerly seeks confirmation of Aristodemus’ account from the 
master himself (Symposium 173b4–6); see Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan (2004, 10–18). The same could 
be asked of Plato, the author of the dialogue: What kind of lover is he, and what kind of guide was 
Socrates for him? 
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Plato’s goal is not merely to praise Eros, but to provide us with a truthful235 account of 
it in its different dimensions, particularly in its ascending movement toward Beauty itself 
as its final destination, what is the point of the other speeches? That is, if it is Socrates’ 
discourse that conveys the truth about eros, why should Plato give us, not one, but, 
including Alcibiades’, seven speeches on love? In spite of some differences, 
commentators generally agree that these speeches pave the way to Socrates’ disclosure 
about matters of love by providing us with lesser accounts of Eros.
236
 Put differently, the 
speeches give us a range of possible errors (perhaps the most common views about Eros 
in Plato’s milieu237), each of which bespeaks the respective speaker’s partial view of 
love.
238
 But why spending time writing misguided discourses? 
In light of my earlier claim that the metaphor of ascent constitutes the focal image 
of the dialogue (1.3), I maintain that each of the speeches reflects the particular condition 
of a given speaker in regard to Eros, hence his specific position with respect to the 
possibility of proceeding or being led correctly in matters of love.
239
 It seems to me that 
                                                 
235
 Socrates explicitly alerts us to the fact that his goal in praising Eros is to tell the truth (τἀληθῆ) about 
him (Symposium 198d3, 199a7, 199b3), as pointed out earlier (note 128). 
 
236
 See Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan (2004, 46–50) for a summary and critical assessment of some of the 
most prominent views on the issue, followed by the authors’ own stance. 
 
237
 But since not all the speeches pronounced at Agathon’s party were reported (Symposium 180c2), the 
views presented in the seven discourses recounted by Apollodorus-Aristodemus, while exemplary, are 
not exhaustive of the range of the partial views about Eros. 
 
238
 Brisson (1998, 39–49) is a notable exception to this view. He gathers the Symposium speeches into three 
thematic groups: (i) Phaedrus and Agathon: one Eros, based on traditional theology; (ii) Pausanias and 
Eryximachus: two Eros and two Aphrodites, Heavenly and Vulgar; (iii) Aristophanes and Socrates: one 
Eros, who is a god and a daimon respectively, helping humans to realize their aspirations. However, as 
Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan (2004, 48) remark, this grouping leaves the order found in the Symposium 
unexplained; in fact, it may even “obscure” it. 
 
239
 In doing so, Socrates meets his interlocutors (and Plato his, readers) where they find themselves with 
respect to a given issue (in this case, eros). See Rosen (1987, xlviii–li). 
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Plato spends time reporting these conditions for two main reasons. First, he wants to 
display awareness, not only of a number of views about eros, but especially of the fact 
that these are views precisely about eros, that is, views that are not foreign to the wider 
phenomenon of love that Socrates is going to describe (or, that he just described, in 
Alcibiades’ case). In other words, these views, while limited, offer a genuine description 
of at least one aspect of eros, and as such display partiality rather than (or only 
consequently) outright erroneousness.
240
 Secondly, Plato intends to show that in order to 
overcome such partiality, one has to become aware of it as partiality; only then is one in 
the position to be directed beyond the partiality, toward the whole. To fall short of this 
awareness and of practical transformation means failing to grasp the erotic phenomenon 
in its entirety: another unsuccessful love story. 
This leads me to my second illustration, focusing on Socrates’ discussion of 
immortalization through reproduction (Symposium 206b1–209e4241). Two problems 
intersect here: one concerns the possibility that Diotima may be talking not only about 
“interpersonal” but also about individual immortality; the other touches on the relation of 
eros and Diotima’s view of identity. I will deal with the first problem first. Although 
Diotima talks about reproduction as the mortal means to immortality, one should not 
immediately assume that reproduction is only interpersonal.
242
 In fact, her starting point 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
240
 E.g., Eryximachus, whose perspective on his own profession (i.e., medicine) rightly recognizes the 
irenic or harmonizing side of Eros, but fails to account for the more disruptive and disorderly 
manifestation of it (see Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan 2004, 62–68; Reale 1997a, 81–96). 
 
241
 Cf. Laws IV.721b6–c8. 
 
242
 See Irwin (1995, 306–308), who contrasts “interpersonal” and “intrapersonal” immortality (i.e., 
immortality of the species and immortality of the individual). 
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is the process of renewal of the individual, expressed in what appears to be a flux view 
of identity.
243
 According to her description, there is no enduring substratum constituting 
the alleged sameness of any given living thing; this holds both for the body, whose parts 
are in a constant process of renewal, and for the soul, whose affections are unstable and 
whose knowledge even (τὰς ἐπιστήμας: 208a2) must be rejuvenated by exercise, or 
practice (μελέτη: 208a5). Reproduction mirrors this process of individual renewal at a 
collective level, thus making for the immortality of the species.
244
 Insofar as the aim of 
the reproductive process is, as Rowe puts it, “(a kind of) immortality,”245 it constitutes an 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
243
 Symposium 207c8–208b7; cf. Gorgias 493a–494b, Theaetetus 156e7–157c2. Compare Pascal, Pensées 
113 (Brunschvicg 123 = Pascal 1964, 1120): “Il n’aime plus cette personne qu’il aimait il y a dix ans. Je 
crois bien: elle n’est plus la même, ni lui non plus.” 
 
244
 This is Aristotle’s view in De anima II.415a22–b7. 
 
245
 Rowe (1998, 185). It has been argued that this passage contradicts Plato’s characteristic doctrine of the 
immortality of the soul (e.g., Hackforth 1950; Grube 1980, 149), or else that here Plato is reporting an 
opinion held by the historical Diotima (Waithe 1987, 86–90, 108–111). Questioning the presupposition 
behind the first position should suffice to add to the already high improbability of the second (cf. note 
132 above). The point of controversy is, primarily, Symposium 208b2–4: “Through this device [i.e., 
reproduction], Socrates—she said—what is mortal, whether a body or any other thing, shares in 
immortality, while the immortal does it in another way” (ταύτῃ τῇ μηχανῇ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, θνητὸν 
ἀθανασίας μετέχει, καὶ σῶμα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα· ἀθάνατον δὲ ἄλλῃ; Burnet 1899–1907 and Bury 1932 
read ἀδύνατον in place of ἀθάνατον). Now, if “the immortal” (ἀθάνατον) means not only gods and 
daimons (Brisson 1998, 212 note 441), but also what in the soul is immortal (Bury 1932, xlvi; Reale 
1997a, 192–193), there is no reason to doubt any discrepancy in Plato’s thought. However, this view is 
possible only if one takes into account at least those dialogues in which the immortality of the soul is 
affirmed and whose date of composition is likely proximate to that of the Symposium, namely the Phaedo 
and the Phaedrus. Grube (1980, 149) argues that “to make the passage at all compatible with the Phaedo 
we must include the intellect under the ἀθάνατον which is immortal ἄλλῃ.” And he adds that “certainly 
no one who had not the other dialogues before him would take this to refer to anything but the gods.” 
While granting that personal immortality is never openly affirmed in the Symposium and that the issue 
does remain highly debatable, the problem with taking Grube’s position (and in part Hackforth’s, who 
elaborates on the same point) as definitive does not lie in their pertinent remarks, but in the unspoken 
presupposition behind what they say, namely that Plato’s contemporaries who were familiar with the 
Symposium were unaware of his doctrines in the other dialogues, a presupposition which as such is 
neither proved nor, for that matter, established as probable. On the contrary, it seems to me that the 
opposite might very well be more probable. 
Finally, Cobb’s stance is peculiar: on the basis of Diotima’s view of immortality he argues, not that 
Plato had doubts about the issue in the Symposium, but that he was ironic when he offered proofs for it in 
other dialogues (Cobb 1993, 76, 190–191). Independently of one’s conclusions about the issue itself, I 
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expression of eros typical of all mortal beings both at the individual and at the 
collective level. 
As for the second problem, what does it mean to say that eros aims at immortality 
for a being whose identity is the sum of bodily and psychological features which are both 
relatively random and in constant motion? What gets immortalized? At the individual 
level: if at seven my hair was brunette and at sixty (if I will still be alive and have some 
hair left), white, will I have failed to immortalize myself? In fact, have I not already 
failed to do so, given that I no longer remember so many of the short poems that I was 
painstakingly made to memorize as a child? At the collective level: Do I fail to 
immortalize my parents when I favor strawberry ice cream, given that they only like 
coffee ice cream? Will I have failed to achieve immortality if I will be unable to 
introduce my students to the pleasures and challenges of reading Plato or any other 
philosopher I happen to teach on a given semester? The very silliness of these questions 
unveils the futility of an immortality based on such adventitious features. For this reason, 
Diotima clarifies from the start that giving birth, or reproduction, is not any kind of 
reproduction, but “giving birth in beauty” (τόκος ἐν καλῷ: 206b7–8). If beauty (in 
hindsight, Beauty) is not what regulates giving birth, the result will be a futile 
proliferation of random individual traits. I will not be concerned about perpetuating such 
idiosyncrasies (say, my parents liking coffee rather than strawberry flavored ice cream) 
unless I also find them worth perpetuating; but why exactly I should find them worth 
perpetuating is precisely what should be explained, if possible. 
                                                                                                                                                 
cannot help wondering whether ascribing irony to Diotima’s account of immortality, rather than to all the 
others, would have made for a simpler and more plausible explanation (at least statistically). 
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At this point of the speech, we are still in the Lesser Mysteries of Love, but one 
thing seems clear already: the individual soul (let alone the individual body) taken as a 
random collection of empirical preferences does not suffice to explain something like 
Eros’ ladder, for as we saw, the erotic ascent implies the ability to transcend one’s 
preferences, the (initial) partiality of one’s eros, and rise at levels of increasing 
universality. This is already a critique of a merely physiological or scientific view of the 
human,
246
 which, while taking note of and cataloguing all these preferences, remains 
incapable of envisioning the possibility of subsuming them under an ascending erotic 
movement in which inferior, utterly idiosyncratic desiderata are gradually replaced by 
higher (i.e., more worth perpetuating) ones. But for this to be possible, the soul has 
already to be able to recognize the partiality of its immediate desiderata, and be willing 
to direct itself to Beauty. 
Aristophanes’ discourse, my third illustration, is a perfect example of the 
partiality in which even the best lovers can get caught. Despite its being cast in the form 
of fiction (a myth), there is much that rings true about love in this wonderfully 
constructed speech,
247
 most notably the idea that love amounts to lack, or need, and as 
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 See Rosen (1987, 251). Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan (2004, 144) observe that this part of Socrates’ 
discourse “is certainly directed against Pausanias’ and Eryximachus’ self-satisfied and self-sufficient 
views of the soul, the virtues, and sciences.” 
 
247
 The beauty of this speech is the recognition of Aristophanes’ indisputable greatness as a comic poet 
(Bury 1932, xxix–xxx; Reale 1997a, 98–101; Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan 2004, 85) and 
simultaneously a subtle statement of Socrates’ (i.e., Plato’s, or philosophy’s) ability to rise above it by 
means of Aristophanes’ own art. Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan (2004, 1, 215–220) may be right in 
arguing that the Symposium contributes to the famed quarrel between poetry and philosophy of Republic 
X by providing a positive view of art, namely one in which the artist is aware of his or her fabricated 
images precisely as images (the Symposium being one of these images, and Plato, one such artist). See 
also note 137 above. 
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such to a quest for a (lost and) more encompassing unity.
248
 In loving something, we 
grasp ourselves as lacking wholeness and at the same time aim at making ourselves 
whole (again). It would be hard to deny such a basic truth as one becomes aware of it 
through Aristophanes’ speech. The problem lies not in this, I believe, but in the poet’s 
understanding of wholeness; for who is whole in his story? Apparently two kinds of 
beings: the gods and the spherical human creatures prior to Zeus’ surgical procedure. The 
wholeness of both sorts of beings, however, is a rather sorry kind of wholeness. In the 
spherical creatures, it manifests itself most peculiarly in physical strength and arrogance 
(190b5–6), resulting in their titanic desire to attack the gods. The gods, on their part, are 
unassailable by such creatures, but at the same time seem unable to do without the latter’s 
honors and sacrifices (190c4–5). The shortcoming of such an understanding of 
wholeness, therefore, mars from the very start Aristophanes’ view of Eros as the god, 
restorer of human nature.
249
 As for the other gods, the comic poet does not even show 
awareness that such a view of their nature is thoroughly questionable.
250
 
                                                 
248
 “Thus, eros is the name for the desire of and aspiration to wholeness” (τοῦ ὅλου οὖν τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ 
διώξει ἔρως ὄνομα: Symposium 192e10–193a1); see also Symposium 191c8–d5. 
 
249
 Eros is described as “trying to make of two one and to heal human nature” (ἐπιχειρῶν ποιῆσαι ἓν ἐκ 
δυοῖν καὶ ἰάσασθαι τὴν φύσιν τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην: Symposium 191d2–3). Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan’s 
(2004, 74) remark on the issue is incisive: “If we are pious, we shall be restored to our original nature. 
But our original nature is violent and impious [...]; the original globular creatures were violent, impious, 
and unintelligent, or they were content like animals and unintelligent; thus the conditions before and after 
division render piety meaningless. To restore an ancient nature is not to fulfill human desire but to 
contradict it.” 
 
250
 It may be also for this reason that in the Republic the poets are deemed inadequate to act as educators. 
Cf. Republic II.379a–385c for what a correct understanding of divine nature may look like according to 
Plato. In a more benevolent reading of Aristophanes’ story, one could argue (i) that the poet never said 
that the spherical humans were truly whole before Zeus cut them in half, and (ii) that true unity is one 
that lacks nothing and cannot be dispersed into multiplicity. We could concede that (i) is true, but then it 
is not clear that (ii) is what Eros truly brings about in Aristophanes’ story. Alternately, (i) can be easily 
rebutted if we observe that what the halved human beings desire is not a new condition, but precisely the 
restoration of the condition they were in prior to Zeus’ resolution. As for (ii), while it may be an accurate 
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In this light, it is Aristophanes’ very notion of wholeness that becomes 
questionable and, through it, his understanding of Eros (of eros). Plainly put, if the 
restoration of wholeness is the goal of Eros’ work and if to be whole means simply to 
regain what was one’s own independently of what it was, then it is clear that eros has a 
merely appetitive aspect. But since this view, as it turns out, does not do justice to the 
erotic phenomenon in its entirety (see Subsection 1.3.1 above and 1.5.5 below), then 
either wholeness is not eros’ aim, or else it must be understood differently. Socrates 
makes this explicit as he refutes Aristophanes’ view: “love is neither of the half nor of the 
whole unless, my friend, this happens to be good.”251 Thus, there is a standard attached to 
eros which is prior to wholeness; this standard is goodness. And so for Socrates to 
conceive of eros merely as a function of wholeness, while forgetting that it clearly points 
to something of which wholeness may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition (i.e., 
what is good), ultimately means already to misunderstand it. 
1.5.5 Love between Appetite and Donation; Loving Persons 
In this last subsection I will touch on two interconnected issues often discussed in 
Plato scholarship: first, whether Platonic love is merely appetitive or egoistic; second, 
                                                                                                                                                 
view of wholeness, it can hardly be attributed to Aristophanes’ mind (Plato’s Aristophanes, to be sure) 
from the text. Moreover, it is not clear that merely to rejoin one’s other half coincides with the view of 
wholeness expressed in (ii). In fact, the spherical humans already desired (i.e., lacked) something (i.e., to 
overpower the gods: Symposium 190b5–c1) before Zeus halved them. Thus, a lack was already present 
even when they were allegedly whole. In other words, they were never truly whole (if, that is, eros in its 
merely appetitive aspect is an index of the absence of wholeness; the terms δίωξις and ἐπιθυμία used at 
192e10–193a1 seem to point at this). The same argument applies to the gods. They, too, are not truly 
whole since, in a dynamics reminiscent of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic (Phenomenology of Spirit §§ 
178–196), their status is dependent on those who offer them honors and sacrifices (190c1–6), those very 
humans who arrogantly rose up against them. 
 
251
 Symposium 205e1–3: ὁ δ’ἐμὸς λόγος οὔτε ἡμίσεός φησιν εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα οὔτε ὅλου, ἐὰν μὴ τυγχάνῃ γέ 
που, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀγαθὸν ὄν. Later on (212c4–8), Aristophanes tries to reply to this, but is interrupted by the 
sudden entrance of a drunken party on the scene. 
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whether it is possible, according to Plato’s view of eros as I have tentatively outlined it 
in this chapter, to love a person for that person’s sake. 
The first interrogative—Is Platonic love merely appetitive?—has a double target: 
(1) on the one hand, the lover, that is, the initiate making his way into the mysteries of 
love; (2) on the other, the beloved, which in the Ascent Passage is ultimately nothing 
other than Beauty itself, hence the Good. 
(1) On the side of the lover, Socrates showed that love does not cease when I, the 
lover, get what I desire, for I still desire that this possession continue in the future 
(Symposium 200b9–d7). The problem takes the following formulation, which I adapt 
from an article by R. A. Markus:
252
 if all eros is merely appetitive, (i) psychologically, 
once I get what I desire I become afraid to lose it, and so love turns into a kind of fear; 
(ii) logically, happiness as the fulfillment of all desire is either impossible or else, if 
possible, desire must cease. Both (i) and (ii) are true, however, only if the premise is in 
place, namely only if all eros is nothing but appetite, sheer need. 
(2) On the side of the beloved (i.e., Beauty or the Good), all love must be denied 
to the Good in principle, for the Good is the Good not only insofar as it is the ultimate 
desideratum, but, perhaps more importantly, because it does not itself have a 
desideratum.
253
 Again, this holds on the same premise that eros is merely appetitive. 
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 Markus (1955, 223). 
 
253
 One may object that the Good can itself experience love of an appetitive kind by desiring our ascent to it 
in the way each of the two halves of Aristophanes’ spherical creatures desires the other half. This is 
implausible, however, for if I desire the Good and the Good desires my ascent to itself, then neither of us 
is truly an end, but only a means to the further end which is unification. It follows that unification, not the 
(alleged) Good, is the Good. Plato puts it well at Philebus 60c2–4: “If this [i.e., the good] were always 
present in living beings entirely and in every way, they would never need anything else again, but they 
would have perfect self-sufficiency [τὸ δὲ ἱκανὸν τελεώτατον].” 
  
89 
Now, that love ordinarily means more than need or lack may be clear to 
most.
254
 Here it is a matter of concisely showing that this was clear to Plato as well. 
There is little doubt, I believe, that love is more than appetitive from the perspective of 
the Platonic lover. In fact, while Socrates endorses Aristophanes’ view of love as need, 
he does not reduce eros to mere lack. No matter how essential lack is to eros, for Socrates 
lack is only the beginning of the erotic movement.
255
 Once the lover has the goal of his or 
her affection in view, the result is not mere possession, the simple satisfaction of a need, 
but a creative activity, that which in the Lesser Mysteries of love is called “giving birth in 
beauty” (τόκος ἐν καλῷ: Symposium 206b7–8), and which in the Greater Mysteries 
coincides with the generation of beautiful speeches at the different levels of the ascent
256
 
(except in the last step, which, as we saw, lies beyond the discursive realm). 
The question is why this should be the case, that is, why eros as lack or need 
should turn into eros as creative and self-giving activity. At the stage of the Lesser 
Mysteries, this transition, while manifest, remains somewhat problematic, since as we 
saw, immortality through procreation appears to be immortality only sui generis. And 
yet, even at this intermediate stage, eros is not merely a lack, for a creative activity is 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
254
 Although, arguably, some may never experience love beyond need.  
 
255
 But it is a beginning that should not be underemphasized, for it reappears at every level of the ascent. 
Once the lover comes to possess the desideratum at one level, a new lack appears, signaling the 
insufficiency of what was just achieved. 
 
256
 Symposium 210a7–8 (γεννᾶν λόγους καλούς), 210c2 (τίκτειν λόγους), 210d4–6 (πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς 
λόγους καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τίκτῃ καὶ διανοήματα ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ). Cf. Markus (1955, 225–226), 
Rist (1964, 24–29), Moravcsik (1971, 285–286, 292–293), Cobb (1993, 74–75). 
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already in place, despite the fact that the element of need is not eliminated 
altogether.
257
 It is only at the very last stage of the ascent
258
 that eros as lack is 
thoroughly transfigured into creative donation. Love of Beauty, not in one of its partial 
manifestations, but of Beauty itself by itself with itself, is no longer desire to possess, but 
desire to give and create: as Markus puts it, “a kind of generosity rather than a kind of 
need. It culminates in togetherness with the object loved and in a creative bringing forth 
in its presence from the lover’s superabundance.”259 
The reason for this dynamic transformation of eros is not found in the Symposium, 
but it can be inferred, legitimately I believe, from other dialogues. Incidentally, it also 
serves us to show that if any eros is found at all on the side of the beloved or ultimate 
desideratum (i.e., the Good), it is a kind of eros from which the appetitive element of lack 
or need is completely absent. This position can be formalized in a simple syllogism: (i) 
the Good, which from the lover’s perspective is the ultimate desideratum, is an 
essentially generous or donative principle; (ii) to ascend to the Good means to some 
extent to become like it; (iii) ergo, to ascend to the Good means to some extent to become 
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 Markus (1955, 225–227) remarks that at this stage love is no longer the lack of a needy being, but the 
giving of something by a being that is already complete. Hence, although divinity and immortality were 
denied to Eros as need, they are now granted to him in procreation. While I have much sympathy for 
Markus’ overall thesis, I see two problems in his reading at this particular point: first, it is not clear to 
what extent pregnant beings are “complete”. More specifically, their very desire for immortality seems to 
bespeak precisely their incompleteness. Secondly, desire for immortality expressed in pregnancy and 
procreation seems to be a kind of giving only incidentally. The goal is not to give, but to achieve 
immortality for oneself. However, we may recall that the stage of pregnancy and reproduction is not 
final; when this is kept in mind, I believe that Markus is correct. 
 
258
 Whether this is ever reached by any particular individual will remain an open question. 
 
259
 Markus (1955, 227). See also Armstrong (1961), Rist (1964, 23–40). 
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generous or donative.
260
 What is needed is some textual evidence for the two premises 
of the syllogism. 
The texts in support of the major premise, namely that the Good is an essentially 
generous or donative principle, are the following.
261
 Phaedrus 247a7: 
jealousy lies outside the divine chorus. 
 
Republic II.379b15–c7: 
[b15] The good is not the cause of all things, but it is rather the [16] cause 
of good things, while not being the cause of bad ones. [c1] Certainly, he 
[i.e., Adeimantus] said. [2] Therefore, I [i.e., Socrates] continued, since 
the god
262
 is good, it will not [3] be the cause of all things, as many people 
say, but will be the cause of few things for [4] men, and not the cause of 
many things, for we have much [5] less good things than bad things, and 
while the cause of good things is none [6] other than the god, it is 
necessary to find some other causes for the bad ones, [7] but not the god. 
 
Timaeus 29e1–3: 
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 From this perspective, the purpose of the ascent is to become, not an ultimate object of desire, but 
generous and donative, of which being an ultimate object of desire may be a probable consequence. 
 
261
 Phaedrus 247a7: φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται; Republic II.379b15–c7: [b15] Οὐκ ἄρα πάντων 
γε αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὖ [16] ἐχόντων αἴτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον. [c1] Παντελῶς γ’, 
ἔφη. [2] Οὐδ’ ἄρα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἂν [3] εἴη αἴτιος, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, 
ἀλλὰ ὀλίγων μὲν τοῖς [4] ἀνθρώποις αἴτιος, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιος· πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω [5] τἀγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν 
ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐδένα [6] ἄλλον αἰτιατέον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἄλλ’ ἄττα δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ [7] αἴτια, 
ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸν θεόν; Timaeus 29e1–3: [e1] ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς [2] περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε 
ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος· τούτου δ’ ἐκτὸς [3] ὢν πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ. See 
also Phaedo 99c1–6, Phaedrus 246d6–e3, Republic II.378b8–c6, VI.500c9–d1, X.617e4–5, Timaeus 
28c2–29a6, 37c, Laws IV.713c5–714a2, VII.821a2–b2, Epinomis 988a5–b7; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 
I.983a3. 
 
262
 Plato’s usage of the term θεός and of its adjectival cognate θεῖος is extremely fluid (see van Camp and 
Canart 1956; François 1957, 246–304). The noun θεός variously refers to the gods in general (Euthyphro 
7b2, Cratylus 391d6, Symposium 180a2, Republic II.364b3) and the traditional gods in particular 
(Phaedrus 246e4–247a4, Timaeus 39e–41a, Laws IV.717a6–b6), the demiurge (Timaeus 30a2–c1 ff.), 
the world (Timaeus 34b8, 92c7), the heavenly bodies (Timaeus 39e10–40a7 ff.). The adjective θεῖος 
variously refers to the Ideas (Sophist 254a8–b1; cf. Republic VII.517d4–5), intellect or reason (Philebus 
22c6, Republic IX.590d4), the soul, particularly in its best part (Phaedo 79e8–80b5, 91c8, Phaedrus 
246d6–e3, Timaeus 41c2–d3, 44d3–6 and 69c3–5, 90a2–b1), good people (Philebus 18b7, Republic 
VII.540c2, II.383c4; see also Laws IV.716c1–e2), people in contact with the Ideas (Republic VI.500c9–
d1; see also Symposium 212a6: θεοφιλεῖ), and several other things, such as a divine production (Sophist 
266d6) and the divine madness of love (Phaedrus 256b6, 265a10, 266a7–b1). 
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[e1] He [i.e., the Demiurge] was good, and in the good there is never [2] any 
envy about anything, but being free of it, [3] he wanted all things to 
become like him as much as possible. 
 
And here are the texts in support of the minor premise, namely that to ascend to or 
approach the Good means to some extent to become like it.
263
 Republic X.613a7–b1: 
[a7] The gods do not fail to care for [8] the one who eagerly desires to 
become just and, by practicing [b1] virtue, to resemble a god as much as it 
is possible for a man. 
 
Theaetetus 176a8–b3, b8–c2: 
[a8] For this reason one should [b1] escape as soon as possible from here 
to get there. [This] escape is to resemble a god as much as [2] possible; 
and [such] resemblance is to become just and pious with [3] wisdom. [...] 
[b8] God is nowhere and [c1] in no way unjust, but is most just, and there 
is nothing [2] more similar to him than the one of us who in turn has 
become as just as possible.” 
 
Laws IV.716c4–d4:264 
[c4] In our view it is God who is preeminently ‘measure of all things,’ [5] 
much more so than any man, as they [6] say. So, if you want to become 
dear to such a being, [7] you must do your level best to become like it, 
[d1] and according to this reasoning the one among us who is temperate 
[2] is dear to God, being like him, whereas the one who is not temperate 
and unjust is unlike him and [3] his enemy; and the same reasoning 
applies [4] to the other vices. 
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 Republic X.613a7–b1: [a7] οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπό γε θεῶν ποτε ἀμελεῖται [8] ὃς ἂν προθυμεῖσθαι ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος 
γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων [b1] ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ. Theaetetus 176a8–
b3, b8–c2: [a8] διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε [b1] ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ 
κατὰ [2] τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως [3] γενέσθαι. [...][b8] θεὸς οὐδαμῇ 
[c1] οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος, ἀλλ’ ὡς οἷόν τε δικαιότατος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν [2] αὐτῷ ὁμοιότερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὃς ἂν 
ἡμῶν αὖ γένηται ὅτι δικαιότατος. Laws IV.716c4–d4: [c4] ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον [5] 
ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἤ πού τις, ὥς φασιν, [6] ἄνθρωπος [Protagoras: DK 80.A21 = Plato, 
Theaetetus 166d2–3]· τὸν οὖν τῷ τοιούτῳ προσφιλῆ γενησόμενον, εἰς [7] δύναμιν ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ αὐτὸν 
τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεσθαι, [d1] καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον ὁ μὲν σώφρων ἡμῶν [2] θεῷ φίλος, 
ὅμοιος γάρ, ὁ δὲ μὴ σώφρων ἀνόμοιός τε καὶ [3] διάφορος καὶ ὁ ἄδικος, καὶ τὰ ἄλλ’ οὕτως κατὰ τὸν 
αὐτὸν [4] λόγον ἔχει. See also Phaedrus 253a1–b1, Timaeus 90d1–7, Minos 319a3–5. In passing, we 
may add that Eros’ character, not so much of intermediate, as of interpreter and intermediary 
(Ἑρμηνεῦον καὶ διαπορθμεῦον: Symposium 202e3), comes fully in focus in this work of ὁμοίωσις. 
 
264
 T. J. Saunders’s translation (in Cooper 1997), modified. 
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All this should suffice to settle the second issue as well: the charge that the 
Platonic lover does not love the person for the person’s sake and rather uses people as 
means to achieve immortality understood as the eternal possession of the good.
265
 What I 
would like to add here is a more explicit reply to this charge. The charge hinges on what 
one means by person or individual. As we saw in the previous subsection, if the 
individual person is reduced to a collection of constantly shifting somatic and psychic 
traits, and if to love these traits means to love the person for the person’s sake, then one 
would have to admit that there is no room for this kind of love in the Symposium. But one 
may also ask why exactly there should be room for such love, for how is love of random 
features different from some kind of fixation? What does it mean to love a person for the 
color of her hair, his dented chin, or her taste for cheese? Would I love him less if his 
chin were disfigured (or merely reconfigured) in a motorcycle accident, or if she lived 
long enough to see her hair turn white? Would her recently developed lactose intolerance 
end my love for her along with her love for cheese? If loving a person for the person’s 
sake means to love him no matter who this person will become, I have a hard time seeing 
how a girl could fall in love with a good-natured boy and continue loving him even when 
he has turned into a crook.
266
 If, on the one hand, what she loves is his crookedness, how 
has her love not turned into a kind of pathology? If, on the other hand, what she continues 
                                                 
265
 This charge is clearly formulated in a seminal article by Vlastos (1973) and critically revisited by 
Nussbaum (2001, 165–199; for my criticism of Nussbaum’s broader position on Plato, see Appendix 
E.6). The charge has been variously rejected by Kosman (1976), Warner (1979), Price (1981); shorter 
assessments of Vlastos’ position include Griswold (1986, 128–129), Irwin (1995, 308–311), Osborne 
(1994, 222–226), Gerson (2003, 142–143), Corrigan and Glazov-Corrigan (2004, 136–137), Zuckert 
(2009, 2 note 2). 
 
266
 Of course, a crook at heart, if there ever was one, and not necessarily someone who violated some law. 
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to love is something other than his crookedness, whom does she love? Is it his past 
good nature that she continues to love? Or is it the possibility that he might change for 
the better? Either way, she loves a model in whose light she saw and/or hopes to see her 
beloved.
267
 
It may be objected that this approach to the notion of person is excessively 
speculative and amounts to a misunderstanding of what it means to be a person—an 
objection from which, incidentally, often I have a hard time distancing myself. Put 
interrogatively, will I ever love a person, or will I always already love an ideal of which 
the person is nothing but a comparatively inadequate reflection or representation? When 
asked in these terms, the question already seems to presuppose something which, if one 
grants that my brief interpretative account of Ideas in Subsection 1.5.2 is at least 
plausible, Plato would not concede. The presupposition is the view that ideals exist 
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 Cf. Phaedrus 253a6–c2. To antagonize Platonic eros and a view of love derived from the Hebraic and 
Christian traditions may be helpful as long as one is fair to both. According to Vlastos (1973, 32–33), in 
Plato’s view “to make flesh-and-blood men and women objects of our affection would be folly or worse, 
idolatry, diversion to images of what is due only to their divine original. We are a prey to this error, Plato 
would say, because of our carnal condition, burned with incompleteness which fellow creatures have 
power to complete; were we free of mortal deficiency we would have no reason to love anyone or 
anything except the Idea: seen face to face, it would absorb all our love. Here we see the polar opposite 
of the ideal which has molded the image of the deity in the Hebraic and Christian traditions: that of a 
being whose perfection empowers it to love the imperfect; of a Father who cares for each of his children 
as they are, does not proportion affection to merit, gives it no more to the righteous than to the perverse 
and deformed.” As it is expressed by Vlastos, this opposition is not very helpful, for even in the Hebraic 
and Christian traditions, “to love the imperfect” does not mean to love the imperfect qua imperfect, but 
qua capable of being perfected; and for the Father to care for his children “as they are” does not mean to 
give in to whatever capricious whim these children may happen to have, but to care that their condition 
be improved, for after all, what they truly are according to the tradition Vlastos is referring to is imago 
Dei. This already implies that divine love and care are carried out in conformity with an “ideal image” 
that transcends the particular imperfection and condition of each person, although the care itself would 
have to be provided on the basis of one’s particular situation, or one’s imperfections. Now, Platonic eros 
and Judeo-Christian love probably differ on several counts, but on this particular point they seem far 
from displaying the polar opposition invoked by Vlastos (cf. R. E. Allen 1991, 95–98; see also pages 
200–201 below). As I mentioned earlier (Subsection 1.5.3), we can certainly misrepresent the “ideal 
image” in accordance with which we love and care for our beloved; when this happens, our love and care 
have been disfigured: the ascending eros of the Symposium has turned into something more similar to the 
Ἔρως τύραννος of Republic IX.571a–576b. 
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alongside persons more or less in the same way as trees exist alongside rocks and 
squirrels on the university campus. But if this is not granted, the objection loses much of 
its force, for from the point of view of the individual, Ideas (or ideals) are not things 
alongside things, but possibilities which, by being actualized in the life of a person, cause 
that person to be more lovable. That is, Ideas are intelligible causes of sensible things, but 
for the perspective of the individual person this ultimately means that they are the very 
potentialities nested within the human: possibilities of which at first one has merely a 
distant inkling, and which only later are illuminated, painstakingly discovered, and found 
worth pursuing. By thus throwing light on these possibilities and trying to identify with 
them as much as it is humanly possible, we come to actualize ourselves in accordance 
with what was discovered and pursued, while this process of approximation to the ideal 
unveils new possibilities to be activated and realized. 
Thus, to charge Plato with a view of love in which the beloved is loved not for his 
or her sake but as an instrument to achieve immortality for oneself already presupposes 
that his “erotics” can be isolated from the fuller trajectory sketched by the Ascent 
Passage, or, as Gerson writes in connection with the Phaedrus, “from his 
metaphysics.”268 In the ascent, the beauty of the desired thing (at whatever level) would 
not even become “visible” were it not for the Beauty in which the thing participates. In 
other words, whatever is seen worth loving in the beloved is something that, while 
shining not independently of the particular beautiful features of the beloved, already 
transcends them by indicating the possibility of a higher beauty. It would be easy to 
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 Gerson (2003, 142). 
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mistake one’s consideration for this indication as mere scorn for what is inferiorly or 
partially beautiful, but this ought not to be the case; and that in fact it is not the case 
becomes clear from Socrates’ rejection of Alcibiades later in the dialogue (Symposium 
217a2–219e5). His is not the scornful rejection of someone aware of his superiority over 
the one who is offering his beautiful body as matter for barter. On the contrary, Socrates 
rejects Alcibiades’ offer because to accept it would coincide with the obvious derailment 
of an ascent correctly (again, ὀρθῶς) performed. Moreover, this derailment would 
involve not only Socrates, but also Alcibiades. Hence, Socrates does not take advantage 
of his superior dialectic attractiveness (215a4–216c3), but uses it as itself an indication of 
the path Alcibiades should take if he wants to make his soul more beautiful. Far from 
using Alcibiades as a means to an end, Socrates tries to show him the end at which both 
should aim by working together toward it (219a8–b2). In light of this episode, correctly 
to ascend toward Beauty can hardly be a matter of using others as means to an end, for 
when this happens it is the end itself that is missed.
269
 
It will be objected that, since I do not possess ideals in their purity, to say that I 
love another person in light of these ideals always means that what I actually love is 
neither those ideals nor that person, but the extent to which that person has succeeded to 
embody my reception of those ideals, and hence, ultimately, the image of myself in the 
other person. This objection may be answered initially by saying that its basic claim is 
true also (in fact, that it is true to a greater degree) of love of the other person for the 
                                                 
269
 A different interpretation of the Symposium in general and of the figure of Alcibiades in particular has 
been put forth by M. C. Nussbaum’s in her book, The Fragility of Goodness (Nussbaum 2001, 165–199). 
I provide critical remarks on this interpretation in Appendix E.6. 
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other person’s sake, for what I love here is in fact a collection of empirical features 
which I find lovable and which as such point at me as the only arbiter of what is lovable 
and what is not. More fundamentally, the objection loses much of its power if one keeps 
in mind that to love another person in light of an ideal (or a set of ideals) does not mean 
that I immediately grasp, let alone embody, those ideals perfectly and thus I can go on 
effortlessly to love whomever happens to embody them as best as possible. Rather, to 
love another person in light of an ideal means at the same time to be willing to take upon 
oneself the task of understanding and embodying those ideals with and for
270
 the beloved 
person.
271
 
Thus, I conclude that the problem is not so much if and how Platonic love allows 
for genuinely loving a person “for that person’s sake,” but rather how loving a person for 
that person’s sake does not already include in its essence some kind of pathology, and 
therefore if and how one can truly love a person without already being oriented by an 
ideal in accordance with which his or her love is shaped.
272
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 By adding “and for” I may give the impression that the individual person is a kind of “super-ideal” for 
whose sake one works at understanding and embodying all other ideals. This is fundamentally correct, I 
believe, to the extent that it is ideals, and not something else (e.g., mere satisfaction of some relatively 
arbitrary needs or desires), that are understood and concretely embodied, or individualized. In other 
words, I contend that if to understand and embody ideals and the full blossoming of the individual person 
stand in a relation of means to end, it is only through these specific means that end can be achieved. 
 
271
 This, I maintain, is the sense of Socrates’ and Alcibiades’ reciprocal commitment to self-improvement 
found toward the end of the Symposium (219a8–b2). 
 
272
 I would be tempted to temperate this final statement by noting that what I have argued in this subsection 
is not an attack on the importance and value of individuality but rather a critique of a certain view of 
individuality, namely, individuality as a relatively random collection of empirical features (cf. also my 
brief remarks in note 270 above). However, I am aware that by doing this I would risk to cloud the very 
difficulty of explaining what exactly it means to love an individual for his or her own sake. I will take 
refuge in the long passage that concludes a penetrating article by Jean-Louis Chrétien, L’amour du neutre 
(Chrétien 1990, 329–344), on the impersonality (or neutrality) of love in Plotinus: “Il ne suffit pas de dire 
qu’on aime quelqu’un pour échapper à l’amour du neutre. Lorsque j’aime quelqu’un pour sa beauté ou sa 
vertu, c’est, que je le veuille ou non, l’impersonnel que j’aime à travers lui. Prendre le contrepied de cette 
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1.6 Conclusive Remarks 
Before I turn to Plotinus, it may be helpful to offer a summary of the major 
conclusions reached in this chapter. These conclusions will become the focus of the rest 
of this study as I investigate the way in which the Platonic view of eros was received and 
transformed by the subsequent tradition. 
(1) Plato’s text is read as a starting point for, or as an implicit exhortation to, 
improving one’s life by practicing philosophy. Both the dramatic setting of the dialogue 
and the connection of its main topics and arguments to those of other dialogues are 
crucial for an understanding of the same. Plotinus’ reading of Plato, while obviously not 
in line with the standards of modern historico-critical methodology, is fair to the extent 
that it heeds Plato’s exhortation to philosophy. 
(2) The term ἔρως is chosen as the name for the phenomenon of love analyzed in 
the Symposium because it is found to be the most apt both to cover the breadth of the 
phenomenon itself and to convey the connection to Eros, the god of love. 
(3) The central metaphor of Socrates’ speech in the Symposium and of the 
dialogue as a whole is that of the ladder of love, or eros’ ascent to Beauty itself. The 
metaphor implicitly includes all the other speeches as only partially successful attempts at 
                                                                                                                                                 
possibilité ne résout pas pour autant la difficulté: aimer quelqu’un pour sa manques et ses défauts, pour 
ce quoi il échappe à l’universel, pour l’imperfection singulière qui est sienne, nous fait certes échapper à 
l’amour du neutre, mais peut-être aussi à l’amour. Le culte de l’accidentel où se complaisent les amants 
ne garantit pas l’amour pour l’être de quelqu’un. Dire qu’un aime pour rien, mais seulement « parce que 
c’etait lui, parce que c’etat moi », nous approche davantage de la vérité de l’amour, mais posons-nous la 
question: qui, lui? et qui, moi? que la difficulté sous d’autres formes réapparaît, car la résponse nous 
reconduit à l’alternative de l’amour d’un au-delà impersonnel de la personne ou d’une idolâtrie 
égocentrique des accidents. L’alternative n’est brisée que si l’au-delà de la personne est lui-même 
personnel à l’infini, que si la lumière dans laquelle apparaît la personne est celle-là meme de l’amour qui 
la fait être elle-même à jamais, que si l’amour lui-même est une personne” (Chrétien 1990, 344). But to 
endorse this conclusion already means to have moved beyond Plato’s (and Plotinus’) explicit reflection, I 
maintain, although not necessarily against it. Cf. also Section 5.2 in the Epilogue. 
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accomplishing the ascent. 
(4) The levels of beauty that constitute the rungs of Eros’ ascending ladder 
already point at a division of reality in terms of body, soul, intellect, and what lies at the 
threshold of intellect. This division finds its continuity in the qualified presence of Beauty 
at all levels. 
(5) The terminus of the ascent is Beauty itself, an Idea which is found to be one of 
the main aspects of the Good, the other aspect being Truth. Beauty’s privilege among the 
Ideas consists in its being ordered to “shining forth” in the sensible. Eros is the path to the 
Good under the aspect of Beauty, while dialectic is the path to the Good under the aspect 
of Truth. 
(6) Eros does not immediately put us in contact with the Good under the aspect of 
Beauty, but, if questioned and followed correctly, it indicates a task for the lover. There is 
no guarantee of success in this task; in fact one should not even discount the possibility of 
a total shipwreck. However, if the ascent is ever performed correctly, both in its dialectic 
and in its erotic version it entails a process of transformation of the entire soul. We could 
say, simply, that the ascent is this transformation. 
(7) Eros is not merely appetitive, that is, it cannot be reduced to lack or need. On 
the contrary, both in the Lesser and in the Greater Mysteries, Diotima emphasizes an 
important aspect of creativity and donation. Likewise importantly, brief but poignant 
passages from other dialogues suggest that the ultimate desideratum itself is found to be 
an essentially donative principle, and the erotic ascent to the principle, a transformation 
of Eros from an appetitive to a donative and creative dynamism. 
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All this, I maintain, can be read in the dialogues legitimately, if tentatively. 
And as I observed earlier at the end of both Section 1.2 and Subsection 1.5.2, the extent 
to which such a reading is already dependent on, or influenced by a trend that one will 
find only in the subsequent tradition of Platonism remains a matter for debate which only 
the expert knower of both Plato and the tradition after him may be able to determine. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
PLOTINUS AS INTERPRETER OF PLATO: 
A READING OF ENNEADS III.5 [50] ON EROS 
Lui était presque un enfant... Ses delicatesses mystérieuses m’avaient 
séduite. J’ai oublié tout mon devoir humain pour le suivre. Quelle vie! La 
vraie vie est absente. Nous ne sommes pas au monde. Je vais où il va, il le 
faut. Et souvent il s’em-porte contre moi, moi, la pauvre âme. Le 
Démon!—C’est un Démon, vous savez, ce n’est pas un homme. 
—A. Rimbaud 
Δηλοῖ δὲ ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκεῖ καὶ ὁ ἔρως ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁ σύμφυτος, καθὸ καὶ 
συνέζευκται Ἔρως ταῖς Ψυχαῖς καὶ ἐν γραφαῖς καὶ ἐν μύθοις. 
—Plotinus1 
2.1 Introduction 
This and the next two chapters will provide an account of Plotinus’ understanding 
of Platonic ἔρως in the context of his metaphysics.2 In the present chapter, I will first 
introduce the way Plotinus approaches the Platonic text (Section 2.2), hence I will 
proceed to offer a reading of what is arguably the most pertinent sample (for our purpose) 
                                                 
1
 A. Rimbaud, Une saison en enfer, Délires I, Vierge folle (Rimbaud 2003, 204, 492; translation slightly 
modified): “He was very nearly a child... His mysterious ways seduced me. I forgot all my earthly duties 
in order to follow him. O this life! Real life is absent. We are not of this world. I go where he goes, how 
can’t I? And yet he blows up at me all the time, me—the poor soul. That demon!—He is a demon, you 
know, he is not a man.” Plotinus VI.9 [9] 9.24–26: “And the soul’s innate love makes clear that the Good 
is there, and this is why Eros is coupled with the Psyches in pictures and stories.” 
 
2
 For directions on how to read the references to editions and/or translations of Plotinus’ text see Section 3 
of the Preface. A full list of the orders of the Enneads, their titles, and their dates is found in Appendix A. 
In the present chapter, treatise III.5 [50] On eros is cited only by chapter and line number; unless 
otherwise indicated, translations of passages from this treatise are mine, as noted in Preface note 7. I 
particularly benefited from the translations and commentaries of WOLTERS and HADOT, respectively in 
English and French, and from the translations and notes by IGAL (in Spanish) and ARMSTRONG (in 
English). 
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of Plotinian exegesis of Plato’s thought on eros in general and of the Symposium 
myth of Eros’ birth in particular: Enneads III.5 [50] On eros (Section 2.3 and 2.4). The 
two chapters that follow are two halves of the same diptych which we may call, echoing 
the title of a work by Agnès Pigler on the topic, a metaphysics of love.
3
 Thus, Chapter 
Three will show how love is operative from the point of view of procession, or the 
derivation of all reality form one single source, namely the One; conversely, Chapter 
Four will show how eros is operative in the process of return, or the soul’s purificatory 
movement toward its source taken as the highest desideratum, that is, the One qua Good. 
2.2 Plotinus as Interpreter of Plato 
Plotinus’ reading of Plato is filtered through a variety of sources, all very likely 
from within the Greek philosophical tradition,
4
 chronologically both prior and posterior 
                                                 
3
 PIGLER. 
 
4
 The question of a non-Hellenic, most notably Indian, influence on Plotinus is a matter of debate. The issue 
was stirred particularly, if not originally, by Bréhier in his 1928 book, La philosophie de Plotin. Bréhier 
answered the question positively by tracing parallels between Plotinus and the Indian tradition on the 
issues of the identity of the source of all reality and the individual’s deepest self (i.e., the coincidence of 
Brahman and Ātman captured in the “That art thou!”—Tat tvam asi—of the Upaniṣads: see Chandogya 
Upaniṣad VI.8.7, 9.4, 10.4, 12.3, 13.3, 14.3, 15.3, 16.3), and the overcoming of a sharp dichotomy 
between subject and object (Bréhier 1961, 107–133). Though not considered implausible in principle, 
Bréhier’s position was criticized from early on, specifically by Armstrong (1936), who pointed out the 
lack of both external and internal evidence in support of the thesis: externally the historical data offered 
by Bréhier are either very thin or of secondary importance; and internally Plotinus’ speculative 
innovations can be easily explained on the basis of the Greek tradition within which he worked. More 
fundamentally, Rist (1967, 224–229) argues that Indian derivation is made even more implausible by the 
fact that the kind of mysticism espoused by Plotinus differs radically from that of the Upaniṣads in that 
Plotinian union with the One does not imply complete identification with it, as it would seem to be the 
case in the coincidence of Ātman and Brahman, at least in the ordinary interpretation of the Tat tvam asi 
(for a view arguing against the possibility of reading Tat tvam asi as an identity statement, see: Brereton 
1986; Olivelle 1996, 349). Following Zaehner (1957, especially chapters 8 and 9), Rist calls the former 
kind of mysticism “theistic,” and the latter, “monistic” (cf. Chapter Four note 234 below). For a brief 
assessment of the topic in fundamental agreement with these conclusions see Wallis (1995, 13–15); for a 
detailed survey of views on the issue see Wolters (1982), who ultimately argues for the inconclusiveness 
of the available evidence. 
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to Plato.
5
 At times he positively employs these sources to throw light on what he 
takes to be Plato’s doctrine; other times he interprets them to be unfortunate departures 
from Plato’s original teaching;6 other times still he sees them as plainly aberrant readings 
of the Platonic text.
7
 Very generally, it seems fair to say, with Charrue, that Plato is 
Plotinus’ main source, and that Plotinus’ appreciation of other thinkers is directly 
proportional to their philosophical proximity to what he takes to be Plato’s true teaching.8 
In relation to the Platonic corpus, Plotinus refers to himself as a mere interpreter 
                                                 
5
 See VP 14.4–16; cf. the Index fontium to HS2 (III, 326–373). General overviews of Plotinus’ sources can 
be found in Wallis (1995, 16–36), Charrue (1978, 15–41), and Stamatellos (2007, 3–22); for shorter 
accounts see Gatti (1999, 10–14), Lacrosse (1994, 17–20), PIGLER (9–12). On the influence of specific 
authors or movements on Plotinus see: Graeser (1972) for the Stoics; Szlezák (1979) for Plato and 
Aristotle; Stamatellos (2007) for the Presocratics; see also the groundbreaking articles in the collection 
Les Sources de Plotin (1960). A fuller bibliography on the issue, prepared by Gerson, can be found in 
Wallis (1995, 187–188); see also relevant entries in Dufour (2000–2012). 
 
6
 Aristotle is a good example of both cases. If on the one hand Plotinus is critical of Aristotle’s 
identification of the first principle with thought thinking itself (Metaphysics XII.1074b34–35), on the 
other he makes ample use of this and other Aristotelian doctrines to develop his own views of the 
hypostasis Νοῦς and to make sense of several puzzles (e.g., about soul and the sensible world). Often 
Aristotelian strategies are combined with Platonic views in order to clarify a given point; for instance, the 
possibility, beyond pure univocity and mere equivocity, of applying the same term to the One and to 
what derives from it, is supported through a combination of the Aristotelian notion of focal meaning (i.e., 
all beings are so named in reference to what is “being” primarily, that is, substance) with the Platonic 
notion of participation (see Bussanich 1999, 60–61). See Rist (1967, 178–180), Wallis (1995, 23–24), 
Gatti (1999, 11), and, above all, the extensive treatment given to the topic by Szlezák (1979). 
 
7
 This, for instance, is the case of Gnosticism, which comes under attack in the so-called Großschrift (III.8 
[30], V.8 [31], V.5 [32], II.9 [33]), on which see Roloff (1970), Cilento (1971), and Elsas (1975); cf. also 
pages 399–400 below. Plotinus states explicitly at II.9 [33] 6.24–28: “[24] And in general they [i.e., the 
Gnostics] [25] falsify [καταψεύδονται] Plato’s account of the manner of the making [viz. the fashioning 
of the sensible universe at the hands of the Demiurge in Plato’s Timaeus], and a [26] great deal else, and 
degrade [ἕλκουσι] the great man’s teachings as if they [27] had understood the intelligible nature, but he 
and the other [28] blessed philosophers had not” (cf. also VP 16.9–12). 
 
8
 Charrue (1978, 17–23); see also Lacrosse (1994, 17–19). This statement should not lead us to 
underestimate the positive influence that other authors, especially Aristotle, had in shaping Plotinus’ 
understanding of Plato (see note 5 above). If we are to trust the testimony of the V century Neoplatonist 
Hierocles of Alexandria as reported about four centuries later by the Constantinopolitan Patriarch Photius 
(Bibliotheca 251.461a26–39), Plotinus aimed at bringing together Plato and Aristotle under the same 
encompassing understanding (νοῦς), a feature which the Alexandrine apparently inherited from his 
master, Ammonius. Gatti (1999, 21) rightly draws a parallel between this report of Hierocles and 
Porphyry’s remark that Plotinus “brought the mind [νοῦν] of Ammonius to bear on the investigations in 
hand” (VP 14.14–16). 
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of Plato.
9
 As an interpreter, however, he chooses carefully the passages to be 
interpreted. In fact, his interests (and, in fact, the interests of Platonism in general) in 
Plato’s writings have rightly been called “anthological.”10 Accordingly, throughout the 
Enneads Plotinus focuses on a few selected dialogues and, perhaps more importantly, on 
some key passages within them, often paying little attention to the context of these 
passages in their respective works.
11
 This should not surprise us, however, since for 
Plotinus, what Plato says in his writings is important to the extent that it expresses a truth 
that is universal and permanent.
12
 Such an approach obviously results in a departure from 
                                                 
9
 V.1 [10] 8.10–14: “And [it follows] that these statements of ours are not new; they do not belong to the 
present time, but were made long ago, not explicitly, and what we have said in this discussion has been 
an interpretation [ἐξηγητὰς] of them, relying on Plato’s writings for evidence that these views are 
ancient.” This hardly means that Plotinus merely repeats what Plato wrote. His reading of Plato may 
remain questionable from the standpoint of modern philology, as I indicate below (note 11). As Dodds 
(1960, 2) rightly argues in a seminal article, “Plotinus built his structure very largely out of used pieces, 
the materials that Greek philosophical tradition presented to him. But the essence of the Plotinian system 
lies in the new meaning which the whole imposed on the parts; its true originality is not in the materials 
but in the design (as, indeed, I suspect is the case with every great philosophical system).” 
 
10
 Rist (1967, 182); see also Wallis (1995, 22), Gatti (1999, 11). 
 
11
 Schwyzer (1970) has showed how this is the case, for instance, with Plotinus’ interpretation of the 
Philebus. Does this imply that Plotinus is completely unconcerned with what Plato actually meant? If 
anything, he constantly refers his readers, more or less explicitly, to the dialogues in order to find textual 
support for his own theories (e.g., I.2 [19] 3.5, II.1 [40] 7.1, III.5 [50] 1.5, III.6 [26] 11.1, III.7 [45] 1.13–
16, IV.3 [27] 1.23 ad fin., V.8 [31] 4.51–55, VI.2 [43] 22.1–3, VI.4 [22] 16.4–7). However, he is also 
aware that Plato is not always transparent but speaks in riddles (αἰνίσσομαι: e.g., III.4 [15] 5.3, IV.2 [4] 
2.49, VI.2 [43] 22.1, 13), and consequently needs to be explained and clarified (e.g., IV.8 [6] 1.27; IV.4 
[28] 22.10). As I just pointed out, Plotinus sees his own philosophic endeavor as an interpretation of, or 
commentary on Plato, of whom he is very seldom critical, for instance on pleasure as restoration or 
replenishment, which, perhaps following Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics X.1173b9–15), he seems to 
consider a genuine view of Plato (I.4 [46] 12.5–6, VI.7 [38] 25.1–3; cf. McGroarty 2006, 168–169; but 
see also Chapter Four note 25 below). His reading of the dialogues, however, is seldom accurate when 
considered from a philological standpoint. And yet, admittedly, this is not the standpoint from which he 
chooses to operate, as his sharp remark on Longinus’ way of reading Plato confirms: “Longinus is a 
scholar [φιλόλογος], but certainly not a philosopher [φιλόσοφος]” (VP 14.19–20), a lover of words, 
rather than of wisdom. For a commentary on this remark by Plotinus see Pépin (1992). Cf. Seneca 
(Letters to Lucilius 108.23, 30), who highlights a similar contrast between philosophia and philologia 
(see also Cicero, De republica I.2). 
 
12
 Incidentally, this is also something that Plotinus might have learned from Plato (Symposium 201c6–9). In 
this light, perhaps, we can explain his lack of interest in the so-called aporetic dialogues, as well as in 
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what Plato actually said—if, that is, anyone could establish apodictically what this is. 
And yet, Augustine’s well-known remark that in Plotinus Plato lived again13 is not as far-
fetched as it would seem at first if one is willing to concede, with Rist, that “there are 
certain elements in the thought of Plato himself which, if isolated, will turn him into a 
proto-Plotinus, if any notion of a rigid Platonic system be maintained.”14 
This possibility of mapping the main structure of the Plotinian system from some 
isolated Platonic elements is possible if at least three interconnected conditions are taken 
into account. The first condition is that some specific texts from the Platonic corpus are 
selected in which Plato is ambiguous or else appears to contradict statements he makes 
elsewhere.
15
 Secondly, one must allow for the possibility that some philosophical 
problems that are treated explicitly only in the subsequent tradition of Platonism may in 
fact be present in Plato at least implicitly.
16
 It is a good reader’s task to point out such 
problems and, qua philosopher, seek answers to (and textual support for) them, which is 
just what Plotinus tries to do in his writings. Thirdly, Plotinus reads Plato with an 
eminently practical interest in mind, that is, the improvement of one’s soul through the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Plato’s biography (see Gatti 1999, 27), of which one might detect a parallel in his own reluctance to 
share autobiographical information, as reported by Porphyry (VP 1.1–4 ff.). 
 
13
 Augustine, Contra Academicos III.41. 
 
14
 Rist (1967, 58); see also Reale (2004, VIII, 57). I tried to highlight some of these elements in my reading 
of Plato’s view of eros throughout Chapter One, especially Subsection 1.5.2. 
 
15
 “Elsewhere” here may include not only his writings but also the unwritten doctrines (ἄγραφα δόγματα) 
mentioned by Aristotle in Physics IV.209b15 (see Chapter One note 17). 
 
16
 It goes without saying that the same claim could be made about Plotinus (cf. Rist 1971, 77–78), and 
indeed about every philosopher. 
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practice of philosophy:
17
 thus, what we may call a lack of emphasis on a philological 
or scholarly approach to the Platonic text
18
 has its positive counterpart in Plotinus’ 
faithfulness to and focus on what he took to be the core of Plato’s teaching, namely its 
usefulness in view of improving one’s life in the face of particular questions raised by a 
particular audience.
19
 It follows that Plotinus’ reading of Plato is primarily not a 
historico-critical affair with each individual dialogue, but an active engagement of the 
text on the background of questions and objections raised by other schools of his time.
20
 
                                                 
17
 None of these three conditions is exclusive to Plotinus’ reading of Plato. However, one will recognize 
that the first is generally avoided, at least ideally, by contemporary readers of Plato, whose philosophical 
interests are (should be?) hardly ever divorced from philological concerns. By contrast, the second 
condition is still very much part of the way we read Plato, to the point that his greatness is attested in part 
also by the best readers’ ability to show how philosophical questions that received extensive treatment 
only later in the history of philosophy can already be found, albeit in embryone, in the dialogues. As for 
the third condition, in my experience within the academia thus far I have found very few readers of Plato 
who explicitly recognize that the object of their study may have a direct impact on their efforts to 
improve their lives. 
 
18
 If we are to trust Porphyry, this applies also to Plotinus’ composition of his own writings (VP 8). 
According to Rist (1967, 170–173), this privilege accorded to philosophy over philology may correspond 
to the method Plotinus inherited from his master, Ammonius. See also O’Meara (1993, 6–7). 
 
19
 May we argue, then, that Plotinus’ philosophical production is also dialogical, but in a way different than 
Plato’s? In the latter the dialogue, though sometimes possibly rooted in actual conversations surrounding 
the historical figure of Socrates, may be the literary form he chooses for the discourse of philosophy as 
such (see my discussion at pages 27–30). The treatises of the Enneads, by contrast, are elaborations of 
replies to questions asked by an actual audience (see VP 13; 4.10–11), sometimes put in writing only 
because of the insistence of close persons, Porphyry in primis (VP 5.5–7). 
L. Brisson and A.-Ph. Segonds (in Brisson et al. 1992, 223) remark that, while for authors like Origen 
and Jerome the claim to have put their thoughts in writing under the insistence of some friends might 
have been merely false modesty, for Plotinus this is unlikely to be the case, since the claim is made not 
by Plotinus himself, but by Porphyry. They fail to consider that this fact may be lack of modesty on the 
part of Porphyry, who, by pointing at his own influence on Plotinus, would lead posterity to direct some 
of the praise given to the Enneads to the insistence that occasioned their production. But if Porphyry 
overestimates the influence of his insistence on his master (e.g., perhaps, when he undervalues the quality 
of the treatises that Plotinus wrote late in his life, when Porphyry was in Sicily and Plotinus was ill; cf. 
Igal 1972, 104–106), it may very well be that Plotinus’ case is not unlike that of Origen and Jerome, 
whatever this may be. For all I can tell, the difference between Plotinus and these authors on the issue is 
that while the latter did not shun from including an autobiographical reference in their writings, Plotinus’ 
own silence about what led him to put his thoughts in writing may simply be part of his broader 
reluctance to speak and leave behind something of himself (cf. VP 1).  
 
20
 Hence Gerson’s judgment on Plotinus’ general approach to the dialogues: “I believe the best way to 
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Now, among Plotinus’ favorite dialogues is the Symposium and, in it, 
Socrates’ speech, in particular the story of Eros’ birth (203a9–e5) and the so-called 
Greater Mysteries of love (209e5–212a7), as well as Pausanias’ distinction of a double 
Aphrodite and a double Eros (180c3–e3 ff.).21 The first and last of these three passages 
constitute the focus of a large portion of Enneads III.5 [50], with which I will deal in the 
next section (2.2). Before I turn to it, however, we should ask: Granted that Plotinus’ 
exegesis of Plato is philologically far from impeccable, how does he manage to make it 
philosophically plausible? The three conditions briefly outlined in the previous paragraph 
are already a partial answer to this question. Further help is provided by Lacrosse, who 
offers three methodological viewpoints which characterize Plotinus’ overall reading of 
Plato.
22
 The first viewpoint is what Lacrosse calls a “sublimated Platonism,” the second, 
an “objectifying (or ontologizing) and syncretistic exegesis,” and the third is Plotinus’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
distinguish Plotinus’ Platonism both from Plato’s and from the versions of Neoplatonism that came after 
Plotinus is to focus on Plotinus’ response to the most serious objections raised against Platonism. These 
objections, principally Aristotelian and Stoic, naturally presume specific interpretations of Plato’s claims. 
Plotinus’ Platonism is, roughly, the reformulation of these claims in response to these objections. These 
reformulations rarely correspond with exactness to anything to be found in the dialogues” (Gerson 1999, 
6). Regrettably much of the material that would help us to reconstruct the objections and alternative 
philosophical positions of Plotinus’ interlocutors is available to us only in fragmentary form. 
 
21
 The Symposium is only one of three dialogues explicitly mentioned in the Enneads (III.5 [50] 2.7, 5.2; 
see also VP 15.7, 23.9), the others being the Philebus (III.5 [50] 8.9, IV.3 [27] 7.1, VI.7 [38] 25.2–3; see 
also VP 20.42) and the Phaedrus (III.5 [50] 8.7, IV.3 [27] 7.12–13, IV.8 [6] 1.36–37). Gatti (1999, 11) 
includes the Theaetetus and the Republic in this list, but if to cite a dialogue “explicitly” means to name 
its title, I must admit that have been unable to find explicit mention of these two dialogues, whether in 
the Enneads or in SP (the Republic is mentioned at VP 20.43, the Gorgias at VP 20.42, probably the 
Laws at VP 12.6, and presumably the Critias at VP 7.14). However, citations and allusions (the 
difference between the two seems to be rather thin: see Szlezák 1979, 19 note 39) to other dialogues 
abound, especially to Phaedo, Parmenides, Sophist, Republic, Theaetetus, and Timaeus (see the Index 
fontium of any modern edition of the Enneads). 
 
22
 We will find these viewpoints operative in the brief exposition of Enneads III.5 [50] in the next section. 
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way of reading mythical narratives.
23
 In the remainder of this section I will briefly 
touch on these three viewpoints. 
According to Lacrosse, what constitutes the sublimating aspect of the Plotinian 
reading of Plato is the fact that Plotinus takes a doctrine of his master “in order to raise its 
points of application and thus purify its extension.”24 With respect to our topic, the 
doctrine in question is Plato’s view of love as presented in Socrates’ second discourse in 
the Phaedrus. The sphere of interest of this discourse within the dialogue is human love. 
Now, the language of love, through which Socrates in the Phaedrus introduces the 
possibility of a dialectical ascent to the world of Ideas, is extended beyond the sphere of 
interpersonal human love and is employed to describe a mystical experience.
25
 Further, 
while the language of dialectic leads to the realm of Intellect but also stops there, the 
language of love is still operative to describe the further ascent to the One beyond 
                                                 
23
 The three viewpoints can be found in Lacrosse (1994, respectively at pages 21–30, 30–35, and 35–41). 
 
24
 Lacrosse (1994, 30 note 59): “pour élever ses points d’application et purifier ainsi son extension.” To 
avoid confusion with a remark I made in Chapter One note 211, it should be kept in mind that this kind 
of sublimation is not Freudian sublimation. In the context of Plotinian exegesis, it is a matter of seeing 
how the dynamic that takes place in a certain sphere has an analogue in (or, more in keeping with 
Plotinus’ view of reality, is an analogue of) a different, ontologically superior, sphere. For Freud, on the 
other hand, sublimation is the channeling of sexual energy toward objects or activities that are seemingly 
unrelated to sexuality. 
 
25
 As Hadot (1993, 54) writes, “when Plotinus uses the language of the Phaedrus it is not, as it was for 
Plato, in order to describe human love, but rather immediately to express a mystical experience. For 
Plotinus, human love is no longer the starting point or first stage in a gradual ascent, but has become a 
mere term of comparison. It is only a reflection of that genuine love which is infused into the soul by the 
Good.” See also Hadot (1988, 291–293), PIGLER (17). However, I think it would be wrong, in light of 
this statement, to claim that human love, of which sexuality is a fundamental expression, has no place in 
the ascent. While it is true that the ascent does not have to start with sexual love, it certainly can move its 
first steps form there, as Plotinus himself attests (I.3 [20] 2). Thus, strictly, human love does not 
“immediately [...] express a mystical experience,” but rather might direct to such an experience the one 
who is willing to understand the nature of eros at work in sexuality (see also note 51 below). To this 
extent, one can argue that Plotinus does not differ from Plato as strikingly as Hadot (and perhaps more so 
PIGLER) seems to maintain, since for both thinkers the love of the beauty of bodies is both a genuine 
expression of Beauty and an opportunity to rise (though not to rise necessarily) to qualitatively superior 
expressions of Beauty. 
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Intellect as well as the process of derivation of all reality from a single source.
26
 I will 
make these claims more explicit and support them in the next two chapters. 
In addition to this, Lacrosse describes Plotinus’ exegesis of Plato as objectifying 
(or ontologizing) and syncretistic. The chief Plotinian example of the objectifying aspect 
of this description is the hierarchical classification of the threefold One of the Platonic 
Parmenides in the three Plotinian hypostases: the One as the principal One (i.e., One in 
the proper sense, the single source of all reality, itself beyond all form and 
determination); Intellect as the one-many (i.e., the one-which-is-one: multiple unity, or 
Nous as the ever actual unification of thinking and the multiplicity of the intelligibles qua 
object of thougth), and Soul
27
 as the one-and-many (i.e., both unity and multiplicity, ever 
borrowing from Nous its object of contemplation, which it always approximates 
dianoetically without ever possessing it in noetic actuality).
28
 By syncretically relating 
                                                 
26
 Hence Trouillard’s (occasionally misquoted: e.g., by Lacrosse 1994, 27; PIGLER 17) remark: “quand la 
dialectique a achevé sa tâche, l’amour n’a pas fini la sienne” (Trouillard 1995b, 157). 
 
27
 I will consistently capitalize the terms “one” and “intellect” when these refer to the first two so-called 
hypostases of the Plotinian system: the One and Intellect (or Nous). The term “intellect” will not be 
capitalized when it refers to the particular intellects connected to individual rational souls. As for the 
term “soul,” I will capitalize it only when it indicates the Soul-Hypostasis and the World-Soul, while I 
will leave it in small case when its referent is either soul in an undetermined sense or individual 
embodied souls. On these distinctions see Section 2.3 and Subsection 3.4.2 below; on the term 
“individual” as applied to souls, see note 83; on the term ὑπόστασις see Section 2.4. 
 
28
 V.1 [10] 8.25–26: [25] ...τὸ πρῶτον ἕν, ὃ κυριώτερον ἕν, καὶ δεύτερον [26] ἓν πολλὰ λέγων, καὶ τρίτον 
ἓν καὶ πολλά. The first One (i.e., the One) is also called “the absolute One” (τὸ πάντως ἕν and παντελῶς 
ἕν: VI.2 [43] 9.6 and 30), while the the second One (i.e., Nous) is also called “the One that is” (τὸ ἓν ὂν: 
VI.2 [43] 9.8, 10.11, VI.4 [22] 11.20); cf. Proclus, Platonic Theology I.11.47.10–12: ...τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἓν 
τιθεμένοις, τὸν δὲ νοῦν ἓν πολλὰ, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἓν καὶ πολλά, τὰ δὲ σώματα πολλὰ καὶ ἕν. The references 
to Plato’s Parmenides correspond to what traditionally are referred to as the first three hypotheses of the 
notoriously difficult second part of the dialogue: the absolutely simple One (137c4–142a8), the one 
which is one with Being, hence a one-many (142b1–155e3; 144e5: ἓν πολλὰ; cf. Chapter Three note 
200), and the one which is both one and many (155e4–157b5; 155e5: ἕν τε ὂν καὶ πολλὰ; cf. Chapter 
Three note 260). For an extensive treatment of Plotinus’ three hypostases in light of his reading of the 
Parmenides see especially Dodds (1928), who first worked out extensively the identification of the One 
of the first hypothesis of the Parmenides and the Good of the Republic that is at the basis of Plotinus’ 
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these three “ones” to different and seemingly incongruent utterances in the Platonic 
corpus, Plotinus manages to overcome the ambiguities found in Plato. Thus, the Good 
beyond being of Republic VI.509b9 is equated to the One of the first hypothesis of the 
Parmenides, which is superior and transcends the realm of Intellect and corresponds to 
Plotinus’ One. In contrast, Plato’s referring to the Good as still an idea (although the 
supreme one) in Republic VI–VII,29 is taken as an indication that in these passages he is 
talking, not about the absolutely simple One, but about the One-Many, which coincides 
with Being and corresponds to Plotinus’ Intellect. 
This way of reading the Platonic text reaches beyond the Parmenides. Thus, 
where Plato speaks of the soul at times as simple (e.g., in the Phaedo) and at times as 
composite (e.g., in the Timaeus, but also in the Republic), Plotinus sees these claims as 
the expression of two different and yet connected realities, respectively the Soul-
Hypostasis and individual souls mixed with body.
30
 And as Lacrosse remarks, this 
practice is not limited to concepts, but extends to mythical figures as well: for instance 
the figure of Eros, which Plato alternately conceives as a god (Phaedrus 242d9), as a 
daimon
31
 (Symposium 202d13), and as an affection (πάθος) of the soul (Phaedrus 252b2). 
As we shall see in the next section, for Plotinus these seemingly contrasting descriptions 
                                                                                                                                                 
One/Good (Bréhier already hinted at this in 1924: see Bréhier 1924–1938, II, 59 note 3 ad II.4 [12] 5.31–
32). See also Rist (1962a), Jackson (1967), Charrue (1978, 43–115), Gurtler (1992). 
 
29
 Plato, Republic VI.505a2, 507b5–7, 508e3, VII.517c1, 526e1, 534c1. 
 
30
 IV.2 [4] 2; see also VI.4 [22] 4. Souls mixed with body include both individual souls and the World-
Soul. On the appropriateness of this denomination see note 83. 
 
31
 As with Plato, I will simply transliterate the terms δαίμων and ἔρως (cf. Preface note 3, Chapter One note 
113) though I will occasionally refer to the latter as “love” and capitalize it when it is obvious that it is 
the proper name of the mythical character Eros.  
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of Eros become compatible as he refers them to three different kinds of love. 
This brings me to the third viewpoint mentioned by Lacrosse, which constitutes a 
general key to Plotinus’ way of reading mythical narratives such as that of Eros’ birth 
found in the Symposium.
 
It is Plotinus himself who gives us this key explicitly at III.5 
[50] 9.24–29:32 
[24] Now myths, if they are really going to be myths, must both divide 
[25] temporally the things of which they speak, and separate from each 
other many [facets] of the [26] beings which, though existing in unity, are 
nevertheless distinguished in rank or powers
33
 (seeing that [27] even 
reasoned discourses both introduce generations of things ungenerated and 
[28] they too separate things that exist in unity
34
); and once [the myths] 
have fulfilled their didactic function as best as they can, [29] they allow 
the one who understood [them] to recompose [what was divided]. 
 
This passage chiefly clarifies three things. First, myths are not descriptions of 
factual events, but narrative elaborations of realities whose separation is, rather than 
spatiotemporal, one of “rank or power.”35 Secondly, the division operated by myths is not 
                                                 
32
 III.5 [50] 9.24–29: [24] Δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους, εἴπερ τοῦτο ἔσονται, καὶ μερίζειν [25] χρόνοις ἃ λέγουσι, 
καὶ διαιρεῖν ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων πολλὰ τῶν [26] ὄντων ὁμοῦ μὲν ὄντα, τάξει δὲ ἢ δυνάμεσι διεστῶτα, ὅπου [27] 
καὶ οἱ λόγοι καὶ γενέσεις τῶν ἀγεννήτων ποιοῦσι, καὶ τὰ [28] ὁμοῦ ὄντα καὶ αὐτοὶ διαιροῦσι, καὶ 
διδάξαντες ὡς δύνανται [29] τῷ νοήσαντι ἤδη συγχωροῦσι συναιρεῖν. For a similar view, cf. Sallustius, 
On the Gods and the World IV.9; the last two lines of this text are particularly significant: “Now, these 
things never occurred in any particular moment, but always are; and Intellect sees all things at once, 
while discursive reason expresses some first and others later” (Ταῦτα δὲ ἐγένετο μὲν οὐδέποτε, ἔστι δὲ 
ἀεί· καὶ ὁ μὲν νοῦς ἄμα πάντα ὁρᾷ, ὁ δὲ λόγος τά μὲν πρῶτα τά δὲ δεύτερα λέγει; my translation). 
 
33
 Cf. III.2 [47] 1.20–26, IV.3 [27] 9.14–20, IV.8 [6] 4.38–42. 
 
34
 Cf. VI.7 [38] 35.27–30. 
 
35
 WOLTERS (249) rightly notes that the double καὶ at lines 24–25 of this passage is correlative; its purpose 
is to “separate and coordinate two related but distinct features of myths: the presentation of 1) the eternal 
as temporal, and 2) the integral as separated.” The same goes for the second and third καὶ at line 27. The 
extent to which Plotinus’ reading of myths is allegorical in the way Philo’s works, Porphyry’s Cave of 
the Nymphs, or Plutarch’s De Iside et Osiride (Moralia V) are, is debated. Pépin (1955, 5; 1976, 190) 
criticizes de Gandillac’s (1952, vii, note 1) claim that Plotinus is “rarement allégoriste.” Pépin may be 
right, given also his treatment of several myths found in the Enneads (Pépin 1955; 1976, 190–209, 378–
384), and yet de Gandillac’s remark does not sound so hasty when one compares Plotinus’ rather 
moderate allegorism with the doubtlessly more explicit one of the authors I just mentioned. 
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ultimate but propaedeutic: in fact, those who have understood their purpose are 
enabled to see the unity of that which the mythical account separated.
36
 And thirdly, 
while we should emphasize the proximity of mythos and logos insofar as they appear to 
have in common the procedure of division (διαίρεσις), we should not conflate them, since 
οἱ λόγοι at line 27 does not seem to be equated but rather contrasted with τοὺς μύθους at 
line 24. Therefore, in this passage mythos and logos must be distinguished clearly, if 
minimally,
37
 although in the present context we are not given to know what the difference 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
36
 For this reason, the ὁμοῦ at lines 26 and 28 does not indicate mere proximity, but interpenetration of 
what is together, hence my translation of it as “in unity”; cf. III.5 [50] 7.51, 9.14 (see WOLTERS 211 and 
250). 
 
37
 Thus, I think that Lacrosse (1994, 37–38) overstates his case when he claims that Hadot’s translation of 
λόγοι at III.5 [50] 9.27 as “discours rationnels” (HADOT, ad loc.) introduces an erroneous opposition 
between mythos and logos. He goes on to argue that, on the contrary, in this text λόγοι should be taken as 
meaning “‘récits’ mythiques,” which are indeed rational, but that should not be differentiated from the 
μύθους with which the passage began. I rather think that the text makes better sense if read as expressing 
a qualified contrast between mythos and logos (see also Harrington 1975, 119). Virtually all the 
translators cited in the first subsection of the section of the Bibliography titled “Plotinus,” with the 
exception of Guthrie and, curiously, all of the four older French translators (Bouillet, Alta, Meunier, and 
Bréhier), render λόγοι with terms implying that Plotinus is talking about something other than mythos. 
Some examples: “rationes” (Ficino 1492); “begriffliche Darstellungen” (H. F. Müller); 
“wissenschaftliche Darlegungen” (Harder); “esposizioni scientifiche” (Cilento); “ragionamenti” 
(Faggin); “philosophy” (MacKenna and Page); “rational discourses” (ARMSTRONG); “reasoned 
discourses” (WOLTERS); “exposiciones razonadas” (IGAL); more safely, the Japanese translators 
(Mizuchi, Tanogashira and Tanaka) write 論説 (ronsetsu: “discourses,” the first kanji conveying the 
meaning of “argument,” “discussion”) and provide the phonetic, katakana rendering of λόγοι (ロゴイ) in 
furigana next to their translation, as they also did with μύθους on line 24 (物語, monogatari; 
ミュートス). If what is at stake for Lacrosse is to avoid setting up too stark a contrast between mythos 
and logos (hence his speaking of mythos as “logos mythique”: Lacrosse 1994, 38), it seems to me that it 
would be easier to defend the proximity of these terms by simply observing that for Plotinus they share a 
common procedure, that of division (διαίρεσις). This procedure, to be sure, is common to all discourse. 
Thus, the contrast between logos and mythos is only a secondary one; the real contrast is that between the 
diachronic unfolding of elements common to all discourse and their synchronic coexistence in noetic 
intuition (cf. HADOT 23, 246; see also my remarks in Appendix D). Therefore, even to speak of a “logos 
mythique” does not guarantee the rationality of mythical discourse unless mythos, like logos, is 
understood as a species, so to speak, of the diachronic unfolding of the contents of Intellect at a lower 
hypostatic level. Cf. IV.3 [27] 30.7–9; see also the following note. (Thanks to Kenji Aoki for kindly 
reviewing my transliterations of the Japanese translation of the Enneads, Mizuchi, Tanogashira and 
Tanaka 1986–1988, whenever I cite it verbatim.) 
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between the two kinds of discourse is.
38
 
To sum up, Plato is Plotinus’ primary source, but Plotinian exegesis cannot be 
reduced to a literal or philological exegesis of Plato. Thus, while Plato remains Plotinus’ 
starting point, he admits that the Platonic text is not always transparent, so that on the one 
hand he has to explain it (sometimes by critically employing material from other thinkers, 
especially Aristotle), and on the other, in so doing, he develops a philosophy of his own 
that neither coincides with nor is independent of Plato.
39
 
2.3 An Overview of Enneads III.5 [50] On Eros 
As Wolters shows, this treatise is neither a lecture nor a mere commentary, but a 
philosophical inquiry,
40
 which takes the mythical figure of Eros as presented in the 
                                                 
38
 To my knowledge, Plotinus never deals explicitly with the distinction between mythos and logos (hence 
the partial justification for Lacrosse’s critique mentioned in the previous note). May it be that logos in the 
more technical sense of rational discourse includes also the procedure contrary to division (διαίρεσις), 
namely re-composition (9.29: συναιρεῖν, συναίρεσις), while mythos differs from logos not only for the 
fantastic and often poetic character of its narratives, but also because it implies only a diairetic 
procedure? Or are we to say that both mythos and logos are only diairetic in nature? If the latter is the 
case, it is hard to imagine what kind of “discourse,” other than “mythical” and “rational,” would 
characterize the reassembling procedure; that for Plotinus the act of reassembling does not coincide with 
the intuitive grasp of the elements in unity but is a kind of discourse, and as such also diachronic (see 
previous note), seems beyond doubt, as he himself shows in the discursive re-composition of his own 
exegesis of Eros in III.5 [50] 9.29–57. Cf. IV.3 [27] 9.14–20, 10.1–2 ff. for what one might refer to as a 
non-mythical sample—should we call it “logic or dianoetic” (τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ: 9.19–20)?—of the 
practice of division (here called “analysis,” ἀναλύειν: 9.19) and re-composition in the Enneads which 
should enable one to “grasp in unity” (ὁμοῦ λαβεῖν: 10.2) what was divided only through logos (τῷ 
λόγῳ: 9.19); see also IV.6 [8] 4.35–42, VI.7 [38] 3.4, 35.28. On a terminological note, διαίρεσις is one of 
the names of the dialectical procedure in the Theaetetus, and especially throughout the Sophist and 
Statesman; in Pheadrus 266b3–7, Plato couples division with another operation, collection (συναγωγή), 
in the context of dialectic (cf. also Phaedrus 249b5–c4). If, despite its having been placed at the end of 
the treatise, we take the passage on myth as programmatic of Enneads III.5 [50], then we can safely 
suppose that what Plotinus does in his inquiry On Eros is also an experiment in Platonic dialectic 
minimally understood as the science of correct division and collection. What is being divided in order to 
be better understood is, first, love or desire, and, second, the soul itself as that in which love inheres. 
 
39
 As PIGLER (11) remarks, this is the very ideal of exegesis: creativity on the basis of a well-established 
tradition. 
 
40
 WOLTERS (xi–xii). 
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Symposium (particularly in Diotima’s account of his birth at 203a9–204a7), as its 
guiding element for addressing the question: “What is eros?”41 The purpose of the 
treatise is readily stated in its opening lines:
42
 to investigate whether eros “is a god, or a 
daimon, or an affection of the soul, or if one is a god or a daimon and another an 
affection, and what kind of thing each is” (1.1–3). Unsurprisingly, the main reference is 
Plato,
43
 whose seemingly contrasting utterances on eros’ nature are here interpreted in a 
syncretistic way, as I pointed out in Section 2.2. Therefore, the problem, from here to the 
end of the treatise, will be to put aside the first, exclusive alternative of the indirect 
question about eros (i.e., whether he is a god, a daimon or an affection of the soul) by 
showing in what sense the second, more inclusive alternative (i.e., that eros is all these 
things) is to be pursued. After the introductory lines (1.1–10), the remaining material in 
the treatise comprises three major divisions: 1.10–65 (eros as an affection of the soul; 
                                                 
41
 As with Plato’s, Plotinus’ jargon of desire is varied. Here is the same list of terms given in Chapter One 
note 76 as they occur in the Enneads (cf. Radice and Bombacigno 2004) with numbers in parentheses 
again referring respectively to the occurrences of the term in question, and to those of its immediate 
verbal, adjectival, and substantive cognates: ἀγάπη (0, 31); ἀφροδίσιος (5, 0); βούλησις (4, 150) and 
βουλή (2); δίωξις (1, 28); ἐπιθυμία (70, 53); ἔρως (65), Ἔρως (27), and their adjectival and verbal 
cognates ἐρωτικός (10) and ἐράω (39); ἔφεσις (54, 90); θέλησις (10, 178); θυμός (34, 18) and its cognate 
προθυμία (10, 3); ἵμερος (0, 1); ὄρεξις (50, 26); ὁρμή (31, 25); πόθος (7, 18); φιλία (6, 51); cf. also 
σπουδή (7, 77) and ὠδίς (10, 6). Composite nouns (e.g., φιλομαθής) are not included in this calculation. 
Plotinus’ use of these terms is rather loose. I already pointed out (Chapter One note 76) that the term 
στοργή (love or affection, in particular of parents and children, though rarely it may indicate sexual love: 
cf. LSJ, s.v.) never appears in Plotinus. As remarked by Arnou (1967, 63), “entre tous ces termes ἔρως, 
ἔφεσις, πόθος, ὄρεξις, ὁρμή, il ne reste chez Plotin que des nuances, qui souvent s’effacent” (see also 
Gerson 1994, 151, who endorses this conclusion; cf. Chapter Four note 5). As a general warning to the 
reader of the Enneads, Rist (1967, 43) writes that “Plotinus’ use of terminology is not always a guide to 
his thought.”  
 
42
 III.5 [50] 1.1–3. As indicated in Section 3 of the Preface, for the sake of brevity from this point through 
the end of Chapter Two in my references to Enneads III.5 [50] I will report only chapter and line 
numbers. References to other treatises are given in full. 
 
43
 Other sources of Plotinus’ dissertation are the θεολόγοι (2.2, 8.21), that is, “ancient mythologizing poets” 
(WOLTERS, 47), probably including Hesiod (Theogony 120–121), the Orphics (fragments 1, 2, 28, 37), 
and Acusilaus (DK 9.B1–3 = Damascius, De principiis 124, III.163.19–164.8; Plato, Symposium 178b8–
9; Scholia to Theocritus XIII.1/2). Cf. also Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Republic I, 132–140. 
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classification of eros); 2.1–4.25 (Eros as a god and as a daimon); 5.1–9.57 (Eros as 
daimon: exegesis of the Symposium myth of Eros’ birth). A more detailed outline of the 
treatise can be found in Table 2 on the next page. 
I will deal with the classification of eros as an affection of the soul in Subsection 
2.3.1, and reserve another subsection to clarify Plotinus’ reading of the elements found in 
the Symposium myths (2.3.2). In the following section (2.4) I will comment on what I 
take to be the central tenet of Enneads III.5 [50], namely Plotinus’ view of eros as 
something belonging to the soul not accidentally but essentially. 
2.3.1 Enneads III.5 [50] 1.10–65: Eros as an Affection of the Soul; 
Classification of Eros 
The Platonic text at the basis of the claim that eros can be an affection of the soul is 
Phaedrus 252b2, where the experience of love is explicitly called a πάθος.44 The 
fundamental thesis of this division (and, in fact, of the whole treatise) is not only that eros 
“arises in souls that long to be joined to something beautiful” (1.11–12),45 but more 
                                                 
44
 In Plotinus the term πάθος is used synonymously with πάθημα (e.g., 1.65; WOLTERS 8). On occasion, I 
simply transliterate the word πάθος (pathos), but in general I follow ARMSTRONG in rendering both 
πάθος and πάθημα with “affection.” It should be observed, however, that since the description of eros in 
its pure form can be applied not only to individual embodied souls, but also to the World-Soul and to the 
Soul-Hypostasis, and since pure eros is called πάθος, one might be tempted to infer that the World-Soul 
and the Soul-Hypostasis are subject to something accidental, an emotion or a passion (the first two senses 
in LSJ, s.v.; see this and the next subsection on these classifications of Soul). This does not seem to be 
the case in Plotinus. The best solution would be to opt for a more neutral translation of the term πάθος; 
regrettably, no such translation is available among those afforded by LSJ (s.v.; “condition” as found 
under πάθος LSJ A.III and under πάθημα LSJ A.II still seems to retain the sense of something happening 
to the soul only accidentally) nor, for that matter, in E. A. Sophocles (1900, s.v.) or Kittel and Friedrich 
(1964–1976, V, s.v. πάσχω). Thus, I will continue to translate the two terms with “affection” while 
maintaining that when I refer to the eros of the World-Soul and of the Soul-Hypostasis as pure, I am not 
implying that eros is a pathos or accidental affection. See also note 87 below. 
 
45
 The text at the basis of this affirmation is Symposium 204c–209e. 
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Table 2. An Outline of Enneads III.5 [50] On Eros* 
 
I. Introduction 
Subject and method of the treatise (1.1–10) 
 
II. Eros as an affection of the soul (1.10–65) 
1. Two kinds of love: temperate and shameful (1.10–16). 
2. The genesis of love: desire for Beauty itself (1.16–38). 
3. Fourfold subdivision of the two kinds of love (1.38–
65). 
a1. Pure love with recollection (1.38–39). 
a2. Pure love without recollection (1.39–40). 
b. Mixed love: in accordance with nature (1.40–
46). 
• Statement of the difference between pure and 
mixed love (1.46–50). 
c. Deviant love: at variance with nature (1.50–55). 
• Restatement of the difference between pure 
and mixed love (1.55–65). 
 
III. Eros as a god and as a daimon (2.1–4.25) 
1. The problem of Eros’ relation to Aphrodite (2.1–19). 
a. Main theme and sources, especially Plato (2.1–
9). 
b. Puzzle: Was Eros born of Aphrodite, with her, 
or both? (2.10–14). 
c. A double Aphrodite: Heavenly and Vulgar 
(2.14–19). 
2. Heavenly Aphrodite: pure Soul (2.19–32). 
3. Heavenly Eros: pure love (2.32–3.27). 
a. The nature of pure love (2.32–39). 
b1. Metaphorically: Eros is like an eye (2.39–46), 
b2. ...ousia from ousia (3.1–5), 
b3. ...generated from the Soul’s contemplation of 
Intellect (3.6–13). 
c. The “etymology” of Eros: ὅρασις (3.14–19). 
d. Summation: pure Eros and pure Soul (3.19–27). 
4. Eros as daimon (3.27–4.9). 
a. The Eros of the World-Soul (3.27–38). 
b. Eros of individual souls as the substantial 
daimon of each soul (4.1–9). 
5. The Hierarchy of erotes and their corresponding souls 
(4.9–25). 
a. Relations between erotes and souls (9–15). 
b. Eros’ varied manifestations in the world (15–
23). 
c. Summation and transition (23–25). 
 
IV. Exegesis of the Symposium myth: 
Eros as daimon (5.1–9.57) 
1. Problem: the Symposium on the nature of daimons 
(5.1–4  6.1 ff.). 
2. Objections to the identification of Eros with the 
sensible world (5.5–21). 
3. Back to the problem: the nature of daimons in the 
Symposium (6.1–6). 
4. Six questions and five answers on daimons (6.7–45). 
a. Q&A 1: How daimons differ from gods: they 
are subject to passion; gods are not (6.7–13). 
 
b. Q 2, unanswered: Why didn’t daimons stay 
impassive? (6.13–14). 
c. Q&A 3: No daimons in the intelligible, but 
secondary gods in the sensible (6.14–24). 
d. Q&A 4: Daimons as traces of soul in the 
cosmos (6.24–27). 
e. Q 5 and 6 (6.27–28)  A 5 (6.28–35, 7.26–58); 
A 6 (6.35–7.25). 
f. A 5.a: only Eros springs from the Soul’s desire 
of the good, other daimons for the sake of 
administering the world (6.28–35). 
g. A 6: Daimons’ participation in matter (6.35–
7.25). 
i. Daimons share in intelligible matter (6.25–
35). 
[ Exegesis of the myth proper (7.1–9.57) ] 
ii. Penia as the mythical representation of 
intelligible matter (7.1–9). 
iii. Poros as the mythical representation of 
Logos (7.9–12). 
iv. Eros as a mixture of his parents (7.12–25). 
h. A 5.b: Daimons and the three kinds of love 
(7.26–58). 
i. Other daimons are like Eros, but desire 
particular goods (7.26–30). 
ii.Universal Eros; desires for particulars; evil 
desires (7.30–39). 
iii. Only natural erotes are good in ousia 
(7.39–46). 
iv. Principle of Soul production (7.46–49). 
v. Analogy of erotes and thoughts (7.49–58). 
5. Other elements of the myth of Eros’ birth in the 
Symposium (8.1–23). 
a. Zeus as Intellect and his relation to Aphrodite 
(8.1–23). 
i. Zeus as Intellect and Aphrodite as Soul 
(8.1–17). 
ii. Godesses as the souls of gods; Aphrodite 
as Hera, Zeus’ spouse (8.17–23). 
b. Poros, Zeus’ garden, and nectar are all symbols 
of logos (9.1–23). 
i. Poros’ relation to Intellect and Soul; nectar 
and garden (9.1–16). 
ii. Nectar is logos as the drink of inferior 
divinity (9.16–19). 
iii. Garden is logos as the place outside of 
Zeus-Intellect (9.19–23). 
6. The function of myth and its application to Eros’ story 
(9.24–57). 
a. The function of myth in general (9.24–29). 
b. Division and recomposition of the elements of 
myth in Eros’ story (9.29–59). 
 
* Auxiliary sources: WOLTERS (xxxiv, liii–lviii), 
IGAL (II, 116–118), HADOT (92–94). 
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radically that its origin (ἀρχή) is a desire for Beauty itself present in soul (1.16–19).46 
Hadot rightly points out that in the first chapter of III.5 [50] desire for Beauty itself is not 
distinguished from the desire for the Good (cf. 1.17, 23–24, and 64), so that here 
Plotinus’ claim is not unlike the countless instances in which he states, “the absolute 
anteriority” of the desire for the Good to all desiring.47 
What reasons does Plotinus offer for the claim that the presence of this desire for 
the Good under the aspect of Beauty is something present “formerly” (πρότερον: 1.17) in 
the soul, that is, it is innate or connatural (σύμφυτος48) to it? He writes that the presence 
of Beauty itself to the soul is, or rather grounds, a kind of “recognition, an affinity, and an 
                                                 
46
 Beauty itself (αὐτὸ τὸ κάλλος) or, simply, Beauty (here capitalized to avoid equivocation with the 
plurality of beautiful things participating in it) is obviously a Platonic expression (see Plato, Parmenides 
134c6–8, Phaedrus 250e2, Greater Hippias 292d2, Republic V.476c2–3, 479a2). 
 
47
 See HADOT (151): “c’est le désir du bien qui a cette antériorité absolue”; cf. also de Gandillac (1952, 63–
64). See I.6 [1] 7.1, I.7 [54] 1.22, V.5 [32] 12.7–8, VI.5 [23] 1.12, VI.7 [38] 33.29, 42.12; cf. Plato, 
Philebus 20d8; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.1094a3. Elsewhere, at V.5 [32] 12, Plotinus does 
distinguish more precisely between desire of the Good and desire of Beauty and emphatically 
subordinates the latter to the former. He argues that while Beauty is grasped only by those who already 
know it and have already been painfully awaken to it by eros (see Plato, Phaedrus 249c–252c; cf. 
Plotinus I.6 [1] 4.12–22), the desire for the Good is naturally and gracefully present even to those who 
are asleep and unaware of it and is beyond recollection (cf. VI.7 [38] 22). This distinction between 
Beauty and the Good, however, does not seem to be operative in the first chapter of III.5 [50] (but see 
also 6.29: τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ καλοῦ). Thus it must also follow, for the text to be free of contradiction, that 
the connatural eros mentioned in this treatise does not coincide with the one presented in V.5 [32] 12. 
Tentatively, I take the difference between the erotes in the two treatises to be one of extension. More 
specifically, the eros in V.5 [32] 12 is the desire of Beauty understood technically as an Idea (or, 
elsewhere, as representative of the entire realm of Intellect: V.1 [10] 7.27–30, V.8 [31] 1.1–6, VI.7 [38] 
18.1–2); instead, the eros of III.5 [50] is of a more comprehensive kind, since its referent is not Beauty 
taken strictly as noetic Beauty, but first Beauty as an analogue of the Good, true ἀρχή of all eros (1.17, 
23–24, 64), further as the archetypal (noetic) Beauty of which there can be recollection (1.33, 40), and 
finally as the several images, “here below,” of the archetypal Beauty (1.26, 35). More explicit parallels 
on which I base this interpretation are I.6 [1] 6.23–26, 7.14–18, 28–29, 9.37–43, VI.7 [38] 32.24–39, 
33.21–22, VI.8 [39] 15.1–2. Helpful remarks on the subject can be found in IGAL (I, 38–39), O’Meara 
(1993, 97–99), Gerson (1994, 212), Corrigan (2005, 216–217). See also note 49 and pages 328–330 
below. 
 
48
 VI.9 [9] 9.24–26; see also IV.3 [27] 25.29, V.5 [32] 12.11–15, VI.7 [38] 31.17–18. 
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awareness of kinship [with it] independent of reason.”49 But how does this 
recognition take place? Patently, as we experience beautiful things, which are taken to be 
“images” (εἰκών: 1.26, 35) of Beauty itself.50 The reasoning behind these affirmations 
seems to be the following: if we feel a loving transport toward beautiful things, it must be 
because we recognize something in them that makes them beautiful, and hence desirable; 
this “factor” is Beauty itself, and things called beautiful are desired as images of it; the 
possibility of this recognition is not a product of our encounter with beautiful things, but 
is itself a prior predisposition connatural to the soul which is activated or heightened, as it 
were, by the presence of images of Beauty.
51
 All experiences that we might refer to as 
                                                 
49
 1.17–18: [17] ἐπίγνωσιν [18] καὶ συγγένειαν καὶ οἰκειότητος ἄλογον σύνεσιν. HADOT (100 note 20, 152) 
argues that the topic of recognition has its textual antecedent in the notion of ἀνάμνησις found in the 
Phaedrus (249b6–c4). However, if it is true that, as I argued in note 47 and as Hadot himself points out, 
here Beauty is not sharply distinguished from the Good and that for Plotinus there is no recollection of 
the Good (V.5 [32] 12.13), one might be inclined to disregard the plausibility of this reference to the 
Phaedrus. Of the editions and translations of the Enneads cited in the section of the Bibliography titled 
“Plotinus,” only Hadot mentions this reference, although Guthrie (1918) and IGAL quote I.6 [1] 2.3, 7–11 
as parallels, where the Beauty Plotinus is talking about is indeed that of Intellect (see also II.9 [33] 16.45, 
V.3 [49] 2.11). A possible solution to the puzzle is that to maintain that here Plotinus does not distinguish 
sharply between desire of Beauty and desire of the Good does not mean to say that these desires 
themselves are not sharply distinguished, but rather that in the text the different aims of these desires are 
sometimes expressed by the same term (i.e., Beauty itself). Thus, Beauty itself refers alternately to the 
Good and to Intellect, and it is up to the reader to figure out what the case in each instance is. One must 
admit that a solution of this kind requires a great deal of work on the part of the reader, but this is not an 
unusual requirement for someone familiar with the Enneads, whose terseness “often verges on 
unintelligibility” (WOLTERS 238; cf. also Bouillet 1957–1961, I, xiii; Arnou 1967, 7) and has rightly been 
called “désespérante” (HADOT 9), making a commentary virtually indispensable. To be sure, in Plotinus 
the terms καλός and κάλλος have a very wide spectrum, ranging from material things through Intellect 
and the One, much like in Plato they spanned from a single beautiful body to Beauty itself through all the 
rungs of Eros’ ladder (see page 49 above; cf. Corrigan 2005, 205–207). And as in Plato beautiful things 
on inferior rungs of the ladder were such by participating in Beauty itself, so in Plotinus beauties at any 
given level are considered to be images of the Beauty at the level right above it (see for instance I.6 [1] 2, 
V.8 [31] 1, as well as the passages quoted at the end of note 47), so that the term “beautiful” lends itself 
to be used analogously of rather different, though not altogether disconnected, things. As for the other 
elements in these two lines (1.17–18), the affinity of soul and Beauty also echoes a favorite Platonic 
theme (e.g., Republic X.611e2; see also Chapter One note 149); finally, ἄλογον does not mean irrational 
but independent of, or prior to reason (see HADOT 152; cf. VI.7 [38] 20). 
 
50
 On the basis of what I argued in notes 47 and 49, “Beauty itself” here refers to the noetic realm. 
 
51
 Cf. VI.7 [38] 21–22. Speaking of Eros as the son of Aphrodite (cf. Plato, Phaedrus 242d9), Plotinus 
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erotic have this recognition of Beauty as their common denominator. Thus, Plotinus, 
quickly commenting on Symposium 206b1–e6,52 points out that to generate, both in 
nature as a whole (1.19–24) and in the context of the sexual intercourse of individuals 
(1.26–30), means to generate with Beauty in view.53 
The thesis that all eros issues from an originary desire for Beauty itself is 
important insofar as it already alerts us to the fact that, whatever its further specifications 
may be, eros’ origin is one and the same. Two such specifications were quickly 
introduced at 1.10–16 between the eros as the desire of “temperate people who are akin 
to Beauty itself” (1.13),54 and eros as a desire that “wants to issue in some shameful 
action [εἰς αἰσχροῦ τινος πρᾶξιν]” (1.13–14). Another distinction is breached at 1.30–36 
between the eros of those who are moved to generate without the recollection 
(ἀνάμνησιν: 1.34) of the archetypal Beauty (ἀρχέτυπον: 1.33) that is at the basis of all 
                                                                                                                                                 
writes that, besides being the guardian of beautiful boys (Plato, Phaedrus 265c2–3), he also works as the 
“mover of souls toward the beauty [up] there [ἐκεῖ κάλλος], or else to increase the already existing 
impulse toward it [τὴν ἤδη γενομένην πρὸς τὸ ἐκεῖ ὁρμήν]” (2.4–6). The predisposition of which I am 
speaking here is this “already existing impulse.” See also my remarks in Subsection 4.4.3. 
 
52
 See especially Symposium 206c8–d2 (“But these things [i.e., pregnancy and birth] cannot occur in what 
is disharmonious. And ugliness is disharmonious with everything divine, while beauty is harmonious.”) 
and 206e5 (“[Eros is love] of procreation and of birth in beauty”), clearly alluded to at 1.28–29. 
 
53
 WOLTERS (xvi–xxii) speaks of this view as a vindication of sexual love in Plotinus. He argues, with 
Trouillard (1955b, 162) and against such authors as Friedländer (1958, 55–58), Hadot (1993, 56; see note 
25 above), and Ferwerda (1965, 90), that sexual love, being rooted in the soul’s connatural desire for 
Beauty, can in fact be the starting point of the soul’s ascent to the Good, as Plotinus himself remarks (I.2 
[19] 5, I.3 [20] 2, VI.7 [38] 31). HADOT (29) later recognizes that Wolters is right in insisting on the 
fundamental goodness of sexual love. 
 
54
 1.13: σωφρόνων αὐτῷ τῷ κάλλει οἰκειωθέντων. Cf. Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Alcibiades I 48.8–9. 
The terms οἰκειόω (1.13, 25), οἰκείωσις (1.38), and οἰκειότης (1.25) indicate the natural affinity of two 
given terms (cf. Chapter Four note 85). WOLTERS (10) rightly remarks that in Plotinus these terms are 
soul and the intelligible realm (2.24; cf. III.8 [30] 6.18, 21, 8.7), or else the sensible and the intelligible 
(III.6 [26] 1.21, 3.1, IV.4 [28] 44.16, 23). However, given that, as I pointed out above, no sharp 
distinction is made initially between desire for Beauty and desire for the Good in this chapter of treatise 
III.5 [50], one wonders whether a deeper sort of affinity might be intended. 
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beautiful images, and the eros of those who do recollect the archetype. These 
distinctions are then taken over and made sharper at 1.38–65. The following threefold 
classification of eros, which I borrow from Hadot,
55
 can be derived from the text: 
(1) Pure eros (1.38–39, 46–47, 55–57, 58–59) 
(a) With recollection (1.39–40, 60–62) 
(b) Without recollection (1.40, 59–60) 
(2) Mixed eros (1.30–36, 40–46, 47–50, 57–58) 
(a) With recollection (1.34–35, 60–62)  
(b) Without recollection (1.32–33, 35–36, 59–60) 
(3) Deviant eros (1.38, 50–55, 63–65).56 
We are here called to present Plotinus’ justification for three main distinctions: 
the one between pure (καθαρὸς: 1.38) and mixed (μέμικται, μικτὸν: 1.40, 57) eros; the 
one between eros according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν: 1.42) and deviant or unlawful eros at 
variance with nature (ἐν παρανόμῳ καὶ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν: 1.50); and the one between eros 
with recollection and eros without recollection. We should not lose sight of the fact that 
                                                 
55
 See HADOT (163); cf. WOLTERS (liii) for a similar division. IGAL (II.116–117, 123 note 12) offers a 
different classification: (1) Pure eros: (a) with recollection, and (b) without recollection; (2) Mixed eros: 
(a) according to nature, and (b) against nature. Igal’s subsumption of eros against nature under mixed 
eros is not unjustified insofar as Plotinus states that unlawful lovers started out from the course in 
accordance with nature but strayed from it (1.51–52). However, as I show in the next few pages, the chief 
characteristic of mixed eros is a desire of procreation; but since this characteristic is absent in eros 
against nature, this is better distinguished as an altogether different type of eros, hence my preference for 
Hadot’s classification. 
 
56
 A similar classification appears at 7.30–39. There, however, it is the Good, rather than Beauty, that 
explicitly constitutes the goal of eros. Moreover, what in the first chapter of the treatise I called deviant 
eros, in chapter 7 is barely even referred to as eros, but is called “evil desire” (7.37: κακαῖς [...] 
ἐπιθυμίαις; but see 7.42: Οἱ [viz., ἔρωτες]), and as a consequence it cannot be considered as belonging 
essentially to the soul (7.42). See HADOT (226–230). On eros as belonging essentially to the soul see 
Section 2.4 below. 
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the context of these distinctions is eros as an affection of the soul, that is, something 
that the soul comes to experience incidentally as it comes in contact with images of 
Beauty at the sensible level. 
Let us begin with the last distinction. The discriminating factor between the two 
kinds of lovers is that those who love without recollection of the archetypal Beauty take 
images of Beauty for true Beauty, while recollecting lovers appreciate images of Beauty 
precisely qua images.
57
 Plotinus further remarks that the mere fact of not recollecting the 
archetype and even the fact of being attracted to inferior beauties is free of fault 
(ἀναμάρτητος: 1.37).58 This is consistent with his guiding principle that the ultimate aim 
or origin of all eros is Beauty itself, so that attraction to its images, even if one is unaware 
of the archetype, is a tribute to it rather than an immediate error of judgment. More 
importantly, not only does lack of recollection not mar the purity of one’s eros, but if 
eros is called pure even in the absence of recollection, recollection itself is not, strictly, 
an essential aspect of pure eros (nor, for that matter, of mixed eros).
59
 
What, then, makes eros pure and distinguishes it from mixed eros? Plotinus offers 
                                                 
57
 See Plato, Phaedrus 249d5, 250a7; cf. Plotinus V.8 [31] 8.13; II.9 [33] 17.33–38. 
 
58
 What does constitute fault (ἁμαρτία: 1.38) is abandonment to, or fall into, sexual intercourse (ἡ δὲ πρὸς 
μίξιν ἔκπτωσις: 1.38), resulting in a misguided consideration of sensible pleasure as the primary 
desideratum. 
 
59
 One may be tempted to identify pure eros without recollection with the originary desire for Beauty itself 
mentioned at 1.16–17. The reason for this is that, as we saw earlier (see pages 116–118, especially notes 
47 and 49), at 1.16–17 the originary desire for Beauty itself, ἀρχή of all eros, is not sharply distinguished 
from the soul’s connatural desire for the Good, and the latter, being beyond all form (that is, beyond the 
realm of Νοῦς), is also beyond all possible recollection (V.5 [32] 12.13), and so beyond knowledge, since 
from the perspective of soul, to come to know an Idea implies a recollection of it (see IV.7 [2] 12.8–11, 
IV.8 [6] 4.30; see also I.2 [19] 4.21, II.9 [33] 12.7, 16.47). However, the identification of pure eros 
without recollection with the originary desire mentioned at 1.16–17 would be inconsistent, since in this 
context recollection, while absent, remains at least possible. This is also true, a fortiori, of mixed eros 
without recollection. 
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his explanation at 1.38–50 and elaborates further on it at 1.55–65. He argues that eros 
is pure when one is “content with beauty alone [ἀγαπητὸν τὸ κάλλος μόνον]” (1.39), 
while it is mixed when it is accompanied by “another desire, [viz., the desire] to be 
immortal as far as it is possible for a mortal.”60 This added desire results in a productive 
activity in which, like in Symposium 206b1–209e4, the lovers aim at perpetuating 
themselves through sexual union. One could say that the purity of eros, whether with or 
without recollection, consists in its being simply theoretical or contemplative.
61
 
Accordingly, its mixed character results from an additional element, which for Plotinus is 
the desire to procreate. 
But why is mixed eros introduced as an inferior kind of eros? That is, why is 
contemplation alone superior to contemplation plus procreation? One tends to shrink 
from the notion of a purely contemplative eros, taking its purity as a polite euphemism 
for impotence: contemplative love as sterile love. This is clearly not what Plotinus has in 
mind. The superiority of pure contemplation over productive contemplation, or of pure 
                                                 
60
 1.40–41: [40] ἄλλη τοῦ [41] ἀθάνατον εἶναι ὡς ἐν θνητῷ ἐπιθυμία. The italic in my translation indicates 
the allusion to Plato, Symposium 206e8. 
 
61
 Thus, Armstrong, in a note to this passage, is correct when he says that “[i]n Plato all love up to the 
highest is essentially productive (cf. Symposium 212a). In Plotinus it is not” (ARMSTRONG III.170–171, 
note 1). We might add that in Plato, like in Plotinus, the productive activity that takes place at the lower 
levels of Eros’ ladder is an inferior kind of activity when compared to the contemplation of Beauty itself 
at the highest level. The difference between Plotinus and Diotima seems to be, not that for the latter eros 
is productive while for the former it is merely contemplative, but rather that for Plotinus genuine 
contemplation devoid of desire for self-perpetuation, and hence for procreation, is possible even when 
the object of contemplation is less than Beauty itself. It is primarily a matter of attitude of the soul rather 
than, strictly, of level of ascent. I therefore disagree with Friedländer when, contrasting Plato and 
Plotinus’ views of love, he claims that Plotinian eros is “meaningless within the world of phenomena” 
and the Plotinian soul is “alienated from this world” (Friedländer 1958, 57, 56). The point is not that the 
material is meaningless and the soul is estranged from it, but rather that the material can be correctly 
appreciated only when the soul erotically relates to it with an eye to what is ontologically superior not 
only to the sensible, but also to itself. 
 
  
123 
over mixed eros, is due to the greater self-sufficiency of the former. In Plotinus’ own 
words at 1.46–50:62 
[46] Therefore, that which does not want to generate [47] is more self-
sufficient in regard to beauty, while that which desires [48] to produce 
something beautiful wants to do so out of lack and is not [49] self-
sufficient; and it thinks it will produce something of that sort, if at all, if it 
will [50] generate in beauty. 
 
The comparative, αὐταρκέστερον, highlights the fact that pure eros is not self-
sufficient tout-court; after all, no eros, insofar as it is intentional, will ever be thoroughly 
self-sufficient.
63
 Rather it is “more self-sufficient” than other kinds of eros, which depend 
on additional factors besides Beauty. By contrast, all that pure eros needs in order to be 
pure, is Beauty.
64
 
We finally come to the distinction between mixed eros and unlawful eros (here 
used synonymously with “eros against, or at variance with, nature,” or, more concisely, 
                                                 
62
 1.46–50: [46] Τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ γεννᾶν [47] ἐθέλον μᾶλλον αὐταρκέστερον τῷ καλῷ, τὸ δὲ ἐφιέμενον [48] 
ποιῆσαι καλόν τε ἐθέλει ποιεῖν ὑπ’ ἐνδείας καὶ οὐκ [49] αὔταρκες· καί, εἴπερ τοιοῦτον ποιήσει, οἴεται, εἰ 
ἐν καλῷ [50] γεννήσεται. The μᾶλλον at 1.47 is pleonastic (WOLTERS 29). 
 
63
 See Plato, Symposium 199e–200a; cf. Subsection 1.4.2. 
 
64
 Conversely, mixed eros is not altogether deprived of contemplation. But while pure eros is contemplative 
in an unqualified way (that is, purely, or by simply gazing on, or being content with, Beauty itself: the 
last level of Eros’ ascent in the Symposium), mixed eros is so qualifiedly (that is, mixedly, or as 
productive of images of Beauty with Beauty in view: the Lesser Mysteries as well as all the lower rungs 
of Eros’ ladder in the Symposium). When neither of these is the case, then eros becomes deviant, as we 
shall see presently. And as HADOT (159–160) points out, the hierarchy between erotes rehearses one of 
the great Plotinian principles, that “making and action are either a weakening or a consequence of 
contemplation. [...] For who, if he is able to contemplate what is truly real will deliberately go after its 
image?” (III.8 [30] 4.39–40, 43–44: [39] τὴν ποίησιν [40] καὶ τὴν πρᾶξιν ἢ ἀσθένειαν θεωρίας ἢ 
παρακολούθημα]. [...] [43] Τίς γὰρ θεωρεῖν τὸ ἀληθινὸν δυνάμενος [44] προηγουμένως ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τὸ 
εἴδωλον τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ;). This is not a manifesto of idleness or, worse, a well-pondered contempt of the 
sensible realm; if anything, it is an appreciation of the sensible insofar as it is the result of contemplation 
and as such cannot be evil (as for the Gnostics). I will return briefly to this point in Chapter Four (pages 
399–400). For a stimulating study on the topic of contemplation in Plotinus see Gatti (1996). 
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“deviant”65). We saw that the presence of the additional desire for procreation is what 
introduces a difference in pure eros, thus making it mixed. Now, this desire is also what 
makes of mixed eros an eros in accordance with nature, distinguishing it not only from 
pure eros but also from eros at variance with nature. Thus, just as the presence of desire 
for self-perpetuation in eros introduces a double difference (i.e., mixed eros as 
distinguished from both pure and deviant eros), so its absence introduces an ambiguity, 
namely the fact that based on the mere lack of the desire for self-perpetuation, the 
positive identity of eros remains hidden.
66
 It follows that a further factor is needed if one 
is to distinguish deviant eros not only from mixed eros but, perhaps more importantly, 
also from pure eros. This factor is the soul’s attitude toward sensible beauty understood 
as an image of the archetypal Beauty of Intellect. In the case of pure eros the attitude is 
contemplative, while deviant eros is an immoderate abandonment to pleasure (1.38) 
resulting in the soul’s inability both to recognize the desire to procreate and to use images 
of Beauty to recollect Beauty itself (1.53–55). 
However, it is important to realize that for Plotinus all eros is essentially good, 
that is, it primarily indicates a connection to Beauty insofar as the soul, even when eros 
has become deviant, is stirred and attracted by images of Beauty. As Hadot rightly 
                                                 
65
 Line 1.52 refers to lovers who have strayed from the course in accordance with nature (παράφοροι ἐκ 
ταύτης [i.e., πορείας]), hence the appellative “deviant” used to describe their eros. 
 
66
 This is a recurrent theme in Plotinian metaphysics: the extreme terms of a hierarchy share the absence of 
the features proper to the intermediate terms. So, for instance, the One and matter, which constitutes the 
antipodes of Plotinus’ universe, share the character of formlessness in opposition to the pure form of 
Intellect and the partial form of soul and ensouled bodies (see VI.7 [38] 33.13, 21, 37, VI.9 [9] 3.4, 43, 
I.8 [51] 3.14, 31, 8.21, II.5 [25] 4.12). Cf. Chater 3 note 329, and Chapter Four note 75. 
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observes, “there is no love which is substantially evil.”67 Plotinus’ remark that “the 
desire for good often involves the fall into evil” (1.63–64)68 does not invalidate, but 
confirms this observation, since it points to the fact that even deviant eros is ultimately 
rooted in the primary desire of Beauty itself connatural to soul, a topic to which I will 
return in Chapter Four. In conclusion, for Plotinus eros as an affection (πάθος) of the soul 
is a single phenomenon that can manifest itself in the three types of eros presented above, 
hence the use of the plural (παθήματα) in the closing line of the chapter. 
2.3.2 Enneads III.5 [50] 2.1–9.57: Identification of the Mythical Entities 
In chapters 2–9 of treatise III.5 [50] Plotinus continues his explanation of Plato’s 
(seemingly) conflicting affirmations about eros, now focusing on the descriptions of Eros 
as a god and son of Aphrodite (Plato, Phaedrus 242d9, Symposium 180d1–e2) and as a 
daimon with a different set of parents (Plato, Symposium 202d13, 203a9–204a7).69 
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 HADOT (163): “Il n’y a pas d’amour substantiellement mauvais.” See also Lacrosse (1994, 71–77). 
 
68
 1.64–65: [64] ἡ ἀγαθοῦ ἔφεσις ἔχει εἰς κακὸν τὴν ἔκπτωσιν [65] πολλάκις. ARMSTRONG’s translation. 
WOLTERS (45) claims that “Plotinus is not here speaking of the desire of the Good,” but he offers no 
reasons for such a claim. I believe Wolters is correct to the extent that desire for any good and desire for 
the Good are different. However, if one keeps in mind that desire for any good ultimately points to the 
Good and is possible because of the Good, I see no reason for categorically dismissing the possibility that 
Plotinus here may in fact be talking also about the Good. 
 
69
 It may be convenient to report the Platonic passages from the Symposium where these mythical entities 
are mentioned. 
Here is the story of Eros’ birth as told at Symposium 203b2–e5: “[b2] Well, when Aphrodite was born, 
the gods had a banquet, both the others [b3] and Poros [i.e., Passage, Resourcefulness] son of Metis [i.e., 
Counsel, Wisdom]. After they dined, [b4] Penia [i.e., Poverty, Want] came begging, just as [it happens] 
when there is a feast, and [b5] she was near the door. Now, Poros, entering Zeus’ garden drunk with 
nectar—[b6] for wine did not exist yet—[b7] [and] since he was weighed down [with drink], lied down 
to sleep. So Penia, planning [b8] to have a child from Poros due to her own resourcelessness [ἀπορίαν], 
lied down by [c1] him and conceived Eros. Just for this reason [c2] Eros has been a follower and a 
servant [ἀκόλουθος καὶ θεράπων] of Aphrodite, [c3] because he was begotten during her birthday 
celebrations [γενεθλίοις], and at the same time he is by nature [c4] a lover of beauty [φύσει ἐραστὴς ὢν 
περὶ τὸ καλὸν], and since Aprhrodite is beautiful. [c5] So, insofar as he is son of Poros and Penia, Eros 
has such a fate. [c6] First, he is always poor [πένης], and far from [c7] delicate and beautiful [ἁπαλός τε 
καὶ καλός], as most people think, but [is rather] hard [σκληρὸς], [d1] and rough [αὐχμηρὸς], and barefoot 
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Before dealing with the speculative relevance of Plotinus’ exegesis of the mythical 
characters and elements found in the Platonic text, it may be better to offer a brief 
account of what he takes these characters to represent. It is at this juncture that his 
reading of myths (of which, as we saw, he will not give us a theoretical statement until 
the last chapter of the treatise) comes into focus together with the other exegetical 
strategies of sublimation, ontologization and syncretism mentioned in Section 2.2. 
The classification of the results of Plotinus’ exegesis of the mythical data he 
inherited from Plato and the poets mentioned in notes 43 and 72 was first suggested by 
Ficino in his 1475 commentary on Plato’s Symposium and has been retrieved and 
elaborated further by Wolters, Lacrosse, and, more systematically, by Hadot, whose main 
conclusions I follow.
70
 The material in this subsection can be read more easily with Table 
2 and Table 3 in hand. 
                                                                                                                                                 
[ἀνυπόδητος], and homeless [ἄοικος], always lying on the ground [d2] and without a bed [ἄστρωτος], 
going to sleep on doorsteps and on streets in the open air, [d3] since he has his mother’s nature, ever 
associated with want [ἐνδείᾳ σύνοικος]. [d4] In conformity with his father, on the other hand, he is a 
schemer [ἐπίβουλός] after the beautiful and the [d5] good, being courageous [ἀνδρεῖος], and bold [ἴτης], 
and earnest [σύντονος], a skillful hunter, [d6] always contriving some devices, [and] a desirer of wisdom 
[φρονήσεως ἐπιθυμητὴς] [d7] and resourceful [πόριμος], philosophizing [φιλοσοφῶν] through all his life, 
[d8] a wonderful enchanter [γόης] and sorcerer [φαρμακεὺς], and a sophist [σοφιστής]; [e1] by nature he 
[is] neither immortal [ἀθάνατος] nor mortal [θνητός], but sometimes in the same [e2] day he blooms and 
lives, whenever he is resourceful [εὐπορήσῃ], and [e3] sometimes he dies but then comes back to life due 
to his father’s nature; [e4] and what is brought about always passes away [ποριζόμενον], so that Eros is 
neither lacking [ἀπορεῖ] [e5] nor wealthy [πλουτεῖ], and further, he is in the middle of wisdom and 
ignorance [σοφίας, τε αὖ καὶ ἀμαθίας ἐν μέσῳ ἐστίν].” 
And here is Pausanias’ division of Aphrodite and Eros given at Symposium 180d3–e3: “[d3] For we all 
know [d4] that there is no Aphrodite without Eros [οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ Ἔρωτος Ἀφροδίτη]. Therefore, if she 
were one, [d5] Eros would [also] be one. But since there are two [Aphrodite], there must [d6] also be two 
Eros. And how [are] the goddesses not two? One [is] somewhat [d7] older and motherless, Uranus’ 
daughter [ἀμήτωρ Οὐρανοῦ θυγάτηρ], whom we also [d8] name Heavenly [Οὐρανίαν]; the other [is] 
younger, [daughter] of Zeus and Dione [Διὸς καὶ Διώνης], [e1] whom we call Vulgar [Πάνδημον]. It 
necessarily follows that [the] Eros who [e2] is coworker [συνεργὸν] of the latter is rightly called Vulgar 
[Πάνδημον], and the [e3] other Heavenly [Οὐράνιον].” 
 
70
 See Ficino, Commentary on Plato’s Symposium VI.7; WOLTERS (xxv–xxvi); HADOT (40–65); Lacrosse 
(1994, 41–64). 
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Table 3. Mythical Entities and Their Metaphysical Equivalents in Enneads III.5 [50] 
Mythical Entities Metaphysical Equivalents 
References to Enneads III.5 [50] 
(and to Plato) 
APHRODITE Soul 4.22, 8.2–3, 5, 9.30–33 
Urania: daughter of Uranus 
& Cronus 
Soul-Hypostasis 
2.15, 17–32, 3.1–5, 24, 4.9–10  
(Symposium 180d4–e6) 
Pandemos: daughter of 
Zeus & Dione or, 
simply, of Zeus 
World-Soul 
 
Soul of the Intellect of the World-Soul 
2.16–19, 3.30–31, 4.20, 5.11–12, 8.14–20 
(Symposium 180d4–e6) 
 Individual (rational) souls 
4.1–14, 6.30; see references in (2.a) & (2.b) of 
the next entry (Eros) 
EROS Soul’s activity reaching for the good 4.21–23, 9.39–41, 55–57 
Uranius: god, son of 
Aphrodite Urania 
Love of the Soul-Hypostasis: divine, 
pure 
2.1–3, 32–39, 3.19–27, 7.3–4, 9.39–41 
(Symposium 180d4–e6, Phaedrus 242d9) 
Pandemos: 
• son of Aphrodite 
Pandemos; 
• daimon, son of Poros 
and Penia 
(General references) 
5.3–4, 7.12–25, 9.42–53 
(Symposium 180d4–e6, 203b1–e5) 
(1) Love of the World-Soul 3.27–38, 4.9–10, 14–15, 7.12–25 
(a) of the superior part: divine, pure 3.27–30, 4.2–3, 6.28–30, 8.1–16 
(b) of the inferior part: daimonic, 
mixed 
3.32–33, 6.30–35 
(2) Love of individual (rational) souls 4.1–14, 6.30 
(a) of the superior part: divine, pure 
1.10–13, 38–40, 46–47, 55–59, 2.8–9, 3.33–36, 
4.23–25, 6.28–30, 7.30–31, 39–42, 55 
(b) of the inferior part: daimonic, 
mixed 
1.40–46, 47–50, 55–59, 3.36–37, 4.25, 7.39–42 
 
(c) deviant: possible only for the 
inferior part 
1.13–14, 38, 50–55, 63–65, 7.36–39, 42–46 
URANUS The Good 2.15, 19–20, 33–34; (Symposium 180d7) 
CRONUS Intellect 2.19–20, 33–34; (Cratylus 396b3–c3) 
ZEUS 
Intellect of the World-Soul (// 
Demiurge) 
2.16, 8.1–16, 9.30; (Philebus 30d1–2, Phaedrus 
246e4, Letters II.312e3); note 77 
DIONE  2.16; (Symposium 180d8) 
HERA = Wife of Zeus = 
Aphrodite daughter of Zeus 
Soul of the Intellect of the World-Soul 8.22–23 
DAIMONS 
• Traces of Soul in the cosmos 
• Different from Eros 
6.24–27 
6.27–35, 7.26–36 
PENIA (Poverty) 
Intelligible (psychic) matter, receptacle 
of logos 
6.44, 7.1–9, 9.45–53 
METIS (Counsel)  5.3 
(Symposium 
203b2–7) 
POROS (Resourcefulness) 
The logoi coming to Soul from Intellect 
7.9–12, 8.3–4, 9.1–16, 34–37 
GARDEN of ZEUS 8,4, 9.8–19, 34–37 
NECTAR, 
DRUNKENNESS 
9.5–8, 19–23, 34–37 
 
Some parallels in the rest of the Enneads 
 
• Aphrodite as soul: V.8 [31] 2.10–14, 13.15–17, VI.9 [9] 9.31. 
• Aphrodite Urania: VI.9 [9] 9.29; see also II.1 [40] 5.6, II.3 [52] 9.43–47, II.9 [33] 9.32. 
• Aphrodite Pandemos: V.8 [31] 13.15–17, VI.9 [9] 9.30; see also IV.8 [6] 2.31–38. 
• Eros’ relation to Aphrodite/soul: VI.9 [9] 9.25; also V.9 [5] 2.11, VI.5 [23] 10.3, VI.6 [34] 7.12; cf. Plato, Symposium 180d4. 
• Eros Uranius: VI.9 [9] 9.28. 
• Eros Pandemos: VI.9 [9] 9.28–29. 
• The love of the two parts of individual souls: IV.4 [28] 43.5–7, IV.8 [6] 4.1–3. 
• Uranus as the One: III.8 [30] 11.35–45, V.8 [31] 12–13 (passim; cf. notes in Soares 2003, 133–134), V.5 [32] 3.16–24; see 
Hadot (1981), also for the next two entries. 
• Cronus as Intellect: III.8 [30] 11.35–45, V.1 [10] 4.9–10, 7.33–35, V.8 [31] 12–13 (passim), V.5 [32] 3.16–24. 
• On Zeus: II.3 [52] 13.30–31, IV.3 [27] 12.8–12, IV.4 [28] 9.1, 10.1–4 (associated with the Demiurge), V.1 [10] 7.34–37, V.5 [7] 
3.20–24, V.8 [31] 4.39–42, 10.1–4, 23, 12–13 (passim), VI.9 [9] 7.24. 
• On the multiplicity of daimons: II.9 [33] 17.34, III.2 [47] 3.24, V.1 [10] 4.5. 
• On Penia and the notion of matter as indetermination: III.6 [26] 14.5–10; cf. also note 89 above, pages 251–256, 279. 
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The leading principle of Plotinus’ exegesis is that “every soul is Aphrodite.”71 
The problem can be summarized in terms of the double parenthood of both Eros and 
Aphrodite in the Symposium. On the one hand, we have the duplicity of the figure of 
Aphrodite, who is divided by Pausanias in heavenly (Urania) and earthly (or vulgar in 
the etymological sense of “popular”: Pandemos) based on her parenthood: Uranus in the 
first case, Zeus and Dione in the second (2.14–32).72 On the other hand, we have the 
duplicity of Eros, who is at once son of Aphrodite, hence either heavenly (2.33–3.26) or 
earthly (3.27–4.25) depending on the nature of his mother,73 and of Poros and Penia (5.1–
7.58), who conceived him on the day of Aphrodite’s birth in Zeus’ garden as Poros was 
drunk with nectar (8.1–9.23).74 
Plotinus reshapes the seemingly conflicting identities of these mythical characters 
and elements to fit his system. Thus, Aphrodite Urania corresponds to what is generally 
referred to as the Soul-Hypostasis, that is, Soul unmixed with body, also called divine 
Soul, Soul simply (μόνον ψυχὴ, ἁπλῶς ψυχὴ: 3.31), or Unparticipated Soul;75 her Eros is 
                                                 
71
 VI.9 [9] 9.31: ἔστι πᾶσα ψυχὴ Ἀφροδίτη. See also V.8 [31] 2.10–14. 
 
72
 Plato, Symposium 180c3–e3. As I mentioned at the end of Subsection 1.3.2, Plotinus finds useful 
elements for his exegesis of Plato not only in Socrates’ statements, but also in those of other characters in 
the dialogue. This is a clear sign of the syncretistic aspect of his exegesis. Extra-Platonic sources on the 
duplicity of Aphrodite may include: Hesiod, Theogony 190; Homer, Iliad V.311–372; Xenophon, 
Symposium 8.9–10; Pausanias, Description of Greece IX.16.2–3. 
 
73
 Plato, Symposium 180c3–e3. It must be observed that for Plotinus the duality of Aphrodite and her 
corresponding Eros is not one of moral opposition (as it seemed to be in Pausanias’ discourse in the 
Symposium), but rather of ontological subordination. Therefore, the appellative Pandemos should not be 
taken in the pejorative sense that it has in Pausanias. See HADOT (46–48 and 116 note 137). 
 
74
 Plato, Symposium 203b2–c4. 
 
75
 For a more systematic classification of the hypostasis soul see the opening paragraphs of Subsection 
3.4.2, ending with Table 5 at below. 
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the god Eros, divine insofar as he is always directed to the superior hypostasis of 
Nous (here represented by Cronus), in turn directed to and derived from the Good or the 
One (here represented by Uranus).
76
 Aphrodite Pandemos, on the other hand, corresponds 
to the World-Soul, in turn divided in a superior (divine) and in an inferior (daimonic) 
part. The superior part is actually the particular intellect of the World-Soul (here 
represented by Zeus) ever contemplating Nous (i.e., again, Cronus).
77
 More precisely, the 
World-Soul is the individual soul that belongs to the particular intellect of Zeus, in 
accordance with the principle that every particular intellect (represented by a male god) 
expresses itself, or is connected to, an individual soul (represented by a goddess: 8.19–
20). This connection is expressed both by a father-daughter relation (hence Aphrodite as 
the daughter of Zeus: 8.11–17) and by a husband-wife relation (hence the identification 
                                                 
76
 The text which is very likely at the basis of the identification of Cronus with Intellect and of Aphrodite 
Urania’s contemplation of it (and, arguably, of Zeus and Uranus as well) is Plato’s Cratylus 396b3–c3, 
which reads: “[b3] And that he [viz., Zeus] is the son of Cronus [b4] may seem outrageous [ὑβριστικὸν] 
to one who hears it for the first time, [b5] but it is reasonable that Zeus be the offspring of a great 
intelligence [διανοίας]: [b6] for koros [κόρον] means, not a child [παῖδα], but his purity [τὸ καθαρὸν] and 
[b7] unmixedness of Intellect [ἀκήρατον τοῦ νοῦ]—and he [viz., Cronus] is son of Uranus, as the story 
[λόγος] goes; [b8] and again, it is right [καλῶς] that the vision toward the above [ἐς τὸ ἄνω ὄψις] is 
called with the name [c1] ‘urania’ [οὐρανία], for it looks at the things above [ὁρῶσα τὰ ἄνω], and just 
from there, Hermogenes, the astronomers say that [c2] comes the purity of intellect [τὸν καθαρὸν νοῦν], 
[c3] and that the sky [τῷ οὐρανῷ] was rightly [ὀρθῶς] given its name.” 
 
77
 Plotinus’ avowed sources for the identification of Zeus are Plato’s Phaedrus 246e4, Philebus 30d1–2, 
and Letters II.312e3. Elsewhere (IV.4 [28] 10.1–4), Plotinus explicitly associates Zeus with the figure of 
the Demiurge or Divine Craftsman found in Plato’s Timaeus (see especially 29d–30c; relevant passages 
of the Timaeus referred or alluded to by Plotinus in relation to this issue include 37c7, 39e7–9, 41a7–8, 
69c3–4). Other important passages on the Demiurge in Plotinus are II.1 [40] 5.1–9, II.3 [52] 18.15 (νοῦς 
δημιουργός), III.2 [47] 1.1–26, IV.4 [28] 9.1–9, V.9 [5] 3.20–30; cf. also II.4 [12] 7.9–14, II.9 [33] 6, 
IV.8 [6] 1.40–50, V.1 [10] 8.5–6, V.8 [31] 8.9. The issue concerning the Demiurge is complex, due in 
part to a certain lack of clarity in the Timaeus story itself, which led to subsequent interpretations of this 
figure (see Zandee 1961, 24–26; Wallis 1995, 34). In any event, the matter is not central to our concerns. 
I think that from the references to the Enneads I just listed in this note it may be safe to conclude that an 
identification of the Demiurge with the Intellect of the World-Soul (and hence with the figure of Zeus as 
presented in III.5 [50]) is highly plausible (cf. Gerson 1994, 56–58). 
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of Aphrodite with Hera, Zeus’ spouse, also attested in the myths: 8.22–23).78 Thus, 
strictly, what is generally referred to as the World-Soul, much like every individual 
rational soul, is actually a complex entity made up of two parts, or rather, aspects: a 
superior one permanently connected to the realm of Intellect via the Soul-Hypostasis, and 
an inferior one, the psychic part proper, directed to the care of the material cosmos. Given 
that in treatise III.5 [50] the character of Zeus is used consistently to represent the 
superior part, and Hera is mentioned only once clearly in reference to the inferior part, it 
would have been convenient to have Aphrodite Pandemos constantly representing the 
World-Soul as a whole, but Plotinus’ usage does not seem to be wholly transparent on 
this point.
79
 
Since the two parts of the World-Soul are divine and daimonic, the quality of their 
Erotes will also be divine and daimonic,
80
 or Uranius and Pandemos, respectively.
81
 The 
other daimons we find in the myths are interpreted as traces of Soul into the cosmos 
(6.24–27) and are thus associated to the inferior part of the World-Soul. However, they 
differ from Eros insofar as they spring from Soul for the sake of the administration of the 
cosmos (6.30–35; 7.26–36), while the major feature of Eros as a daimon, even when he is 
involved in the promotion of marriages, is to direct the souls in love toward the 
                                                 
78
 Pausanias, Description of Greece III.13.9; Timaeus of Locris, On the Nature of the World and the Soul 
96e. See HADOT (236–240) for a detailed account of this identification. 
 
79
 See 2.17 (τῇδε), 3.30–31, 8.14–17. 
 
80
 An alternative interpretation of Plotinus’ exegesis takes the double Aphrodite (Urania and Pandemos) as 
two levels of the World-Soul, the superior or separate one, and the inferior one linked to the body of the 
cosmos on the model of the embodied human soul (see IGAL II.128 note 36; cf. II.3 [52] 9.31–47). For an 
assessment and dismissal of this interpretation, see HADOT (51–55). 
 
81
 On the close connection between divine and daimonic love, cf. I.2 [19] 6.1–11; I.6 [1] 7.19–21. On the 
meaning of Pandemos in this context see note 73 above. 
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recollection of higher realities (3.30–38, 6.28–30; 7.30–36).82 
This division of the World-Soul in two parts (i.e., Zeus as its intellect and 
Aphrodite-Hera as its corresponding soul) is mirrored in the structure of individual
83
 
rational souls.
84
 It must be observed that these souls are not derived from the World-Soul 
as its parts. On the contrary, since both individual rational souls and the World-Soul are 
mixed with a material element and are derived from the Soul-Hypostasis, they are called 
soul-sisters.
85
 
One will object that this reading does not account for the fact that eros as an 
affection (or better, as three different types of affections) of the soul treated in the first 
chapter of this treatise has no mythological equivalent. I assume that this is because its 
third type (i.e., deviant eros) can never be ascribed to the World-Soul, whose great power 
for Plotinus prevents it from ever losing sight of higher realities.
86
 However, I find 
nothing to prevent us from ascribing the first two types of eros as an affection of the soul 
(i.e., pure and mixed eros) to both the Soul-Hypostasis and the World-Soul. More 
specifically, the eros of the Soul-Hypostasis (i.e., Aphrodite Urania) and of the particular 
                                                 
82
 Cf. III.4 [15] 3. 
 
83
 WOLTERS (124) complains that the use of the word “individual” to refer to, say, a rational (human) soul 
is imprecise, since strictly also the World-Soul is an individual soul. So, he suggests calling the World-
Soul “macrocosmic soul,” and what are generally referred to as individual souls, “microcosmic souls.” 
While Wolters’ observation is correct, I will pragmatically disregard his suggestion simply because, 
given the word usage that has imposed itself in Plotinian scholarship, his designations would be likely to 
generate further confusion in an area where the labeling of entities is already quite fluid. 
 
84
 Further material on the individual soul, especially on the Plotinian doctrine of an undescended part of the 
soul, is found in Chapter Three (pages 238–240) and Chapter Four (Subsection 4.3.2 and 4.4.1). 
 
85
 See II.9 [33] 18.16, IV.3 [27] 6.13; cf. also IV.3 [27] 2.1–10, 54–59. 
 
86
 See II.9 [33] 2, IV.3 [27] 4.21–37, IV.8 [6] 7.23–32. 
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intellect of the World-Soul, or of its superior part (i.e., Zeus), will be pure and divine, 
while that of its inferior part, or of the soul belonging to this intellect (i.e., Aphrodite-
Hera), will be mixed and daimonic.
87
 
As for Poros and Penia, they represent two aspects of Aphrodite, the soul. On the 
one hand, Poros is logos, the very presence of Nous in the soul, or soul insofar as it is in-
formed by Nous.
88
 Penia, on the other hand, is matter,
89
 receptacle of logos and symbol of 
privation and indigence, or, more specifically, of a yet undetermined desire for the Good, 
                                                 
87
 Cf. HADOT (53–60). To ascribe pure eros to the Soul-Hypostasis and to the World-Soul is legitimate 
provided that we keep in mind that the status of eros in this context is not, strictly, that of an affection 
(πάθος, πάθημα), as it appears to be the case, by contrast, in the first chapter of the treatise. The reason 
for calling eros an affection in the first chapter seems to be not only the need to make sense of Plato’s 
claim about eros in this regard (Phaedrus 252b2), but above all the fact that in the context of the first 
chapter eros reaches the soul’s awareness mainly as a result of an accidental encounter with images of 
Beauty at the sensible level. Sees notes 46 above and 106 below. 
 
88
 Lacrosse (1994, 59). Cf. Porphyry, Sententiae XXXVII, particularly 45.8–9. 
 
89
 Plotinus normally associates poverty (πενία) with lower or sensible matter: see I.8 [51] 3.16, 5.21–24, 
II.4 [12] 16.19–23, III.6 [26] 14.5–17 (in this passage the association is explicitly to the Platonic 
character, Penia; see page 279 below), VI.7 [38] 12.22 (see the opening pages of Subsection 3.4.3 for a 
classification of matter in Plotinus). By contrast, the matter at issue in III.5 [50] is not sensible but 
intelligible (Ὕλεν... νοητὴν: 6.44). However, doubts remain as to whether the intelligible matter 
mentioned in this treatise corresponds to the one treated technically in II.4 [12] 5.2–5, 15, VI.3 [44] 9.36. 
Armstrong remarks that intelligible matter here is to be understood as “an intermediate stage between 
complete incorporeality and material embodiment,” of which we find antecedents in Plato (Epinomis 
984d8–e5) and Aristotle (On the Generation of Animals III.761b8–23; Metaphysics VII.1036a9–11, 
VIII.1045a34), but which is found nowhere else in Plotinus (ARMSTRONG III, 189 note 2; echoed by 
Radice 2002, 622 note 34; cf. also O’Brien 1991, 83 note 25). In reply, WOLTERS (168) aptly cites I.2 
[19] 2.19–22, where corporeal and intelligible matter differ “only in degree.” Strictly, therefore, what 
matter indicates here is not corporeality, but indetermination (ἀοριστία: 7.6, 18). Similarly, intelligible 
matter indicates, not soul tout-court as Bréhier (1924–1938, III, 182 note 1) briefly states, but intelligible 
indetermination, as we shall see in the next chapter (Subsection 3.4.1). Consequently, and again strictly, 
the opposite of “material” is not “intelligible,” but “thoroughly determined.” It follows that the 
intelligible realm, to which soul has access, is opposed to the sensible insofar as it is incorporeal, not 
insofar as it is immaterial, for immateriality here means indetermination, and Plotinus speaks both of an 
intelligible and of a corporeal or sensible indetermination: intelligible and sensible matter respectively. 
Following ARMSTRONG (and contrary to Dillon 1969, 35–36), IGAL (II, 134 note 64) claims that the 
intelligible matter mentioned in III.5 [50] is not the one treated technically at II.4 [12] 2–5, but rather a 
kind of “psychic matter” which, represented by Penia (7.1–9, 9.48–53), stands for the indetermination of 
the lower soul. Igal is certainly correct insofar as the focus of the discussion is Penia as an aspect of soul 
connected to Eros qua daimon. Moreover, his observation does not invalidate the equation between 
matter and indetermination. See also the closing pages of Subsection 3.4.2 for Pigler’s interpretation of 
the character of Penia (PIGLER 180–186). 
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“an indeterminate and indefinite representation [ἀόριστον καὶ ἄπειρον φάντασμα]” 
(7.8). The daimon Eros, springing from the intercourse of these two aspects, reflects the 
diversity of his parents (7.12–25). The relation of Penia to Poros, whereby Eros is 
engendered, is that of matter to form, a hylomorphic intercourse that represents “the 
fundamental law of the genesis of all reality, a scheme of universal explanation.”90 
Finally, the garden and nectar are further representatives of logos, the presence of Nous in 
soul.
91
 
As I mentioned earlier, the results of this section are schematically summarized in 
Table 3 above. 
2.4 The Substantiality of Eros: 
Observations on Some Passages of Enneads III.5 [50] 
The goal of the present section is to clarify the content of some of the passages 
which I take to be the philosophical core of Plotinus’ treatise on eros. These passages are 
speculatively very closely interrelated and can be gathered under three headings: eros as 
ὑπόστασις and οὐσία generated from another ὑπόστασις and οὐσία (2.32–39 and 3.1–6); 
the illustration of Eros as the eye of Aphrodite, the soul (2.39–46 and 3.6–19); and the 
parallel between eros and thoughts (7.49–46). 
I will begin with a summary clarification of the two key terms, ὑπόστασις 
                                                 
90
 HADOT (73): “la loi fondamentale de la genèse de toute réalité, un schéma d’explication universel.” 
Hadot explains that the drunkenness of Poros is typical of love at all levels, a fact indicating that even 
when desire seems satisfied, an insurmountable distance remains between desire and its object, a 
separation that is bridged only within the Good itself. Following this remark, Hadot explains how this 
scheme functions not only at the level of soul, but also within Intellect. See also note 109 below and 
Chapter Three note 269. 
 
91
 HADOT (77–81). See also Chapter Three note 281. 
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(hypostasis) and οὐσία (ousia), which are at the center of the discussion. Given the 
difficulty in providing a single rendering for each term, here I will simply transliterate 
them. Plotinus writes at 2.32–39:92 
[32] Now, following upon [33] Cronus, or, if you wish, upon Cronus’ 
father, [34] Uranus, [Aphrodite] directed [her] activity toward him and 
was made akin [to him], and being in love with [him], [35] she engendered 
Eros and with Eros she looks toward him, and [36] her activity produced a 
hypostasis and an ousia, and [37] the two look upward,
93
 both she who 
gave birth [i.e., Aphrodite/Soul] and the beautiful Eros who [38] was born 
as a hypostasis ever ordained toward another Beautiful [i.e., 
Cronos/Intellect] [39] and having its being in it... 
 
These few lines provide us with the backbone of Plotinian procession and return 
(which I will treat in the next two chapters) in terms of hypostasis and ousia. 
The first point in need of clarification concerns the word hypostasis. Since in the 
jargon of Plotinian scholarship this term is generally reserved for the three hierarchically 
ordered principles of all reality (i.e., the One, Intellect, and Soul),
94
 and since Plotinus is 
emphatic about the fact that there are neither more nor less than three of such principles,
95
 
one would be justified in asking whether when he calls eros a hypostasis he is 
contradicting himself. That the answer to this question must be negative can be easily 
ascertained, first, by verifying whether Plotinus himself refers to these three principles as 
                                                 
92
 2.32–39: [32] Ἐφεπομένη [33] δὴ τῷ Κρόνῳ ἤ, εἰ βούλει, τῷ πατρὶ τοῦ Κρόνου [34] Οὐρανῷ ἐνήργησέ 
τε πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ᾠκειώθη καὶ ἐρασθεῖσα [35] Ἔρωτα ἐγέννησε καὶ μετὰ τούτου πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπει, καὶ 
[36] ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῆς ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν εἰργάσατο, καὶ [37] ἄμφω ἐκεῖ βλέπει, καὶ ἡ γειναμένη καὶ ὁ 
καλὸς Ἔρως ὁ [38] γεγενημένος ὑπόστασις πρὸς ἄλλο καλὸν ἀεὶ τεταγμένη [39] καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐν τούτῳ 
ἔχουσα... 
 
93
 See note 76 above. 
 
94
 For instance Whittaker (1918, 36), Wallis (1995, 47–61), PIGLER (20), Corrigan (2005, 23–26). 
 
95
 See II.9 [33] 1.12–16, 2.1. 
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hypostases, and second, by a quick look at how the term hypostasis is used in the 
Enneads. Now, Plotinus’ term of choice to identify the One, Intellect, and Soul is, rather 
than hypostasis, ἀρχή.96 Even when the three principles are in fact referred to as 
hypostases, the noun hypostasis is usually modified in some way or another
97—an 
indication that, even when used technically, the term has a much broader field of 
application than the so-called three hypostases.
98
 The point, therefore, is not to deny that 
Soul, Intellect, and the One are hypostases, but that the term hypostasis is not restricted to 
these three. Ultimately, hypostasis in Plotinus means the existence that any given thing 
has independently of what, added to it accidentally (whether actually or in thought), is not 
part of its essence, whose account is as accurate as it is proximate to what he takes to be 
Plato’s understanding of it.99 
                                                 
96
 See, for instance, II.9 [33] 1.12–16, III.5 [50] 7.16 (whether in the first volume of HS2, or in the modified 
version found in the Addenda of the third volume of the same edition), III.8 [30] 9.1–7, V.1 [10] 9.23–24, 
V.2 [11] 1.1, V.3 [49] 15.23, 27, 16.7, 13, 38, V.4 [7] 1.12, V.8 [31] 7.44, 9.5, VI.8 [39] 19.16, VI.9 [9] 
5.24, 6.35. Plotinus also calls the three principles “three natures” (ταῖς φύσεσι ταῖς τρισίν: V.1 [10] 8.27; 
φύσεις: II.9 [33] 1.20; see III.5 [50] 1.45 and WOLTERS 27 on it). Gerson (1994, 3–4), to whom I owe 
most of the references in this note, argues that the three principles (the One, Intellect, and soul) are 
explanatory categories, paradigms, and actual causes of reality. 
 
97
 See, for instance, III.4 [15] 1.1–3, VI.2 [43] 4.17 (νοητὴν ὑπόστασιν); see also II.9 [33] 1.41: πλειόνων 
ὑποστάσεων (a plurality of hypostases). Similarly Porphyry, in the titles of what he numbered as treatises 
V.1 [10] and V.3 [49], does not speak of hypostases tout-court, but of primary (ἀρχικῶν) and knowing 
(γνωριστικῶν) hypostases respectively (VP 25.36, 4.41, Pinax 5.2; VP 6.11, 25.40, Pinax 5.4). Plotinus 
did not himself give titles to his treatises, but Porphyry tells us that the titles which he reports in VP are 
the ones that came to prevail among those who owned copies of Plotinus’ treatises (VP 4.14–19). As 
Dörrie (1955, 73) shows, the term ὑπόστασις acquired a technical sense only with Porphyry. 
 
98
 Many different things are called hypostasis or are said to have hypostasis in the Enneads: the One (V.4 
[7] 1.12, VI.8 [39] 15.28, 13.43–44); Nous (V.1 [10] 7.42); Soul (III.5 [50] 2.24, V.1 [10] 3.9, 15); logos 
(III.5 [50] 9.19–20); wisdom (I.4 [46] 9.19); knowledge (VI.1 [42] 6.13–15); numbers (VI.6 [34] 5.17); 
time (III.7 [45] 13.49, IV.4 [28] 15.3); relations (VI.1 [42] 7.26–27), among which eros (III.5 [50] 3.1, 
4.3: ὑποστατὸν); motion (VI.6 [34] 16.41); plants (V.2 [11] 1.25); matter (I.8 [51] 15.2; but see III.6 [26] 
7.9–20); sensible things as having apparent hypostasis (V.5 [32] 1.14–15: τὴν δοκοῦσαν ὑπόστασιν); and 
so on. 
 
99
 This, I believe, is part of what Gerson (1994, 3) has in mind when he claims that “the term means simply 
‘extra-mental existence’ or ‘existents’ in the plural” (see VI.2 [43] 13.27–28). He adds: “When Plotinus 
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Secondly, in this passage, the terms hypostasis and ousia are used 
synonymously both with “being” (τὸ εἶναι: 2.39) and with each other.100 
Thirdly, as Hadot suggests, lines 38–39 contain an allusion to Aristotle’s 
definition of the category of relation (πρός τι).101 To have one’s being in something (τὸ 
εἶναι ἐν τούτῳ ἔχουσα: 1.39) means to depend ontologically on it.102 If Hadot is correct in 
identifying Aristotle as the background of this passage
103
 and the reference to the 
Stagirite is not a mere coincidence, two different, though related, issues are at work here: 
one is the identification of that on which eros depends as a relative; the other is how 
something relative can be an ousia. The neuter dative, τούτῳ, at line 39 leaves little doubt 
that the relative on which eros depends for its existence is not the feminine Aphrodite-
Soul, but the other Beautiful (ἄλλο καλὸν: 1.38), which in this context is the noetic realm. 
However, qua relative, a relative owes its being to that of which it is a relative; in other 
words, as a non-substantial category, a relative owes its being to the ousia of which it is, 
                                                                                                                                                 
raises a question about the ὑπόστασις of X, he is generally not in doubt that X exists in some way, but he 
is intent on arguing that some opponent’s account of that existence is false and that a better (i.e., 
Platonic) one is needed.” 
 
100
 See WOLTERS (81); cf. the combined expression ὑποστάσεις οὐσιώδεις at 7.43. 
 
101
 HADOT (112 note 104, 178). Aristotle, Categories 6a36–37: [36] Πρός τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα 
αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν [37] ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἕτερον (“We call relatives all such 
things as are said to be just what they are, of or than other things, or in some way in relation to 
something else”). Aristotle, Categories 8a31–32: [31] ἔστι τὰ πρός [32] τι οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ 
πρός τί πως ἔχειν (“those things are relatives for which being is the same as being somehow related to 
something”). Translations are by J. L. Ackrill (in Barnes 1995). 
 
102
 See Atkinsons (1983, 110–111, 147), who provides ample evidence of the Plotinian doctrine that each 
hypostasis acquires existence as a distinct hypostasis by depending on and being defined on the basis of 
the hypostasis prior to it. I will deal with the details of this doctrine from the perspective of eros in the 
next chapter. 
 
103
 Hadot is the only translator/commentator I am aware of who quotes Aristotle as a background source for 
this passage. 
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in traditional terms, an accident (συμβεβηκός).104 In the case of eros, this ousia is 
soul, in which eros would inhere as an accident. But to my knowledge, no accident is 
ever called ousia in Aristotle. The reference to Aristotle, therefore, should be taken as an 
allusion whose purpose is not systematically to criticize Aristotle, but simply to point at 
eros’ dependence, for its being, on that of which it is a relative, namely the Beauty of 
Intellect.
105
 Patently (and negatively), then, to be an ousia does not automatically mean to 
be substantial in an absolute sense, that is, to be causa sui, which, as we shall see (cf. 
Chapter Three note 53), within the Plotinian system is prerogative of the One. 
Finally, and more positively, the term ousia (and, in this context, hypostasis) 
means something which, while having only a relative degree of ontological 
independence, only needs what is ontologically superior to it in order to exist qua ousia. 
Less obscurely, eros in its pure form owes its existence and the fact of being what it is, 
directly, to that in which it inheres (i.e., Soul) and to that of which it is a relative (i.e., the 
Beauty of Intellect); indirectly, to that on which everything, including Soul and Intellect, 
depends for its existence (i.e., the One).
106
 Thus, to say that eros is ousia and hypostasis 
                                                 
104
 The perfect participle of συμβαίνω (i.e., συμβεβηκός, the term traditionally translated with “accident”) 
occurs only five times in the Categories (5a39, b10; 7a27, 33, 36) and is never used technically to 
indicate the nine non-substantial and non-composite predications (Categories 1b25), as it seems to be the 
case in other works of Aristotle (e.g., Posterior Analytics I.75a20, 83b12, Physics VIII.256b10, 
Metaphysics III.995b20). 
 
105
 It would be profitable to investigate whether the allusion to the text of the Categories is also meant (i) as 
a critique of Aristotle’s concession that the soul is ousia, but only “in the sense of the form [εἶδος] of a 
natural body which has life potentially” (De Anima II.412a20–21, my translation; see also II.412a27–28 
and 412b5–6, where the soul qua ousia is called ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη, and 412b10–13; cf. Metaphysics 
XII.1072b26–27), which Plotinus expressly rejects (IV.7 [2] 85); and (ii) as part of Plotinus’ revision of 
Aristotle’s theory of predication and ontology undertaken in the first three treatises of the sixth Ennead 
(42–44 in Porphyry’s chronological order, on which see Strange 1981). 
 
106
 For this reason, I surmise, it may be that when eros is treated as an affection of the soul in the first 
chapter of III.5 [50], it is never called ousia or hypostasis, since in that specific context, qua affection of 
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means that it does not occur to the soul, from which it springs, as something external 
or accidental, but that it is engendered as the chief act of the soul’s nature, and that the 
soul’s essential activity is the desire for Beauty and the Good to which eros is ultimately 
directed.
107
 To be soul, therefore, means to be erotic in this qualified sense, although not 
every individual rational soul succeeds in recollecting eros’ true aim, and some souls 
even deviate from eros’ natural direction. Thus, Arnou’s remark I quoted earlier in note 
42—that in Plotinus the terms ἔρως, ἔφεσις, πόθος, ὄρεξις, ὁρμή cannot be taken as 
consistently signifying qualitatively different ways of desiring—is generally correct but 
also needs to be partially revised in light of Plotinus’ use of the term eros in III.5 [50]; for 
what Arnou claims may be true of all the terms he mentions (with the addition of 
ἐπιθυμία108), except eros. In fact, the former terms indicate desire in its aspect of mere 
                                                                                                                                                 
the soul it owes its existence not only to the particular soul in which it inheres, but also to that soul’s 
accidental encounter with images of Beauty at the sensible level. And yet, even as an affection of the 
soul, eros remains what it is because of its substantial connection to soul. What this connection signifies 
is the essential directedness or tendency of soul qua soul to the realm of Intellect and, indirectly, to the 
One. What eros names is precisely this directedness or dynamic tendency. In the terms of the 
classification of the first chapter of treatise III.5 [50]: eros is pure if all it amounts to is such a tendency; 
it is mixed if the desire to procreate is added on to it; and it is called unlawful and at variance with nature, 
or deviant, when the soul in which it inheres fails to recognize the substantial directedness of its own eros 
and acts contrary to it. In the terms of the rest of the treatise: the eros of the Soul-Hypostasis and that of 
the superior part of the World-Soul and of other individual souls is called divine insofar as it is constantly 
directed to higher realities; by contrast, the eros of the inferior part of the World-Soul and of other 
individual souls, though still participating in the desire for higher realities in some degree, is mixed with 
matter, is involved in the administration of the sensible cosmos, and is called daimonic. See note 80 
above; cf. also Table 3. 
 
107
 In this basic meaning it has in III.5 [50], the tendency expressed by the term eros coincides with the kind 
of desire expressed by the term βούλησις, namely rational desire unequivocally directed toward the Good 
(VI.8 [39] 6.37–38; I.4 [46] 6.19–24), in opposition to other desires (see Gollwitzer 1900–1902, I, 9–10; 
Arnou 1967, 64; Gerson 1994, 151–155). The use of the term βούλησις in this acceptation is well attested 
both in Plato (see pages 74–77 above) and in Aristotle (e.g., Metaphysics XII.1072a27–28; Nicomachean 
Ethics III.1111b26, 1113a5, b6; Rhetoric I.1369a3, b2–3). 
 
108
 The expression τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐπιθυμίας at 9.50–51 is an exception, probably due to the fact that 
Plotinus is following Plato’s use of the term in the text on which he is commenting (see Gerson 1994, 
273 note 73). 
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lack or poverty (represented by Penia in the myth); by contrast, eros in the treatise 
dedicated to it is also an inventive tendency (7.25, 27: ποριστικόν, a feature which he 
derives from his father, Poros) insofar as it is imbued hylomorphically with the logos of a 
superior principle.
109
 
Now, in treatise III.5 [50] Plotinus gives us two illustrations of the hypostatic 
character of eros, here understood as a relative: that of the eye (ὀφθαλμός) at 2.39–46 
(continued at 3.6–19) and that of thoughts (νοήματα) at 7.46–58. Let us begin with the 
key passage where Eros is compared to an eye, at 2.39–46:110 
[39] [Eros is,] as it were, between desiring [40] and desired, [it is] the 
eye
111
 of the desiring that through its medium provides [41] the lover with 
the sight of the desired, while [the eye] itself runs ahead [42] and, before it 
gives the lover the power of seeing through the organ, [43] is itself filled 
with what is seen: seeing earlier [than the lover], to be sure, [44] yet not in 
the same way by fixing
112
 in the lover that which is seen, [45] but [by] 
                                                 
109
 As Lacrosse (1994, 130–131) puts it, “de manière générale, on peut dire que ce qui les differencie 
fondamentalement, c’est que le désir est toujour matière, tandis que l’érôs se présente d’emblée comme 
structure hylémorphique, logos dérivé et hypostase intermédiaire...” (130–131). See also Hadot’s 
reference in note 90 above. I will return to this point in the next chapter. 
 
110
 2.39–46: [39]...μεταξὺ ὥσπερ ποθοῦντος [40] καὶ ποθουμένου, ὀφθαλμὸς ὁ τοῦ ποθοῦντος παρέχων μὲν 
[41] τῷ ἐρῶντι δι’ αὐτοῦ τὸ ὁρᾶν τὸ ποθούμενον, προτρέχων δὲ [42] αὐτὸς καὶ πρὶν ἐκείνῳ παρασχεῖν 
τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶν δι’ ὀργάνου [43] δύναμιν αὐτὸς πιμπλάμενος τοῦ θεάματος, πρότερος μέν, [44] οὐ μὴν 
ὁμοίως ὁρῶν τῷ ἐνστηρίζειν μὲν ἐκείνῳ τὸ ὅραμα, [45] αὐτὸν δὲ καρποῦσθαι τὴν θέαν τοῦ καλοῦ αὐτὸν 
παρα- [46] θέουσαν. 
 
111
 Terms of vision used between 2.40 and 3.19: ὀφθαλμός, ὄμμα (eye); ὅρασις (seeing, the act of sight: on 
the side of the subject); ὁρᾶν, ὅραμα (that which is seen, vision: on the side of the object); θέαμα, 
ὁρώμενον, θέαν (seeing, view, sight, spectacle: it can be both on the side of the subject and on that of the 
object); εἴδωλον (image, likeness), to which ἄγαλμα (9.12) and εἰκών (9.33) are closely related (see 
Appendix C (4). Cf. WOLTERS (98–99) and HADOT (268–277, under the relevant entries in the index). 
References to Plato may include: Theaetetus 156d3–e7, Phaedrus 251a7–b2, Meno 76d2–5, Timaeus 
45b2–46a4 and 67c8–d1. Cf. also Chapter Four note 257. 
 
112
 The term I translated with “fixing,” ἐνστηρίζειν (2.44), is likely opposed to παραθέουσαν, which was 
translated with “as it runs by [it]” (2.45–46). WOLTERS (87) claims that the verb ἐνστηρίζειν is always 
transitive, and hence its object is the eye (WOLTERS’ translation: “the eye does impress”). A good 
number of translators, however, render the verb as intransitive, thus making vision (τὸ ὅραμα: 2.44) the 
subject. Exceptions to this among the editors and/or translators cited in the section of the Bibliography 
titled “Plotinus” are: Ficino (1492: “sistit”; however, the Greek text on which his translation is very 
likely based, the manuscript marked as Parisinus Graecus 1816, in turn based on the Lauretianus 87.3: 
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enjoying the sight of beauty as it runs [46] by [it]. 
 
By the time Plotinus wrote this, the metaphor of the eye of the soul was 
something of a common place in the history of philosophy, at least within the tradition of 
Platonism.
113
 Plotinus reinterprets this metaphor in an original way. The main 
correspondences are three: the Soul as lover, eros as the eye of the lover, and the Beauty 
of Intellect as the beloved. What Plotinus seems to be saying is that eros allows the Soul 
to see the Beauty of Intellect (or Intellect as Beauty). This is not the case, however, for it 
is not eros that produces the Soul’s vision of Beauty, but rather the Soul’s vision of 
Beauty that produces eros as a hypostasis and ousia. Thus Plotinus writes at 3.6–10:114 
                                                                                                                                                 
HS1 xiii–xiv, reads τῷ ἐν τῷ στηρίζειν: see Henry 1948, 45–62; cf. Saffrey 1996, 491–492 for further 
references), Bouillet, H. F. Müller, Guthrie, and MacKenna (including the revised MacKenna and Page), 
Mizuchi, Tanogashira and Tanaka, and IGAL. HADOT (112 note 106) argues that it is hard to think of the 
eye as that which fixes what is seen in the soul because the eye is only the “lieu de passage de l’image,” 
hence his translation: “le spectacle se fixe.” I wonder if what Hadot argues only shifts the focus of the 
problem, for the point seems to be, not whether the eye is the place in which the image is fixed, but 
whether it is the medium through which the fixing is accomplished. As far as I can tell, there does not 
seem to be anything wrong with saying that the “locus” proper of the fixed or impressed image remains 
the soul, while the eye is instrumental in accomplishing the fixing. In any event, the issue remains 
debatable if the term ἐνστηρίζειν could in fact be taken as intransitive. LSJ (s.v.) does not testify to such 
usage, nor do Bonitz (1870, s.v.), E. A. Sophocles (1900, s.v.), Ast (1908, s.v.), and SP (s.v.). Rocci 
(1961, s.v.) cites Philo Alexandrinus 1.15 as an instance of the intransitive use of ἐνστηρίζειν, but none 
of the indexes to Philo I consulted (i.e., J. Leisegang, in Cohen, Wendland et al. 1887–1926, VII.1, s.v.; 
Borgen, Fuglseth and Skartsen 2000, s.v.) confirm this information nor, for that matter, the use of this 
verb in Philo. Perhaps Rocci’s reference is not to ἐνστηρίζειν but to στηρίζειν, which Philo does use 
multiple times and can indeed occur in the active form with the intransitive meaning of “standing fast” or 
“being firmly set” (cf. LSJ B.II, s.v.). 
 
113
 See Plato, Sophist 254a10, Republic VII.518c4–d1, 527d6–e3, and most notably 533d2 (τῆς ψυχῆς 
ὄμμα); cf. Aristotle, Topics I.108a11 (sight: eye = intellect: soul), Nicomachean Ethics VI.1144a30 
(φρόνησις as the eye of the soul). For loose parallels in the Enneads, cf. I.6 [1] 9.30–32, II.4 [12] 10.13–
17, IV.4 [28] 24.28–33, V.1 [10] 1.31–34, VI.8 [39] 19.10 (ὀμμάτων τῆς ψυχῆς). After Plotinus, cf. 
Iamblichus, Protrepticus XXI.120.25; Augustine speaks of an “oculus mentis” (In Epistulam Ioannis ad 
Parthos 102.4, Sermones 342.3, Epistulae 104.6, Enarrationes in Psalmos 57.22, 74.1), and “oculus 
cordis” (Sermones 88.5, 117.5, Enarrationes in Psalmos 30.7), or an “interior oculus” (In Epistulam 
Ioannis ad Parthos 13.3). 
 
114
 3.6–10: [6] Καὶ πρῶτον ἦν ὅραμα αὐτῇ τοῦτο καὶ ἑώρα ὡς πρὸς [7] ἀγαθὸν αὐτῆς καὶ ἔχαιρεν ὁρῶσα, 
καὶ τὸ ὅραμα τοιοῦτον [8] ἦν, ὡς μὴ πάρεργον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν θέαν τὸ ὁρῶν, ὡς τῇ [9] οἷον ἡδονῇ καὶ 
τάσει τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ σφοδρότητι τῆς [10] θέας γεννῆσαί τι παρ’ αὐτῆς ἄξιον αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦ ὁράματος. 
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[6] And this [viz., Intellect] was its [viz., the Soul’s] first vision, and it would 
look [at it] as toward [7] its good, and rejoiced in its seeing, and the vision 
was of such a kind [8] that the seer [could] not make its sight something 
secondary, so that by [9] a sort of delight, [and] a tension toward it, and an 
intensity of the [10] sight, [the Soul] generated from itself something 
worthy of itself and of its vision [viz., Eros]. 
 
Therefore, eros as an eye is not that which made the first vision possible, but the 
essential result of that vision which indicates the Soul’s fundamental connection to 
Intellect, or the almost necessary effect of the Soul’s radical stupor in the face of Beauty, 
here used as the short name for the realm of Intellect. This radical experience brings 
about a hypostasis and an ousia: eros as the indelible mark of Nous on Soul,
115
 or eros as 
the truly real reminder of an unforgettable vision. One need not interpret all this in 
chronological terms; the priority voiced by the word “first” (πρῶτον: 3.6) is logical rather 
than strictly chronological, as confirmed by the passage on myths quoted earlier on page 
111. That is, the vision of Beauty could very well be interpreted as the connatural 
openness of the (rational) soul to contemplate the noetic realm, a possibility which, if 
taken seriously, cannot but be paired with an essential love for this great Beauty: eros.
116
 
Plotinus continues at 3.11–13:117 
                                                 
115
 This vision, to be sure, is itself derived from a still higher vision, to wit, the contemplation of the One by 
Intellect. As we shall see in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, psychic eros, or the eros engendered by the Soul’s 
contemplation of Intellect, is only one type of eros, the other two being noetic eros, that is, Intellect’s 
love for the One, and henologic eros, or the One’s self-love, making of the One the end and origin of all 
eros. 
 
116
 Notice that Plotinus here is talking about eros in its pure form. As we saw in the first chapter of treatise 
III.5 [50], eros can also deviate from its course. When this happens, eros occurs to the soul as something 
external, or accidental. This means that eros may become deviant, but in its essence, qua eros, is 
originarily pure. 
 
117
 3.11–13: [11] Ἐξ οὖν τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος συντόνως περὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον [12] καὶ ἐκ τοῦ οἷον ἀπορρέοντος 
ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁρωμένου [13] ὄμμα πληρωθέν, οἷον μετ’ εἰδώλου ὅρασις, Ἔρως ἐγένετο... The lines that follow 
this passage, 14–19, propose an etymology of Ἔρως as deriving from ὅρασις on the basis of Plato’s 
Cratylus 420a9–b4, whose text reads: “[a9] And eros, since it flows in [εἰσρεῖ] from the outside and this 
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[11] Therefore, from that which is strenuously active about what is seen, [12] 
and from that which outflows,
118
 as it were, from what is seen, [13] Eros 
came into being [as] a filled eye,
119
 like a vision along with [its] 
image
120
... 
 
Wolters rightly points out that in this passage we find the two “constituents” of 
Eros that correspond to his parents in the Symposium myth: Penia and Poros.
121
 The 
former corresponds to the soul’s indeterminateness as the receiving pole of vision (3.11: 
τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος), while the latter (along with nectar and the garden of Zeus) corresponds 
to the images (3.13: εἰδώλου) or logoi flowing from Intellect as the determining pole of 
vision.
122
 
                                                                                                                                                 
flow [ῥοὴ] does not belong [b1] to the one who has it but is introduced from outside through the eyes, for 
[b2] this reason in ancient times [eros] was called esros [ἔσρος: “in-flux”] from the flowing in [ἐσρεῖν]—
[b3] for we used to use a short ‘o’ [οὖ] instead of a long ‘o’ [ὦ]—while now it is called eros [ἔρως] [b4] 
through the change of short ‘o’ into a long ‘o’.” 
 
118
 Notice the assonances and associations with Poros: ἀπορρέοντος (3.12), ποριστικὸν (7.25), εἰσρυεὶς 
(9.8), ῥυέντες (9.14), ῥυέντος (9.35). 
 
119
 The expression ὄμμα πληρωθέν at 3.13 evokes πιμπλάμενος τοῦ θεάματος at 2.43. Cf. also III.8 [30] 
11.6, V.8 [31] 10.14, VI.4 [22] 12.6. 
 
120
 Line 3.13: οἷον μετ’ εἰδώλου ὅρασις (cf. 2.42–43: τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶν δι’ ὀργάνου δύναμιν). I follow 
WOLTERS in translating this with “like image-mediated vision.” WOLTERS (99) also argues that the 
expression tacitly contrasts mediated sensible vision with immediate intellectual vision. This is true only 
if one keeps in mind that “sensible vision” here is used metaphorically (much like “vision” tout-court), as 
confirmed by οἷον at 3.13. 
 
121
 WOLTERS (97). 
 
122
 The (perhaps unavoidable) complaint that to call eros an eye is “just a metaphor” seems to 
underestimate (i) the fundamental difficulty of explaining the nature of love, and (ii) the explanatory 
power of (good) metaphors. One may be inclined to bypass all metaphors and argue that love should be 
understood objectively and literally, say as a complex of chemical reactions. Unfortunately, this allegedly 
non-metaphorical explanation tells us even less about the nature of love than its straightforwardly 
metaphorical equivalent. What is more, such an explanation is also very likely misleading insofar as it 
reduces an experience to what may very well be only one of its (albeit necessary) epiphenomena (i.e., the 
chemical reactions accompanying the experience of love). An indication of this is the fact that the 
supposedly non-metaphorical explanation of love, that is, the chemical formula of love, remains utterly 
unintelligible without the experience of love; it also leaves the very connection between phenomenon and 
epiphenomenon unexplained, that is, it does not seem to shed any light on the reason(s) why an 
experience such as love should manifest itself as a given complex of chemical reactions and, conversely, 
why the same complex of chemical reactions taking place in a test-tube in a lab do not amount to love. 
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As I anticipated, Plotinus indirectly clarifies the substantiality of eros through 
another illustration, that of thoughts (νοήματα) at 7.46–58:123 
[46] For in general it is likely that the true goods [47] are ousia, as long as 
[the] soul acts according to nature within limits,
124
 [48] while the other 
[goods] do not have their activity from soul, but are nothing other than 
affections;
125
 [49] [they are] like false thoughts which have no ousia under 
them [50] the way the really true, eternal, and definite [thoughts] [51] 
possess in a unity [the act of] thinking, what is thought, and being,
126
 not 
only [52] in the [Intellect that is] simply, but also in each particular 
intellect [when it is directed] to a true intelligible, [53] if [it is true that] 
also the intellect in each of us
127
 must be regarded, [54] in its pure 
status,
128
 as [a unity of] the act of thinking and what is thought, although 
we [are] not this [pure status] in unity
129
 [55] and simply. Whence
130
 also 
                                                                                                                                                 
Thus, when the goal is to try to understand what love is, in the end a supposedly literal and objective 
statement about love may turn out to be more (unwittingly) misleading than its metaphorical—and 
knowingly metaphorical—counterpart. 
 
123
 7.46–58: [46] Καὶ γὰρ ὅλως κινδυνεύει τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ τὰ ἀληθῆ [47] κατὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς ἐνεργούσης ἐν 
ὡρισμένοις οὐσία εἶναι, [48] τὰ δ’ ἄλλα οὐκ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐνεργεῖν, οὐδὲν δ’ ἄλλο ἢ πάθη [49] εἶναι· ὥσπερ 
ψευδῆ νοήματα οὐκ ἔχοντα τὰς ὑπ’ αὐτὰ [50] οὐσίας, καθάπερ τὰ ἀληθῆ ὄντως καὶ ἀίδια καὶ ὡρισμένα 
[51] ὁμοῦ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἔχοντα οὐ μόνον [52] ἐν τῷ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ 
περὶ τὸ νοητὸν ὄντως [53] [καὶ νοῦν τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ], εἰ δεῖ καὶ < νοῦν τὸν > ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν τίθεσθαι 
[54] καθαρῶς νόησιν καὶ νοητόν, καὶ μὴ ὁμοῦ καὶ ἡμῶν τοῦτο [55] καὶ ἁπλῶς. ὅθεν καὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν ἡμῖν ὁ 
ἔρως· καὶ γὰρ αἱ [56] νοήσεις· καὶ εἴ τινος τῶν ἐν μέρει, κατὰ συμβεβηκός, [57] ὥσπερ, εἰ τόδε τὸ 
τρίγωνον, δύο ὀρθὰς θεωρεῖ, καθόσον [58] ἁπλῶς τρίγωνον. Words in italic indicate the presence of a 
textual crux, on which see notes 127 and 130 below. 
 
124
 Cf. 1.21, 7.50. 
 
125
 Cf. 7.44. 
 
126
 Cf. V.1 [10] 4.31, V.3 [49] 5.23–28, VI.7 [38] 9.21–38; see Aristotle, Metaphysics XII.1075a1–5, De 
anima III.431a1, b17; Parmenides DK 28.B3 (= Clement of Alexandria, Stromata VI.2.440.12), often 
cited by Plotinus (cf. HS2, Index Fontium). 
 
127
 Line 7.53 presents a textual crux. Three solutions have been proposed. (1) HS1: καὶ νοῦν τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ 
εἴδει. καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν; (2) HS2: καὶ νοῦν τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ, εἰ δεῖ καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν; (3) IGAL, 
followed by HS2 in their Addenda, and by HADOT: [καὶ νοῦν τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ], εἰ δεῖ καὶ < νοῦν τὸν > ἐν 
ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν. In my translation I follow (3). 
 
128
 Cf. IV.4 [28] 2.24; V.3 [49] 3.21, 28. 
 
129
 Cf. V.3 [49] 3.20–44; VI.5 [23] 7.1–17. On the term ὁμοῦ, occurring at lines 51 and 54; see note 36 
above. 
 
130
 Another textual crux is found at 7.54–55, with three solutions offered: (1) HS2: νοητόν—καὶ μὴ ὁμοῦ 
καὶ ἡμῶν τοῦτο καὶ ἁπλῶς—ὅθεν; (2) Addenda to HS2: νοητόν καὶ μὴ ὁμοῦ˙ καὶ ἡμῶν τοῦτο καὶ ἁπλῶς˙ 
  
144 
our eros is [directed to] things [that are] simply; for [so are] also our [56] acts 
of thought: even if [our acts of thought are directed to] something 
particular, [this is] accidental, [57] just like when one observes that this 
triangle here [equals] two right [angles], [he does so] in so far as [58] [it 
is] triangle simply.
131
 
 
This passage is meant to be part of the answer to the fifth of a series of six 
questions asked between 6.7 and 6.28, namely: “Why are not all daimons erotes?” 
(6.27).
132
 Plotinus’ main response to this question, outlined at 6.28–35, is that Eros 
springs from the pure Soul’s desire for the Good and the Beautiful (ψυχῆς ἐφιεμένης τοῦ 
ἀγαθοῦ καὶ καλοῦ: 6:29), while other daimons spring from the inferior part of the World-
Soul (and of individual rational souls) for the sake of the administration of the sensible 
cosmos. 
What justifies the fact that Eros and other daimons are both called daimons 
(although Eros in its pure condition is called a god) is the fact that both essentially share 
in the double aspect of indigence and resourcefulness; or, in mythical language: their 
parents are Poros and Penia.
133
 By contrast, their different aims are what differentiate 
them. Thus Plotinus implicitly recalls the distinction between pure, mixed, and deviant 
                                                                                                                                                 
ὅθεν; (3) IGAL (n.84 ad loc.), followed by HADOT): νοητόν, καὶ μὴ ὁμοῦ καὶ ἡμῶν τοῦτο καὶ ἁπλῶς. 
ὅθεν. In my translation I follow (3). 
 
131
 Cf. Plato, Republic VI.510d5–511a1; Aristotle, Metaphysics VII.1035b1–3, V.1025a32. 
 
132
 The remaining five questions (and answers) are: (1) How do daimons differ from gods? Answer: gods 
are free of affections (ἀπαθὲς: 6.10), daimons are not (6.7–14); (2) Why did daimons not stay impassive? 
Unanswered (6.13–14); (3) Are there daimons in the intelligible realm, and are there gods in the sensible 
cosmos? Answer: there are no daimons in the intelligible, and the gods that we see in the sensible (i.e., 
the heavenly bodies down to the moon) are secondary gods (6.14–24); (4) What are daimons in the 
sensible cosmos? Answer: they are traces left by the Soul in the cosmos (6.24–27); (6) In what sense are 
daimons not free of matter? (6.28). Answer: They participate not in sensible but in intelligible matter 
(6.25–7.25). See the outline of the treatise in Table 2 above. 
 
133
 See 6.1–6, 7.26–30. 
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eros introduced in the first chapter of the treatise. Just like there the discriminating 
factor was the primary aim of any given soul, so here it is the particular daimon with 
which each (rational) soul identifies itself.
134
 What is central to these identifications is the 
fact that, no matter what daimon a (rational) soul happens to identify with, this soul still 
retains the eros with which it is naturally endowed; it does so, however, by leaving it 
inactive (ἀργὸν: 7.34), and to this extent it is inferior to those souls which actively 
identify with their eros by primarily engaging, not in the pursue of particular goods, but 
of the Good true and simple (τοῦ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ ὄντως: 7.31).135 Yet as Plotinus 
emphatically points out, even these inferior daimons are called ousia
136
 insofar as they 
are “according to nature and noble” (κατὰ φύσιν καλοί: 7.40). The only desires that are 
explicitly called evil (κακαῖς... ἐπιθυμίαις: 7.37) and in no way ousia or hypostases 
(οὐδαμῇ οὐσία οὐδὲ ὑποστάσεις οὐσιώδεις: 7.43) are those which have deviated 
altogether from the eros connatural to the soul. These deviant desires are what Plotinus 
takes to be truly “pathological” for the soul, in the sense that they do not belong to it 
originarily or essentially, but are the result of the soul’s vicious attitudes and dispositions 
(ἐν διαθέσεσι καὶ ἕξεσιν: 7.45).137 
                                                 
134
 Historically, the personification, or rather, daimonification (and deification), of the desiderative forces 
present in the soul in its various manifestations had the advantage of giving a plausible philosophical 
interpretation to gods and daimons as central figures in the religious sensibility of the Hellenistic world 
(see Kittell and Friedrich 1964–1976, II, 1–10, s.v. δαίμων). People were thus identified with their 
daimons, or the primary desire which, qua souls, they had embraced (see 7.30–39; cf. Plato, Phaedrus 
252c3–253c6). 
 
135
 To be sure, Plotinus refers both to Eros and to these other daimons with the collective appellative of 
erotes (7.40). However, he does maintain the difference between the two on the basis of their primary 
aim. 
 
136
 See 7.40–42; cf. 4.4–7 on individual souls. 
 
137
 Parallels on the difference between pathos and ousia in the Enneads: II.6 [17] 1.48–49, III.6 [26] 1.25–
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Now, Plotinus compares the pathological status of deviant desires to false 
thoughts, and the substantial status of pure (and, to a lesser extent, mixed) eros to true 
thoughts. To say that true thoughts have the status of ousia means that qua thoughts they 
coincide with what they think. Put differently, in true thinking, the thinking subject and 
its object are identical. This doctrine occurs often in the Enneads and has its more explicit 
avatars in Aristotle and Parmenides (see note 126). To this extent, knowledge or the act 
of knowing, much like eros, is to be understood as a relative term whose substantiality 
depends on the substantiality of what is known.
138
 However, there is a major difference 
between true thoughts and pure eros: the former take place at the noetic level, whereas 
the latter occurs at the level of Soul. Thus, as Hadot points out, the identity of thought 
and being, which in Nous is continuous, can be achieved by particular intellects only 
occasionally. Within this framework, eros qua ousia signifies precisely this tendency of 
each particular intellect toward that which such an intellect can be only partially and 
discontinuously (see 7.54–55).139 And even when the thoughts of a particular intellect are 
directed toward sensible particulars (e.g., the triangle mentioned at 7.57), they can 
nonetheless be true to the extent that they grasp these particulars in light of what is 
absolute (e.g., the absolute triangle, or triangle simply at 7.58: ἁπλῶς τρίγωνον). 
                                                                                                                                                 
32, IV.7 [2] 8
5
.43–46, VI.1 [42] 3.7–8, VI.3 [44] 4.12–15. 
 
138
 On knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) as hypostasis relative to the known (ἐπιστητὸν), see VI.1 [42] 6.13–15, where 
the same claim is made also about sense-perception (αἴσθησις) in relation to what is perceived 
(αἰσθητὸν). 
 
139
 HADOT (234–235). He writes: “L’Amour est justement le désir de ce dont on est privé, donc le désir de 
cette unité, de cette coïncidence avec ce qui est universellement et absolument (7, 55). S’il est 
substantiel, ce sera seulement dans la mesure où il se rapporte à ce qui est absolument (cf. 2, 39; 7, 30–
32): il sera ainsi relation subsistante” (HADOT 235). 
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2.5 Conclusive Remarks and Transition 
Let us briefly summarize the main points of the present chapter. 
(1) In Section 2.2 I sketched the way in which Plotinus interprets Plato, whose 
writings he takes as the basic point of departure of his inquiries. Plotinus’ reading of 
Plato focuses on selected passages and isolated elements in the dialogues which are: often 
ambiguous and in need of explanation; foreshadowing problems explicitly treated only in 
the later tradition; useful for an active engagement in philosophical activity. Other 
authors (in particular Aristotle) are interpreted to shed light on Plato, but always with a 
critical eye. Following Lacrosse, I argued that Plotinus’ exegesis of the dialogues is 
sublimating, objectifying or ontologizing, and syncretistic 
(2) In Section 2.3 I moved on to offer a reading of a text particularly relevant for 
our inquiry in which Plotinus carries out his exegesis most explicitly, Enneads III.5 [50] 
On eros. I explained his threefold classification of eros in pure, mixed and deviant, and 
outlined the metaphysical equivalents of the mythical entities found in the Platonic 
passages that constitute the focus of his exegesis. 
(3) Next, in Section 2.4, I argued that the philosophical core of the treatise is the 
definition of eros as a hypostasis and ousia which is connatural to rational souls in virtue 
of their contemplative connection to Intellect. Eros was called the Soul’s eye, and in its 
purity it was compared to true thoughts. 
*            *            * 
We may now take a step back and ponder once again the metaphor of eros as the 
eye of the Soul as a transition or an entry point into an interpretation of the role of eros in 
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Plotinus’ system. We saw that at the level of the soul’s contemplation of Intellect 
there are two visions: the originary one that generates eros, and the derivative one made 
possible by eros once this has been generated. Concerning the first vision, since 
traditionally the metaphor of sight would seem to be epistemic in nature,
140
 one cannot 
help wondering what eros has to do with the soul’s vision of Intellect. More explicitly, 
why does such vision generate love? Why not knowledge? Or, perhaps more 
appropriately, why not confusion (given the soul’s awareness, through vision, of its 
weaker degree of unity in comparison to Intellect)? Why not frustration (given the soul’s 
failure to live up to the standards of the superior unity of Intellect, at least immediately)? 
Why not envy, desperation, rebellion even? Why love? 
The question “Why love?” seems to be different and yet not altogether 
disconnected from that of (metaphorical) vision. On the one hand, I first ought to see in 
order to love; only successfully will this love enable me to recognize and pursue what 
was found lovable in the first place. On the other hand, if vision did not give birth to love, 
one might wonder what this would tell us about the nature of both the one who sees and 
of what is seen. A sight that does not awake some affective reaction in the one who sees: 
is it even possible? And if possible, would it even be desirable? If the soul were not 
awakened in the presence of Beauty, if it did not grow an erotic eye as something 
naturally sprouting out of such an encounter, what kind of soul would it be? And if the 
connatural connection of soul to the realm of Intellect did not leave its genuine mark on 
the soul in the form eros, how would the soul ever become capable of rising to the noetic 
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 Cf. Chapter Four note 264. 
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level. Instead, it is because vision generates love that the soul is awakened to Beauty 
and the possibility of an ascent is granted. As I shall argue in Chapter Four, the place of 
eros in the ascent is essential. 
Vision without love would amount to the detached codification of optical data (if 
possible at all for a living being). Vision with love, by contrast, means that the soul can 
be touched and reawakened to its true nature: to its connatural connection to the 
intelligible and, eventually, to the One beyond Nous.
141
 The possibility of a vision of this 
sort is in principle open to all individual rational souls, and yet even when eros arises, the 
soul is not automatically transported into the noetic. Though connatural to the soul, the 
connection to Nous requires a certain attunement or disposition of the soul not merely to 
fall in love with Beauty, but also to be open to be transformed so as to become more and 
more akin to it. As already in Plato (see page 79), eros indicates, not an accomplished 
feat, but a task. Thus, love is what allows the lover to see and desire Beauty as that which 
is to be loved; and yet merely to desire Beauty does not make us immediately and 
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 Thus, Chrétien (1990, 330) remarks: “C’est pourqui dans le pensée grecque, et singuilèrement dans la 
pensée platonicienne, toute noétique est une érotique, la théorie de l’esprit est aussi la théorie de 
l’amour.” Doesn’t something similar happen when, say, a man falls in love with a beautiful 
(καλοκἀγαθός) woman? After her vision has given birth to love in him, doesn’t the lover see her face 
everywhere? Doesn’t everything remind him of her hair, her features, her approaching steps, her smile? 
Didn’t this “first” encounter with the beloved, this first vision, bring about something which, no matter 
how accidental and imaginary it may seem to an outsider, for the beloved is the most substantial and real 
thing there is? Doesn’t this love for the beloved now identify the lover more than anything else? Parents, 
siblings, relatives, friends, native land, personal interests: isn’t the lover willing to leave all this behind 
for his beloved, this ineffaceable mark, this unforgettable vision? Doesn’t love make the lover truly see 
things which previously he never even imagined could be there? Does this first vision not allow him to 
enjoy sounds, smells, sights, touches, tastes which he never thought he could enjoy? Isn’t this love 
somehow like a novel organ of vision, a brand new eye that the lover received by which the whole world 
is viewed differently?—Widening the field: Is the case of the scientist’s passion for her discipline 
somewhat similar to that of the lover? Doesn’t the artist pursue his art with a similar erotic attitude? 
What of the sportsperson, the politician, the religious person, the lover of wisdom? Doesn’t something 
similar happen in all these cases, an experience whereby not only a vision is given, but also a new eye, 
which for the viewer is the indication of the task of approximating this vision as best as possible? 
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actually beautiful. 
The question remains: Why do we love anything? Or: Why do we find something 
lovable? In reply to Aristophanes, who restricted the answer to these questions to a 
primordial desire to be whole again by rejoining our lost half, Plato had Socrates suggest 
that this explanation is insufficient, since we would cut off our own limbs if those proved 
to be detrimental to our overall health; thus, eros must be of something beyond what is 
superficially our own, and even beyond wholeness. This factor is the good and only the 
good.
142
 But what is good? And how is the Good recognized amidst partial and often 
misleading goods? That is, why is it often so difficult to recognize it? Isn’t the very 
notion of a universal Good a mere illusion? Plato’s answer to these questions in book VII 
of the Republic pointed at the necessity of purification of the eye of the soul. That is, 
given the involvement of the soul’s (metaphorical) eye with (likewise metaphorical) 
darkness, its sight needs to be habituated, and painstakingly so, to the vision of things in 
light and to the nature of light itself (see pages 68–71). As we shall see in Subsection 
4.3.1, Plotinus follows Plato on this last point. However, he seems to go beyond Plato, or 
at least to be much more explicit than him, about the central question: Why love? 
On the basis of Plotinus’ analogy of eros and thoughts given at 7.46–58, one may 
get the impression that eros, no matter how pure, is only an adventitious condition of the 
soul qua soul due to the latter’s distance from Intellect; and that if the particular intellect 
of an individual soul ever succeeded in identifying with Nous, not partially and 
momentarily, but fully and continuously, its eros would cease to exist. For Plotinus this is 
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 Plato, Symposium 205d10–206a1 (see my third illustration is Subsection 1.5.4). 
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only partially the case, however; for if it may be true that upon such a hypothetical 
success a particular intellect would be integrated in Nous, its eros would be refashioned 
as noetic eros rather than cease to exist altogether. As we shall see, the aim of this 
specifically noetic eros is not Nous itself, but the One beyond Nous. 
Our next task is to show that the claim that the One is the origin and end of all 
reality means to say that the One is the root and terminus of all eros. The question “Why 
love?” can be addressed through three sub-questions, which will be implicitly addressed 
in the next two chapters. This is where my systematic reconstruction of Plotinus’ thought 
on eros takes place more explicitly. First, does eros ever stop? That is, does it have a 
truly ultimate aim? This question will be answered positively and eros’ ultimate aim will 
be identified with the One. However, to have an ultimate aim does not mean that eros 
will cease, but rather that it will be sustained permanently and unswervingly, qua eros, in 
the presence of the beloved. The second question is: Why is Intellect not the ultimate aim 
of desire? As we shall see, the answer will be that it is because within Nous there is still a 
minimal distance, that is to say, a lack of unity, between thinking and what is thought (as 
well as a multiplicity of intelligibles) that Nous cannot serve as the Good. The distance is 
bridged only in the One, and the bridging of this distance is that which Nous desires by 
being a (necessarily imperfect) image of it. Finally, the third question: How can we speak 
about the absolutely simple, and how can the individual soul come in contact with it in 
union? While it seems reasonable to admit that the unity of Intellect, being a noetic 
simultaneousness of reciprocally interpenetrating parts, lends itself to being unfolded 
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successively at the level of soul in a discursive or dianoetic manner,
143
 the very act of 
speaking of that which, qua truly one, has no parts whatsoever seems already to violate 
and hopelessly misrepresent its unity. If we are to speak of the One at all, we must be 
aware of the intrinsically metaphorical character of our utterances. Plotinus’ favorite term 
to describe the One, other than the phrase “the One” (τὸ ἕν), is the Good, whereby the 
One is named, strictly, not for what it is in itself, but in relation to everything else, 
namely as the end point of the aspirations (or, simply, of the eros) of the whole of reality. 
This appellative, “the Good,” will be the focus of Chapter Four, where the One qua Good 
will be approached as the ultimate desideratum of the soul’s erotic ascent. As for a 
metaphor to describe the One itself, prior or independently of what derives from it, 
Plotinus reverts once again to the notion of eros as he writes that the One is 
simultaneously “beloved and love and love of itself” (VI.8 [39] 15.1).144 
In the next chapter I shall investigate the meaning of this statement by Plotinus 
and see that the eros that has been the focus of the present chapter (in fact, that all eros) 
has not only its ultimate aim in the One qua Good (the focus of Chapter Four), but also its 
unoriginated origin in the One metaphorically understood as self-love. Thus, the proper 
seat of eros is not the soul (as it would seem to be in Plato), nor is it Intellect (as with 
Aristotle’s First Mover, which moves by being loved), but rather the One as that which, 
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 Plotinus’ statement about myths discussed earlier at the end of Section 2.2 can be understood precisely 
as a one form of such a discursive unfolding, the other form being that of rational discourse. 
 
144
 VI.8 [39] 15.1: Καὶ ἐράσμιον καὶ ἔρως ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ αὐτοῦ ἔρως (the translation of this line is mine 
throughout; ARMSTRONG’s translation can be found in Chapter Three note 1). I will comment on this text 
in Subsection 3.3.1. Works like Lacrosse (1994), PIGLER, and, I hope, the next two chapters of this study 
should suffice to demonstrate that this Plotinian reference to eros is not “an occasional lapsus,” as 
suggested by Thesleff (1980, 109 note 28). To these works we should add a chapter in Rist (1964, 56–
112), to whom Thesleff’s remark was directed. 
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existing as spontaneous love of itself, in its superabundance gives to what 
immediately proceeds from it, Intellect, a love for the One itself. This love is replicated, 
with lesser intensity, at the level of Soul, of which the treatment of eros as the eye of the 
soul is an illustration. As such, and as diversely argued by Lacrosse and Pigler in their 
monographs on eros in Plotinus (see Preface note 7), eros constitutes the fundamental 
link between the different levels of reality in Plotinian metaphysics, both in the process of 
derivation of all reality from the One and in the process of return to it. 
 154  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: 
PLOTINUS’ METAPHYSICS OF LOVE: 
THE DERIVATION OF ALL REALITY FROM THE ONE AS EROTIC PROCESSION 
Νῦν μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἀνάγκην τοῦ εἶναι ταῦτα ἡ ψυχὴ ἔχει, ἐπιποθεῖ δὲ τὸ 
θρυλλούμενον δὴ τοῦτο καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πάλαι σοφοῖς, πῶς ἐξ ἑνὸς τοιούτου 
ὄντος, οἷον λέγομεν τὸ ἓν εἶναι, ὑπόστασιν ἔσχεν ὁτιοῦν εἴτε πλῆθος εἴτε 
δυὰς εἴτε ἀριθμός, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔμεινεν ἐκεῖνο ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ, τοσοῦτον δὲ 
πλῆθος ἐξερρύη, ὃ ὁρᾶται μὲν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἀνάγειν δὲ αὐτὸ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο 
ἀξιοῦμεν. 
 
Καὶ ἐράσμιον καὶ ἔρως ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ αὐτοῦ ἔρως, ἅτε οὐκ ἄλλως καλὸς ἢ 
παρ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ. 
—Plotinus 
...amorem unius inextinguibilem... 
—Proclus1 
3.1 Introduction 
One of the most obvious difficulties in dealing with any aspect of Plotinus’ 
thought is to find a point of entry in his philosophical universe which would not 
presuppose knowledge of the rest of this universe. Part of the problem is owing to the fact 
that Plotinus’ writings, unlike Proclus’ Elements of Theology for example, do not attempt 
to reproduce a system, but rather discuss particular problems whose solutions are 
                                                 
1
 Plotinus V.1 [10] 6.2–8: “For the soul now knows that these things must be, but longs to answer the 
question repeatedly discussed also by the ancient philosophers, how from the One, if it is such as we say 
it is, anything else, whether a multiplicity or a dyad or a number, came into existence, and why it did not 
on the contrary remain by itself, but such a great multiplicity flowed from it as that which is seen to exist 
in beings, but which we think it right to refer back to the One.” Plotinus VI.8 [39] 15.1–2: “And he, that 
same self, is lovable and love and love of himself, in that he is beautiful only from himself and in 
himself.” Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides VII.509.33: “...the inextinguishable love of the 
One...” 
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intelligible on the basis of a system which, though never made explicit more 
geometrico by Plotinus himself, constitutes the indispensable background of those 
discussions. Thus, in trying to make this background as explicit as possible, Plotinus 
scholars provide us with relatively systematic accounts of his thought which one will 
hardly ever encounter in the Enneads themselves. Some of these accounts revolve around 
the ideas of derivation or procession of all reality from the One, and ascent, return or 
conversion to it.
2
 
The contents of the present and of the next chapter follow in the wake of this 
expository and systematizing method or tradition, but from the point of view of eros.
3
 
What this means, as I anticipated in the closing section of the previous chapter, is that the 
interpretive systematization of the Plotinian universe will have eros as its guiding 
concept, or that the whole of Plotinus’ philosophical output can be clarified in terms of 
eros. More specifically, in these chapters eros will be presented as the key factor through 
                                                 
2
 See for instance the relatively short accounts by Armstrong (1953, 27–41; ARMSTRONG I, xi–xxviii; 1967, 
236–268), Wallis (1995, 47–93), and IGAL (I, 23–35, 93–101), and above all the two classic monographs 
by Trouillard (1955b and 1955a); in part see also O’Meara (1993, especially chapters 6, 7, and 10), 
Gerson (1994, in particular chapters 1, 3, 9, and 10), A. Smith (2004, 1–74), in part Arnou (1967), as 
well as Reale (2004, VIII, 51–52, 171–186), who admittedly focuses on the notion of procession and 
deals with that of return only marginally (cf. also Labecki 2006 and 2007). In different ways, works like 
Alcinous’ Didaskalikos before Plotinus, and, after him, Iamblichus’ Protrepticus, Porphyry’s Sententiae, 
Damascius’ De principiis, and, in rigorous geometrical format, Proclus’ Elements of Theology and 
Elements of Physics are obvious attempts at systematizing (and thereby interpreting in their own terms) 
the set of notions and problems (including those of procession and return) that had become the common 
heritage of of the Platonic tradition, in whose development Plotinus played a fundamental role. For an 
account of the notions of procession and conversion in the broader context of Neoplatonism, see Lloyd 
(1990, chapters 4 and 5). 
 
3
 A clear advantage of this method is its pedagogical force. One of its most obvious shortcomings is the fact 
that in it the explicitly close reading of the text of the Enneads is often replaced by a more synoptic 
approach in which primacy is given to the view of the whole, while the real questions and problems and 
the likely interlocutors of Plotinus’ treatises may at times fall in the background or appear tangential due 
to the focus on the systematic framework within which they are addressed. I hope that the reading of 
Enneads III.5 [50] that I undertook in Chapter Two may represent a sufficient sample of an attempt 
partially to overcome this deficiency in the present study. 
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which Plotinus accounts both for the derivation or procession of all reality from one 
single principle, the One (Chapter Three), and for its return to the same principle as the 
Good, the ultimate goal or highest desideratum of all reality (Chapter Four). Were it not 
for the chronological element introduced by internal references, the content of Chapter 
Three and Chapter Four could be read in reverse order, since the realities they treat are 
the same, only approached from the opposite poles of Plotinian metaphysics.
4
 
The main bulk of this chapter is divided in three sections, the first of which 
introduces the complex problematic of the derivation of all reality from the One (Section 
3.2), while the remaining two analyze the erotic status of each “level” of the Plotinian 
universe from the viewpoint of derivation, namely, the One above
5
 or beyond Nous (3.3) 
and everything else that is derived from it (3.4), to wit, Intellect or Nous (Subsection 
3.4.1), soul (3.4.2), and, beneath these “divine realities” (V.1 [10] 7.49), the sensible or 
material world, including pre-cosmic matter (3.4.3). In my exposition I draw freely from 
the sources cited in the section of the Bibliography titled “Plotinus,” with some important 
additions,
6
 above all Pigler’s monograph, Plotin, une métaphysique de l’amour,7 whose 
                                                 
4
 As Trouillard (1955b, 28) remarks, the two processes “n’apparaissent antithétiques que dans l’image 
spatiale qui les représente comme des événements extraposés.” What this means in the ensuing 
exposition is not only that everything comes from the One as an act of love or generosity on the part of 
the One, but, perhaps more radically, that in this act of love each of the derived hypostases (i.e., Intellect 
or Nous and soul) constitutes itself or comes about as this particular hypostasis by erotically turning itself 
or “reverting” first upon itself and toward its generator (i.e., the hypostasis immediately “above” it), and 
ultimately toward the One (which for Nous is also its immediate generator). See pages 133–139 for the 
meaning of the term ὑπόστασις, and pages 204–207 and 364–367 for the notion of reversion. 
 
5
 Let it be noticed that all such terms as “level,” “above,” “beyond,” “beneath,” and so forth, do not have, in 
this specific context, spatial connotations, much like “before” and “after” are not to be understood in 
strictly temporal terms. 
 
6
 These additions include: Trouillard (1955b), O’Meara (1993), and Gerson (1994). 
 
7
 PIGLER organizes her exposition around conceptual triptychs, which she successively applies to the four 
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precise analyses have made my work in this chapter considerably lighter. 
Table 4 on the next page may be used as a helpful reference, especially in matters 
of terminology, through the reading of this chapter. 
3.2 Derivation of the Many from the One: The Problem and Its Plotinian Solution 
The focus of the present section is Plotinus’ answer to the following interrogative: 
How does multiplicity derive
8
 from utter simplicity (cf. V.9 [5] 14.13: πῶς ἐξ ἑνὸς 
πλῆθος)? This question and its Plotinian answer, concisely put forth chiefly in Enneads 
V.4 [7] (How that which is after the First comes from the First and on the One), include a  
                                                                                                                                                 
levels of Plotinian metaphysics, that is, the One (Power-Life-Love), Nous (Being-Life-Thought; cf. 
Hadot 1960), Soul (Nature-Life-Logos), and Pre-cosmic Matter (Non-being-Impassibility-Death). By 
contrast, my analyses in this chapter, particularly in Section 3.2 and 3.3, have a more modest goal and a 
much narrower scope. I will limit my exposition chiefly to how eros functions as the explanatory concept 
of Plotinus’ metaphysics of derivation (see next note), while dealing only marginally with all the other 
concepts treated by Pigler. In the next chapter I will go beyond Pigler’s treatment of the topic as I attempt 
to describe how eros functions analogously as the key concept to understand the soul’s return or ascent to 
the One. 
 
8
 Two terminological observations on the use of the word “derivation” and its cognates are in place here. 
(1) I follow O’Meara (1993, 60–61) in referring to the process of constitution of all things ultimately 
from the One with the more neutral term “derivation” (occasionally I also call it “procession”), in 
contrast with other such expressions as “emanation,” “production,” “making,” “creation,” and so on. The 
reason for this is to distinguish the process that I take Plotinus was likely to have in mind from the ideas 
often associated with the other terms I mentioned, which may suggest that the process entails (a) 
deliberation and/or (b) fabrication and ought to be material in character (as in the case of making and 
production); (c) that what “springs” from a given source diminishes or otherwise affects the source 
and/or (d) is wholly homogeneous with it (as might be the case with emanation and the idea of 
overflowing); (e) connections to ideas, Christian or otherwise, that are not central or explicit in the 
Plotinian problematic (as might be the case with creation ex nihilo). 
(2) The Greek term I translate with “derivation” in this context is πρόοδος (occasionally διέξοδος, for 
instance at III.8 [30] 9.38, where Plotinus calls the One ἀρχὴ διεξόδου), which in the Enneads is not 
reserved to name the process of derivation or procession of all reality directly from the One, but is used 
also to indicate the several intermediate stages of this process, that is, in approximately “descending” 
order: of Nous (or rather, of intelligible matter, as I will argue in Subsection 3.4.1) from the One (e.g., in 
V.5 [32] 3.9); of Soul (or, perhaps less imprecisely, of psychic matter, as we shall see in Subsection 
3.3.2) from Intellect (e.g., IV.8 [6] 6.5–6); of the World-Soul and of individual souls from the indivisible 
Soul-Hypostasis (e.g., IV.3 [27] 8.2–3; IV.2 [4] 1.44, on which see Chappuis 2006, 52–54); of the soul’s 
powers from the soul (e.g., IV.8 [6] 5.33); of soul into plants (e.g., V.2 [11] 1.27); of images from form 
(e.g., III.6 [26] 17.7; see Fleet 1995, 266). Less technically, the term πρόοδος is used also to indicate the 
progress of such quantitative entities as the unit and the point toward multiplicity (e.g., VI.3 [44] 12.14; 
cf. also VI.6 [34] 11.26) and the progress of any given potentiality toward its proper actualization (e.g., 
VI.3 [44] 22.7, 47). 
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Table 4. Prospect of the Derivation of All Reality in Plotinian Metaphysics: 
Stages, Kinds of Unity, Kinds of Love 
Stage of Derivation Kind of Unity Kind of Love 
O 
N
E 
(The Good, Principle, First, Source, 
Root, Father, Beyond, etc.) 
Unqualified simplicity Self-love 
N 
 
O 
 
U 
 
S 
Loving Intellect (intelligible matter, 
indefinite dyad, pre-hypostatic noetic 
matter, primary otherness) 
Indeterminate erotic energy wholly directed toward the One 
Thinking Intellect (the fully formed 
hypostasis of Nous) 
Noesis (intuition) 
Noetic (intuitive) possession of the One; 
friendship among intelligibles 
Undescended (part of) individual souls 
S 
 
 
O 
 
 
U 
 
 
L 
Pre-hypostatic (intelligible) psychic 
matter (psychic analogue of Loving 
Intellect) 
 Indeterminate erotic energy wholly directed toward Nous 
Soul-Hypostasis (higher soul)  
Eternal primary dianoia 
or discursiveness 
Dianoetic (discursive) possession of 
Nous 
Remainder of intelligible 
(psychic) matter (Penia in III.5 
[50] 7 and III.8 [30] 5) 
  
Indeterminate erotic energy wholly directed toward the 
Soul-Hypostasis 
 World-Soul (lower soul, Nature) 
  
Eternal derivative 
dianoia (discursiveness) 
Constant connection to the Soul-
Hypostasis’ contemplation of Nous; care 
for the sensible cosmos 
Immanent 
Nature 
Intellect of the 
World-Soul 
 
Rational individual souls in their 
embodied operations  
Temporal dianoia 
(discursiveness) 
Intermittent connection to the Soul-
Hypostasis’ contemplation of Nous; care 
for the individual body    
M 
A 
T 
T 
E 
R 
(LOWER 
MATTER, 
as 
opposed 
to Intel-
ligible 
Matter) 
Cosmic matter (sensible 
matter, the sensible, body) 
Unity of discrete parts, 
temporal (form, life) 
Sympathy (organic); friendship implying 
enmity 
   
Pre-cosmic matter (Penia in 
I.8 [51] 14, III.6 [26] 14) 
Formless continuity Aspiration to existence 
 
 
Notice 
 
• The double line between the level of soul and the level of matter indicates the fundamental difference which 
Plotinus posits between the hypostases or higher realities (i.e., the divine things of V.1 [10] 7.49; cf. page 259 
above) and the material universe. 
• The gap between the levels of pre-cosmic and cosmic matter indicates the tentativeness with which I take pre-
cosmic matter to be part of Plotinian metaphysics understood as a system of integral emanation (see note 17). 
• From the top, the decreasing shades of the highlighted rows indicate the decreasing erotic intensity of levels or 
stages of intelligible matter. 
• The various connections (i) of the undescended (part of) individual souls to individual souls in their embodied 
operations, (ii) of the latter to the sensible, and (iii) of the intellect of the World-Soul to the Soul-Hypostasis’ 
contemplation of Nous, are indicated by semi-open links between these levels. 
• The reasons for placing undescended individual souls in Nous should become clearer after reading the next 
chapter, particularly Subsection 4.3.2, 4.4.1, and 4.6.2. 
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cluster of related problems, which I here summarize in the order in which they will 
appear in the ensuing subsections. First, why should the many derive from one principle 
and why should there be only one such principle, the Principle
9
 (Subsection 3.2.1)? 
Secondly, since the Principle will turn out to be of an unqualifiedly simple nature, how 
can we speak of it (3.2.2)? Thirdly, how or in what manner do the many derive from the 
One? It is in reply to this last question that I will introduce Plotinus’ Principle of Double 
Activity
10
 (3.2.3). And lastly, are the Plotinian hypostases real things with a relatively 
independent existence or aspects-modes of one single, all-encompassing reality (3.2.4)? 
A summary treatment of these questions constitutes the necessary framework to 
                                                 
9
 Along with “Principle” (ἀρχή: e.g., I.3 [20] 1.3, II.9 [33] 1.21, VI.8 [39] 9.12; cf. SP, s.v., A2.a) and the 
more frequent “the Good” (τὸ ἀγαθόν, τἀγαθόν: e.g., I.6 [1] 9.38, III.5 [50] 7.31, VI.7 [38] 36–37, 
passim; cf. SP, s.v. ἀγαθός d; cf. Chapter Four note 9), several other terms will be capitalized when 
referring to the One. These terms include: “the First” (τὸ πρῶτον: e.g., I.6 [1] 6.25, II.4 [12] 5.32, VI.9 
[9] 3.16; cf. SP, s.v. πρῶτος, b and b2), “Simple” (ἁπλοῦν: e.g., I.6 [1] 7.9, V.6 [24] 4.1, 11–12, VI.7 
[38] 29.9; cf. SP, s.v. ἁπλοῦς, e), “Source” (πηγή: e.g., I.6 [1] 6.15, VI.7 [38] 23.21, VI.9 [9] 5.36), 
“Root” (ῥίζα: III.1 [3] 4.5, III.3 [48] 7.11, 21, VI.8 [39] 15.33), “God” (θεός: e.g., I.8 [51] 2.25, V.1 [10] 
8.7, V.3 [49] 7.1–2, VI.9 [9] 5.3; cf. SP, s.v., (c)), “Father” (πατήρ: e.g., I.6 [1] 8.21, V.5 [32] 12.37, V.8 
[31] 13.5, VI.8 [39] 14.38, VI.9 [9] 9.34; cf. SP, s.v., b; cf. also Chapter Four note 149), “the Beyond” 
(τὸ ἐπέκεινα: e.g., III.7 [45] 2.7–8, V.9 [5] 2.24, VI.2 [43] 3.10; cf. SP, s.v., a), “Cause” (αἰτία: e.g., VI.8 
[39] 18.39, VI.9 [9] 9.2; αἴτιον: e.g., I.8 [51] 2.29, V.5 [32] 13.19, VI.5 [23] 9.4, VI.7 [38] 16.23, 42.11, 
VI.8 [39] 18.38, VI.9 [9] 3.49, 6.55 and cf. also VI.2 [43] 3.21. This is not to be confused with τὸ διότι, 
“the Because,” which is identical with the εἶδος of a thing: cf. VI.7 [38] 2.1–50, 3.19–22, 19.17–19), 
“End” (τέλος: cf. Chapter Four note 4). An important text often cited in these references is Plato’s Letters 
II.312e1–4. 
 
10
 The expression “Principle of Double Activity” does not occur in the Enneads (but see note 100 below). If 
I employ it (and capitalize it), it is simply because it serves me as a useful label for an idea that occurs 
very often in Plotinus. The same applies to other expressions that appear and are discussed later in this 
and the following chapter, namely: “Principle of Prior Simplicity,” “Principle of Prior Actuality,” 
“Principle of Reversion,” “Principle of Superabundance,” “Principle of Henologic Giving,” “Principle of 
Superiority of Cause to Effect,” “Principle of Likeness of Cause and Effect,” “Principle of As-
similation,” “Principle of Affinity,” and “Principle of Participation.” A summary table (Table 6) of all 
these principles is provided at the end of Chapter Four for the reader’s convenience. As previously 
pointed out (Chapter Two note 27), I also capitalize the following: “One,” “Intellect” or “Nous” (as well 
as “Form,” “Being,” and “Beauty” when these are used as shorthand descriptions of the noetic realm), 
“Soul-Hypostasis” (not to be confused with the expression “the hypostasis soul” as indicating the whole 
of psychic manifestations, and with “soul,” often used anarthrously to indicate soul in general without 
reference to any of its specific manifestations), and “World-Soul.” 
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understand the workings of eros in Plotinian metaphysics, both for this and for the 
next chapter. 
3.2.1 Necessity of Deriving the Many from the One, 
and the Uniqueness of the Principle 
The notion of a single source of all reality is part of the Greek philosophical 
tradition even prior to Plotinus.
11
 However, when one considers that, despite their talk of 
an Idea of the Good as the cause of both the knowledge and the existence of Ideas
12
 and 
of a First Mover as the final cause of all things,
13
 both Plato and Aristotle seem to have 
taken the cosmos to be without beginning in time,
14
 it might be asked whether there ever 
                                                 
11
 Gerson (1994, 3 and 227–228 note 5) points out that this single Principle is uncontentiously called “god” 
(θεός) within this tradition. On the Plotinian One as θεός see Rist (1962b), Ham (2000, 279–281). For 
references in Plotinus see SP, s.v. θεός (c). 
 
12
 Notice that in the Republic just as the sun is called responsible for sight and cause of things seen 
(Republic VI.508b9, VII.516c2: αἴτιος), so the Good is called the cause (αἰτία) of knowledge and of all 
that is correct and beautiful (Republic VI.508e3, VII.517c2). If the metaphor of the sun (which stands for 
the Good) is read in light of the story of the cave in book VII, in this context “things” does not mean 
sensibles but Ideas. To my knowledge, nowhere does Plato attribute to the Good direct causality for the 
existence of sensible things (nor, for that matter, of the soul), although at Republic VI.509b2–4 he does 
state that the sun does not only provide visible things (τοῖς ὁρωμένοις) with the power to be seen 
(ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμιν), but also with generation, growth, and nourishment (τὴν γένεσιν καὶ αὔξην καὶ 
τροφήν), which obviously are features incompatible with Platonic Ideas. By contrast, Proclus (Elements 
of Theology 12) seems to have in mind precisely this passage from the Republic when he identifies the 
Good with the ἀρχή of all, or the final cause with the efficient cause (see Dodds 1963, 198; cf. note 167 
below, and Section 4.2). Whatever the case may be, if it is still Ideas that Plato has in mind in Republic 
VI.509b, then the only way I see in which the Good could be said to cause the existence of things is 
indirectly, namely if, agreeing that the Good causes the existence of Ideas, the latter in turn cause the 
existence of sensible things, so that the Good becomes the ultimate cause of the existence of everything, 
although one might then wonder (i) whether the existence caused by the Good and that caused by the 
Ideas would have to be taken equivocally, or else (ii) why Ideas are necessary at all as causes of 
existence. Against the latter conjecture, (ii), Gerson (1990, chapter 2, in particular pages 57–65) argues 
that Ideas cause things, not to be, but merely to be what they are; in other words, they act as formal 
causes. Admittedly this problem, though legitimately raised in reference to Plato, is borrowed from the 
later tradition and never seems to surface explicitly in Plato. 
 
13
 See especially Republic VI–VII for Plato, and Physics VIII and Metaphysics XII for Aristotle. 
 
14
 Here I have in mind Plato’s notion of the so-called “receptacle” (ὑποδοχή) of becoming as logically prior 
to both the cosmos and the four elements of water, air, earth and fire (Timaeus 49a6, 51a8–b1, 52d2–e5, 
69b2–c5), along with Aristotle’s notion of prime matter (πρωτή ὕλη, a rare expression but a key element 
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was a Greek or Hellenized thinker who explicitly upheld the single origin thesis for 
what it truly means, namely that all reality derives from one single source, and not from 
the combination of two or more independent elements of which one may be more 
important than the other. If we except some possible anticipations of the thesis in the so-
called Neopythagoreans,
15
 it seems that the one who first formulated it explicitly and 
precisely in Greek philosophy was Plotinus. To put it more sharply, what the thesis 
means for our author is: (i) that everything, including lower matter (as distinguished from 
intelligible matter
16
), derives from the One and depends on it for its existence;
17
 (ii) that 
the many, whether taken individually, partially, or as a totality, can in no way be resolved 
                                                                                                                                                 
in the Aristotelian system: e.g., Metaphysics V.1015a7, IX.1049a25–26; cf. also VII.1035b30: τῆς 
ἐσχάτης ὕλης, ultimate matter), which has no separate existence and so is never experienced as separate 
from form (see for instance De generatione et corruptione II.329a24–26, 34–b1; cf. Metaphysics 
VII.1029a20–28). Schwyzer (1973, 266–272; cf. also Fleet 1995, 200–201) points out that Plotinus 
identifies Plato’s receptacle with Aristotelian prime matter (see II.4 [12] 1.1–4, III.6 [26] 11–12, 13.12–
18, 19.14–18; cf. also II.4 [12] 6), probably following Aristotle’s own lead (e.g., Physics IV.209b11–16, 
where the Stagirite identifies matter and space, or χώρα, the latter being closely associated with the 
receptacle in Timaeus 52a8–b5), although evidence in Plato might suggest otherwise (see W. D. Ross 
1936, 565–567; Gerson 1994, 108–109; Corrigan 1996, 4 note 8; for a helpful discussion on the 
interpretation of the receptacle see Zeyl 2000, lix–lxiv; for an argument in favor of Aristotle’s 
interpretation see Fleet 1995, 164–167), and although Plotinus does not seem to follow Aristotle in 
identifying matter and space (see Narbonne 2009). 
 
15
 The Milesian scholar Alexander Polyhistor (first century B.C.) writes that the idea of matter as derived 
from an original principle, the monad (ἡ μονάς), is of Pythagorean descent (see Diogenes Laertius, Lives 
of Eminent Philosophers VIII.24–25); cf. also Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 230.34–
231.5. For other sources see Wallis (1995, 32–36), O’Brien (1993, 27 note 4). 
 
16
 On lower matter see Subsection 3.4.3; on intelligible matter see pages 224–226 below. 
 
17
 Cf. in particular VI.7 [38] 23.20–24, where both derivation and dependence in being are stressed. The 
most concise and least technical statement of the derivation of all reality from the One is probably found 
in a protasis at VI.7 [38] 23.4–5: ...ἔκ του τὰ πάντα... This position has been called “émanation intégrale” 
(O’Brien 1981, 118; 1991, 11; 1993, 112; 1995, 22; followed by O’Meara 1999b, 25; Corrigan 1996, 
262), an expression which I will not use often in these pages but which well describes Plotinus’ system of 
derivation of all reality from one single source, as long as one maintains that emanation dose not imply 
any diminution in the Source (cf. H. F. Müller 1913, 416–422; Gerson 1994, 28–29; note 8 above). 
However, I adopt this position not without some reservations, for even conceding that lower matter is 
unambiguously and consistently said to be generated in the Enneads, I have not been completely 
persuaded that it coherently fits Plotinus’ metaphysical architectonics (see Subsection 3.4.3). 
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in the One, and so the One must be understood as utterly transcending what derives 
from the One (not only in the sense of being other than it, but also as not being directly 
involved in it);
18
 (iii) that derivation does not detract from the simplicity of the One;
19
 
(iv) that the One must be incorporeal;
20
 and (v) that the process of derivation is a-
temporal.
21
 These five points sum up Plotinus’ basic views on derivation.22 
                                                 
18
 On the transcendence of the One see for instance I.8 [51] 7.16–23, on which cf. O’Meara (1999b, 132–
133); see also III.2 [47] 5.25–32, V.1 [10] 6.12–39, V.4 [7] 2.26–34, V.5 [32] 13.17–20, VI.9 [9] 2.44–
47; and most emphatically at VI.9 [9] 6.55: “But the cause of all things is none of them” (Τὸ δὲ πάντων 
αἴτιον οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐκείνων). 
 
19
 See for example III.8 [30] 9.39–40, 10.28–31, V.1 [10] 7.18–23, V.2 [11] 1.1–2, V.3 [49] 11.16–25, V.4 
[7] 2.5–6, V.5 [32] 12.47–50, V.6 [24] 3, VI.7 [38] 16.29–31. 
 
20
 Cf. for instance V.4 [7] 1.17–19; the entirety of VI.5 [23] On the presence of being, one and the same, 
everywhere as a whole II. When understood as fulfilling the first four conditions, (i) through (iv) in the 
main text, the One is taken to be the universal cause in the sense that it is the origin of all reality (see note 
17 above). But the One is cause also in another sense, namely as the final object of desire of all reality, 
which will be the focus of the next chapter (see particularly Section 4.2). 
 
21
 Cf. II.9 [33] 3.11–15, III.2 [47] 1.20–26, VI.7 [38] 23.22–24. This is the thesis of the so-called eternity of 
the cosmos, common to the entire Greek tradition. For a concise treatment of the problem in connection 
with Plotinus, see Moreau 1970, 17–26, especially 22–26). Plotinus is generally in agreement with this 
tradition, but with an important specification, namely his understanding of eternity and its relation to time 
(on which see Appendix D). For this reason, I prefer to refer to the process of derivation as “a-temporal” 
rather than as “eternal.” 
 
22
 Leaving aside the fifth condition, (v) (a-temporality; see previous note), the originality of Plotinus may 
become apparent through a quick overview of the thought of the major philosophers of the Greek 
tradition before him on the issue. 
It may be that the concept of ἀρχή in the Physiologists fulfills (i), radical dependence for existence, and 
perhaps even (ii), radical transcendence (cf. Gerson 1990, 5–14, 15), although what is predicated of the 
ἀρχή is more like a heightened difference that does not seem to preclude involvement in its effects; 
however, it tells us little about (iii), simplicity, and it is not clear that it fulfills (iv), immateriality: see 
Thales (DK 11.A12 = Aristotle, Metaphysics I.983b6–33), Anaximander (DK 12.B1 = Simplicius, 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 24.13–21), Anaximenes (DK 13.A5 = Simplicius, Commentary on 
Aristotle’s Physics 22.9–13; DK13.A7 = Hippolytus, Philosophoumena I.7.1–12). 
Conditions (i), (iii), and (iv) may be true of Xenophanes (DK 21.A30 = Aristotle, Metaphysics 
I.986b18–27; DK 21.B23 = Clement of Alexandria, Stromata V.14.399.14–17) and the Eleatics 
(Parmenides: DK 28.B8.1–49 = Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 145.1–146.22; Zeno: DK 
29.A21 = Aristotle, Metaphysics III.1001b7–13; Melissus: DK 30.B8 = Simplicius, Commentary on 
Aristotle’s On the Heavens 558.9–559.12; DK 30.B9 = Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 
109.34–110.2, 87.6–7), but it is not clear that the same can be said of (ii). In fact, the transcendence of 
Being with respect to beings voiced by these authors (i.e., the fact that Being, or the one, is none of the 
beings, or the many, depending on it) actually does not amount to the totality of these beings, thus 
implying some sort of pantheism or immanentism. Something along the same lines may be argued about 
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The main question is: Why must all reality be understood as deriving from a 
single principle? The most concise answer to this interrogative is the longstanding 
principle that whatever is composite, or made up of parts, ultimately derives from 
something that is simple, a statement which, with O’Meara, I will refer to as the Principle 
of Prior Simplicity.
23
 The version of it given at
24
 V.4 [7] 1.5–15 is a classic Plotinian 
                                                                                                                                                 
Heraclitus’ view of change (DK 22.B30, 31 = Clement of Alexandria, Stromata V.14.396.10–21; DK 
22.B90 = Plutarch, De E apud Delphos 8: Moralia V.388e). 
The case of the so-called Pluralists, as the name assigned to them partially indicates, is open to fulfill 
only half of the first condition, namely that things do depend on a certain principle for their existence, but 
this principle is conceived of as a plurality of elements (Empedocles: DK 31.B26 = Simplicius, 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 33.18–34.3), of homeomeriae plus Nous, which are strictly kept apart 
(Anaxagoras: DK 59.B4, B12 = Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 34.18–35.9, 164.24–
165.4 and 156.13–157.4), or of atoms (Leucippus: DK 67.A7 = Aristotle, De generatione et corruptione 
I.324b35–325a6, 325a23–b11; DK 67.A9 = Aristotle, De generatione et corruptione I.314a21–24, 
315b6–15; Democritus: DK 68.A43 = Dionysius of Alexandria in Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica 
XIV.23.2–3 = PG 21, 1272b–c). 
Given their materialism, the case of both Epicureans (e.g., Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus 38–44, 54 = 
EPICUREA 5–8, 14) and Stoics (e.g., SVF I, 90 = Cicero, Academica I.39; SVF II, 303 = Seneca, Letters 
to Lucilius 65.2; SVF II, 329 and 359 = Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentary on Aristotle’s Topics 
301.19–25 and 359.12–16; SVF III, 84 = Seneca, Letters to Lucilius 106.2–10, and cf. also 113.20; 
Plutarch, De superstitione 1: Moralia II.165a; Tertullian, De anima 6 = PL 2, 656a) is similar to that of 
the Pluralists (the Epicureans, in particular, rely on the materialistic physics of Leucippus and 
Democritus). 
Various forms of Gnosticism are also to be distinguished from Plotinus on the issue of derivation 
owing to their explicitly dualistic outlook, in which the material world is conceived of as radically evil 
and so eternally opposed to, rather than derived from, a good source (see for instance Corpus 
Hermeticum VI.4 and, less extremely, VI.2 and X.12). Even Numenius, an older contemporary of 
Plotinus whose thought seems to have anticipated Plotinus’ speculation on the One and the hypostatic 
division of reality (e.g., Numenius, fragments 15 and 21), strongly rejected the claim that matter could be 
derived from the Principle (Numenius, fragment 52). 
The thought of Philo Alexandrinus is probably the closest to what I take to be the Plotinian position on 
the issue on all counts, except the fact that for Philo, a Jew whose starting point is divinely inspired 
Scripture, creation amounts to bringing something into existence from absolute nothingness, or “from 
non-being into being [ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι]” (De vita Mosis II.267; see also Legum Allegoriae 
III.10; De somniis I.76), where this does not seem immediately to imply the kind of a-temporal process 
(the fifth condition) involved in the Plotinian derivation of all reality from the One (see pages 187–188, 
263–264 below); on Philo see Reale (1979), Radice (1989). Augustine’s speculation about time in 
Confessions XI will be also a reflection on the a-temporal modality of creation. 
 
23
 O’Meara (1993, 44–49). 
 
24
 V.4 [7] 1.5–15: [5] Δεῖ μὲν γάρ τι πρὸ πάντων εἶναι ἁπλοῦν, τοῦτο καὶ [6] πάντων ἕτερον τῶν μετ’ αὐτό, 
ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ὄν, οὐ μεμιγμένον [7] τοῖς ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, καὶ πάλιν ἕτερον τρόπον τοῖς ἄλλοις παρεῖναι [8] 
δυνάμενον, ὂν ὄντως ἕν, οὐχ ἕτερον ὄν, εἶτα ἕν, καθ’ οὗ [9] ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἓν εἶναι, οὗ μὴ λόγος μηδὲ 
ἐπιστήμη, [10] ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐπέκεινα λέγεται εἶναι οὐσίας εἰ γὰρ μὴ [11] ἁπλοῦν ἔσται συμβάσεως ἔξω 
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text:
25
 
[5] For there must be something simple before all things,
26
 and this [6] 
must be something other than all the things that come after it, existing by 
itself, not mixed [7] with the things that derive from it, and all the same 
able to be present in a different way to these other things, [8] being really 
one, and not a different being and then one; it is [9] false even to say that it 
is one, and there is “no concept or knowledge”27 of it, [10]; it is indeed 
also said to be beyond being.
28
 For if it is not [11] to be simple, outside of 
all coincidence and composition, and [12] truly one, it could not be a first 
principle; and it is the most self-sufficient, because it is simple [13] and 
the first of all: for that which is not the first needs [14] that which is before 
it, and what is not simple is in need of its simple components [15] so that 
it can come into existence from them.
29
 
 
O’Meara observes that there are three different points at issue here. The first is 
that in this context the parts making up the whole are not of the kind whose existence 
depends on the existence of the whole; instead, they have a double existence: both within 
                                                                                                                                                 
πάσης καὶ συνθέσεως καὶ [12] ὄντως ἕν οὐκ ἂν ἀρχὴ εἴη—αὐταρκέστατόν τε τῷ ἁπλοῦν [13] εἶναι καὶ 
πρῶτον ἁπάντων· τὸ γὰρ τὸ μὴ πρῶτον ἐνδεὲς [14] τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, τό τε μὴ ἁπλοῦν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἁπλῶν 
[15] δεόμενον, ἵν’ ᾖ ἐξ ἐκείνων. The italicized terms in the English translation at lines 11–12 do not 
appear in ARMSTRONG, whose rendering I am here reporting with the addition of those missing words. 
 
25
 Some parallels for the Principle of Prior Simplicity include III.8 [30] 9.1–6, 10.20–23, V.3 [49] 12.9–20, 
16.12–16; cf. also VI.5 [23] 1.1 (IGAL, ad loc.). Within the Platonic tradition, one can encounter other 
versions of this principle in Alcinous’ Didaskalikos X.165.34–166.14, and more notably in Proclus’ 
Elements of Theology 1–6. For a possible antecedent of this principle see Alexander of Aphrodisias, 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 55.20–56.6 (cf. O’Meara 1999a, 69). Other reformulations of the 
principle, heavily recontextualized and accompanied by sustained arguments, are found throughout the 
history of philosophy, typically in the Middle Ages (e.g., Bonaventure, Commentaria in quatuor libros 
Sententiarum I.d8.p2.q1; Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I.q3.a7; Duns Scotus, De primo principio 
IV.3–6). 
 
26
 Cf. Plato, Letters II.312e3–4. Notice that for Plotinus the Principle of Prior Simplicity is already at work 
at intermediate levels of unity: “the principle of each group of things is simpler than they are themselves” 
(V.3 [49] 16.7–8: ἡ ἀρχὴ ἑκάστων ἁπλουστέρα ἢ αὐτά). 
 
27
 Cf. Plato, Parmenides 141e10–11. 
 
28
 Cf. Plato, Republic VI.509b9, Parmenides 142a3–4. 
 
29
 Cf. V.3 [49] 12.9–14. 
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the composite and independently of it.
30
 The second point is that when wholes are 
analyzed into their parts, this analysis will lead to one single ultimate element which is 
unqualifiedly simple, is “presupposed, directly or indirectly, by all composite things,” 
and is “independent of all that derives from it.”31 And thirdly, since the elements of any 
given compound are not random aggregates, but unified structures with an inner 
organization, which therefore require a principle of unity,
32
 the priority of the unifying 
principle with respect to the composite is better understood as superiority “in power and 
being.”33 
This principle must be one and one only,
34
 that is, one of a kind: unique in its 
absolute simplicity.
35
 The sole reason Plotinus offers for this last claim in treatise V.4 [7] 
is that if there were two such things, both would be one.
36
 Now, since the Principle is 
unqualifiedly simple, it cannot be a body, for body is understood to be infinitely divisible 
                                                 
30
 Cf. V.6 [24] 3.10–15. O’Meara (1993, 46) observes: “This dual status is common in Plotinus’ universe: 
soul is both part of (in) the world and separate from it; intellect is both part of (in) soul and above it; and 
the nature of intellect is such that it derives from something which both composes it and is prior to it, the 
One. This is no universe where immanence excludes transcendence.” 
 
31
 O’Meara (1993 46, 45); see also O’Meara (1999a, particularly 67–73); cf. Dodds (1960, 3). 
 
32
 Cf. V.3 [49] 12.9–14. 
 
33
 O’Meara (1993, 49). O’Meara continues: “It is superior in power because it produces the compound. And 
it is superior in being because it exists at a higher level of perfection: it possesses unity, self-integrity, 
independence to a greater degree.” See also O’Meara (1999a). 
 
34
 This is not unlike Spinoza’s affirmation that God is the only existing and conceivable substance (Ethics 
I.p14), with the essential difference that by affirming that God is the immanent but not transitive cause of 
all things (Ethics I.p18), Spinoza obliterates God’s transcendence, which Plotinus, by contrast, 
strenuously maintains. Plotinus argues that the One, like Spinoza’s single substance, is none of the things 
derived from it, nor their totality (see note 18 above), but he would never say that things derived from the 
One are its modes, as it is the case of particular things in Spinoza (Ethics I.p25.cor.). 
 
35
 See II.3 [52] 6.16–17, V.3 [49] 12.19–20, VI.7 [38] 23.22–24. 
 
36
 V.4 [7] 1.15–16: [15] Τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον ἓν μόνον δεῖ [16] εἶναι· ἄλλο γὰρ εἰ εἴη τοιοῦτον, ἓν ἂν εἴη τὰ 
ἄμφω. 
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and so it lacks simplicity by definition.
37
 One may grant, therefore, that the First will 
have to be something incorporeal (μὴ σωματικὴ: V.4 [7] 1.19), but what does it mean to 
say that if there were two such things, both would be one? Put more technically, what 
does it mean to say that the simplicity of the Principle implies its uniqueness? 
Gerson, from whose accounts I borrow freely in the remainder of this 
subsection,
38
 remarks that the possibility of there being two or more such principles 
differing solo numero, as in Leibniz’s indiscernibles,39 should be discarded because the 
uniqueness of the Principle “is supposed to follow from its being the sort of thing it is (τὸ 
τοιοῦτον [cf. VI.9 [9] 6.23]), namely, one or simple.”40 One might argue that although the 
two are indiscernible to the inquirer, at least one factor still ought to be postulated in 
order to differentiate them. If we do so, this factor must be either essential to the nature of 
the Principle or inessential. If it is essential, then the one possessing it in addition to all 
that the two have in common will be the Principle; if it is inessential, the one possessing 
it is diminished, qua (alleged) Principle, by the very fact of possessing it, thereby not 
being the Principle. 
The fact is that one cannot argue for the uniqueness of the Principle without 
already taking its nature into consideration; conversely, one can argue against its 
uniqueness only by failing to take its nature into consideration. At VI.8 [39] 7.39–41, 
Plotinus explicitly argues about the One that “[39] it possesses uniqueness [τὸ μοναχὸν] 
                                                 
37
 V.4 [7] 1.17–18: Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἁπλοῦν σῶμα. Cf. note 20 above. 
 
38
 See Gerson (1994, 3–14; 1990, 201–212). 
 
39
 Leibniz, Discours de Metaphysique 9 (= Leibniz 1875–1890, IV, 433–434). 
 
40
 Gerson (1994, 5). 
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not because it is obstructed by something else but because [40] it is this very thing 
[τῷ τοῦτο αὐτὸ εἶναι] and is, we may say [οἷον], satisfied with itself [ἀρέσκειν ἑαυτῷ] 
and has nothing [41] better than itself” (cf. also VI.8 [39] 9.13). As Gerson observes, 
“[e]vidently, unqualified simplicity is thought to be incapable of duplication,”41 and 
duplication is impossible because the absolutely simple is identical with the First (τὸ 
πρῶτον: see V.4 [7] 1.1–3), whose essential and absolute priority is incompatible with the 
very notion of duplication.
42
 
Plotinus is not quite as explicit on this point, but I believe that what he has in 
mind is a necessary connection between that nature of the Principle and its uniqueness, or 
the fact that uniqueness is necessarily part of its nature—“part,” that is, from the 
perspective of the inquirer. Its nature is infinity of power, which as such resists the notion 
of multiplication. There is nothing in principle limiting the number of individuals that can 
                                                 
41
 Gerson (1994, 5). Incapability of duplication here should not be understood as a lack, but as a necessity 
grounded in the very nature of the Principle. As I will argue in Subsection 3.3.2, the simplicity of the One 
is the simplicity of an infinite self-sufficient power (see V.5 [32] 10.20–23, VI.5 [23] 12.3–7, VI.9 [9] 6), 
which as such, of necessity, does not engender, nor is it engendered by, an infinite equal to itself. 
 
42
 Aristotle’s Metaphysics XII.1074a31–38 would appear to be an antecedent of this line of thinking: “[31] 
It is evident that there is only one heaven [εἷς οὐρανός]. For if [32] there were a number of heavens, as 
there are a number of men, then the principle [ἀρχή]—one for each heaven—would be specifically [εἴδει] 
one [33] but numerically [ἀριθμῷ] many. Now, things that are numerically [34] many all have matter 
[ὕλην]; for many < particulars > have one and the same account [λόγος]—[35] that of man, for 
instance—but Socrates is one < particular >. But the primary essence [τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι... τὸ πρῶτον] has 
[36] no matter, since it is actuality [ἐντελέχεια]. Hence the primary [37] unmoved mover [τὸ πρῶτον 
κινοῦν ἀκίνητον] is one in number and in account; so also then what is always [38] and continuously 
moved; and so there is only one heaven” (translation by Irwin and Fine; cf. Metaphysics VIII.1045a36–
b1). However, this text fails to provide a background for the Plotinian notion of the uniqueness of the 
Principle, for as we shall see (Subsection 3.4.1 and Section 4.2), Plotinus will criticize Aristotle, saying 
that the Aristotelian First Principle, being intellective in nature (Metaphysics XII.1074b34–35: ἡ νόησις 
νοήσεως νόησις), is not truly simple, hence, in accordance with the Principle of Prior Simplicity, not 
truly First (see for instance V.1 [10] 9.7–27; V.3 [49] 5; VI.9 [9] 2). More in keeping with our point, the 
reason given by Aristotle for the uniqueness of the First Principle (namely that the latter is pure actuality 
and therefore wholly deprived of matter, which is the element that makes for multiplication within the 
same kind in the passage I cited) simply does not seem to be what Plotinus has in mind; in fact, Plotinus 
admits the existence of incorporeal intellects that are one in kind (see Gerson 1994, 6), hence, I surmise, 
the absence of any reference to Aristotle for the text of V.4 [7] 1.5–15 in HS1 and HS2. 
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belong to a given species, even in the case of incorporeal intellects (see note 40). This 
cannot be the case with the Principle if it is to be truly the First. Thus, Plotinus’ remark 
that if there were two such things both would be one means, not that these two things are 
both first although we have no way to establish how they differ, but rather that either 
none of the two is the First, and so a new First must be postulated, or else that their very 
nature excludes the possibility of their being, as it were, multiple individuals within the 
same genus, and so they are not two but one. 
But what does it mean for Plotinus to say that something is simple (ἁπλοῦν)? 
Very broadly, it means that nothing can be predicated (κατηγορεῖσθαι) of it.43 For this 
reason he states that the One, as that which is unqualifiedly simple, has no essence 
(οὐσία);44 that is, it cannot be circumscribed by a limit or assigned any specific content. 
Strictly, even to call it “One” perhaps is inappropriate and a mere negation of 
multiplicity; when we do so, we do it in an ordinary fashion (κοινῶς: VI.9 [9] 5.32) and 
certainly we are not to imply that what is called “One” is first something else, and One 
only successively.
45
 On the contrary, for the One to be and to be one are identical. This is 
not the case for everything that is derived from the One; that is, in everything but the 
One, unity is provided from without (to wit, by the One itself) as something distinct from 
                                                 
43
 See III.8 [30] 10.28–31. Plotinus writes that to add something to the mere expression “the Good” is, 
rather than a proper addition to it, the addition of deficiency, as if a diminution of its reputation (III.8 
[30] 11.12–13, V.5 [32] 13.7–16). On the issue of predication concerning the One and its ineffability see 
the next subsection. 
 
44
 See for instance III.8 [30] 9.53–54, VI.9 [9] 5.30. 
 
45
 See V.5 [32] 6.26–35, VI.9 [9] 5.31–33; cf. Plato, Parmenides 142a3. 
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each thing’s essence.46 
Now, Gerson suggests that a thing’s unity amounts to its existence as not only 
conceptually but also really distinct from that thing’s essence, so that what the One gives 
to everything derived from it is that thing’s existence47.48 My contention, which I adapt 
from Pigler,
49
 and which rather than being at variance with Gerson’s position tentatively 
supplements it from the vantage point of our main topic, is that the language of essence 
and existence can be legitimately transposed in terms of eros. More explicitly, this means 
chiefly two things. First, what distinguishes the eros that belongs to the One (to which I 
will refer as henologic eros) from the eros of everything else is that henologic eros, 
unlike any other manifestation of eros, is not directed to something other than itself and 
so does not entail any lack whatsoever.
50
 Thus, just like in the language of being the One 
                                                 
46
 VI.9 [9] 1. See the next note for further references. 
 
47
 This line of reasoning was hinted by Rist (1973, 83–85) and ably, if differently, developed by Corrigan 
(1984; 1999) and Gerson (1990, 185–226, especially 201–212; 1994, 5–14). In short, as I just indicated 
in the main text, according to the last two authors something is unqualifiedly simple when its essence 
coincides with its existence (here synonymous with its unity). These authors claim that this identity 
applies to the Plotinian One and quote a number of texts from the Enneads to support their point (e.g., 
VI.9 [9] 2; VI.6 [34] 13.50, VI.7 [38] 2, 21.12–14, 42.11, VI.8 [39] 13.56–57, 20.15–16, 21.32–33), 
although they do not always agree about the argumentative persuasiveness of each passage. Thus, they 
make of Plotinus the precursor of a famed argument in the history of philosophy (on which see Gilson 
1952, 74–107; MacIntyre 1967). Gerson in particular thinks that the identity of essence and existence in 
the One constitutes the crucial argument in support of what I referred to as the Principle of Prior 
Simplicity. He even believes that the distinction between essence and existence, or, as he puts it in this 
context, “the individually existing Form and the nature its name names such that the latter serves the 
universalizing function while the former remains separate” (Gerson 1990, 44), is already present, though 
not explicitly emphasized, in Plato, most notably in the first part of the Parmenides, in Philebus 15a1–b8, 
and Timaeus 51e6–52a4, 53b1–5 (see Gerson 1990, 33–81, in particular 40–52). Gerson (1990, 44) goes 
on to argue that “Plato clearly intends participation in a Form to mean having the attributes that the 
Form’s name names, but not having the Form’s properties, that is, immutability, eternality, etc.” 
 
48
 For a critique of this position as put forth by Gerson (1994), see D. L. Ross (1996). I already touched on 
this point earlier in Chapter One (pages 19–22). 
 
49
 PIGLER. 
 
50
 We shall see (Subsection 3.4.1) that noetic eros, or the eros proper to Intellect, is an eternally fulfilled 
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is the ground of its own existence, so in the language of eros the One is at the same 
time beloved, love, and love of itself (VI.8 [39] 15.1). Second, what the One gives to 
everything ultimately derived from it (though apparently not to matter
51
) is a fundamental 
directedness toward the One itself, which as the target of this aim is conceived of as the 
Good. Thus, just like in the language of being everything receives existence from the 
One,
52
 which alone is causa sui,
53
 so in the language of eros no thing, whether taken 
                                                                                                                                                 
eros, ever in possession of its desideratum (i.e., the One) and to this extent it entails no lack. However, an 
element of lack must still be maintained in it by the very fact that its desideratum is something other than 
itself, for Nous, while never deprived of its beloved, is not itself the beloved, or the Good, except 
equivocally, as when Intellect is called the proper good of soul, or that through which soul tends to the 
Good (cf. I.7 [54] 2.9–11, VI.7 [38] 30.7–8, VI.8 [39] 7.1–2). 
 
51
 See Subsection 3.4.3 below. 
 
52
 See notes 46 and 47 above for references. In addition to this, Plotinus seems to maintain that the One is 
not only the cause, but also the sustainer of the existence of things (VI.7 [38] 23.20–24, 42.11, VI.8 [39] 
21.19–21, VI.2 [43] 11.27–29, VI.9 [9] 1.40–42; indirectly, cf. also II.1 [40] 4.16–21, II.9 [33] 3.1–3, 
IV.2 [4] 2.42–48, VI.3 [44] 23.1–5; see Gerson 1994, 10). Some fourteenth centuries later, Descartes 
(Meditations III.49 = Descartes 1897–1910, VII, 49) will echo this idea as he wrote that “conservation 
differs from creation only by a distinction of reason.” 
 
53
 See VI.8 [39] 14.41, where the One is explicitly referred to as cause of itself (αἴτιον ἑαυτοῦ); cf.VI.8 [39] 
7.53, 13.55, 15.8, 16.21, 20.2 and 21. If conceived of temporally, the notion of self-causation is 
obviously contradictory, for before the One were to bring itself into existence, it would either exist or not 
exist. If it existed, causation would not occur simply because the One already existed; if it did not exist, 
causation would still not occur because, in accordance with the Parmendean adage, ex nihilo nihil fit 
(Parmenides, DK28.B8.5–10 = Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 78.14–19; cf. also 
pseudo-Aristotle, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias 974b12 = DK 30.A5), and so the One will 
never exist. Ousager (2004, 129–137) makes the interesting point that we would be able to bypass all 
these problems if, instead of translating αἴτιον ἑαυτοῦ as causa sui, we rendered it with ratio sui, its own 
reason. Whatever the case may be, it is certainly not in temporal terms that one should understand the 
expression αἴτιον ἑαυτοῦ, or causa sui, when referred to the One. Instead, the One’s self-causation may 
be clarified from the perspective of its double causality, efficient and final (I offer more explicit remarks 
on the issue of the One’s double causality in what follows: see pages 181, 188–191, and 217–218, and 
more extensively in the next chapter, Section 4.2). From the perspective of efficient causation, to say that 
the One is causa sui means that it neither receives existence nor is maintained in existence by anything 
other than itself (cf. VI.5 [23] 12.34–35); similarly, from the perspective of final causation, for the One to 
be causa sui means that it seeks nothing beyond itself. As for the specific context of treatise VI.8 [30], 
On free will and the will of the One, Plotinus’ main goal in speaking of the One as cause of itself is to 
exclude from it all contingency: since the One does not receive existence from without and seeks nothing 
outside itself, it cannot be other than it is and for it freedom is identical with necessity (see Hadot 1999, 
33–36). Important contributions on the concept of αἴτιον ἑαυτοῦ as applied to the One are Beierwaltes 
(1999) and Narbonne (2001a, 98–110), and the already quoted Ousager (2004, 129–137); here one can 
find further references to primary and secondary sources. 
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individually or collectively, will ever be the universal object of love, or the Good, but 
everything is erotically predisposed toward the One,
54
 which alone is simultaneously the 
Good of all and amor sui. 
I will deal with this last point more extensively in Subsection 3.3.1. But before I 
come to it, we must briefly turn our attention to the remaining preliminary questions, 
beginning with the one I implicitly anticipated in the preceding paragraphs: the question 
of the ineffability of the One. 
3.2.2 The Ineffability of the One 
The issue of the simplicity of the One goes hand in hand with those of its 
transcendence and ineffability, for if to be unqualifiedly simple means, minimally, to be 
impervious to all predication (see note 43), one must ask how and if we can even speak of 
it. How can one attribute simplicity to the One if this precludes all distinction and 
therefore, a fortiori, all dianoetic or discursive distinction? Accordingly, Plotinus calls 
the One “truly ineffable” (ἄρρητον τῇ ἀληθείᾳ: V.3 [49] 13.1), and the contact with it, 
“without speech and without thought” (ἄρρητος καὶ ἀνόητος: V.3 [49] 10.43). And yet, 
he does not think that speech about the One is altogether impossible. On the contrary, he 
indicates two paths out of silence, one negative and another positive.
55
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
54
 Cf. I.7 [54] 1.1–20; I.8 [51] 2.2–4; V.3 [49] 15.11–12. At VI.8 [39] 13.12–13 Plotinus even makes the 
radical claim that “[12] every being in its desire for the Good wants to be [13] that [Good] rather than 
what it is” ([12] τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστον ἐφιέμενον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ βούλεται [13] ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ἢ ὅ ἐστιν εἶναι). 
 
55
 Cf. Armstrong (1940, 1–28); Rist (1964, 69–87). A loose parallel of this can be found in Alcinous, who 
speaks of three ways of conceiving (νόησις) God: negation or abstraction (ἀπόφασις; negative utterances 
in my exposition in the main text), analogy (ἀναλογία; the via positiva in the main text) and eminence 
(ὑπεροχή; superlatives and expressions of transcendence in my account). See Alcinous, Didaskalikos 
X.165.16–34 (see Rist 1964, 87–88 note 129); cf. Numenius, fragments 2 and 9. 
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Let us begin with the so-called via negativa. The language of negation, whose 
constant use in Plotinus makes of him one of the most illustrious forerunners of negative 
theology, is often found in the Enneads in passages where the One is said not to be a 
number of things; for instance: neither being, nor substance, nor life,
56
 ungenerated,
57
 
incorporeal,
58
 without form,
59
 without activity,
60
 needing nothing,
61
 and so on. Plotinus 
explains the dynamic of negation in the following passage, V.3 [49] 14.5–8:62 
[5] But we have it [i.e., the One] in such a way that we speak about it [6] 
but we do not speak it. For we say what it is not, [7] but we do not say 
what it is: so that we speak about it from what comes after it. [8] But we 
are not prevented from having it, even if we do not speak it. 
 
Thus, our language about the One, rather than expressing the Principle 
straightforwardly, indicates it in a roundabout way by our making signs to ourselves 
(ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς σημαίνειν: V.3 [49] 13.5), as it were. However, in the context of negation, 
apophatic utterances about the One should not be understood as indications of a mere 
lack,
63
 but, in Wallis’ terms, as “denials of everything inconsistent with the One’s 
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 III.8 [30] 10.30–31: μὴ ὄντος, μὴ οὐσίας, μὴ ζωῆς. 
 
57
 V.4 [7] 1.19: ἀγένητος; cf. Plato, Phaedrus 245d1. 
 
58
 V.4 [7] 1.19: μὴ σωματικὴ. Cf. also VI.9 [9] 5.1–5. 
 
59
 V.5 [32] 6.4: ἀνείδεον; cf. VI.7 [38] 17.36, 28.28, 32.9, 33.37, VI.9 [9] 3.4, 43. The formlessness of the 
One should not be confused with the formlessness of matter, on which see note 329. 
 
60
 V.6 [24] 6.3: ἀνενέργητον. 
 
61
 VI.9 [9] 6.34: ἀνενδεὲς ἁπάντων; cf. VI.9 [9] 6.17–18, 24. 
 
62
 V.3 [49] 14.5–8: [5] Ἀλλ’ οὕτως ἔχομεν, ὥστε περὶ αὐτοῦ μὲν [6] λέγειν, αὐτὸ δὲ μὴ λέγειν. Καὶ γὰρ 
λέγομεν ὃ μὴ ἔστιν· [7] ὃ δέ ἐστιν, οὐ λέγομεν· ὥστε ἐκ τῶν ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ [8] λέγομεν. Ἔχειν δὲ 
οὐ κωλυόμεθα, κἂν μὴ λέγωμεν. See also V.3 [49] 14.8 ad fin., VI.9 [9] 3.49–54, 5.34. 
 
63
 That apophatic utterances are not indication of a mere lack is a misconception about Plotinus and 
Neoplatonism that we might fall into if we were uncritically to espouse Heidegger’s interpretation of 
Western metaphysics as onto-theology and forgetfulness of being. Heidegger’s main thesis is that the 
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excellence, in particular of all plurality and all limitation.”64 Thus, for instance, the 
One does not possess faculties that are found at lower levels of unity, including 
intellection (νοεῖν),65 not because it lacks them but because it does not need them.66 Most 
                                                                                                                                                 
history of Western metaphysics can be read as a momentous and variously formulated forgetfulness of 
Being (Seinsverlassenheit), which ultimately means forgetfulness of the difference between Being (Sein, 
Seyn) and beings (Seiendes): the ontological difference. This forgetfulness results in the reduction of 
Being either to the most general concept of being (which is the focus of ontology) or to the highest of 
beings (i.e., God, the focus of theology), whence the designation of metaphysics as onto-theo-logical 
(onto-theo-logisch). As the history of such forgetfulness, metaphysics according to Heidegger ought to 
undergo an epochal overcoming (Überwindung) so as to enable human beings to recall Being itself 
(“Andenken an das Sein selbst”) (Heidegger, 1998, 278–279 = Gesamtausgabe 9, 367–368). This thesis 
appears often in the Heideggerian corpus; it is the object of focused attention in the following essays: the 
1929 What is Metaphysics?, including its 1943 Postcript and, above all, its 1949 Introduction (where the 
term “ontotheological” appears), all collected in Wegmarken (Heidegger 1998, 82–96, 231–238, 277–290 
= Gesamtausgabe 9, 103–122, 303–312, 365–383); The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics 
(1957) in Identität und Differenz (Heidegger 1969, 42–74, 107–143). If Heidegger’s thesis is taken to 
apply to Plotinus, the One will be reduced to one among the beings derived from it, which Plotinus 
strenuously denies. The alternative is that the thesis does not apply to Plotinus, but then either the One is 
reduced to nothing (the point against which I am presently arguing) or else Heidegger’s thesis, by failing 
to take into account the tradition of Neoplatonism, is itself at least historically inaccurate, though 
undeniably thought provoking. Regrettably, Heidegger’s references to Plotinus are brief, scattered, and 
general (e.g., Heidegger 1988, 81 = Gesamtausgabe 24, 13; Heidegger 1995, 38 = Gesamtausgabe 33, 
47; see Beierwaltes 1989, 368 n. 12 for further references), thus making it very hard to establish the 
extent to which he thinks that the forgetfulness of which he speaks can be applied, if at all, to this major 
stream of the Western metaphysical tradition. Thus Narbonne (2001a, 149–150) is correct to lament that 
“la thèse de l’oubli de l’être, donnée comme le trait fundamental de la tradition métaphysique occidental, 
et qui ne fait donc pas de quartier pour Plotin ou ses successeurs, s’est justement dispensée d’une 
veritable confrontation avec la pensée néo-platonicienne.” On this issue one can profit from the reading 
of Hadot (1959), Aubenque (1971), Beierwaltes (1989, 365–378; 1995b), Schürmann (1982), Kremer 
(1989), Narbonne (2001a, 149–167; 2001b, 187–271); see also Caputo (1986), who by showing the 
influence of Meister Eckhart on Heidegger already points at the debt that the latter indirectly owes to the 
tradition of Platonism. 
 
64
 Wallis (1995, 57). Plotinus states it explicitly at V.5 [32] 6.26–30: “[26] But perhaps this name ‘One’ 
contains [only] a denial of multiplicity. [27] This is why the Pythagoreans symbolically indicated it to 
each other by the name of Apollo, [28] in negation of the multiple. But if [29] the One—name and reality 
expressed—was to be taken positively, it would be less clear [30] than if we did not give it a name at all” 
([26] Τάχα δὲ καὶ τὸ “ἓν” ὄνομα τοῦτο ἄρσιν ἔχει πρὸς τὰ πολλά. [27] Ὅθεν καὶ Ἀπόλλωνα οἱ 
Πυθαγορικοὶ συμβολικῶς πρὸς [28] ἀλλήλους ἐσήμαινον ἀποφάσει τῶν πολλῶν. Εἰ δὲ θέσις [29] τις τὸ 
ἕν, τό τε ὄνομα τό τε δηλούμενον, ἀσαφέστερον [30] ἂν γίνοιτο τοῦ εἰ μή τις ὄνομα ἔλεγεν αὐτοῦ). See 
also the lines that follow this passage, V.5 [32] 6.30–37. On the etymology of “Apollo” given at lines 
27–28, cf. Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride 75 (Moralia V.381f). 
 
65
 See III.9 [13] 9, V.3 [49] 11 and especially 13, V.6 [24] 6.29–35, VI.7 [38] 37.24–31, VI.9 [9] 6.44–45. 
 
66
 Cf. IV.4 [28] 24.1–12, V.6 [24] 5.1–5, VI.7 [38] 9.38–46, 41. Faculties such as the senses, the ability to 
deliberate, and even intellection, are certainly powers, but they are also indications of a lack. The case of 
deliberation illustrates the point well (cf. pages 188–191, 202–204): we are capable of deliberation 
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importantly, when the One is said to be “beyond being,”67 the point is not that the 
One is non-existent.
68
 The Plotinian “beyond being” is neither absolute nothingness nor 
an “otherwise than being,” but rather an excess of being, or “being otherwise” (i.e., 
otherwise than the Being taken in its technical acceptation, namely Nous).
69
 Therefore, a 
certain continuity can be maintained between the One and beings, since negative 
descriptions of the One indicate utter superiority, or excellence, rather than mere 
privation.
70
 
                                                                                                                                                 
because we possess reason, but we do so also because the best course of action is not immediately 
available to us, and so we need to deliberate about it. The One, by contrast, has no need for this, for it is 
always in the best possible condition. 
 
67
 See references in the Index Fontium of HS1 and HS2 under Plato, Republic 509b9; cf. note 70 below. 
 
68
 At I.7 [54] 1.8 the One is even said to be the best of beings (ἄριστον ὂν τῶν ὄντων); and at III.8 [30] 
10.26–35 Plotinus clearly argues that the One, although it is none of the things of which it is the origin 
and although nothing can be strictly predicated of it, is not nothing. 
 
69
 See particularly V.5 [32] 6. Cf. also next note. 
 
70
 It may be asked how it is possible to refer to the One as both “beyond being” (insofar as the One is like 
nothing that is found in Nous or at lower ontological levels) and “being otherwise” (insofar as the One is 
not altogether non-existent). I think the answer to this question depends on what facet of the problem one 
wishes to emphasize. If what is at stake is the affirmation of the One’s transcendence, then the Platonic 
formula of the “beyond” (ἐπέκεινα, ὑπέρ: see note 72 and 73) is employed. If, by contrast, what is at 
stake is the affirmation of the One’s existence, then Narbonne’s expression “being otherwise” may safely 
be applied to it. However, it should be kept in mind that what each expression amounts to is an emphasis 
on a different facet of the same problem, and that one expression does not immediately efface the other. I 
maintain that for Plotinus it would be equally mistaken to claim, on the one hand, that the One is non-
existent on the ground that it is said to be “beyond being” and, on the other, that the One is a part of or in 
the totality of beings because it is occasionally said to be. It may seem that what is at stake in this 
problematic is also the validity of the principle of the excluded middle as applied to the seemingly all-
encompassing couple of being and nothingness. A thing either is A or is not A, that is, in terms of being 
and nothingness, a thing either is or is not: tertium non datur. This principle is far from being invalidated, 
however, since “to be” for Plotinus is identical with Nous (cf. Chapter One note 187); therefore, in saying 
that the One is other than being, he simply places it beyond the noetic sphere without committing himself 
to say that it does not exist absolutely. I surmise that a partial solution to this problem would lie in 
developing a language that is not so dependent on the notion of being (or on the close connection of 
being and essence)—an immense task, to be sure—but I do not know of any passage in which Plotinus 
consciously attempts that, although this does not necessarily mean that he is unaware of the problem. To 
my knowledge, the only philosopher who explicitly attempted anything like this within the Western 
tradition is Emmanuel Levinas in his later publications, particularly Otherwise than Being or Beyond 
Essence (Levinas 1981). The focus of Levinas’ analyses, however, is not the One, but the human person 
  
175 
In this sense, the language of negation already points to the language of 
eminence (or of the highest degree of perfection), testified by Plotinus’ abundant use of 
superlatives
71
 and of expressions indicating transcendence, such as ὑπέρ (“above”)72 and 
ἐπέκεινα (“beyond”).73 While appreciating why expressions of transcendence should 
belong under the path of negation, we might be tempted to conceive of superlatives as 
closer to affirmation. I believe instead that it is safer to keep both under the heading of 
negation insofar as the degree of perfection they express in this context is one which, 
while occurring in the form of affirmative linguistic descriptions, points beyond the field 
of description altogether, toward an experience that lies not only beyond the dianoetic, 
but also beyond the noetic. Let us consider the positive path. 
The via positiva is the language of analogy, whereby Plotinus attempts to give 
                                                                                                                                                 
(and God), and “being” for him means more than Nous (for a discussion of the similarities and 
differences of the Neoplatonic and the Levinasian notions of being and what is beyond or otherwise than 
being, see Narbonne 2006a, 42–93; cf. also Narbonne 1992, 117–119 and Narbonne 1998, 138). 
 
71
 E.g., ἀγαπητότατον: VI.8 [39] 16.15; αἰτιώτατον: VI.8 [39] 18.38; ἀκρότατον: III.9 [13] 9.5, V.1 [10] 
10.24; ἁπλούστατον: II.9 [33] 1.8, III.8 [30] 9.17, V.3 [49] 13.34, VI.8 [39] 14.15; ἄριστον: VI.7 [38] 
33.14; αὐταρκέστατον, ἱκανώτατον, and ἀνενδεέστατον: VI.9 [9] 6.17–18, 24; δυνατώτατον and 
μέγιστον... δυνάμει: V.4 [7] 1.25 and VI.9 [9] 6.7–8; ἐρασμιώτατον: VI.7 [38] 32.25, 33.14; 
καθαρώτατον: VI.9 [9] 3.26; μάλιστα: VI.8 [39] 16.19; τελειότατον: V.1 [10] 6.40, VI.8 [39] 20.14; 
ὑπέρτατον: IV.2 [4] 2.54, VI.8 [39] 16.9. 
 
72
 E.g., ὑπεράγαθον: VI.9 [9] 6.40; ὑπεράνω: VI.8 [39] 21.30; ὑπερβολή: VI.8 [39] 10.33; ὑπέρκαλον: I.8 
[51] 2.8, VI.7 [38] 33.20 (to which cf. I.6 [1] 9.37–43); ὑπερνόησις: VI.8 [39] 16.32; ὑπερόντως: VI.8 
[39] 14.42; ὑπερερρύη and ὑπερπλῆρες: V.2 [11] 1.8–9; ἐνέργεια ὑπὲρ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ζωήν: VI.8 
[39] 16.35–36 (line 34 has ἐπέκεινα in place of ὑπέρ; cf. III.8 [30] 10.3). 
 
73
 E.g., ἐπέκεινα τῶν ἀρίστων βασιλεύων ἐν τῷ νοητῷ: I.8 [51] 2.8–9; αὐτὸ οὐκ ὂν οὐσία, ἀλλ’ ἐπέκεινα 
ταύτης καὶ ἐπέκεινα αὐταρκείας: V.3 [49] 17.13–14; τὸ δὲ ἐπέκεινα αἴτιον: I.4 [46] 4.19; ἄριστον ὂν τῶν 
ὄντων καὶ ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὄντων: I.7 [54] 1.8–9; τὸ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος: I.3 [20] 5.7–8; ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας, 
ἐπέκεινα καὶ ἐνεργείας καὶ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ νοήσεως: I.7 [54] 1.19–20 (cf. III.8 [10] 9.9–10, III.9 [13] 
9.1, 12, V.1 [10] 8.7–8, 10.2, V.3 [49] 11.1–2, 28, 12.47–48, 13.1–2, V.4 [7] 1.10, 2.38–43, V.5 [32] 
6.11, 20, V.6 [24] 6.30, V.8 [31] 1.3–4, V.9 [5] 2.24, VI.2 [43] 17.22–23, VI.6 [34] 5.37, VI.7 [38] 
24.19–20, 40.26–27, VI.8 [39] 9.28, 12.1–2, 19.13, VI.9 [9] 11.42); ἐπέκεινα ἁπάντων: V.1 [10] 6.13 (cf. 
VI.2 [43] 3). 
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positive, albeit metaphorical, descriptions of the One.
74
 His favorite metaphors are 
those of the spring
75
 and of the root of a tree,
76
 of fire, snow, and of an odorous 
substance,
77
 of the center of a circle (or of a series of circles),
78
 of light (or the sun),
79
 and 
of love.
80
 It is hard to overemphasize that these descriptions are metaphorical, hence the 
sustained use of such qualifiers as οἷον81 and ὥσπερ82 (“as if,” “so to speak,” “like”). 
                                                 
74
 The kind of analogy Plotinus is likely to have in mind is not one of proper proportionality but, as Gerson 
(1990, 213) writes, one “of proportion where the cause is denominated from its effects.” Thus, the One is 
variously called or said to have βούλησις (V.8 [39] 13.56), ἐνεργεία (VI.8 [39] 7.47, 51, 16.15, 35, 20.9), 
ζωή (VI.8 [39] 7.51), νοῦς (V.4 [7] 2.18), οὐσία (VI.7 [38] 17.6, VI.8 [39] 7.52, 20.10), ὑπόστασις (VI.8 
[39] 7.47, 20.11), and so on, not in the sense that it is identical with any of these things spoken of 
ordinarily, but in the sense that its nature has (or rather, is) the power to bring about all such things as 
effects while itself remaining that very power (see Section 3.3). The One possesses eminently what it 
does not have actually (see PIGLER 58). Or, to cite Gerson (1990, 214) again, “the One is virtually what 
everything else is actually” (cf. V.3 [49] 15.27–32, V.5 [32] 9.1–10). This principle is attributed to 
Speusippus and criticized, perhaps not wholly fairly, by Aristotle at Metaphysics XII.1072b30–1073a3. 
The images reported in the ensuing lines of the present paragraph in the main text, I maintain, are 
attempts to indicate metaphorically the causal nature of the One. 
 
75
 On the One as source (πηγή) see particularly III.8 [30] 10; cf. VI.9 [9] 11.31. The One is called source of 
a number of things: beauty (I.6 [1] 6.15–16, 9.41–42), acts according to nature (I.7 [54] 1.15–16), Nous 
(II.5 [25] 3.40, VI.9 [9] 9.2), true soul (II.5 [25] 3.40), cause and being (VI.8 [39] 14.29–32), the best 
things (VI.9 [9] 5.36), life (VI.9 [9] 9.1). 
 
76
 On the image of the tree see III.8 [30] 10; cf. VI.8 [39] 15.33–36, VI.9 [9] 9.2. 
 
77
 V.1 [10] 6.34–37, V.4 [7] 2.30–33. See the next subsection, where these passages are quoted in full. On 
fire see also IV.3 [27] 10.30–31, V.1 [10] 3.9–10, V.3 [49] 7.23–25, V.4 [7] 1.31; on snow see V.4 [7] 
1.31; the example of the odorous substance does not seem to occur elsewhere in the Enneads in reference 
to the One (it is found referred to Nous at VI.7 [38] 12.23–30, where all the senses are brought together 
to describe the life pouring forth from Intellect). 
 
78
 On the image of the circle see I.7 [54] 1.23–24, IV.1 [21] 1.16–17, IV.4 [28] 16.23–30, V.1 [10] 11.10–
12 (cf. page 316 below), VI.5 [23] 5, VI.8 [39] 18.7–32. As ARMSTRONG (V, 50–51 note 1) rightly 
remarks, the metaphor of the circle “can be used at any level of the hierarchy to describe the combination 
of immanent presence and transcendent separateness which Plotinus sees when he is trying to describe 
the relationship of a relatively complex and multiple derived reality to its simpler and more unified 
source” (cf. e.g. IV.2 [4] 1.24–29). A similar point can be made about the images of light/sun (on which 
see I.7 [54] 1.24–28, III.5 [50] 2.31–32, IV.3 [27] 11.14–17, IV.5 [29] 7; cf. note 160 below) and of love 
(on which see my previous chapter). 
 
79
 On the image of light/sun see I.7 [54] 1.24–28, IV.3 [27] 17, V.1 [10] 6.28–30, VI.8 [39] 18.32–36. 
 
80
 On the One as love (eros) see VI.8 [39] 15.1, 16.12–14; see Subsection 3.3.1 below. 
 
81
 To limit our references to the passages just cited in this paragraph and their immediate context: III.8 [30] 
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Thus, at VI.8 [39] 13.47–50 Plotinus tells us that “[47] one must go along with the 
words, if one [48] in speaking of that [Good] uses of necessity to indicate it expressions 
[49] which we do not strictly speaking allow to be used; but one should understand [50] 
‘as if’ with each of them.”83 In fact, even such a common appellative as “the Good” does 
not really name the One, but only a perspective on it (to wit, the perspective of the whole 
of reality desiring it), so that strictly not even goodness is predicated of the One.
84
 
This array of positive analogies offered by Plotinus does not only constitute a path 
out silence as he attempts to indicate the unqualifiedly simple nature of the One by means 
                                                                                                                                                 
10.4, 9, 11, 29; IV.3 [27] 17.12; IV.4 [28] 16.21; V.1 [10] 6.12–13, 29, 33, 45; VI.8 [39] 13.50, 15.5–6, 
16.12–13, 19–21, 24, 31, 18.4 (and several other times in the remainder of chater 18). Cilento (1963, 99) 
refers to the term οἷον with the felicitous expression “coefficiente di approssimazione,” but on the same 
page he does not seem to realize that the function of this term is only secondarily to soften the features of 
the images that Plotinus uses to speak about the One. By contrast, the primary function of οἷον is to 
introduce us to those images and, through them, both to the possibility of thinking about that of which 
they are images (i.e., the One) and to the realization that this exceeds all thinking. Thus, the meaning of 
οἷον is closer to “nearly” rather than to “so to speak.” (this is similar to one of the meanings of the Latin 
quasi: see Lewis and Short 1879, s.v., II.A; cf. Beierwaltes 1999, 223–225). Thus, οἷον is an index of 
neither pure negation nor pure affirmation, but, as Beierwaltes (1999, 225) puts it, “[e]s hat eine für das 
Denken und seinen Selbstüberstieg anagogische Funktion.” 
 
82
 Once again, to limit our references to the passages just quoted in this paragraph and their immediate 
context: III.8 [30] 10.4; IV.3 [27] 17.22; V.1 [10] 6.29, 45, 7.4, 31; VI.8 [39] 15.34, 18.33. Anton (1982, 
158–159 note 11) goes so far as to argue that in VI.8 [39] 7.31–32, 11.6, 10 οἷον is used “in a 
conspicuously technical sense.” 
 
83
 VI.8 [39] 13.47–50: [47] Δεῖ δὲ συγχωρεῖν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, εἴ τις [48] περὶ ἐκείνου λέγων ἐξ ἀνάγκης 
ἐνδείξεως ἕνεκα αὐτοῖς [49] χρῆται, ἃ ἀκριβείᾳ οὐκ ἐῶμεν λέγεσθαι· λαμβανέτω δὲ καὶ [50] τὸ οἷον ἐφ’ 
ἑκάστου (my emphasis in the translation). Cf. V.5 [32] 6.22. 
 
84
 See II.9 [33] 1.5–8, V.3 [49] 11.22–23, VI.7 [38] 24.13–16, 41.28–31, VI.9 [9] 6.39–42, 55–57. It 
follows that attributes normally associated with the Good, like self-sufficiency for example, are also not 
strictly predicated of the One (see V.3 [49] 17.12–14). What is said about the One is not categorically 
predicated of it but, as I pointed out earlier, is inferred from what comes after it (V.3 [49] 14.7–8, V.5 
[32] 6.17–21, VI.9 [9] 3.49–54). In fact, all strict categorial predication, including the appellative 
“Principle,” fails in the discourse about the Principle. As Meijer (1992, 184) puts it, “‘[t]o speak about it 
(περὶ αὐτοῦ)’ is not to speak categorially about the nature of the One but rather about its relations with 
what follows to reversely leading to conclusions about the One.” We might recall that among these 
relations, that of priority and posteriority of nature between the One and the many is one of non-
reciprocal dependence, that is, one in which the posterior depends on the prior for its existence but not 
vice versa (cf. pages 164–165 above; see also my discussion of the Principle of Participation in Section 
4.5 below). 
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of words, but also throws light on a question closely connected with the idea that 
everything derives from a single source which is unqualifiedly simple, namely: How can 
the many (or, to use the language of Plato’s Parmenides, “the others”) spring from the 
One? How can something unqualifiedly simply give rise to multiplicity? Plotinus’ answer 
to this question is his original Principle of Double Activity, as I already anticipated (see 
note 10). 
3.2.3 Modality of the Derivation of the Many from the One: 
The Principle of Double Activity 
Very generally, the Principle of Double Activity states that everything operates in 
accordance with a twofold activity which is proper to it: internal and external.
85
 The 
principle is found most frequently in Plotinus’ account of the emergence of a hypostasis 
from another. I will begin by citing two passages in which the Principle of Double 
Activity is put forth explicitly.
86
 The first passage is V.4 [7] 2.26–3787: 
[26] But how, when that [viz., the One] abides unchanged, does [Intellect] 
[27] come into being? For each and every thing there is an activity which 
                                                 
85
 The only exception to the Principle of Double Activity in Plotinus’ system would seem to be lower 
matter, which has no external activity and therefore generates nothing beyond itself (see Subsection 
3.4.3). 
 
86
 V.4 [7] 2.26–37 and V.1 [10] 6.25–39; other important references, more or less explicit, to the Principle 
of Double Activity: II.9 [33] 8.22–26, III.2 [47] 4.13–16, III.5 [50] 3.3–5, III.8 [30] 5.14–17, IV.3 [27] 
10.31–41, IV.5 [29] 6.23–31, 7.13–20, 49–51, IV.8 [6] 6.6–15, V.2 [11] 1, V.3 [49] 7.19–25, VI.2 [43] 
22.26–33, VI.8 [39] 18.46–52. Rutten (1956) calls this principle “doctrine des deux actes”; I follow IGAL 
(I, 28–29), who calls it “principio de la doble actividad.” 
 
87
 V.4 [7] 2.26–37: [26] Ἀλλὰ πῶς μένοντος ἐκείνου [27] γίνεται; Ἐνέργεια ἡ μέν ἐστι τῆς οὐσίας, ἡ δ’ ἐκ 
τῆς οὐσίας [28] ἑκάστου· καὶ ἡ μὲν τῆς οὐσίας αὐτό ἐστιν ἐνέργεια [29] ἕκαστον, ἡ δὲ ἀπ’ ἐκείνης, ἣν δεῖ 
παντὶ ἕπεσθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης [30] ἑτέραν οὖσαν αὐτοῦ· οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς ἡ μέν τίς ἐστι συμπληροῦσα 
[31] τὴν οὐσίαν θερμότης, ἡ δὲ ἀπ’ ἐκείνης ἤδη γινομένη [32] ἐνεργοῦντος ἐκείνου τὴν σύμφυτον τῇ 
οὐσίᾳ ἐν τῷ [33] μένειν πῦρ. Οὕτω δὴ κἀκεῖ· καὶ πολὺ πρότερον ἐκεῖ μένοντος [34] αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ 
ἤθει ἐκ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τελειότητος [35] καὶ συνούσης ἐνεργείας ἡ γεννηθεῖσα ἐνέργεια ὑπόστασιν [36] 
λαβοῦσα, ἅτε ἐκ μεγάλης δυνάμεως, μεγίστης μὲν [37] οὖν ἁπασῶν... I take the καὶ at line 35 to be 
epexegetical. The translation is ARMSTRONG’s, slightly modified. 
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belongs to the essence and one which goes out from the essence; [28] and that 
which belongs to the essence is the actuality which [29] each thing is, 
while the other activity derives from the first one, which must in 
everything follow it of necessity, [30] being different from the thing itself: 
as in fire there is a heat which is the fullness of [31] its essence, and 
another which comes into being from that [primary heat] when [fire] [32] 
exercises the [activity] which is connatural to its substance in [33] abiding 
unchanged as fire. So it is also in the higher world; and much more so 
there, while the Principle abides [34] in its own proper way of life, the 
activity generated from the perfection in it, [35] that is, from its coexistent 
activity acquires substantial existence, [36] since it comes from a great 
power, the greatest [37] indeed of all... 
 
The second passage particularly deserving of attention is V.1 [10] 6.25–
39:
88
  
[25] So, if there is a second after the One [26] it must have come to be 
without the One moving at all, without any inclination or act of will [27] 
or any sort of activity on its part. How did this happen then, and [28] what 
are we to think of as surrounding the One in its repose? [It must be] a 
radiation from it [29] while it remains unchanged, like the bright light of 
the sun which, so to speak, [30] runs round it, springing from it 
continually while it remains unchanged. And all [31] beings, as long as 
they remain in being, necessarily give out from their own essences, [32] in 
dependence on their present power, a surrounding reality directed to what 
is outside them, [33] a kind of image [34] of the archetypes from which it 
was produced: fire [produces] the heat which comes from it; [35] snow too 
does not merely keep its cold inside itself; and [36] perfumed things show 
this particularly clearly: as long as they exist, something is diffused from 
themselves [37] around them which is enjoyed by what is near them. And 
[38] all things, when they come to perfection, produce: what is always 
perfect produces always and [39] everlastingly; and it produces something 
less than itself. 
                                                 
88
 V.1 [10] 6.25–39: [25] Δεῖ οὖν ἀκινήτου ὄντος, [26] εἴ τι δεύτερον μετ’ αὐτό, οὐ προσνεύσαντος οὐδὲ 
βουληθέντος [27] οὐδὲ ὅλως κινηθέντος ὑποστῆναι αὐτό. Πῶς οὖν καὶ [28] τί δεῖ νοῆσαι περὶ ἐκεῖνο 
μένον; Περίλαμψιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μέν, [29] ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ μένοντος, οἷον ἡλίου τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ λαμπρὸν ὥσπερ 
[30] περιθέον, ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ γεννώμενον μένοντος. Καὶ πάντα [31] τὰ ὄντα, ἕως μένει, ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν 
οὐσίας ἀναγκαίαν τὴν περὶ αὐτὰ πρὸς [32] τὸ ἔξω αὐτῶν ἐκ τῆς παρούσης δυνάμεως δίδωσιν αὐτῶν [33] 
ἐξηρτημένην ὑπόστασιν, εἰκόνα οὖσαν οἷον [34] ἀρχετύπων ὧν ἐξέφυ πῦρ μὲν τὴν παρ’ αὐτοῦ 
θερμότητα· [35] καὶ χιὼν οὐκ εἴσω μόνον τὸ ψυχρὸν κατέχει· μάλιστα δὲ [36] ὅσα εὐώδη μαρτυρεῖ 
τοῦτο· ἕως γάρ ἐστι, πρόεισί τι ἐξ αὐτῶν [37] περὶ αὐτά, ὧν ἀπολαύει ὑποστάντων ὁ πλησίον. Καὶ [38] 
πάντα δὲ ὅσα ἤδη τέλεια γεννᾷ· τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ τέλειον ἀεὶ καὶ ἀίδιον [39] γεννᾷ· καὶ ἔλαττον δὲ ἑαυτοῦ γεννᾷ. 
ARMSTRONG’s translation, minimally modified. 
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Four observations on these passages should suffice to outline the essentials of the 
theory. The first concerns the probable lexical and conceptual sources of the Principle of 
Double Activity, the two activities being the activity of the essence (ἐνέργεια τῆς οὐσίας) 
and the activity from the essence (ἐνέργεια ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας).89 From a lexical standpoint, its 
most likely background is constituted by Aristotle’s twin notions of ἐνέργεια and 
ἐντελέχεια.90 The basic Aristotelian meaning of ἐνέργεια is that of being engaged in a 
given work or activity (ἔργον)91 as opposed to merely having the potentiality, or potency 
(δύναμις), for it.92 In this sense the meaning of ἐνέργεια extensively overlaps with that of 
ἐντελέχεια.93 But Aristotle also distinguishes between first and second actuality, as when 
someone knows Greek but is not speaking it at the moment (first actuality), in contrast 
with someone who knows it and is presently speaking it (second actuality).
94
 Now, first 
actuality (in our example, the ability to speak Greek whenever one wishes if nothing 
                                                 
89
 The two expressions, ἐνέργεια τῆς οὐσίας and ἐνέργεια ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, literally, if clumsily, translated as 
“activity of the essence” and “activity from the essence,” have also been variously rendered as “internal 
and external activity (or act)” (e.g., in the first chapter of Emilsson 2007), “inmanente” and “liberada” 
(IGAL I, 28), or, more neutrally, “primary and secondary activity” (e.g., Gerson 1994, 22–35), or “first 
and second activity.” This is acceptable as long as we remain aware that “secondary” does not mean 
accidental or unnecessary (much like Igal’s “actividad liberada” does not mean that this activity was 
previously “forced” in some way or another), and as long as we stay clear of spatial connotations (as one 
might wrongly infer from Emilsson’s “internal and external activity”). 
 
90
 Neither word occurs in Plato, hence their highly probable Aristotelian derivation. Both terms are often 
translated with “actuality” (see note 102 on translating some Aristotelian terms). 
 
91
 The spectrum of activity is rather wide, ranging from, say, a person’s ordinary walking (De 
interpretatione 23a4–11, Physics V.228a12–17, On the Generation of Animals II.736b22–25) to the 
eternal unhindered thinking of the Prime Mover (Metaphysics XII.1071b19–20, 1072b726–27). 
 
92
 See for example De interpretatione 19a9, 23a4–11, Physics III.201a9–15, Metaphysics IX.1048a25–b5. 
 
93
 Cf. Physics III.201b5–13, 202a15–16, De anima II.417a6–9, 419a9–11, Metaphysics IX.1047a30, 
1050a22–23. 
 
94
 See De anima II.417a21–b9, 412a22–28; cf. Nicomachean Ethics I.1098a5–7. 
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external prevents it) is in fact also a kind of potentiality, traditionally referred to as 
“active potentiality,” a “heightened state”95 to be distinguished from the more basic 
potentiality of someone who, being of the appropriate sort of genus and matter (τὸ γένος 
τοιοῦτον καὶ ἡ ὕλη96), is in the position of being able to learn to perform a given activity 
(in our example, to speak Greek) but has not learned it (yet). 
Admittedly, the actuality of the Aristotelian Prime Mover, that is, the activity of 
self-thinking, ought to be of the second (Aristotelian) kind, and permanently so.
97
 If one 
concedes Aristotle’s reasoning in Metaphysics XII, this is not too difficult to maintain, 
since the way in which his God moves the heavens is by its being their final cause, or the 
highest object of love.
98
 In our next chapter we will see that, in spite of certain 
differences, this is also the case of the Plotinian One, which in the Enneads is called the 
“most loved” (ἐρασμιώτατον).99 But unlike Aristotle’s Prime Mover, whose activity is 
wholly self-contained and whose causality is strictly final, the One appears to have both a 
double activity and a double causality. The double causality in question is on the one 
hand final and, on the other, efficient (see my last observation in this subsection). As for 
                                                 
95
 I borrow the expression from Brentano (1975, 37), who uses it in a slightly different context. Thomas 
Aquinas, commenting on Aristotle’s treatment of the potential and the actual in De anima, already hinted 
at the idea that the relation of first to second actuality is one of potency to act (Thomas Aquinas, 
Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima II.1.18). 
 
96
 Aristotle, De anima II.417a27; cf. 412b18–b3, where in the example of vision, the faculty of sight (ὄψις) 
is distinguished from actual seeing (ὅρασις) not only conceptually but also terminologically. 
 
97
 See Metaphysics XII.1071b19–22, 1072a23–26; cf. the difficult passage on active or agent intellect in De 
anima III.430a10–25. 
 
98
 See Aristotle, Metaphysics XII.1072a26–b3; 1072b2–3 in particular: “the final cause [...] moves by being 
an object of love” (τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα [...] κινεῖ δὴ ὡς ἐρώμενον). Cf. De anima III.433a27–28. 
 
99
 VI.7 [38] 32.25, 33.14. 
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its double activity,
100
 the One (and in fact, every being whatsoever
101
) is said to 
possess an ἐνέργεια which, much like that of the Aristotelian God, is self-contained, and 
another which, proceeding of necessity from the One, generates something other than the 
One.
102
 
It appears then that while from a lexical point of view the Aristotelian derivation 
of the Principle of Double Activity may seem probable, from a conceptual standpoint no 
strict parallel can be drawn between Aristotle’s two entelechies and Plotinus’ two 
activities. This is so because Aristotle’s first actuality is a kind of potentiality, whereas 
there is nothing potential in the Aristotelian sense in either activity of the One. It may be 
objected, first, that Plotinus himself refers to the One with the term δύναμις, as when he 
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 The expression “double activity” is explicitly found at II.9 [33] 8.22 (ἐνέργειαν... διττήν) and at VI.2 
[43] 22.29 (ἐνέργειαι διτταί). 
 
101
 See the opening paragraphs of Section 3.3 below. 
 
102
 Gerson (1994, 23) writes about the Aristotelian God: “To have activity outside itself would be to allow a 
wedge between what the principle is in itself and what it does outside itself. Such a wedge would require 
that the former be in potency to the latter.” He goes on to state that “Plotinus combines the Aristotelian 
distinction of act and potency with the distinction of first and second actuality in a most remarkable 
way.” This could be misleading if we took it to imply that Plotinus introduces potentiality in the One 
(something which Gerson does not do, to be sure) and if we failed to consider that, as I already pointed 
out, the Aristotelian distinction between first and second actuality already contains an explicit reference 
to potency in Aristotle himself. Thus, as ARMSTRONG (V, 212 note 2) remarks, the distinction between 
two actualities applies only to human minds, which exercise the activity of thinking only intermittently; it 
does not apply to the divine Nous, which is eternally active and actual. Therefore, for Aristotle the human 
soul is itself a first actuality distinct from the particular activities it is engaged in at the level of the 
composite (activities which amount to the second actuality), but since the soul does not exist separately 
from the composite, it must always be engaged in some one of these activities (see Gerson 1990, 308 
note 70). For this reason the distinction of first and second actuality as outlined in De anima II.412a11–
413a3 cannot apply to the One strictly (see Plotinus V.6 [24] 6.5–12). The One’s second activity, 
therefore, is not something that takes place within the One, or something added to it, but an activity 
which, while springing of necessity from the One, gives rise to something that is not identical with it, and 
for this reason the One can be said to possess not only final but also efficient causality. The First Mover, 
by contrast, cannot be an efficient cause because its causality is never directed outwards (cf. Lloyd 1976, 
147–148; Gerson 1994, 24; Bussanich 1999, 48); that is, the Aristotelian God lacks the activity from the 
essence, whence I take it that for Aristotle it is not the case that everything perfect is productive of 
something other than itself (cf. notes 180 and 181 below). 
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calls it the “power of all things” (V.4 [7] 2.38: δύναμις πάντων103), or a power that is 
“unspeakable” (IV.8 [6] 6.12: ἀφάτου), “infinitely great” (V.3 [49] 16.2: ἀμήχανος104), 
“endless in depth” (VI.5 [23] 12.5: βυσσόθεν ἄπειρον105), and “standing on its own” 
(VI.6 [34] 8.10–11: ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς βεβῶσαν). Secondly, in Aristotle the first ἐντελέχεια is 
sometimes equated with “habit” (ἕξις106), a notion that would seem less fraught with the 
danger of introducing potentiality in the Principle and so, after all, adequate to serve as 
the background of the Principle of Double Activity. 
Neither objection stands however, since, in the first place, the notion of δύναμις at 
work in the expressions from the Enneads I just quoted is not the Aristotelian one of 
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 On the One as δύναμις πάντων see also III.8 [30] 10.1, V.1 [10] 7.9–10, V.3 [49] 15.33, V.4 [7] 1.36, 
V.5 [32] 11, 12.38–39, VI.7 [38] 32.31, VI.8 [39] 9.44, VI.9 [9] 5.36–37, 6.7–8. 
 
104
 On ἀμήχανος (V.3 [49] 16.2) as meaning “infinitely great,” see LSJ A.II.3, s.v. (cf. also SP, s.v.). Here 
are some of the translations listed in the section of the Bibliography titled “Plotinus.” Ficino: 
“inextimabilem”; Bouillet: “inépuisable”; H. F. Müller: “unermessliche”; as usual creatively, MacKenna 
(maintained in MacKenna and Page): “immeasurably fruitful”; Bréhier: “immense”; Harder: 
“unerschöpfliche”; Cilento: “infaticabile”; ARMSTRONG: “overwhelming”; IGAL: “imponente”; Faggin: 
“inesauribile”; Ham (2000): “prodigieuse.” 
 
105
 On the power of the One as ἄπειρον (boundless or infinite) see V.5 [32] 10.22–23, 11.1–5; VI.5 [23] 
4.13–14. The power of the One is ἄπειρον, however, not in the pejorative sense of an imperfect 
scatteredness, as in the case of lower matter (see note 329 below), but in the sense that the One is that 
which imparts form and determination while itself remaining beyond all form and determination. 
 
106
 Aristotle, De anima II.412a21–28 (where the word used is ἔχειν, the verbal cognate of ἕξις), 417b9–16; 
cf. also Nicomachean Ethics I.1098b33–1099a3 and Eudemian Ethics II.1218b35–36, 1219a6. I am not 
dogmatically committed to the traditional rendering of ἕξις with “habit,” an obvious heir to the less 
obscure (in Latin; cf. Sachs 2001, 183) habitus. However, I am mildly reluctant to embrace (or at least to 
give unqualified preference to) such creative translations of it as “active condition,” found in Sachs’ 
versions of Aristotle’s De anima (Sachs 2001) and Nicomachean Ethics (Sachs 2002). My reluctance 
springs from the fact that, without a good explanation (which Sachs does provide, to be sure, in his 
introductory essay to the Ethics: Sachs 2002, xi–xvii), to my (non-native English speaker’s) ears 
translations of this sort remain at least as impenetrable as (though arguably less misleading than) the old 
“habit” and the more recent “state” and “condition.” Moreover, while it is true that by itself the English 
“habit” is in all likeness misleading as a rendering of ἕξις, it is also true that for Aristotle “habituation” 
remains central to the constitution of ἕξις in the Nicomachean Ethics. A similar reluctance on my part 
applies to other terms, such as δύναμις (Sachs 2001, 184: “potency (not potentiality)”) and, less mildly, 
ἐνέργεια (Sachs 2002: “being-at-work”) and ἐντελέχεια (Sachs 2001: “being-at-work-staying-itself”); in 
the cases of ἐνέργεια and ἐντελέχεια, Sachs’ renderings may even give the (misguided) impression that 
the two words share the same root in Greek. 
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potentiality and (temporary) lack of actualization.
107
 In fact, not only is δύναμις 
banned altogether from the One (as it is from the Aristotelian Prime Mover), but it is 
thoroughly refashioned to mean infinity of power.
108
 And secondly, as Hadot remarks in 
connection with some texts of Marius Victorinus and of Porphyry,
109
 although it is true 
that in Aristotle there is a definite tie between first ἐντελέχεια and ἕξις, “the Aristotelian 
habitus is but an analogue of the [Plotinian] first activity. Even if this first activity is 
known as an active power, it is not itself a habitus.”110 If a conceptual analogue of 
Plotinian δύναμις, which here appears to coincide with first activity,111 is to be found, it 
                                                 
107
 Needless to say, Plotinus’ refashioning of the meaning of δύναμις does not mean that he is unaware of 
the ways in which Aristotle uses the term to mean a (yet) unfulfilled ἐνέργεια, as is clear from several 
passages in the Enneads (e.g., III.8 [30] 11.2, V.3 [49] 7.17–18, and especially II.5 [25], the treatise on 
the potential and the actual). On δύναμις in Plato and on a comparison between the Platonic and the 
Aristotelian usage of the term, see Souilhé (1919, respectively 71–168 with the appended Tableau 
Récapitulatif, and 169–190); see also note 115 below. 
 
108
 See particularly VI.9 [9] 6 and VI.5 [23] 11; cf. V.5 [32] 6.14–15 (ἄπλετον φύσιν). Lloyd (1955, 145) 
rightly points out that “power” was the primary meaning of δύναμις not only before Plotinus, but well 
before Aristotle (cf. Souilhé 1919, 1–70). What Aristotle did is to distinguish between two main senses of 
the term: that of active power and that of possibility (potentiality), with the latter being dependent on the 
former (see Metaphysics V.1019a15–1019b15). Aristotle probably turned to the notion of ἐνέργεια as 
more apt to express the nature of the Unmoved Mover, from which all potentiality is excluded. When 
Plotinus employs the notion of δύναμις in reference the One, he does not reverse the Aristotelian order 
nor does he merely rename Aristotele’s divine ἐνέργεια. As Lloyd (1955, 146) writes, “Aristotle’s 
ἐνέργεια was complete in itself: Plotinus’ δύναμις is always accompanied by a δύναμις or ἐνέργεια 
ποιητική.” This ἐνέργεια ποιητική is neither Aristotelian potentiality, which would imply lack, nor 
Aristotelian pure ἐνέργεια, which is not ποιητική at all. For a different use of δύναμις in the context of 
the discussion on lower matter see note 334 below. 
 
109
 Hadot (1968, I, 228–230; see also 335 note 6). Victorinus’ text in question is Against Arius III.5.1 (= PL 
8, 1102b); the texts of Porphyry are Ad Gaurum 33.14, 52.6, 12–15. 
 
110
 Hadot (1968, I, 228 note 4): “L’habitus aristotélicien n’est qu’analogue à l’acte premier. Même si cet 
acte premier est conçu comme une puissance active, il n’est pas lui-même un habitus.” 
 
111
 Sometimes Plotinus equates the δύναμις of a thing to what elsewhere he calls its ἐνέργεια, as when he 
applies the Principle of Double Activity to soul, but the language he uses is that of δύναμις rather than of 
ἐνέργεια (IV.3 [27] 10.29 ad fin.; cf. II.9 [33] 8.22–26, V.1 [10] 6.45). See the opening paragraphs of 
Section 3.3 below. 
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would lie less in the Aristotelian than in the Stoic notion of ἕξις.112 Chrysippus, for 
example, speaks of ἕξις as a principle of both cohesion113 and specification114 of any 
given thing: ἕξις is a thing’s substantial character from which result certain specific 
effects external to the thing. Plotinus’ Principle of Double Activity seems to presuppose a 
distinction like the Stoic one between a thing’s ἕξις and the effects deriving from it. 
Unlike Aristotelian δύναμις (and unlike Aristotelian ἕξις, which for the most part can be 
understood as a form of actualization presupposing potentiality
115
), Stoic ἕξις is not 
                                                 
112
 Cf. Hadot (1968, I, 225–239). 
 
113
 SVF II, 540.172.1–2 (= Cleomedes, Circular Motions of Heavenly Bodies I.1.10.27–28): ἕξιν γὰρ ἔχειν 
τὴν συνέχουσαν αὐτὴν [viz., οὐσίαν] καὶ συντηροῦσαν. Cf. also SVF II, 473.155.29–30 (= Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, On Mixture 216.14); SVF II, 477.157.6–8 (= Alexander of Aphrodisias, De anima Mantissa 
139.30). 
 
114
 SVF II, 449.147.38–43 (= Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantiis 43: Moralia XIII.1053f); SVF II, 
612.187.3 (= Philo, De aeternitate mundi 17, VI.99.16). In these passages ἕξις as a specifying principle is 
equated to the substantive quality of each thing and is mentioned in connection with such realities as the 
hardness of iron, the thickness of stone, the whiteness of silver, and the inner fire of charcoal. 
 
115
 I take it that this is how Hadot (1968 I, 228 note 4) understands Aristotelian ἕξις. If so, he is certainly 
right in the case of virtue (ἀρετή) as presented in the Nicomachean Ethics (e.g., I.1103a9–10, 
II.1106a10–12, b36, III.1114b26–27, VI.1143b24–25). However, it would seem that the usage of ἕξις in 
Aristotle cannot be reduced to this meaning. For instance, in his analysis of vision Aristotle calls light 
(φῶς) “the activity of the transparent qua transparent [ἐνέργεια τοῦ διαφανοῦς ᾗ διαφανές]” (De anima 
II.418b9–10), which is made such or is actualized as transparent by fire (De anima II.418b14–15, 
419a24–25); and he adds: “light appears to be the contrary of darkness [ἐναντίον... τῷ σκότει]; but 
darkness is a privation of that state from the transparent [στέρησις τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἐκ διαφανοῦς], so 
that evidently light is its presence [παρουσία]” (De anima II.418b18–20, my translation). Rutten (1956, 
103) quotes these passages in connection with Plotinus’ Principle of Double Activity (as expressed at 
IV.5 [29] 7.13–17) and understands the interior activity of the Aristotelian fire as the Plotinian activity of 
the essence, and the action by which fire actualizes the transparent as the activity from the essence. The 
obvious difference between the two sets of activities in Aristotle and in Plotinus is the fact that in 
Aristotle the transparent pre-exists fire, albeit unactualized, while in Plotinus the very existence of the 
derived reality constitutes the activity from the essence. (One might wonder what an unactualized 
transparent would be, but certainly it is not nothing and it still would not be nothing if there were no fire 
to actualize it qua transparent.) Perhaps the Aristotelian derivation of the Principle of Double Activity 
could have been supported through a reference to the passage on passive and active intellect in De anima 
III.5, where Aristotle compares the active intellect (ποιητικόν) to “a kind of state, such as light [ὡς ἕξις 
τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς]” (De anima III.430a15). In this text there is no question of unactualized potency: ἕξις 
appears to be identified with pure ἐνέργεια. This passage and the history of its interpretation, however, 
are so complex that this reference alone would hardly suffice to support an Aristotelian meaning of ἕξις 
as the plausible source of Plotinian δύναμις (here equated to ἐνέργεια τῆς οὐσίας). Moreover, as I 
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possibility or (yet) unachieved actuality, but active power irradiating externally 
according to the nature of the thing, a power through which the nature of the thing may 
also become known. 
There is little doubt that a detour through the Stoic concept of ἕξις is useful to 
clarify Plotinus’ understanding of δύναμις.116 But a plausible antecedent of the notion of 
an active power irradiating externally as the nature of the thing can be found even before 
the Stoics, more specifically in Plotinus’ main source of inspiration: Plato. In fact, this 
notion is not only already present in Plato, but the term used to indicate it is also our main 
suspect: δύναμις.117 As Souilhé has showed, the Platonic δύναμις belonging to a thing is 
both active and passive, for on the one hand it reveals the nature of a given thing by 
irradiating that thing’s peculiar trait outwardly, while on the other it shows that that thing 
can be acted upon by some things and resist some others. In a word, as Souilhé puts it, 
δύναμις is for each thing “at the same time principle of knowledge and principle of 
                                                                                                                                                 
remarked above (note 108), Aristotle’s pure ἐνέργεια is wholly self-contained, whereas Plotinian δύναμις 
is always productive of something other than itself. Hence the plausibility of considering Stoic along 
Aristotelian influence on Plotinus concerning this point, and, I surmise, the correctness of Hadot’s 
critique of Rutten (1956, 101) for failing to recognize this. In any event, even if Hadot is right in taking 
Stoic ἕξις as a plausible source of the Plotinian Principle of Double Activity, one should not forget (i) the 
analogical character of Plotinus’ discourse and (ii) the materialism that distinguishes the Stoic from the 
Plotinian outlook (cf. note 146). 
 
116
 For a more detailed account of the Plotinian appropriation of the Stoic notion of ἕξις see Narbonne 
(2001a, 58–87, especially 72–79). 
 
117
 Plato uses the noun δύναμις (and the related verb δύνασθαι) in this acceptation in relation to a number of 
things, for instance the four elements (Philebus 29b8, Timaeus 32c8), intelligence (Philebus 31a2), the 
moist (Philebus 32a1), drugs and Socrates’ famed charm to make the soul healthy (Charmides 156b2–3), 
soda and other similarly pungent substances (Timaeus 66a1), acidity and salinity of blood in rotting 
vessels (Timaeus 82e6), the congealing power of fibers (Timaeus 85d6). In particular, at Republic 
VI.509b9–10 the Good is said to be beyond οὐσία by transcending it “in dignity and power [πρεσβείᾳ καὶ 
δυνάμει].” Here too, as in the other passages I just cited, the meaning of δύναμις is clearly not that of 
Aristotelian potentiality. Cf. Souilhé (1919, 150–152) for further references. 
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diversity.”118 Taken in this sense, δύναμις can apply to everything in the Plotinian 
universe, except the One, whose power is a pure outflow that excludes all affection 
(παθεῖν). If a Platonic antecedent of properly henologic δύναμις must be found, perhaps 
one may quote Republic VI.507c6–508c2, where the maker of the senses fashioned eyes 
and colors (i.e., the proper object of sight) with “the power to see and to be seen”;119 and 
yet in order to actually have sight a third thing is needed, namely light, without which the 
eyes remain blind and the colors unseen. But light, an illustration of the Good (the One in 
Plotinus), causes sight and visibility while itself remaining unseen, or seen only in a most 
peculiar way (see my reading of Republic VI.508b9–10 at pages 68–71). In other words, 
light gives to the eye the power to see, and to colors, the power to be seen. Light itself, 
however, neither sees nor is seen, for it is the more fundamental δύναμις which is not 
seen directly but divined, as it were, through that which it makes possible while itself 
never being identical with anything which it makes possible. If this interpretation is not 
too far-fetched, perhaps the meaning of the Plotinian δύναμις πάντων might also be 
clarified with reference to Plato.
120
 
Further, one will notice—my second observation—that in the texts from the 
Enneads I quoted at the outset of this subsection Plotinus says that the One’s activity τῆς 
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 Souilhé (1919, 149): “En un mot, elle est à la fois principe de connaissance et principe de diversité.” See 
Sophist 247d8–e4 (a text absent from the Index fontium of both HS1 and HS2), where Plato has the 
stranger suggest to the materialists “that things that are are nothing but power” ([e3] τὰ ὄντα [4] ὡς ἔστιν 
οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις), and that δύναμις is to be understood as ability to act (ποιεῖν) on something or 
to be acted upon (παθεῖν), even if minimally, by something (cf. also Phaedrus 270b4–9, Theaetetus 
156a5–7). For a useful discussion of these passages and those cited in the previous note see Cornford 
(1957, 234–239). 
 
119
 Plato, Republic VI.507c7–8: τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμιν. 
 
120
 Emilsson (2007, 52–68) offers a useful survey of possible sources of the Principle of Double Activity in 
Plato and Aristotle. 
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οὐσίας is prior to its activity ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας. This priority should not be understood as 
chronological but rather as one of being and power (see note 33 above). Thus, while it 
would be true to say that for Plotinus there never was nor will there ever be a time in 
which the One’s (nor, for that matter, Intellect’s and Soul’s) activity from the essence did 
not exist, it is likewise true to say that this activity depends, for its being, on a more 
fundamental activity, the activity of the essence, as its necessary condition.
121
 This 
dependence is non-reciprocal, for the activity of the essence is the very being of the thing 
in question,
122
 that which abides
123
 unchanged even while generating something other 
than itself. 
My third observation regards the necessity of the activity from the essence.
124
 
This would seem to contradict the priority I just claimed for the activity of the essence 
over the activity from the essence; for if the latter is connected to the former of necessity, 
in what sense is the activity of the essence independent of that from the essence? Let us 
remind ourselves that the immediate subject of our questioning is the One, although 
analogous questions could be asked of Intellect, Soul, and even sensible things. How 
could the One be the One if Nous (or rather, intelligible matter, as we shall see in 
Subsection 3.3.1) were not to spring from it as its second activity? Qua One, the One 
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 Cf. II.9 [33] 8.22–26, III.5 [50] 3.3 ff., IV.3 [27] 10.32 ad fin. (on which I briefly comment in the 
opening two paragraphs of Section 3.3), IV.5 [29] 7.17–23, V.1 [10] 3.6–10, V.2 [11] 1.13–18, V.3 [49] 
7.19 ad fin., VI.2 [43] 22.26–33. Cf. Appendix B on what I take to be the meaning of necessity in this 
context. 
 
122
 See VI.8 [39] 4.28, 7.46–54, 12.22–25. 
 
123
 Notice the insistent use of the verb μένειν (to remain, to abide) in V.4 [7] 2.26–37 and V.1 [10] 6.25–39, 
cited above in the body of the text; cf. III.4 [15] 1.1. See also the references in note 185 below. 
  
124
 Here too notice the insistent use of the terms indicating necessity (δεῖ, ἀνάγκη) in V.4 [7] 2.26–37 and 
V.1 [10] 6.25–39, quoted above. Cf. Appendix B note 1 below for further references. 
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must generate intelligible matter. Are we then to presuppose a necessitating force 
prior to the One? If so, would the One truly be the Principle? Or are we to say that the 
distinction between first and second activity is merely conceptual?
125
 
The key to these questions, the answers to which are all negative in the Enneads, 
lies in the appropriate grasp of the Plotinian meaning of necessity. When we say that the 
whole of reality springs of necessity from a single source, what necessity means in this 
statement is not external determination,
126
 but a superior kind of freedom, one in which 
the burden of deliberation and choice is absent and in which activity takes place as a 
matter of pure spontaneity.
127
 The One, therefore, cannot be other than what it is, not 
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 According to Rutten (1956, 104–105) this is Aristotle’s position in Physics III.202b6–8 and De 
generatione et corruptione I.324a9–11, where the distinction between the action of the mover and that of 
the moved is only conceptual. For Plotinus, by contrast, the activity from the essence is really distinct 
from the activity of the essence. 
 
126
 External determination for Plotinus can be of three kinds (VI.8 [39] 9.6–13): violence (βία), such as 
forced action and motion of which Aristotle speaks (Physics VIII.254b13, Metaphysics V.1015a26–b3, 
Nicomachean Ethics III.1110a1–4); chance (τύχη), such as happening to be courageous in times of war 
(VI.8 [39] 5.8–10; cf. VI.8 [39] 7.11–15); and necessity (ἀνάγκη), which counters the activity of reason, 
such as an artisan’s dependence on the nature of the material with which he is working (cf. Plato, 
Timaeus 46d1–e6, 47e3–48a5; see Plotinus VI.8 [39] 10; see also note 131 below). But since the One, in 
its activity, depends on nothing external to it, none of these three types of determination can possibly 
apply to it (see Gerson 1990, 219–220 for a more elaborate exposition of this point). 
 
127
 Combès (1969, 322) puts it sharply: “La nécessité est le détour que la liberté s’impose pour se poser soi-
même radicalement.” Cf. Rist (1967, 137–138). Plotinus, consistently with his principle that the ἀρχή of 
something differs from that of which it is ἀρχή (see note 134 below for references) calls the One, not 
free, but the maker of freedom (ἐλευθεροποιὸν: VI.8 [39] 12.19). Narbonne (2001a, 37–38) calls the 
freedom of the Plotinian One a freedom of necessity, as opposed to a freedom of contingence. He links 
the freedom of necessity to the Scholastic notion of libertas spontaneitatis (e.g., in the XVI century 
Spanish Jesuit Luis de Molina: Molina 1876), in which only one course of action is open but at the same 
time the agent’s assent and desire are required to pursue it. The libertas spontaneitatis is fruitfully 
contrasted with the notion of libertas indifferentiae, in which the agent is indifferently open to two or 
more courses of action (I was unable to find the precise expressions “libertas spontaneitatis” and “libertas 
indifferentiae” in Molina 1876, although the corresponding concepts are there). One could also compare 
the freedom of the One in Plotinus with the “happy necessity [nécessité hereuse]” which Leibniz 
attributes to divine nature (Théodicée 374 = Leibniz 1875–1890, VI, 338). Leibniz, however, denies that 
a genuine indifference is freedom at all (Théodicée 302–303 = Leibniz 1875–1890, VI, 296–297); in fact, 
he states that it is impossible (De libertate = Leibniz 1840, II, 669). See also the useful discussion by 
Ousager (2004, 165–170). 
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because it is constrained, but because, prior to all deliberation and choice in the 
ordinary sense of these terms, it is in possession, as it were, of a stable grasp of the best 
course of action and of an unwavering will and power to bring it about; indeed, on 
Plotinus’ view, it is bringing it about ab aeterno.128 We may refer to this condition, 
beyond both ordinary freedom and ordinary necessity, as either henologic freedom or 
henologic necessity.
129
 The illustrations given by Plotinus (fire, snow, and smell) may 
help to clarify the point. Fire, for example: in its double activity, since fire is heat, it heats 
of necessity what is within its reach, based on its intensity. If fire did not make things hot, 
it would cease to be fire.
130
 This fact implies no external determination but flows as a 
matter of course from the nature of fire. Nor does this fact imply that the nature of fire 
depends on the observation that we perceive some things as hot; quite the contrary, from 
                                                 
128
 In this sense, therefore, although all deliberation is denied to the One (III.2 [47] 1, V.8 [31] 7), the One 
is said to have will (βούλησις: see VI.8 [39] 13.1–9, 51) and even choice (αἵρεσις: VI.8 [39] 13.51). 
Granted, this is not the ordinary experience of willing and choice, and yet one will admit that it is neither 
coercion, nor chance, nor ordinary necessity. Analogously, Plotinus explicitly says that the One does not 
think, and yet he is unwilling to call it unthinking (ἀνόητον: III.8 [30] 9.15); instead, he tentatively 
attributes to it introspection (κατανόησις: V.4 [7] 2.17), forethought (προνοεῖν: V.3 [49] 10.43), and 
super-thought (ὑπερνόησις: VI.8 [39] 16.32). See also note 165 below. 
 
129
 It is true that, as Gerson (1990, 309 note 83) notes, Plotinus uses such terms as ἐχρῆν and ἔδει to 
indicate the necessity proper to the One in contrast with ordinary necessity, labeled ἀνάγκη (VI.8 [39] 
9.13–15). This distinction, if intended to be technical, is not in use in the passages on the Principle of 
Double Activity which I cited earlier (V.4 [7] 2.26–37 and V.1 [10] 6.25–39). Cf. again Appendix B note 
1. 
 
130
 The term “fire” (πῦρ) indicates the ordinary phenomenon of fire with which we are familiar only 
derivatively. Thus, the fire I experienced, say, in my youth at summer-camp is not itself the activity of 
fire’s essence, but one image of that heat itself—the fire beyond, Fire itself (VI.7 [38] 11.47, 48: 
ἐπέκεινα πῦρ, αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ), or universal fire (IV.8 [6] 3.19: τοῦ παντὸς πυρὸς)—of which all such fires 
are manifestations. We should again remind ourselves of the metaphorical character of the element of fire 
as used in this context. Fire is carefully chosen among sensible phenomena as an illustration for what 
Plotinus takes to be its closeness to the incorporeal (I.6 [1] 3.21–22; cf. Plotinus’ remarks on the 
incorporeal activity of the luminous body at IV.5 [29] 6–7, on which see Armstrong 1940, 54–58). For an 
account of how fire fits in Plotinus’ cosmology see II.1 [40] 7 and the commentaries by Dufour (2003, 
145–156) and Wilberding (2006, 208–224); a helpful diagram on this can be found in IGAL (I, 356–357 
note 45). 
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the fact that we observe that some things are hot which under different circumstances 
can be cold, we may infer that there exists a source of heat which, in terms of heating 
power, is prior to and independent of the things being heated.
131
 
This leads me to my fourth and last observation on the texts taken as evidence of 
the Principle of Double Activity, a point which here I will only introduce while leaving 
its positive development to the next section. Prior to Plotinus, the likeness between cause 
(αἰτία, αἴτιον) and effect was conceived of primarily as likeness in kind132 (as the likeness 
between an oak tree and an acorn, for example). But the One is not itself a kind
133
 and, 
qua Principle (ἀρχή), it must be different from what derives from it.134 Therefore, it may 
be asked what it is exactly that the One causes in its “products.” Gerson argues that what 
                                                 
131
 Once again, it can hardly be overemphasized that the images Plotinus uses to exemplify the double 
activity of the One should not be taken literally. As illustrations, they evocatively indicate, rather than 
plainly express, the double activity of the One. More importantly, the type of necessity at work in the 
phenomena that are the focus of these illustrations obviously differ from the kind of will, choice and 
freedom that Plotinus attributes to the One (see note 126 above). The limitations of these metaphors, 
however, are not merely negative, for in their failure to express precisely the dynamism at work in the 
Principle, they positively point at the discontinuity between the One and everything else derived from it. 
In fact, although there is no distinction of first and second ἐνέργεια within the One, what derives from the 
One exists as really distinct from it (hence Plotinus’ insistence on the transcendence of the One and the 
impossibility of a pantheistic interpretation of his metaphysics; see Gerson 1990, 214–215). Conversely, 
these illustrations, however imperfect, also point at the continuity between the One and everything else 
because, despite the differences between the double activity of the Principle and the activities of 
everything else, the One’s first ἐνέργεια (i.e., its very being) is said to be known through its second 
ἐνέργεια (V.1 [10] 7.42–48, V.3 [49] 14.7). This means that the nature of the cause can be glimpsed 
through observation of its effects (cf. note 74 above). 
 
132
 See for instance Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I.72a29–30, Metaphysics II.993b23–31. In these passages 
Aristotle’s emphasis is on the idea that the true cause of a feature (e.g., heat) shared by a number of 
things (e.g., hot bodies) is what possesses that particular feature in the highest degree (e.g., fire). Cf. 
Alexander of Aphrodisias, De anima Mantissa 111.19–22. 
 
133
 See VI.2 [43] 9.5–10. 
 
134
 See V.3 [49] 15.37–39, VI.9 [9] 6.54–55. Cf. Plato, Greater Hippias 297a2–3; Aristotle, Movement of 
Animals 700a35–b3. 
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the One causes is the very being or existence of the thing.
135
 In this sense, the One is 
understood as (a very peculiar kind of) efficient cause, while essential or formal causality 
is reserved to the second hypostasis: Intellect.
136
 As already anticipated, I will follow 
Pigler’s suggestion that what the One causes in its “products” is love for the One, which 
in the Principle is the One’s love of itself and the One as itself love (see Section 3.3 
below). 
3.2.4 The Status of the Hypostases 
Before I turn to analyze how the Principle of Double Activity operates in terms of 
eros in each hypostasis, a few remarks are in place about the status of the hypostases 
themselves, which in the technical sense for Plotinus are neither more nor less than 
three.
137
 The question can be asked briefly in terms of the alternative outlined by Wallis: 
Are the hypostases separate independent entities (the static view), or are they levels or 
degrees of reality present in us as states of consciousness (the dynamic view)?
138
 The 
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 Gerson (1994, 237–238 note 53). The texts Plotinus cites in support of his views are: I.6 [1] 7.11–12, 
V.1 [10] 4.29–30, 5.5, VI.7 [38] 42.11, and VI.8 [39] 14.29. See notes 46–47 above. 
 
136
 Gerson (1994, 34–35, 58). I hinted that the efficient causality of the One is of a peculiar kind because 
what the One causes, in this perspective, is not the initiation of change in some pre-existing material (at 
least not directly), as might be the case for an Aristotelian efficient cause or principle of motion (ἡ αρχὴ 
τῆς κινήσεως, or ἡ αρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς, or τὸ τῆς μεταβολῆς αἴτιον: see Physics II.194b29–32, De 
generatione et corruptione II.335b9–336a12, Parts of Animals I.639b12–13, Metaphysics I.983a30, 
984a26; cf. also Plato, Philebus 26e1–27b3), but existence itself. 
 
137
 II.9 [33] 1.12–16, 2.1. On the meaning and use of the term ὑπόστασις see pages 133–139 above. On 
what Plotinus takes to be the antecedents of his doctrine of the hypostases, see V.1 [10] 8–9. On Nature 
or the World-Soul as, not a fourth hypostasis, but as part of the hypostasis soul see note 294. On matter 
as a “desire of existence [ὑποστάσεως ἔφεσις]” (III.6 [26] 7.9) rather than itself a hypostasis, see pages 
276–278 below. 
 
138
 Wallis (1995, 5). Wallis traces the problem back to the German scholarship of the first half of the 
twentieth century, most notably O. P. Kristeller and H.-R. Schwyzer, in which the two sides of the 
alternative (i.e., hypostases as objectively existing realities versus hypostases as states of consciousness) 
are respectively named gegenständlich (the static view) and aktuell (the dynamic view). 
 
  
193 
problem is similar to the one faced by Plato in his postulation of Forms as 
explanatory entities (on which see the opening pages of Subsection 1.5.2), and is central 
not only to Plotinus but also to the Platonists after him. 
Interestingly, Plotinus seems to endorse both sides of the alternative. The clearest 
statement of his position is probably V.1 [10] 10.5–10:139 
[5] And just as in nature there are these three of which we have spoken 
[viz., the One, Nous, and Soul], [6] so we ought to think that they are 
present also in ourselves. I do not mean [7] in [ourselves as] beings of the 
sense world—for these three are separate [from the things of sense]—but 
in [ourselves as] [8] beings outside of the realm of sense perception; 
“outside” here is used in the same sense as [9] those realities are also said 
to be “outside” the whole universe: so the corresponding realities in man 
[are said to be outside], [10] as Plato speaks of the “inner man.”140 
 
As Atkinson points out, the distinction between “in nature” and “in ourselves” can 
be traced back to Plato, and the view that the human soul is a microcosm reflecting the 
structure of the whole of reality is already found in Democritus.
141
 But unlike 
Democritus, for whom the analogy seems to be one of proportionality between the 
functions of the beings in the world and those of the parts of the soul,
142
 Plotinus thinks 
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 V.1 [10] 10.5–10: [5] Ὥσπερ δὲ ἐν τῇ φύσει τριττὰ ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ εἰρημένα, [6] οὕτω χρὴ νομίζειν καὶ 
παρ’ ἡμῖν ταῦτα εἶναι. Λέγω δὲ οὐκ [7] ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς—χωριστὰ γὰρ ταῦτα—ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τοῖς [8] 
αἰσθητῶν ἔξω, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τὸ ἔξω ὥσπερ [9] κἀκεῖνα τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ ἔξω· οὕτω καὶ τὰ 
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, [10] οἷον λέγει Πλάτων τὸν εἴσω ἄνθρωπον. See also I.1 [53] 8.1–12, III.9 [13] 2.4–5 (“a 
man must prepare [παρασκευάζειν] himself so that the principles in him [τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἐν αὐτῷ] are also 
his goals [τέλη]); cf. III.5 [50] 3.25–27, V.3 [49] 3, VI.5 [23] 1.16–21, VI.9 [9] 2.35–36. 
 
140
 See Plato, Republic IX.589a7–b1: ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος; cf. Enneads I.1 [53] 10.15 (see also 7.18–23): τοῦ 
ἔνδον ἀνθρώπου; III.2 [47] 15.59: τῷ ἔξω Σωκράτει. 
 
141
 Atkinson (1983, 212–213). See Plato, Phaedo 102e5; Democritus (DK 68.B34 = David, Prolegomena to 
Philosophy 38.14–21; Galen, De usu partium corporis humani III.10, III.241). 
 
142
 I.e., just as in the world there are beings whose function is to rule, so there is a part that has the same 
ruling function within the soul. 
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that the two higher hypostases are in us, or in soul, actually.
143
 At the same time, he 
claims that all things are in the One, or rather that the One possesses all things 
beforehand.
144
 Is Plotinus contradicting himself here? Or is he simply refashioning, 
without solving it, the dilemma concerning the status of the hypostases? 
Unless the hypothesis of self-contradiction is taken seriously, evidently the 
modalities of containment in Plotinus’ two statements (i.e., the containment of Soul, 
Nous, and the One in the human soul, and that of all things in the One) must differ. In the 
former case, to say that the human soul contains the three hypostases obviously does not 
mean that it encompasses them spatially, but rather that it has the power to turn toward 
them and grow in likeness to them.
145
 This process of assimilation corresponds to the 
erotic movement of ascent or return of the soul to the Principle with which I will deal in 
the next chapter. What is important to notice at this stage of our discussion is that the 
soul’s capability of rising to the level of higher hypostases does not imply any lack or 
potentiality (in the main Aristotelian sense of the term) in those hypostases. On the 
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 See III.4 [15] 3.22 (ἐσμὲν ἕκαστος κόσμος νοητός), 6.22; cf. I.1 [53] 13.7–8. Whatever the reasons, the 
view of the hypostases as states of consciousness seems to be more agreeable to modern sensibility than a 
view of them as separate independent entities. The work of recent commentators appears to confirm this 
observation: so, for instance, Wallis (1995, 5–6, 72–73, 82) stresses what he calls an illusionist or 
telescopic view of the hypostases, while Hadot (1993, chapter 2; 2002, 163–168) refers to them as levels 
of self or of consciousness, and Lloyd (1990, 126) calls them “experiences” and “types of 
consciousness.” Gerson (1994, 227 note 3) rightly warns us that such (relatively anachronistic) 
qualifications of the hypostases should not be taken to imply that for Plotinus the hypostases exist in 
thought alone or depend on thought for their existence. I will have the occasion to return to this point in 
the next chapter (see Subsection 4.3.2). 
 
144
 V.3 [49] 15.24–33; see especially lines 29–30, where the One is said to have all things by possessing 
them beforehand (τῷ πρότερον ἔχειν αὐτά). Similarly, Plotinus says that the One is everywhere 
(πανταχοῦ) and nowhere (οὐδαμοῦ) (VI.8 [39] 16.1–2, V.5 [32] 8.23–24; cf. also III.9 [13] 4), a principle 
to which Bussanich (1999, 47, 50) refers to as the principle of immanence. 
 
145
 Cf. Brunner (1973, 93–94), Atkinson (1983, 214). 
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contrary, if a potentiality can be observed in any given thing, the priority of its 
corresponding actuality must be maintained (e.g., in the case of the human soul, the 
actuality of that to which this soul has the ability to become assimilated, namely the Soul-
Hypostasis, Intellect and, ultimately, the One), a principle to which we might refer as the 
Principle of Prior Actuality.
146
 This principle is not prerogative of Plotinus, but common 
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 I modify the expression from Lloyd (1976, 147), who speaks of a “prior actuality principle.” Under the 
heading of “prior actuality principle,” Bussanich (1999, 46–48) includes several elements which I 
distributed differently in my exposition in this and the next chapter (e.g., the Principle of Superiority of 
Cause to Effect and the Principle of Affinity). This should not worry us excessively, since all these 
“principles” or elements are mutually implicating in Plotinian metaphysics. In the Principle of Prior 
Actuality, the priority of actuality over potentiality (in the Aristotelian sense) refers not, say, to my actual 
knowledge of Pythagoras’ theorem at twelve years of age as opposed to my potential knowledge of it at 
four, in which instance potentiality is obviously prior to actuality, at least chronologically (Aristotelian 
examples of this kind of priority of potentiality over actuality are found in On Sense and Sensibilia 
438b21–23 and On the Generation of Animals II.736b15, 741b7–15). The priority I have in mind refers 
rather to the priority that actuality has over potentiality when the latter is generally understood as a 
principle of change. In this sense, it is standard Aristotelian doctrine, found chiefly in Metaphysics 
IX.1049b4–1051a3 (cf. also De interpretatione 23a21–6, Metaphysics VII.1032a22–25). Aristotle’s main 
reasons to uphold this position can be reduced to the three senses in which he understands the priority of 
the actual over the potential in this passage from the Metaphysics, namely: (i) priority of formula or of 
expression in speech (λόγος), so that that of which the potential is potential is conceptually prior to the 
potentiality for it (e.g., capability of building is understood on the basis of a previous knowledge of 
actual building; cf. De anima II.415a19–20); (ii) priority of time (χρόνος), as in the priority of the actual 
individual of a given species over a potential individual of the same species (although the individual 
itself is potential before being actual, e.g. as a seed before being a tree; cf. On the Heavens III.302a7–9); 
(iii.1) most importantly, priority of being (οὐσία), since things that are posterior in the process of 
becoming (γένεσις) must already possess the form (εἶδος) of what they are becoming (e.g., a boy must 
already possess the form of man), toward which they move as toward an end (τέλος); (iii.2) priority of 
being can be understood also in a stronger sense (κυριωτέρως), namely as the priority of eternal (ἀίδια) 
over perishable (φθαρτά) beings, for the former exist only actually and of necessity (hence excluding all 
potentiality) in their perpetual activity. We find Plotinus formally subscribing to this doctrine chiefly in 
the sense of (iii.1) and (iii.2), though disagreeing with Aristotle on assigning the place of ἀρχή of all to 
Intellect, for example at IV.7 [2] 8
3
.13–20, where he also makes clear that the act of a given potency is in 
a way the desideratum (ὀρεκτὸν) of that potency (cf. also V.9 [5] 4.4–10). Plotinus uses the Principle of 
Prior Actuality in different contexts, for instance in his critique of Stoic materialism at VI.1 [42] 26.1–17. 
There he contends that when the Stoics argue that matter is a principle (ἀρχή), they make the potential 
prior to the actual (on ὕλη as ἀρχή in Stoicism see: Zeno, in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent 
Philosophers VII.134, and in Philo, De providentia I.22 = SVF I, 85; Cleanthes, in Hermias, Irrisio 
Gentilium Philosophorum 14 = SVF I, 495; Crysippus, respectively in Sextus Empiricus, Against the 
Mathematicians IX.11 and X.312 = SVF II, 301 and 309, and in Alexander of Aphrodisia, On Mixture 
224.32 = SVF II, 310). But this cannot be, argues Plotinus, for the potential, qua potential, is posterior to 
the actual because it is unable to initiate change; in order for change to occur, the potential needs 
something actual prior to it. Thus, in the case of matter something actual is required to turn matter into a 
body by initiating motion. Plotinus applies the Principle of Prior Actuality to the hypostases, or real 
beings, as he states that a higher hypostasis (e.g., the One) is actual prior to a lower one (e.g., Nous), and 
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possession of the whole (Neo-) Platonic tradition.
147
 
In the second statement, by contrast, to say that the One possesses all things 
beforehand does not mean that it itself is or can become all things, a view that would 
amount to pantheism and would also introduce potentiality and multiplicity in the 
Principle. As we saw earlier (Subsection 3.2.1), the One abides unchanging in its being, 
which is identical with the activity of the essence. All things are in the One or belong to it 
in the radical sense that it is by the One’s infinite power that they exist and are sustained 
in their being. And as Plotinus explains, this modality of containment of things in the One 
prevents them from being in it as already actually distinct (ὡς μὴ διακεκριμένα: V.3 [49] 
15.31); if this were not the case, multiplicity would again creep into the Principle. How, 
then, does the differentiation of everything derived from the One take place? It occurs 
first at the second level (i.e., at the level of Nous as the ever actually unified multiplicity 
of the intelligibles, and the duality of thinker and object of thought), and then by recourse 
to the second level, in the sense that by lovingly contemplating Nous, soul diachronically 
makes explicit, unfolds, or temporalizes, the perfectly unified multiplicity of the second 
                                                                                                                                                 
conversely that a lower hypostasis is potentially a higher one (see VI.7 [38] 17.6–8). 
 
147
 See Lloyd (1976). Plotinus warns us that the One is called cause (αἴτιον) only from the perspective of 
the causatum, and that we should not predicate causality of the One taken by itself (VI.9 [9] 3.49–54). 
And yet, it is on the basis of the Principle of Prior Actuality that a certain continuity between the One as 
cause and the whole of reality as its effect can be maintained. However, this continuity should not be 
understood as continuity of genus and species, but as one of decreasing levels of unity or, in terms of 
love, of increasing distance between one’s relatively unified identity and the aim of one’s eros (i.e., the 
perfect erotic identity which is the One; see Subsection 3.3.1). Thus, when the Principle of Prior 
Actuality is applied to the individual soul’s eros for the One, we might have to say that the soul’s desire 
for the One and its capability to ascend to it presupposes necessarily that there exist a One to begin with, 
or that the One be prior in being to the soul’s desire for it. On the objection that desire for the One is 
fictional and can be reduced to some other (allegedly more basic) form of desire, see the second part of 
note 50 in Chapter Four. 
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hypostasis (see Appendix D below).
148
 
In light of what I just said, it should be clear that the hypostases cannot be 
understood as monads, completely sealed off from each other. If this were the case, 
neither procession nor return could ever take place. On the contrary, the Plotinian 
metaphysics of the hypostases is one that entails both discontinuity and continuity or, if 
one prefers, both transcendence and immanence of the Principle in the fabric of reality. It 
entails discontinuity insofar as the hypostases are really distinct, independent, or separate 
from one another. But it also entails continuity to the extent that this separation is not to 
be understood spatially, but as a priority of being, or the ability of higher hypostases to 
subsist independently of the lower ones while leaving a “trace” (ἴχνος; see Appendix C) 
of themselves in their products. 
Now the fil rouge of both discontinuity and continuity, or this trace of the 
Principle in all that is derived from it, is eros. The self-love of the One, which is identical 
with its primary activity or activity of the essence, is at the source of all procession: it is 
the infinite power by which the One engenders all things. This eros, which in the One is 
perfect self-identity, is found in derivative form (that is, not as perfect self-identity, but as 
a love of the Principle with different degrees of intensity depending on the level of unity 
of the thing possessing it) in everything else. Thus, while the One as self-love abides in 
its perfect self-identity independently of all that is derived from it (what amounts to 
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 The perfectly unified multiplicity of the second hypostasis is itself the result of its even higher form of 
contemplation of the Principle, a contemplation whereby Nous constitutes itself as a hypostasis by 
attempting to replicate the unqualifiedly perfect unity of the One. The source of the differentiation of 
things is, again, the universal eros for the One, now played out either as noetic contemplation of the One 
or as psychic contemplation of Nous as each subordinate hypostasis attempts to replicate the unity of the 
hypostasis immediately above it. See Subsection 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 below. 
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discontinuity or transcendence), its infinite power is naturally propagated in the 
derived hypostases in the form of love for the One (what amounts to continuity or 
immanence). Eros, therefore, is both the source of all procession and the desire for the 
Principle whereby each lower hypostasis constitutes itself as a really distinct entity by 
lovingly contemplating the hypostases immediately above it.
149
 The rest of the present 
chapter is an attempt to analyze this dyanamic. 
3.3 Henologic Eros: 
The One, Perfect Erotic Self-identity and Source of all Love 
The importance of the topic of the One’s eros may be better appreciated on the 
backdrop of the Principle of Double Activity introduced earlier in Subsection 3.2.3. 
Commenting on V.1 [10] 6.31, Atkinson writes that “[t]he application of the double-
activity theory to πάντα τὰ ὄντα is something of an exaggeration.”150 He grounds his 
judgment in the carefulness with which Plotinus chooses the illustrations of his principle 
(i.e., fire, snow, and smell, whose peculiar properties, according to Atkinson, are steeped 
in the Greek philosophical tradition and are particularly apt to clarify what Plotinus had 
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 PIGLER (20) puts it well as she states the central thesis of her work: “Les « tres hypostases », l’Un, 
l’Intelligence, l’Âme, ne sont pas trois réalité distinctes et séparées, trois ‘monades’. Certes, si l’Un est 
bien le Principe absolu dont tout dérive, il y a cependant continuité, et non discontinuité, dans la 
procession des hypostases. Cette continuité est assurée, telle est notre thèse, par le processus dynamique 
de l’Érôs de l’Un comme puissance originelle se transmettant dans ses dérivés.” 
 
150
 Atkinson (1983, 145). Atkinson does admit that Plotinus treats the theory “like a natural law” and 
rightly adds that if this is the case, “then there is no need to worry about whether the producer produces 
intentionally, since what happens is governed by natural necessity.” However, as I pointed out earlier 
(pages 188–191 and 202–204), the contrast between intentionality and necessity can hardly be applied to 
the generation of a hypostasis from a higher hypostasis, in particular the generation Nous from the One, 
since the lack of intentionality in the One does not preclude freedom absolutely, while henologic 
necessity, though analogous to the necessity of a natural law, is identical with henologic freedom. 
 
  
199 
in mind).
151
 While Atkinson’s observations about the properties of fire, snow, and 
smell are correct, I think that the universal application of the theory is crucial to 
understand Plotinus’ metaphysics. For this reason, I consider it to be genuine Plotinian 
doctrine.
152
 As we read at IV.3 [27] 10.32–35,153 the Principle of Double Activity extends 
even to inanimate things:
154
 
[32] In soulless things the one [power], [33] so to speak, lies asleep in 
them, while the [power] from them [which goes out] to something else 
[34] consists in making like themselves that which is capable of being 
affected: and this is of course common [35] to all that exists, to bring 
things to likeness with themselves. 
 
The same point is made in the lines that follow this passage (35–42) with respect 
to soul, whose proper activity is life and is understood as the attempt to bring inanimate 
bodies to likeness with itself by giving them life. Moreover, by Plotinus’ own admission, 
the axiom of the One’s self-diffusiveness introduced in the closing lines of V.1 [10] 1 
(and which I will discuss in Subsection 3.3.2) seems to make sense on the premise that 
what is true of everything else (i.e., that each thing has an activity from the essence) is 
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 Thus, for Atkinson (1983, 57–58) it would be Aristotle’s use of fire to illustrate causal processes 
(Metaphysics II.993b25–26) and such descriptions of it as an “excess of heat [ὑπερβολὴ θερμότητος]” 
(De generatione et corruptione II.330b26) and as a “boiling over [ζέσις]” (Metereologica 340b23) that 
influenced Plotinus’ description of the genesis of Intellect from the One at V.2 [11] 1.8–9. Similarly, it 
would be the (pseudo-)Aristotelian description of smell as an incorporeal “effluvium [ἀπόρροια]” 
(Problems XII.906a24, 907b6–7, 24) that suited Plotinus’ theory (Atkinson 1983, 146). 
 
152
 Notice, however, that to claim that the principle is universal does not mean that Plotinus’ illustrations of 
the Principle of Double Activity are not metaphorical. In fact, the principle, while universal, applies 
differently to different things, in particular eternal and temporal beings. See Gerson (1994, 23–24). 
 
153
 IV.3 [27] 10.32–35: [32] Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀψύχοις τὸ μὲν [ἐξ αὐτῶν] [33] οἷον εὕδει κείμενον ἐν αὐτοῖς, τὸ 
δὲ < ἐξ αὐτῶν > εἰς ἄλλο [34] ὁμοιῶσαι πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ παθεῖν δυνάμενον· καὶ κοινὸν δὴ [35] τοῦτο παντὶ 
τῷ ὄντι εἰς ὁμοίωσιν ἑαυτῷ ἄγειν. I accept von Kleist’s transposition of ἐξ αὐτῶν at line 33 from line 32 
(von Kleist 1883, 40 note 3), as with HS2 (HS1: “fortasse recte”), followed by ARMSTRONG, IGAL; contra 
Bréhier (1924–1938), Harder (1956–1971; Beutler and Theiler: “nicht nötig”), Cilento (1947–1949). 
 
154
 The emphasis in the translation is mine. See also IV.5 [29] 7.17: ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων. 
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true a fortiori of the One. Thus, if what Plotinus has in mind at IV.3 [27] 10.32–42 is 
his own Principle of Double Activity, as I think is the case,
155
 there seems to be little 
doubt that he considers this doctrine a universal fact. This fact is important because as I 
noticed earlier (Subsection 3.1.4) it allows for a certain continuity in Plotinian 
metaphysics. 
The questions I will address in relation to IV.3 [27] 10.32–35, the passage 
suggesting the universality of the Principle of Double Activity, are the following. First 
(Subsection 3.3.1), what kind of love is henologic eros? Second (3.3.2), what does the 
One give? And third, what does it mean to be brought to likeness with the One? The 
treatment of the third question will be postponed until the next chapter (see particularly 
Subsection 4.3.1 and Section 4.6). 
3.3.1 The One: Beloved, Love, and Love of Itself 
The central contention of this subsection is that the activity of the essence, that is, 
the very being of the One or its unqualified unity, can be explained in terms of eros. My 
main goal is to show that eros is what regulates the dynamic of procession of all reality 
from the Principle. The key texts are VI.8 [39] 15.1–2 and 16.12–14: 
[1] And it [i.e., the One], that same self, is beloved and love and love of 
itself, [2] in that it is beautiful only from itself and in itself.
156
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 The only explicit support I was able to find for this is PIGLER (77 note 1). 
 
156
 VI.8 [39] 15.1–2: [1] Καὶ ἐράσμιον καὶ ἔρως ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ αὐτοῦ ἔρως, [2] ἅτε οὐκ ἄλλως καλὸς ἢ παρ’ 
αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ (ARMSTRONG’s translation, slightly modified). In this context the expression “self-
love” has no moral connotations. On Beauty as lovable, cf. I.6 [1] 5.20–21, VI.7 [38] 22, 32.30, V.8 [31] 
9.41. Other than VI.8 [39] 15.1–2 and 16.12–14, I am not aware of any other place in the Enneads in 
which Plotinus refers to the One as love of itself, or self-love. Leroux (1990, 344) gives III.5 [50] 5.6 as a 
parallel, but this line reads Πλάτωνι τὸν Ἔρωτα, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ κόσμου τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ: either I fail to detect 
the connection he is suggesting or else the reference contains a typographical error which I am unable to 
emend. 
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[12] But it [i.e., the One] turns, so to speak, [13] toward its own interior, 
as if filled with love for itself, pure radiance, [14] itself being identical 
with that which it loved.
157
 
 
In this section I will be concerned only with the descriptions of the One as love 
and love of itself. I will deal with the description of the One as beloved in the next 
chapter (see particularly Section 4.2). 
One will notice that in 15.1 the term for love is ἔρως, whereas in 16.13–14 it is 
ἀγαπάω, the verbal cognate of ἀγάπη. Nygren’s celebrated distinction (and alleged 
radical incommensurability) between eros and agape immediately comes to mind, with 
eros standing for merely appetitive desire, and agape indicating a purely donative kind of 
love.
158
 If we take this distinction at face value, we may be led to think that in these 
passages Plotinus is talking about two different types of love. However, as Rist rightly 
points out, Nygren is only statistically correct but ultimately too reductive in his 
judgment, since both Plato and Plotinus “have refined their concept of love in the 
direction of Ἀγάπη to a degree far greater than Nygren has admitted.”159 Be that as it 
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 VI.8 [39] 16.12–14: [12] ὁ δ’ εἰς τὸ εἴσω οἷον [13] φέρεται αὐτοῦ οἷον ἑαυτὸν ἀγαπήσας, αὐγὴν 
καθαράν [14] αὐτὸς ὢν τοῦτο, ὅπερ ἠγάπησε. Here is the translation by Leroux (1990, ad loc.), which I 
loosely followed: “Lui, il se tourne pour ainsi dire au-dedans de Lui-même, comme rempli d’amour pour 
Lui-même et pour sa pure lumière, Lui-même identique à ce qu’Il a aimé.” “Pure light” is an allusion to 
Phaedrus 250c4 (see also Phaedrus 250b1–c1 and 250c8–e1, which I cited at page 59, and Republic 
VI.507b–509c), and as ARMSTRONG (V, 280 note 1) remarks, for Plotinus this light is identical with the 
Good (see I.6 [1] 5.21–22, V.1 [10] 6.27–30, VI.7 [38] 21–22, 36.20–26, VI.9 [9] 4.11, 20; but see also 
note 160 below). 
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 Nygren (1953). The uncompromising tone of Nygren’s position deserves to be cited verbatim: “There 
cannot actually be any doubt that Eros and Agape belong originally to two entirely separate spiritual 
worlds, between which no direct communication is possible” (Nygren 1953, 31). “Agape stands 
alongside, not above, the heavenly Eros; the difference between them is not one of degree but of kind. 
There is no way, not even that of sublimation, that leads over from Eros to Agape” (Nygren 1953, 52). 
 
159
 Rist (1964, 85); see also Rist (1964, 79–87, 98–99; 1970b). Leroux (1990, 356) and PIGLER (28 note 1) 
agree with Rist, who points at two possible reasons for Plotinus’ lack of consideration for ἀγάπη as a 
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may, what I think can be safely inferred from the texts cited above is that the referent 
of both ἔρως and ἀγαπάω is the same love of the One. Moreover, in 15.1 the absence of 
οἷον, Plotinus’ quasi-technical term for analogical predication (see note 81 above), 
indicates that this passage is the locus where the author of the Enneads comes closest to 
speaking about the One positively without recourse to analogy.
160
 
The broader context of both passages is treatise VI.8 [39] On Free Will and the 
Will of the One. As the title given to this treatise by Porphyry suggests, the goal of the 
work is to clarify in what sense the One can be attributed a will or freedom. We saw 
earlier (Subsection 3.1.3) that within the One freedom is identical with necessity. 
                                                                                                                                                 
technical term for henologic love: (i) in order to stay clear of Christian echoes, and (ii) because in the 
context of the soul’s ascent to the One the two kinds of love, eros and agape, “are not entirely separated” 
(Rist 1964, 99). My goal is not to consider Nygren’s thesis explicitly and in detail, nor is it to deny that, 
understood in Nygren’s terms, eros and agape may be useful labels to discriminate between two distinct 
phenomena or two radically different types of experience. All I want to emphasize here, very generally, 
is that the distinction between eros and agape, while in itself meaningful, is likely to be an exaggeration 
when applied to Plotinus, as well as to Plato, as it is persuasively argued by Markus (1955) and 
Armstrong (1961); see also Osborne (1994, 222–226), who criticizes Vlastos (1973) along with Nygren 
(1953), and R. E. Allen (1991, 95–98), whose criticism is directed more specifically to Karl Barth’s echo 
of Nygren’s distinction in his Kirchliche Dogmatik (Barth 1962, 173–193). Finally, Burnaby (1938, 
especially 15–21, 92–100, 121–126, 162–168) shows how the clear-cut distinction between eros and 
agape fails to apply to the theology of Augustine, who is influenced by Platonism and rejects the radical 
discontinuity between the two forms of love postulated by Nygren (cf. previous note). 
 
160
 It will be objected that at VI.8 [39] 16.12–13 Plotinus uses the terms οἷον twice in close succession (and 
once more on line 15). I think the reason for this is that in the context of these lines Plotinus is trying to 
say something positive about the One, but by a detour through Nous (VI.8 [39] 16.15–16: οἷον νοῦς), 
hence the need of the analogical qualifier (cf. PIGLER 28). Following Leroux (1992; see also 1990, 347), 
PIGLER (40–41 and in particular 72–73) identifies the description of the One as light with the description 
of it as love and argues that light is more than just a metaphor (see notes 79 and 157 above for references 
to images of light in the Enneads). I am not fully persuaded by this, since these descriptions, though 
identified, remain different. Thus, one cannot help asking which description is primary and why (or why 
not, if neither is primary). Is one description more literal than the other? If so, how, and why? Are these 
descriptions ultimately still metaphors? (On an aside, at I.7 [54] 1.24–28, as well as at V.1 [10] 6.28–30 
but unlike V.6 [24] 4.16–18, on which see note 278 below, the One is compared not to light, but to the 
sun, while light is said to be what comes from it and depends on it. At least in this instance, it seems 
impossible even to argue that light is said metaphorically of the One, for it is not said of the One at all; 
cf. pages 317–318 below.) For a concise treatment of the metaphor of light in Plotinus see Schroeder 
(1992, 24–39). 
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Empirical freedom, or the freedom that has deliberation and choice as its conditions 
and belongs properly to embodied rational souls, is a secondary type of freedom in the 
sense that it is not truly independent of the relative struggle that these conditions imply; it 
is a freedom that must always confront itself with the limitations within which it is set. 
The absence of these conditions and limitations does not entail the absence of freedom 
tout-court, but only the absence of that kind of freedom for which they are conditions and 
limitations. This means that a different type of freedom is at least conceivable, one that is 
independent of all conditions and limitations and which we could call primary or absolute 
freedom. This other freedom is identical with necessity in the sense that the being which 
is free primarily or absolutely cannot be other than it is and owes its very being to 
nothing but itself: this is freedom as pure, spontaneous self-positing or self-
determination. If freedom is to be attributed to the One at all, this is the kind of freedom 
that belongs to it, a freedom to which I accordingly refer to as henologic (cf. page 190 
above).
161
 
Now at the level of empirical freedom, such phenomena as deliberation and 
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 For excellent analyses of the topic see Leroux (1990, 23–123; 1999). The kind of freedom Plotinus 
attributes to the One (henologic freedom or necessity) does not seem to differ considerably from the kind 
of autonomy which Kant attributes to rational beings that are not subject to sensible inclinations 
(Neigungen). Similarly, in Plotinus what I referred to as empirical freedom, that is, the freedom of 
embodied rational souls, has a plausible Kantian counterpart in the condition of rational beings 
heteronomously determined by sensible inclinations (see Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals IV:432–448; Critique of Practical Reason V:33, 42–44). By contrast, henologic freedom differs 
both from the kind of paradoxical self-assertion one finds in some of Dostoevsky’s characters, for 
instance the fictitious author of the diary of Notes from Underground (Doestoevsky 2003, 229–351), and 
from the possibility of negative divine self-determination, actually rejected by God but still latent in God 
and reawakened by the first man, considered by Pareyson (1995, 235–292). It differs from the self-
assertion of the main character of Dostoevsky’s Notes because there the path of self-debasement this 
character choses is for him a way (perhaps the only way left) to assert himself as an individual, but this 
self-assertion remains a choice made as a reaction to a given situation, which as such is absent in the 
Plotinian One. Henologic freedom also differs from Pareyson’s idea of a rejected but latent negative 
divine self-determination in God simply because no such latency is ever to be found in the One. 
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choice, which necessarily accompany this kind of freedom,
162
 already point to the fact 
that as an empirically free being, I am not identical with the aim of my desire,
163
 indeed 
that deliberation and choice are some of the means by which I try to fill the gap that 
opens between me and my desideratum. Qua desirer, I am always set apart from that 
which I desire, always intentionally directed toward something that I am not, ever divided 
in what I merely conventionally call myself, never truly one. For the One the situation is 
different. Since no gap exists between that which it is and that which it desires, the 
Principle is identical with its desideratum: at once beloved, love, and love of itself. This 
is what makes the One different from everything that is derived from it: its absolute erotic 
self-identity.
164
 
What is obviously problematic in this way of speaking about the One is that its 
unqualified simplicity appears to be forfeited by reflexive expressions implying 
duality,
165
 although one might wonder, as already in the case of being and nothingness 
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 To be sure, I can defer the choice of my course of action to the tossing of a coin or some such device. 
This fact, however, would not invalidate my claim that deliberation and choice accompany empirical 
freedom necessarily, for although as the coin is tossed my action will be a matter of chance, the action is 
not ultimately the result of chance because it was still deliberation and choice that led me to the decision 
of deferring my course of action to the tossing of a coin. 
 
163
 The insight is a somewhat intensified version of Plato’s observation that one does not desire what one 
already has (Symposium 200a1–e6); an intensified version, that is: one does not desire what one is not. 
 
164
 On the One as desiring or needing nothing (or nothing other than itself), see for instance I.7 [54] 1.14–
15, III.8 [30] 11.23–25, III.9 [13] 9.4, VI.9 [9] 6.16–32. On everything other than the One desiring the 
One or the Good see I.7 [54] 1.22, V.6 [24] 5.18–19, VI.5 [23] 1.11–12; cf. also Chapter Four note 14. 
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 VI.8 [39] 15.1 (αὐτοῦ ἔρως), 16.13 (ἑαυτὸν ἀγαπήσας). For other reflexive expressions referring to the 
One see II.5 [25] 3.6 (ἐξιστάμενον ἑαυτοῦ: becoming separated from itself), V.4 [7] 2.16–17 
(διακριτικὸν ἑαυτοῦ: self-discerning; ἡ κατανόησις αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ: itself the thinking of itself), VI.5 [23] 
3.1–2 (οὐκ ἐξίσταται αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ: does not itself become separated from itself), VI.7 [38] 27.18 
(οἰκείωσις πρὸς αὐτοὺς: affinity with themselves; on οἰκείωσις see Hadot 1968, 290–291), VI.8 [39] 
13.21 (ἑαυτό τε θέλει: wants itself), 15.3 (τὸ συνεῖναι ἑαυτῷ: “self-presence,” as translated by MacKenna 
1917–1930, also in MacKenna and Page 1969), and most conspicuously 16.16 ad fin.. A reflexive way of 
speaking about the Principle can already be found in Aristotle’s description of the being of the First 
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(see note 70), whether our grammar permits another mode of expression. A related, 
though perhaps less obvious, problem is the fact that in Plotinus the genesis of each 
hypostasis is described as a folding or reversion (ἐπιστροφή) upon itself and toward the 
hypostasis that generated it, an idea to which we might conveniently refer to as the 
Principle of Reversion.
166
 In terms that will become clearer in the next three subsections, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mover at Metaphysics XII.1074b34–35: “its thought is thought of thought” (ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως 
νόησις). But unlike Aristotle’s Mover, the Plotinian One is free of all noetic determination. In fact, since 
even at the level of Nous thought minimally implies both the duality of thinker and object of thought, and 
the multiplicity of the latter (i.e., the plurality of the Ideas; see note 218 below), the One qua unqualified 
unity must be above or other than thought (see III.8 [30] 11.12–13, V.6 [24] 5, VI.7 [38] 41.16–22, VI.9 
[9] 6.50–55). And yet, despite this, Plotinus does attribute to the One a kind of wakefulness (οἷον 
ἐγρήγορσις: VI.8 [39] 16.31), self-consciousness (συναίσθησιν, συναισθήσει: V.1 [10] 7.12, V.4 [7] 
2.18), introspection (κατανόησις: V.4 [7] 2.17), and a kind of intelligence that is other than the activity of 
Nous (νοήσει ἑτέρως: V.4 [7] 2.18; cf. note 128 above). These attributions do not introduce noetic 
determinations into the Principle, however. Their purpose in Plotinus, I believe, is twofold. First, to deter 
his readers from assuming that since the One is beyond thought, it must be inert and ought to lack 
thinking (see III.8 [30] 9.15: ἀνόητον) and self-awareness in the way, say, a stone lacks them; if this were 
the case, the One would be no different than pre-cosmic matter (see Subsection 3.4.3). Second, to avoid 
the risk of introducing an unqualified discontinuity between the Principle and all derived reality; as I 
mentioned earlier, the radical discontinuity between the One and everything derived from it is tempered 
by the idea that the nature of the Principle is identical with its power (δύναμις) to engender all things, and 
so the One contains all things, including awareness and thought, within itself in advance, so to speak (cf. 
note 74). As for our being able to state positively what this means in regard to the One’s self-awareness, 
one ought to abandon discursive expression, and rather experience that formidable state first hand; but 
for this to be possible, one would have to have already reached the end of the ascent journey to the 
Principle and be unified with it (see Rist 1967, 51–52; on union with the One see Subsection 4.6.3). 
Leroux (1990, 357) rightly remarks about the language of reflexivity employed throughout VI.8 [39]: 
“Des expressions ne sont ici risquées que dans la claire conscience de leur transgression; elles ne 
sauraient être érigées en propositions métaphysique susceptibles d’être construites en contradiction avec 
d’autres. Ce sont en quelque sorte des fusées éclairantes qui s’éteignent dès que leur illumination a 
produit son effet” (cf. VI.9 [9] 6.49–52). 
 
166
 On the reversion of Nous toward the One and of Soul toward Nous, see respectively notes 214 and 270 
below. On ἐπιστροφή and related terms used, rather than in the sense of the Principle of Reversion, in the 
context of the soul’s ascent to the One, see my remarks in Subsection 4.4.2. It is important to point out 
that the Principle of Reversion does not apply to the One, but it is not in principle unthinkable for 
Plotinus to use the language of self-turning or reversion in speaking about the One, as he may be doing at 
V.1 [10] 6.17–18, 7.5–6 (see also all the references containing reflexive expressions in notes 53, 156 and 
166, and in the opening lines of the previous note). Notice that the passage at V.1 [10] 6.17 
(ἐπιστραφέντος ἀεὶ ἐκείνου πρὸς αὐτὸ) contains a textual crux. This line (much like V.1 [10] 7.5–6: Ἢ 
ὅτι τῇ ἐπιστροφῇ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἑώρα...) is problematic because ἐκείνου and αὐτὸ can be understood (i) as 
both referring to the One, or (ii) as referring to the One and Nous respectively (for a list of the supporters 
of each reading see the Addenda ad textum in HS1 397, updated by Atkinson 1983, 135; see Bussanich 
1988, 37–43 for a valuable account of the controversy). On philological grounds, Atkinson (1983, 135–
140) offers good reasons to accept (ii) as the more plausible reading. Yet I am not entirely persuaded that 
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the principle states that in constitutes itself as that particular hypostasis by erotically 
reverting upon itself and toward its generator, every hypostasis except the One (cf. note 
166) replicates the unity of its generator at its own level of existence.
167
 
We can tentatively settle the question of self-reversion by simply noticing that the 
self-turning of the lower hypostases and the self-turning of the One are the same only 
coincidentally. In fact, the turning upon itself of Nous and of Soul is simultaneously a 
movement toward the hypostasis immediately above each of them (i.e., the One and 
Intellect respectively).
168
 The same holds for the One, but with the important difference 
                                                                                                                                                 
philosophically (ii) is the necessary reading, and I believe that (i) may also be considered at least not 
completely implausible (although if this is the case, V.1 [10] 6.17 should not be taken as an instance of 
the Principle of Reversion). In light of such texts as VI.9 [9] 2.35–36 and VI.5 [23] 1.16–21 (cf. also VI.7 
[38] 27.18–22), (i) may also be true for Plotinus, although it is also true that probably he is not stating it 
explicitly at V.1 [10] 6.17. The fact remains, however, that if V.1 [10] 6.17 is about the generation of 
Intellect and (i) is what is meant, then the generation of Intellect remains unexplained (cf. Gerson 1994, 
244 note 12), and (ii) will be the more plausible interpretation. 
 
167
 Lloyd (1990, 127, 128), to whom I owe some of the references in this note, puts it well: “The theoretical 
function of reversion is to complete the reality of what has proceeded and so to give it an identity. [...] So 
the process is a process of self-determination; and it is supposed to be repeated analogously in every case 
of the production of a novel entity.” The general idea conveyed by the Principle of Reversion is stated at 
III.4 [15] 1.8–12, where Plotinus writes about the genesis of the inanimate or lifeless (ἄζων): “[8] Just as 
everything was produced before this [viz., the lifeless] was produced shapeless [ἀμόρφωτον], [9] but was 
formed by turning toward its producer [εἰδοποιεῖτο δὲ τῷ ἐπιστρέφεσθαι πρὸς τὸ γεννῆσαν] [10] and 
being, so to speak, reared to maturity by it, so here, too, that which is produced [11] is not any more a 
form of soul—for it is not alive—but absolute [12] indefiniteness [ἀοριστίαν... παντελῆ].” (This is one of 
the central, if controversial, texts about the generation of lower matter, on which see Subsection 3.4.3; cf. 
also IV.4 [28] 2.3–8). The same idea is clearly expressed also at V.2 [11] 1.10–11 in the context of the 
derivation of Nous from the One. In fact, the whole first chapter of V.2 [11] may be read as an 
anticipation of the cyclical process of constitution of reality which will receive a more scholastic 
formulation in later Neoplatonism in the triad of “abiding” or “rest” (μονή), “procession” (πρόοδος), and 
“reversion” (ἐπιστροφή) (see for instance Anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides XIV.21–26; 
Iamblichus, Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, fragment 53.20 = Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s 
Timaeus II, 215.523–24; Proclus, Elements of Theology 25–39, especially propositions 26, 30 and 31, 
Platonic Theology II.6.41–21–28, Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus I, 371.20–25; Damascius, De 
principiis 72–84, especially 75–78, II.123–137; Dionysius Areopagite, On Divine Names IV.9 = PG 3, 
705a; in the Latin milieu, cf. Marius Victorinus, Hymn to the Trinity III = PL 8, 1144a: “Status, 
progressio, regressus: o beata Trinitas”). What I have called the Principle of Reversion roughly coincides 
with the third stage of this triadic movement, ἐπιστροφή. For what I take to be a different meaning of 
ἐπιστροφή and related terms in the context of the soul’s ascent to the One, see Subsection 4.4.2. 
 
168
 As Plotinus himself points out with regard to Nous, “in turning to itself it turns to its principle” (VI.9 [9] 
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that the Principle has nothing above itself and therefore its turning upon itself does 
not imply a reference to a higher source as in the case of Intellect and Soul. As for the 
issue of reflexive expressions, what they are meant to accomplish, evidently, is not to 
point at an originary split in the Principle but rather to emphasize the self-contained 
character of henologic eros. Unlike anything else, the One aims at nothing outside of 
itself.
169
 In fact, within the One there is a strict coincidence between its being, its 
volition,
170
 and its life.
171
 
                                                                                                                                                 
2.35–36: εἰς αὐτὸν γὰρ ἐπιστρέφων εἰς ἀρχὴν ἐπιστρέφει). Lloyd (1990, 129) observes that “the function 
of reversion in fixing the identity of something otherwise indeterminate is incompatible with reversion to 
the cause and belongs only to self-reversion. This may have been insufficiently recognized by 
Neoplatonists, but they were not forced into a contradiction, so long as they recognized that the 
ascending reversion implied a prior self-reversion. They usually did.” For a treatment of the history and 
meaning of the expression “reversion upon itself” (ἐπιστροφὴ πρὸς ἑαυτόν), see Gerson (1997). 
 
169
 The same point is made by recourse to the language of vision at VI.8 [39] 16.18–21 (cf. also VI.7 [38] 
35, III.5 [50] 3.11–17). 
 
170
 See the concluding lines of the argument at VI.8 [39] 13.55–59: “[55] For if [56] its [viz., the One’s] 
will [βούλησις] comes from himself and is something like his own work [οἷον ἔργον], and this will [57] 
is the same as its existence [ὑποστάσει], then in this way it will have brought [58] itself into existence; so 
that it is not what it happened to be [ἔτυχέν], but what [59] it itself willed.” It is in this sense that the One 
is causa sui (see note 53 above). 
 
171
 In a seminal article Hadot (1960) argued that life (ζωή) constitutes, together with being and thought, one 
of the three characteristic determinations of the structure and genesis of the second hypostasis (see for 
instance VI.2 [43] 8.23–25, VI.7 [38] 13, 21.4–6, 17.14–25; cf. Plato, Sophist 248e6–249a3, Timaeus 
39e3–9; Aristotle, Metaphysics XII.1072b26), although as Cilento rightly remarked in the discussion 
following Hadot’s presentation (in Hadot 1960, 152–153), in a more ordinary sense life is a peculiarity of 
soul (so, for example, at VI.7 [38] 11.35, 43 the term ζωή appears to be used synonymously with ψυχή). 
But can life be attributed to the One at all? Plotinus would seem to deter us from doing so (see III.8 [30] 
10, VI.7 [38] 17). And yet, perhaps echoing Aristotle’s famous dictum about being (Metaphysics 
VII.1028a10: Τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς), Plotinus writes that “[18] [t]he term ‘life’ is used in many 
different senses [Πολλαχῶς], [19] distinguished according to the rank of the things to which it is applied, 
first, second and [20] so on...” (I.4 [46] 3.18–20). Thus, when he does attribute life to the One (VI.8 [39] 
7.51), we must understand that henologic life is of a different kind than that of Intellect and Soul: it must 
be a boundless, infinite and unoriginated life. Here again we find the principle according to which the 
cause must contain the effect eminently (see note 74), and so the One is life in the sense that it is the 
principle of life (III.8 [30] 9.38–39: ἀρχὴ ζωῆς), much like it is called eternal by reason of its being the 
principle of eternity (cf. Appendix D). PIGLER (37–44) calls the life of the One “archi-Vie” (arch-Life) 
and argues that it is identical with the One’s power and self-love. “C’est purquoi, si en l’Un il n’y a 
aucune distinction possible, puisqu’il est l’absolument simple, si en lui tout est strictemen équivalent, la 
lumière, le regard, la Vie, et si surtout tout culmine dans l’Amour que le Principe se porte à lui-même, 
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This self-identity does not amount to inertia, however. If it did, there would be 
no procession or derivation, and the Plotinian universe would be identical with the 
immobility of a single monad. The One’s simplicity is not sterile but is rather the 
simplicity of an infinite erotic power whose self-identity is productive of alterity or 
otherness. For this reason, I maintain, Plotinus found the term “love” and the reflexive 
expression “love of itself” apt to describe his conception of the Principle: because in the 
simplicity of its erotic δύναμις the possibility of otherness, which constitutes the main 
trait of the rest of reality, is already surmised (I will return to the notion of otherness in 
Subsection 3.4.1). 
But why and how is it that the One’s self-love is the source of all procession so 
that Plotinus calls the One “the power of all things” (III.8 [30] 10.1–2)? Why is self-love 
productive of otherness? And if, as I mentioned earlier in Subsection 3.2.3, the activity of 
the essence, which in this context amounts to the One’s love of itself, is really separated 
from, or other than, the activity from the essence, what does this otherness consist of? To 
put it somewhat differently, since the One is ineffable (cf. Subsection 3.2.2), how will we 
be able to affirm that it gives anything to what is derived from it if, qua ineffable, it 
cannot itself be attributed, or be said to possess, whatever it gives? And if the One is also 
the First, the absolutely prior, what will it have to give other than itself? But what does it 
mean for the Principle to give (of) itself? And what is the modality of this henologic 
giving? 
                                                                                                                                                 
alors la « conversion » du Premier vers lui-même exprime, plutôt qu’un mouvement, son indicible unité 
puisqu’elle se fait sans mouvement, l’Un étant absolument immobile, et sans que rien ne soit à voir 
puisque l’Un n’est pas à lui-même un objet” (PIGLER 41 note 2). 
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3.3.2 Superabundance and Its Modality: The One Gives What It Does not Have
172
 
The issue of henologic giving or donation is implicit in the understanding of the 
Principle in terms of an unqualifiedly simple (erotic) power which is identical with none 
of the things that are derived from it. In other words, the simplicity and the transcendence 
of the Principle would seem to preclude either the differentiation of reality, for qua 
simple the One contains none of the things derived from it—and if they are not in the 
Principle, where are they to be found?—or else the very possibility to conceive it as the 
Principle of all, for how can it be called the source of all things by utterly transcending 
them? 
A partial answer to these questions was hinted earlier when it was claimed that the 
nature of the One is such that by abiding in its own power the Principle virtually contains 
all things as effects while never actually becoming any of them (note 74) nor ever 
depending on, or being related to them in any way (note 18). Such claims remain 
unintelligible, however, unless the nature of the One is determined more precisely. I will 
argue that this determination can be accomplished in terms of eros, a word which, as we 
saw in the previous subsection, Plotinus uses to describe the very being of the Principle. 
More specifically, there are two different problems that a description of the nature of the 
One in erotic terms will help us to clarify. The first is the very productivity of the One, or 
why something whose nature is perfectly identical self-love should be generative of 
otherness. The second problem is the identity of the content of what, for lack of better 
terms, I will refer to as the One’s donation in the process of derivation of all reality from 
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 I borrow this formulation from a thought-provoking article by Jean-Louis Chrétien (1990, 259–274), Le 
Bien donne ce qu’il n’a pas. 
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it, namely: What does the One give? 
The question concerning the first production of otherness is central to Plotinus 
and to all Neoplatonic metaphysics. In the previous subsection, the nature or being of the 
One was described as love of itself, or self-love. But why should something whose nature 
is perfect erotic self-identity be productive of otherness? If the One is, or exists, and is 
unqualifiedly simple erotic self-identity, the fundamental question is not “Whence 
otherness or multiplicity?” but “Why otherness or multiplicity?”173 For the sake of 
brevity, the Plotinian answer to this interrogative will be concisely referred to as the 
Principle of Superabundance. Plotinus variously states it in several passages, of which the 
following three may be considered exemplary.
174
 The first passage is V.2 [11] 1.7–9 (full 
Greek text at note 202 below): 
[7] the One, perfect because it seeks [8] nothing, has nothing, and needs 
nothing, overflows [ὑπερερρύη], as it were [οἷον], and [9] its 
superabundance [τὸ ὑπερπλῆρες] makes something other than itself. 
 
And at V.3 [49] 16.1–5 Plotinus writes:175 
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 Thus, once the existence of the One is granted, the fundamental question of metaphysics, “Why is there 
something rather than nothing?”—variously asked, e.g. by Leibniz (Principes de la Nature et de la Grace 
7 = Leibniz 1875–1890, VI, 602; cf. also VII, 289), Schelling (Philosophie der Offenbarung, Vorl. 1 = 
Schelling 1856–1861, II.3, 7), and Bergson (1911, 275), and essentially reformulated by Heidegger 
(1959, 1, passim = Gesamtausgabe 40, 1–2, passim; 1998, 96, 289–290 = Gesamtausgabe 9, 122, 381–
382)—gives rise either to another question (i.e., “Why is there something else rather than merely the 
One?”) or to monism, even if as refined as Spinoza’s. Given his insistence on the transcendence of the 
Principle, Plotinus can hardly be called a monist, even less a pantheist (cf. Gilson 1952, 23–25, 35–37; 
Rist 1967, 213–228; Gerson 2004, 32–34), unless by “monism” one means that all reality derives from 
one single source (O’Meara 1993, 52) whose transcendence is maintained alongside the continuity 
generated by this source in the whole of reality (PIGLER 265). 
 
174
 The translations that follow are from ARMSTRONG, slightly modified. In particular, I translate the aorist 
participles at V.4 [7] 1.35, φθονῆσαν and ἀδυνατῆσαν, as irrealis, this idea being conveyed by ὥσπερ at 
the same line (cf. IGAL, ad loc.). 
 
175
 V.3 [49] 16.1–5: [1] Ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τι εἶναι τὸ μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον, ἀλλαχοῦ [2] εἴρηται, καὶ ὅλως, ὅτι 
δύναμίς ἐστι καὶ ἀμήχανος [3] δύναμις, καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων πιστωτέον, [4] ὅτι μηδέν 
ἐστι μηδὲ τῶν ἐσχάτων, ὃ μὴ δύναμιν εἰς τὸ [5] γεννᾶν ἔχει. The term “elsewhere” (ἀλλαχοῦ) on line 1 
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[1] It has been said elsewhere that there must be something after the First, [2] 
and in a general way that it is power, and overwhelming [3] power; and 
the point has also been made that this is to be believed on the evidence of 
all other things, [4] because there is nothing, even among the things on the 
lower level, which does not have power [5] to produce. 
 
Or again, at V.4 [7] 1.34–39:176 
[34] How then could the most perfect, the first [35] Good, remain in itself 
as if it grudged to give of itself or were impotent, [36] when it is the 
productive power of all things? How would it then still be the Principle? 
[37] Something must certainly come into being from it, if anything is to 
exist also [38] of the others which derive their being from it; for that it is 
from [39] it that they come is necessary.” 
 
The chief source of the Principle of Superabundance is Timaeus 29e1–3177 (see 
also the rest of the passages from Plato cited at the end of Subsection 1.5.5);
178
 and as in 
the Timaeus, the justification of the principle seems to be that the nature of goodness is 
                                                                                                                                                 
may refer to such extended passages as II.9 [33] 3, IV.8 [6] 6, and V.2 [11] 1, which are important 
parallels of all our texts on the Principle of Superabundance. Cf. also V.1 [10] 6, VI.7 [38] 32. 
 
176
 V.4 [7] 1.34–39: [34] Πῶς οὖν τὸ τελεώτατον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον [35] ἀγαθὸν ἐν αὑτῷ σταίη ὥσπερ 
φθονῆσαν ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἀδυνατῆσαν, [36] ἡ πάντων δύναμις; Πῶς δ’ ἂν ἔτι ἀρχὴ εἴη; [37] Δεῖ δή τι καὶ ἀπ’ 
αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι εἴπερ ἔσται τι καὶ [38] τῶν ἄλλων παρ’ αὐτοῦ γε ὑποστάντων ὑποστάντων· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ 
ἀπ’ [39] αὐτοῦ, ἀνάγκη. 
 
177
 Plotinus insists that the temporal origin of the world in the Timaeus myth should not be understood 
literally (see for instance III.2 [47] 1.20–26, IV.3 [27] 9.12–20, VI.7 [38] 6.1–9). In this, he is the heir of 
a tradition that goes back at least to the the early Academy (e.g., Speusippus, Xenocrates, and others: cf. 
Aristotle, On the Heavens I.279a32–280a2; Scholia in Aristotelis de Caelo 489a9–12 = C. A. Brandis, in 
Bekker 1831–1870, IV; Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens 304.3–6). 
 
178
 Lovejoy (1936, 50–55) called what I referred to as the Principle of Superabundance, Principle of 
Plenitude (cf. also Narbonne 2001a, 55–56). Whatever the name assigned to it might be, in later centuries 
this principle will develop into the tradition of the bonum diffusivum sui (see for instance Dionysius 
Areopagite, On Divine Names IV.31 = PG 3, 731b–c; Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I.q27.a5.arg2; 
Bonaventure, Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum I.d45.a2.q1. Cf. Trouillard 1955b, 78–79; 
Chrétien 1990, 259–260; Gerson 1994, 25; Corrigan 2005, 121–122). The reference to the Timaeus and 
the rest of the passages cited at the end of Subsection 1.5.5 (as well as Diotima’s claim about the work of 
eros as “giving birth in beauty” at Symposium 206b7–8; see Subsection 1.4.3) confirms that the Principle 
is older than Plotinus. The “self-” in “self-diffusiveness” (and the “sui” in “diffusivum sui”) should be 
understood in light of the remarks on reflexive expressions put forth in the previous subsection. 
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evidently diffusive of itself.
179
 Consistent with his idea that a glimpse into the cause 
can be caught through observation of its effects (see note 74), Plotinus argues his point by 
reference to “things on the lower level.” Any thing that has reached its perfection, 
maturity or completion (τέλεια) naturally generates something other than itself.180 To be 
or actually to exist implies productivity.
181
 A fortiori, that which exists as the most perfect 
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 Pace Cornford (1937, 34), who claims that all that Plato means when he calls the Demiurge ungrudging 
is that “the imperfection of the world is due to Necessity, not to the deliberate withholding of any 
excellence that it might possess,” and hence that one should not read in the passage unwarranted 
“importations of later theology.” The latter warning is admirable, but to claim, as Cornford (1937, 35) 
does, that the notion of an overflowing love would constitute one such importation not only in the 
Timaeus, but in Greek thought as a whole, seems at least excessive. Plotinus, for one, disproves this 
claim, even independently of the fact that Plotinian henologic eros and Christian love are not identical. 
Moreover, evidence of the kind of love Cornford claims to be absent in Greek thought can be found even 
in Plato, if implicitly and sporadically, for instance at Phaedrus 246d8–e1, 247a7, Republic II.378b–c, 
380c8–9, X.617e4–5, Laws IV.713d5–6, V.731d6–732a4, Timaeus 28c–29a, 37c6–8, and most of all 
29e1–3; see also Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VIII.1159a23–25. On this topic see Rist (1964, 30–34), 
to whom I owe most of the references to Plato in this note. 
 
180
 V.1 [10] 6.37–39; V.4 [7] 1.25–30; cf. Plato, Sophist 248a12. IGAL (I, 29–30) considers this idea the 
core of what I labeled Principle of Superabundance and thus call this principle “principio de la 
productividad de lo perfecto.” If, as I argued, the Principle of Superabundance is true of both animate and 
inanimate things, the notion of perfection is to be taken as indicating something more than merely sexual 
maturity, the focus of Diotima’s discourse on reproduction and immortality in the Lesser Mysteries of 
love (Symposium 206b1–209e4). 
 
181
 Heidegger (1988, 99–121, especially 106–109 = Gesamtausgabe 24, 140–171, especially 149–153) saw 
this when he explained that in antiquity and in the Middle Ages being or existing (Sein; esse and existere; 
εἶναι) was understood primarily as production (Herstellen) and presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit), 
actuality (Wirklichkeit) as actualization (Verwirklichung). I think that this thesis, however insightful, calls 
for at least two critical observations. First, I find its application to Aristotle (and perhaps even to Plato: 
cf. n. 12 above) at least questionable insofar as that which in Aristotle’s system is most truly actual (i.e., 
most truly being), namely the First Mover, is not itself truly productive (or if it is, it is so only by being 
the universal final cause, not by itself being the universal efficient cause; cf. pages 181, 188–191, and 
217–218 above, and Section 4.2). Heidegger’s thesis at first seems to fit better the Neoplatonic and 
Christian traditions than it does Aristotle. However (my second observation), although in Plotinus 
production, which in this context is synonymous with derivation, remains essential to the nature of being 
and actuality, it is already dependent on something which is not itself produced. Heidegger agrees with 
this, but he seems to read Greek ontology as saying without exception that this “something” which is 
already there prior to production is ὕλη or matter (Heidegger 1998, 115–116 = Gesamtausgabe 24, 163–
164). This generalization, I believe, cannot be applied at least to Plotinus and the Neoplatonists after him. 
In fact, if we are to take the Plotinian universe as a system of émanation intégral (see note 17 above), for 
Plotinus what is already there prior to production cannot be matter (for this is itself “produced” or 
derived from prior causes), but rather a more fundamental actuality, namely rest or self-abding (μένειν; 
cf. notes 123 and 185), which is the first activity (or activity of the essence) of a given hypostasis, and 
ultimately of the One. Thus, if Heidegger thinks that the pre-existence of matter as the stuff (Stoff, 
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is most perfectly productive. But again, no indigence in the One is presupposed in the 
procession: the Principle produces out of a necessary excess, hence not for the sake of a 
further end, and certainly not through external means. In this sense, the derivation of all 
things from the One implies no diminishment of power in the One and is closer to natural 
production and the production of logical and mathematical representations rather than to 
artistic production.
182
 
But in what sense is this most perfect productivity of the One erotic in nature? 
Fundamentally, it is erotic in the sense that the perfection of the One or its very being 
coincides with the One’s self-love; derivatively, in the sense that what overflows from the 
Principle bears the mark of the self-love of the One. When the self-love of the One is 
communicated to (or rather, as) what is other than the One, it becomes love for the One, 
hence no longer love of itself but love of the Principle qua other. (To explain how this 
happens specifically at the levels of Nous and soul, the second and third stage in the 
process of derivation of all things from the One, will be the goal of the next section.) 
Superabundance, therefore, is the necessary result of the perfection of the One’s 
erotic self-identity. But the Principle is the unqualifiedly simple. Even if this simplicity is 
the productive simplicity of an erotic power, what can the One possibly produce? What 
                                                                                                                                                 
Material) out of which production can take place belongs necessarily to the concept of production as the 
horizon of the ontological interpretation of being in Greek antiquity, his thesis is true of the Greek 
philosophical tradition (as well as of Gnosticism) only generally, for it ought to be modified to exclude at 
least Plotinus and the Neoplatonic tradition, particularly Proclus (see the closing paragraphs of 
Subsection 3.4.3), as well as the tradition of Christianity, in which the existence of matter clearly 
depends on prior causes. 
 
182
 Cf. Trouillard (1955b, 69–74). Some authors consider the undiminished character of the One’s mode of 
donation as itself a principle: the principle of undiminished giving (e.g., Rist 1964, 74; Wallis 1995, 62; 
Bussanich 1999, 47, 48–50; IGAL I, 30: “principio de donación sin merma”). I simply take it as an 
essential aspect of the Principle of Henologic Giving. 
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can it possibly give if, abiding in itself, other than what derives from it, and ineffable, 
it possesses nothing other than itself? We saw that Plotinus explains the emergence of 
things other than the One from the One by means of the Principle of Double Activity; in 
the example of fire: the heat of the essence of fire is naturally productive of a heat that 
leaves the essence of fire. A metaphor of this kind may lead us to think that the difference 
between the two types of heat is merely one of intensity. But this is not so for Plotinus; or 
rather, intensity is definitely a problem, but only for the heat from the essence: the closer 
heat is to its source, the hotter it is. But fire itself (or, simply, Fire) is different from the 
heat derived from it not because it is more intensely hot, but because its heat is 
unsurpassed, unoriginated and undiminished. It is itself the inexhaustible source of its 
own heat: Fire itself. This illustration already betrays its own weakness, and the weakness 
of all metaphor, in its attempt to disclose the thing to which it points, for we are simply 
unfamiliar with something that owes its heat to nothing but itself. More importantly, 
every source of heat I am familiar with, precisely by diminishing in intensity as it sends 
out heat, shows that what it gives out is not different than itself.
183
 The One, by contrast, 
is expressly said to send out not itself, but something other than itself (the activity from 
the essence). But what does the One send out? What does it give? 
Plotinus’ solution to this question sounds like a riddle. He asserts it repeatedly in 
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 Cf. Rist (1971, 87). Thus, to someone who were to ask of Plotinus to provide an example of a kind of 
giving which, in giving, remains undiminished and other than what it gives, he would provide none, and 
aptly so, for no other reason that none is there to be provided. The example of teaching comes to mind as 
a possible instance of undiminished giving, for in teaching (say, Pythagoras’ theorem), there is no 
diminution of knowledge in the source. However, in this example what is given seems to be of the same 
nature in the giver and in the recipient. By contrast, in being given, not only does the love of the One not 
diminish in the One itself, but in the recipient from self-love it becomes love of another. 
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the Enneads. At VI.7 [38] 17.3–6 he writes:184 
[3] Now, there is no necessity [4] for anyone to have what he gives, but in 
this kind of situation [5] one must consider that the giver is greater, and 
that what is given is less than the giver; [6] for that is how coming to be is 
among the real beings. 
 
For the sake of convenience, the principle according to which the giver gives what 
it does not have will be referred to as Principle of Henologic Giving.
185
 First it should be 
noticed that this principle applies not to everything but to “real beings” (τοῖς οὖσι) 
only;
186
 if fact, of all the principles listed in note 10 above (cf. also Table 6 on the last 
page of Chapter Four), the Principle of Henologic Giving applies only to the One as the 
first term of the process of donation: it is a strictly henologic principle.
187
 In the present 
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 VI.7 [38] 17.3–6: [3] Ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη, ὅ [4] τις δίδωσι, τοῦτο ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις τὸ μὲν [5] 
διδὸν μεῖζον νομίζειν, τὸ δὲ διδόμενον ἔλαττον τοῦ διδόντος· [6] τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ γένεσις ἐν τοῖς οὖσι. This 
was already alluded at VI.7 [38] 15.19–20: διδόντος ἐκείνου [i.e., the One] ἃ μὴ [20] εἶχεν αὐτός. Cf. V.3 
[49] 14.18–19, 15.7, 37–38. 
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 A corollary of the Principle of Henologic Giving is that in generating, the One is not directly involved in 
what it generates, but abides unchanged beyond it (see V.4 [7] 2.26–27, 36–37, V.5 [32] 12.40–50; see 
also the references in note 123). This corollary applies not only to the downward relation between the 
One and Nous, mentioned in these references, but also to that between Nous and soul (V.1 [10] 3.4–15; 
V.2 [11] 1.13–18); it does not apply, however, to the relation between soul and that to which soul gives 
life, for soul, in giving of itself, is unable to abide unchanged (V.2 [11] 1.18–19). This last statement, I 
maintain, is not contradicted by VI.6 [34] 7.4–7, where soul, along with Nature, is said to imitate 
(μιμεῖται) Nous as it generates individual things in different place “while it is all together in itself” (lines 
6–7: αὐτῆς ὁμοῦ ἑαυτῇ οὔσης). The context of this passage is the unitary nature of Intellect, which soul 
imitates to the extent that it too, being incorporeal, is not separated spatially in the way individual 
sensible things are. 
 
186
 I believe that what at first makes the Principle of Henologic Giving appear nonsensical or riddle-like at 
best is its application to the sensible realm. And yet, it is through the sensible metaphor of vision that 
Plato put forward what is virtually the same principle: the sun is the giver of the (intelligible) visibility 
and existence of things (i.e., true beings, as opposed to the shadows in the cave) while itself remaining 
beyond such visibility and mode of existence (see Republic VI.509b2–10 and the story of the cave in 
book VII, which constitute the background of VI.7 [38] 15–23: cf. the critical apparatus of HS1 and HS2). 
See my reading of this in Subsection 1.5.2, especially pages 68–71. 
 
187
 Hadot (1988, 272): “Le problème ne se pose qu’à propos du principe premier, du Bien qui est 
absolument simple.” It may be argued that Nous gives to soul a dianoetic unity which it did not itself 
have, and similarly that soul gives to inanimate bodies a kind of organic unity that it did not itself possess 
in its pure state. This is true, but if the Principle of Henologic Giving is strictly henologic, Plotinus must 
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context the One is conceived of as the giver, whereas Nous is the recipient of the gift. 
In VI.7 [38], Plotinus spends nine whole chapters (15–23) to clarify this point (cf. V.3 
[19] 15); in the context of this treatise what the One is said to give to Nous while itself 
remaining beyond what it gives is form and knowability (see VI.7 [38] 16.22–31). 
This, however, is already a derivative gift, at least conceptually. In fact, as we 
shall see in Subsection 3.4.1, the form and knowability essentially constitutive of Nous 
are not given immediately but are dependent on a prior given, namely, the love for the 
One. So, the answer to the question “What does the One give?” or “What is this gift 
which the One gives without itself possessing it?” is: the One gives love for the One. 
More specifically, the primary otherness, or the One’s activity from the essence, is the 
outpouring of an infinite or boundless love already directed to the One, what Plotinus 
calls intelligible matter (see page 226). From this primordial energy erotically directed 
toward the Principle, Nous arises successively (though not in the chronological sense) as 
the contemplative attempt to replicate the unqualified unity of the One.
188
 
We might wonder whether the One, qua self-love, is not already identical with 
this energy. Plotinus does not think so, and for one simple reason: the One is different 
                                                                                                                                                 
think that what Nous and soul give as causes is somewhat similar to what they possess in themselves. By 
contrast, if the One gives what it does not have, what it gives is thought to be radically different from 
what it does have, although strictly, qua Simple, the One either has nothing or it possesses everything 
eminently (V.5 [32] 9.35, 13.34–35; cf. note 74). 
 
188
 I hope that this will become clearer as I consider the unity of Intellect (Subsection 3.4.1). For now, 
suffice it to say that in Nous thinker and object of thought coincide, and this coincidence constitutes the 
very activity of Intellect. This activity, however, is not entirely self-contained, for according to Plotinus it 
is erotically directed toward the One, that is: Nous is not nor can it be the Principle because, despite the 
perfect and eternally actual unification of the multiplicity it contains (or rather, of the multiplicity with 
which it is identical, that is, the duality of thinking and intelligibles, and the very multiplicity of the 
intelligibles), its activity aims at imitating the unqualified unity of the One. Its other-directed eros makes 
Intellect unsuitable to serve as the Principle of all. 
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than the erotic energy derived from it because this energy already aims at something 
other than itself, namely the One. This is all that differentiates this first “product” from 
the One, and this is why Plotinus says that the One and Intellect are separated merely by 
difference or otherness (διαφορά, ἑτερότης).189 
Another principle, strictly related to the Principle of Henologic Giving, is that 
according to which a cause is superior to its effect: briefly, the Principle of Superiority of 
Cause to Effect. Plotinus states it at V.1 [10] 6.37–39: “[37] And [38] all things when 
they come to perfection produce; the One is always perfect and therefore produces 
everlastingly; [39] and its product is less than itself” (my emphasis).190 When read in 
terms of love, the Principle of Superiority of Cause to Effect means that the One, insofar 
as it is perfect erotic self-identity, produces something that is not perfectly identical with 
the aim of its eros. When this product, in turn, acts as a cause and produces something 
other than itself, the distance of this successive product from the aim of its eros increases 
(and continues to increase as one proceeds downwards in the process of derivation).
191
 
The Principle of Henologic Giving and its corollary Principle of the Superiority of 
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 See for instance V.8 [31] 9. I will return to this in Subsection 3.4.1 below. 
 
190
 V.1 [10] 6.37–39: [37] Καὶ [38] πάντα δὲ ὅσα ἤδη τέλεια γεννᾷ· τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ τέλειον ἀεὶ καὶ ἀίδιον [39] 
γεννᾷ· καὶ ἔλαττον δὲ ἑαυτοῦ γεννᾷ. Likewise explicitly, at VI.7 [38] 17.5–6: “what is given is less than 
the giver; for that is how coming to be is among real beings” (see note 184 above for the Greek text). Cf. 
III.8 [30] 5.24–25, V.5 [32] 13.37–38; see also V.3 [49] 15.7–11 and 16.5–8, where the Principle of 
Superiority of Cause to Effect is given universal application. Cf. Porphyry, Sententiae XIII.5.10; Proclus, 
Elements of Theology 7. IGAL (I, 30–31) calls this principle “principio de la degradación progresiva.” For 
a classic treatment of this principle see Lloyd (1976). For an interpretation of this principle in terms of 
essence and existence, see Gerson (1994, 17); for a phenomenological reversal of this principle as it 
resurfaces, considerably recontextualized, in the third of Descartes’ Meditations (Descartes 1897–1910, 
VII, 40–41), see Marion (2002, 159–173). 
 
191
 More generally, the inferiority stated in the Principle of Superiority of Cause to Effect is one of unity 
and being (see Ham 2000, 256–258). 
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Cause to Effect can also be derived analytically from the vantage point of the One’s 
double causality, efficient and final (see page 181–182 and 191–192 and Section 4.2). As 
the kind of efficient cause it is (i.e., the unique, unqualifiedly simple First), if in giving, 
the One were to give (of) itself, it would have to bring about another itself. But “itself” is 
the uncaused Principle, while that to which the One would allegedly give (of) itself, by 
receiving anything at all, would immediately find itself in a subordinate position, and 
hence it would be incapable of being the Principle.
192
 At the same time, this incapability 
shows that what the recipient received was nothing that belonged to (or rather, was) the 
Principle. Therefore, the One, in giving, does not give (of) itself. Moreover, nothing that 
belongs to the One, or nothing that the One is, is accidental to it. If the One gave anything 
of whatever belongs to itself to something else, it would be giving itself, a proposition 
which was just found to be impossible. It is because of the nature of its uniqueness (see 
3.1.1) that the One cannot give what it has, or what it is: the First as conceived by 
Plotinus does not beget another First; indeed it cannot. At the same time, this 
impossibility cannot be conceived of as lack of power, but rather as a rational necessity. 
Along the same lines, and more in keeping with our central topic, the One does 
not give itself as a final cause either, for in order to give itself in such a way it would 
have to make the recipient of its gift the ultimate end of all, the highest desideratum or 
ἐρασμιώτατον (VI.7 [38] 32.25). But this, again, is inconceivable because the 
ἐρασμιώτατον is most loved for no other reason than for being the Principle, and the 
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 I gloss over the paradox of having to postulate the existence of the supposed recipient of the One’s self 
prior to the giving of the gift, when what the One gives is existence itself (see note 47 above), here 
interpreted as identical with love for unity and, ultimately, for the unqualified unity of the One. 
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Principle precisely of the eros which points back to the Principle as the Good. By 
contrast, the putative recipient of the status of universal end, precisely by being a 
recipient, cannot be the Principle, nor can it be, therefore, the highest desideratum or 
universal final cause. 
An interpretation of the Principle of Superabundance and of the Principle of 
Henologic Giving (along with its corollary Principle of Superiority of Cause to Effect) in 
terms of eros also helps us to make sense of two apparently contradictory ideas 
surrounding the Principle of Prior Actuality (pages 195–196), namely: (i) the notion that 
the cause, which is prior in actuality to the effect, communicates to the effect a certain 
feature that it itself possesses (an idea to which we may refer as the Principle of Likeness 
of Cause and Effect);
193
 and (ii) Plotinus’ caveat about attributing any feature (including 
causality, as in VI.9 [9] 3.49–54) to the One taken in itself. When the One’s nature in 
itself is understood as perfect erotic self-identity, (ii) can still hold if one understands the 
expressions “love” and “love of itself” (VI.8 [39] 15.1) as indicating unqualified unity. 
As for what is said to be communicated in (i), this is not, strictly speaking, a feature or a 
property, but the very love of itself of the One, which at lower levels necessarily becomes 
love for the One qua other and, indirectly, a way to catch a glimpse of the nature of the 
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 A general formulation of the Principle of Likeness of Cause and Effect, simultaneously pointing at the 
necessity of the activity from the essence, is given at II.9 [33] 3.7: “each of necessity must give of its own 
to something else as well” (ἀνάγκη ἕκαστον τὸ αὑτοῦ διδόναι καὶ ἄλλῳ). The principle is operative at all 
levels of reality: e.g., V.1 [10] 3.12–15 (on the intellectual nature of soul due to its origin in Intellect; cf. 
V.3 [49] 7.21–25), V.2 [11] 1.13–14 (on Nous resembling the One, or “being somehow it”: Οὗτος οὖν ὢν 
οἷον ἐκεῖνος), and the whole discussion in IV.3 [27] 10 (on bodies being vivified by the presence of 
soul). All references to the likeness between lower and higher levels of reality can be cited in support of 
this principle: see especially Appendix C and Chapter Four notes 62 and 85. See also pages 339–340 
below on further remarks on the Principle of Likeness of Cause and Effect. Cf. Spinoza, Ethics I.p3. 
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Principle.
194
 
As I shall argue in the rest of this chapter, the love of the One for itself becomes 
love of the One qua other not only for the primary otherness directly derived from the 
Principle, but also for everything that succeeds the primary otherness in the process of 
derivation. For this reason, as I already mentioned, eros is the element that explains both 
the discontinuity and the continuity of the Plotinian universe, or, if one wishes, both the 
transcendence and the immanence of the Principle with respect to everything of which it 
is the Principle. It explains its discontinuity (transcendence), for the love possessed by the 
One is radically other than the love possessed by everything else; but it also explains its 
continuity (immanence), because the love possessed by all derived beings is a trace 
(ἴχνος195) pointing back at the Principle, in which love is pure self-identity, self-positing, 
self-determination.
196
 
3.4 The Eros of Derived Reality: Intellect, Soul, Matter 
As we saw, for Plotinus the Principle of Double Activity is not merely a way to 
account for the action of such phenomena as fire, snow, and smell; on the contrary, these 
are particular cases carefully chosen to illustrate a much more pervasive dynamics, one 
which in his view accounts for the relations among the hypostases: the very fabric of 
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 Moreover, the interpretations of these basic Plotinian principles in terms of eros already indicates the 
way out of the last question that was asked in the opening paragraphs of Section 3.3: What does it mean 
to be brought to likeness with the One? In light of what I put forth in this subsection, it means to become 
more and more one in the sense of gradually approximating the point at which one may be unified as 
much as possible with the aim of one’s desire. To investigate this work of approximation will be the 
focus of the next chapter. 
 
195
 For references to the use of the term ἴχνος in Plotinus see Appendix C. 
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 PIGLER (69) puts it well: “l’Amour de soi du Principe est, en lui, intransitif, alors que l’amour et le désir 
que meuvent les êtres dérivés sont, quant’à eux, transitifs, en ont pour objet l’Un-Bien.” Cf. the reference 
to Spinoza in note 34 above. 
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reality. In the previous section we saw how the nature of the One, the source of this 
dynamics, can be explained in terms of eros, a perfect erotic self-identity, which in turn 
coincides with the activity of the One’s essence. This activity is the very being of the 
One, abiding in itself while being productive of otherness. This otherness, as we shall see, 
is the second hypostasis in its incipient stage: intelligible matter (cf. page 226). 
What the One gives, which it does not itself have, is a love directed to something 
other than oneself. This love is desire of unqualified unity, hence a desire to become 
perpetually identical with the aim of one’s desire. Even a quick reading of the first 
hypothesis of the second part of Plato’s Parmenides should suffice to make one aware of 
how hard it is merely to try to put unqualified unity into words (cf. also Subsection 3.2.2 
above), if nothing else for the fact that the diachronic nature of all expression entails a 
necessary departure from such unity. In tentatively speaking about it, Plotinus described 
the One in terms indicating absolute self-containment. As cause and sustainer of unity or 
existence (cf. note 52 above), the One is itself the cause and sustainer of its own unity or 
existence; as will, it is necessary and spontaneous self-determination, free of all 
deliberation and choice; and as love, it is perfect erotic self-identity. What I will attempt 
to do in what follows is to show how these descriptions, in particular the one pertaining 
to eros, undergo a fundamental transformation in everything derived from the One, 
beginning with the hypostasis that immediately proceeds from it, Intellect or Nous. 
3.4.1 Noetic Eros: Intellect as the Noetic Replica of the Unity and Eros of the One 
From the viewpoint of the observer, the eros of Intellect, to which I will refer as 
noetic eros, has a double identity: if one focuses on its origin, eros is the activity 
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springing from the One’s essence, whereas if one focuses on Nous taken in itself, it is 
identical with the activity of Intellect’s essence. But how does Intellect originate? How 
can its nature be explained in terms of eros? What does pure Intellect have to do with 
love? Does the erotic energy that constitutes the first otherness springing from the One 
already amount to the actuality of Nous? And in what sense can Intellect be said to 
resemble its cause, the One, if the One gives what it does not have and is, unlike Nous, 
unqualified simplicity? I think an effective way to answer these questions is to start from 
the notion of otherness as an initial description of Nous and then move on to explain how 
this primary otherness springing from the Principle becomes the full-blown hypostasis of 
Nous as the latter lovingly tries to replicate the unity of the One at its own level. 
Noetic otherness basically means two conceptually distinct things, one in relation 
to unity and the other in relation to eros. With respect to unity, to be other means to be 
less than perfectly one or, said otherwise, to be one only in a qualified way; otherness, 
therefore, is here synonymous with multiplicity, a movement away from one’s source 
whereby each thing begins to constitute itself as a separate entity.
197
 With respect to eros, 
it means not to be perfectly identical with the aim of one’s desire, and hence to be 
erotically directed to something other than oneself (even while possessing the 
desideratum permanently, as in the case of Nous with regard to the One).
198
 This is true 
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 The idea that a thing is separated from others through otherness may apply loosely to everything, but it 
is strictly true of incorporeal things; bodies, by contrast, are more specifically separated from other 
bodies spatially (see VI.9 [9] 8.29–34; cf. II.4 [12] 5.28–30). 
 
198
 In an important article, Rist (1971, 82–83) points out that otherness is explained metaphorically by 
recourse to motion (κίνησις), which Aristotle classifies as a process or incomplete activity (Metaphysics 
IX.1048b18–36; Nicomachean Ethics X.1174a4–b6); otherness is therefore associated with some kind of 
desire or striving, in the absence of which we would be left with the perfect stillness of the One (V.1 [10] 
4.38–39; the association of otherness and motion occurs also in different contexts, e.g., VI.2 [43] 15.14–
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of everything that derives from the One,
199
 but not in the same way for every thing. 
So, for instance, both Nous and soul are less than perfectly one and less than perfectly 
identical with the aim of their respective desire; however, the gap between the perfect 
unity or erotic self-identity of the One and the qualified unity and erotic status of what is 
derived from the One is wider in the case of soul than it is in the case of Nous. Let us 
focus on Intellect first. 
That what derives immediately from the First should be Intellect and not, say, 
soul or a highly unified sensible organism, is due mainly to the fact that Intellect is taken 
to be the simplest possible thing besides the One. Put differently, if the source of unity is 
unqualifiedly simple, unique, and self-diffusive, then what derives immediately from it is 
the most intensely unified multiplicity. Plotinus takes this to be the one-many (ἓν πολλά), 
that is, Nous.
200
 
But how does Intellect come about or is generated from the One? And what kind 
of unity belongs to its multiplicity? Among the several passages
201
 in which Plotinus 
                                                                                                                                                 
15, VI.3 [44] 18.13–14, 22.37–43, VI.9 [9] 6.18–19, 42–43). 
 
199
 When otherness is understood as multiplicity and other-directed eros, it is completely absent from the 
One (VI.9 [9] 8.33–34). As Rist (1971, 83) puts it, “in any particular being the element of otherness is 
recognizable in the fact that the being is finite. It is not the One; it is only its limited self, limited and 
hence striving for perfection.” The One, by contrast, strives for nothing. And as I mentioned earlier, the 
First is the transcendent par excellence; wholly other than the things derived from it (see III.8 [30] 8.9, 
V.3 [49] 11.18, V.4 [7] 1.6, V.5 [32] 10.2–5) not because it gathers the totality of what is multiple, but 
because it is distinct from everything multiple. 
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 On Nous as one-many (ἓν πολλά) see V.1 [10] 8.26, V.3 [49] 15.11, V.4 [7] 1.21, VI.2 [43] 4.30–32, 
15.14–15, 17.25, VI.6 [34] 13.53, VI.7 [38] 14.11–12; cf. III.7 [45] 3.4–7, III.8 [30] 8.30, VI.4 [22] 
11.15, VI.5 [23] 6.1–3, VI.6 [34] 6.1, 8.22, VI.7 [38] 8.17. Elswhere, Nous is variously described as 
“many in one and one over many” (πολλὰ ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ἓν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς: VI.5 [23] 6.2–3), a “one-all” (ἓν 
πάντα: III.6 [26] 6.23, V.3 [49] 15.23), and more often an “all-together” (ὁμοῦ πάντα: II.6 [17] 1.10, III.6 
[26] 6.23, V.3 [49] 15.21, V.8 [31] 9.3, V.9 [5] 6.8, VI.4 [22] 14.6, VI.5 [23] 6.3, VI.7 [38] 33.8). See 
also note 260 below; cf. Chapter Two note 28. 
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 Here is a list of the chief passages where Plotinus describes the genesis of Intellect, with the main theme 
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presents the genesis of the first alterity from the One is the sequel of a text I cited 
earlier at page 210 as one of the formulations of the Principle of Superabundance; the text 
is V.2 [11] 1.7–13:202 
[7] This, we may say, is the first act of generation: the One, perfect 
because it seeks [8] nothing, has nothing, and needs nothing, overflows, as 
it were, and [9] its superabundance makes something other than itself. 
This, when it has come into being, [10] turns back upon the One and is 
filled, [11] and becomes Intellect by looking towards it. Its halt and 
turning towards the One [12] constitutes being, its gaze upon the One, 
Intellect. Since [13] it halts and turns towards the One that it may see, it 
becomes at once Intellect and being. 
 
At least two stages or phases of the genesis of Nous can be clearly identified in 
this passage: one in which the superabundance from the One comes into being, and 
another in which by turning toward the Principle, being filled by it and looking toward it, 
this superabundance becomes Intellect proper. Traditionally, these two stages have been 
called Loving Intellect and Thinking Intellect respectively (here capitalized for 
disambiguation), or what Plotinus himself refers to as “Intellect in love” (νοῦς ἐρῶν) and 
“Intellect in its right mind” (νοῦς ἔμφρων).203 He writes at VI.7 [38] 35.23–27:204 
                                                                                                                                                 
of each description given in parentheses: V.1 [10] 7.1–19 (sight), V.2 [11] 1.7–13 (superabundance and 
otherness), V.3 [49] 11.1–16 (desire and sight), V.4 [7] 2.22–39 (double activity), V.6 [24] 5.5–12 (sight, 
desire and thought), VI.7 [38] 15–17. For an analogous list on the generation of soul see note 265 below. 
 
202
 V.2 [11] 1.7–13: [7] καὶ πρώτη οἷον γέννησις αὕτη· ὂν γὰρ τέλειον τῷ μηδὲν [8] ζητεῖν μηδὲ ἔχειν μηδὲ 
δεῖσθαι οἷον ὑπερερρύη καὶ τὸ [9] ὑπερπλῆρες αὐτοῦ πεποίηκεν ἄλλο· τὸ δὲ γενόμενον εἰς [10] αὐτὸ 
ἐπεστράφη καὶ ἐπληρώθη καὶ ἐγένετο πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέπον [11] καὶ νοῦς οὗτος. Καὶ ἡ μὲν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο 
στάσις αὐτοῦ [12] τὸ ὂν ἐποίησεν, ἡ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ θέα τὸν νοῦν. Ἐπεὶ οὖν [13] ἔστη πρὸς αὐτό, ἵνα ἴδῃ, 
ὁμοῦ νοῦς γίγνεται καὶ ὄν. See also V.5 [32] 5.16–19: “[16] For this which we call primary being [ὂν... 
πρῶτον] [17] proceeded [προβεβηκὸς], so to speak [οἷον], a little way from the One, but did not wish 
[18] to go still further, but turned inwards [μεταστραφὲν δὲ εἰς τὸ εἴσω] and took its stand [ἔστη] there, 
and became [19] substance [οὐσία] and hearth [ἑστία] of all things...” See also III.8 [30] 9.29–32, V.1 
[10] 5.3–19, 7.5–35, V.3 [49] 11.4–12, V.4 [7] 2.4–7, and the passages from VI.7 [38] 35.19–33 (cf. note 
204 below). 
 
203
 Cf. III.8 [30] 9.29–32, V.3 [49] 16.35–42, V.5 [32] 7.32–35. In his commentary to VI.7 [38] 15–17, 
Hadot (1988, 259–278, and especially the helpful table at page 264) argues that in these chapters of VI.7 
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[23] And that first one is [24] the contemplation of Intellect in its right mind, 
and the other is Intellect in love, when it goes out of its mind [25] “drunk 
with nectar”205; then it falls in love, [26] blooming206 in its enjoyment by 
                                                                                                                                                 
[38] the genesis of Intellect comprises four relatively parallel accounts (i.e., respectively VI.7 [38] 15.9–
23, 16.10–32, 16.32–35, and 17.10–32), each comprising, not two, but three phases, namely: (1) Nous 
which is not yet Nous, but rather an indeterminate proto-ἐνέργεια or proto-Life; (2) The formation of 
Forms within Nous as a fragmentation and determination of the indeterminate proto-Life through a 
turning of Nous toward the One; (3) Actual Nous as the aware self-identity of the totality of Forms. 
Hadot’s division is broadly followed and further explained by PIGLER (75–130) in her treatment of noetic 
eros. Thinking Intellect comprises both (2) and (3). IGAL (I, 31–32, and 45–46) puts it well when he calls 
this dynamic “principio de la génesis bifásica,” and aptly refers to the first stage as “fase proódica” (i.e., 
Hadot’s first phase above) and to the second as “fase epistrófica,” which includes both the turning and 
the generated toward its generator and its own τελείωσις, or fulfillment (i.e., Hadot’s second and third 
phase above). 
 
204
 VI.7 [38] 35.23–27: [23] Καὶ ἔστιν ἐκείνη μὲν [24] ἡ θέα νοῦ ἔμφρονος, αὕτη δὲ νοῦς ἐρῶν, ὅταν 
ἄφρων [25] γένηται μεθυσθεὶς τοῦ νέκταρος· τότε ἐρῶν γίνεται [26] ἁπλωθεὶς εἰς εὐπάθειαν τῷ κόρῳ· 
καὶ ἔστιν αὐτῷ μεθύειν [27] βέλτιον ἢ σεμνοτέρῳ εἶναι τοιαύτης μέθης. The translation that follows is 
ARMSTRONG, minimally modified. The context of the passage is not that of the procession of all reality 
from the One, but of the ascent of the soul to it, hence the inversion of the order between the two stages 
of Nous. 
 
205
 A clear reference to Plato, Symposium 203b5, also occurring earlier in the treatise at VI.7 [38] 30.27. 
Another parallel in the Enneads is III.5 [50] 9.2, where the referent of this drunkenness is not Intellect 
(generally represented by Cronos), but Poros. On the relation between the drunkenness of Poros (of 
Platonic descent) and that of Cronos (of Orphic descent), see Porphyry, Cave of the Nymphs 16 (on 
which cf. Hadot 1988, 39–42). 
 
206
 The term I translate with “blooming” at VI.7 [38] 35.26 is ἁπλωθεὶς. The basic meanings of ἁπλόω as 
found in LSJ (s.v.) are “make single,” “unfold,” “spread out.” In Sleeman and Pollet’s lexicon we are 
given to understand that Plotinus uses this verb only in the meaning of “unfolding” or “expanding” (cf. 
SP, s.v. ἁπλοῦν). The term occurs only two other times in the Enneads, at III.5 [50] 9.2 (in the sense of 
“spread out,” referred to Poros/logos) and at VI.7 [38] 1.56 (clearly in the sense of “unfolding”); cf. also 
ἅπλωσις at VI.9 [9] 11.23. Hadot (1988, 174 note 309) voices his agreement with Ficino (1492: “seipsam 
diffundens”) and Cilento (1947–1949: “tutto steso”) as he translates ἁπλωθεὶς with “s’épanuissant” and 
insists that this blooming occurs “dans l’ivresse et la jouissance” (see also Faggin 2002: “si abbandona”; 
IGAL: “desencogida”). ARMSTRONG translates ἁπλωθεὶς at VI.7 [38] 35.26 with “simplified” (see also 
MacKenna 1917–1930 and MacKenna and Page 1969: “it is made simplex”; Bréhier 1924–1938: “se 
simplifiant”; Harder 1956–1971: “einfach geworden”; Mizuchi, Tanogashira and Tanaka 1986–1988: 
単一化し, tan’itsuka shi). The context and its parallel at III.5 [50] 9.2 suggest that “simplified” is 
probably not the more desirable translation of ἁπλωθεὶς at VI.7 [38] 35.26. However, from a 
philosophical standpoint, one will observe that Loving Nous is indeed more intensely unified than 
Thinking Nous. Moreover, the perspective of the passage is one from below, so to speak: what is 
involved in the assimilation (cf. Subsection 4.3.1) of the ascending soul to Loving Nous is also a process 
of simplification. This is true, I maintain, despite what Aleknienė (2010) writes in a recent article on the 
use of the words ἁπλόω and ἅπλωσις in Plotinus and a few other authors of the first five centuries A.D. 
Aleknienė’s focus is the word ἅπλωσις as it appears at line 23 in Enneads VI.9 [9] 11.22–26; her chief 
contention is that in this passage the noun ἅπλωσις means, not simplification or simplicity (for which 
another noun, ἁπλότης, is generally used, for instance at V.5 [32] 6.32), but rather a self-opening of the 
soul to the One as this is encountered in the so-called mystical union. Aleknienė’s analyses are valuable 
and highlight an important aspect of the contact between the soul and the One that constitutes the last 
stage of the Ascent, namely the notion that union is not a closing of the soul upon itself, but a complete 
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having its fill; and it is better for it [27] to be drunk with a drunkenness like 
this than to be more respectably sober. 
 
Loving or pre-noetic Intellect is what elsewhere is called infinite life
207
 or, more 
technically, intelligible or noetic matter (ἡ νοητὴ ὕλη)208 and the indeterminate or 
indefinite dyad (ἡ ἀόριστος δυάς).209 All these expressions are synonymous in Plotinus. It 
is the very “first movement” or otherness210 away from the Principle, the most intensely 
unified reality immediately derived from the One. All this movement or otherness 
amounts to, apparently, is that unlike the One it is erotically directed not to itself but 
                                                                                                                                                 
and confident abandonment to the source of all things. This is partially confirmed by the nouns that 
precede and follow ἅπλωσις at VI.9 [9] 11.23: ἔκστασις and ἐπίδοσις. Both words imply the very 
opposite of a retreat into oneself; ARMSTRONG’s translation, I believe, is quite appropriate: “a being out 
of oneself” (ἔκστασις) and “giving oneself over” (ἐπίδοσις). However, I think it would be excessive to 
play “simplification” against “self-opening” in the experience of union, as if the two concepts were 
totally incompatible; I believe, instead, that they are complementary. Thus, Aleknienė’s point must 
indeed be noted, but it should not detract from the idea that the confident abandonment or self-opening of 
which she speaks is in fact a simplification of the soul in the philosophical sense of the term: a becoming 
one single reality, undivided openness, total abandonment to the Good, or, as we shall see by the end of 
Chapter Four, pure eros for the One. Cf. also Chapter Four note 249. 
 
207
 VI.7 [38] 17.14–15: ζωή... ἀόριστος. Cf. VI.7 [38] 17.32–33: “the life which is a universal power” (ἡ 
μὲν ζωὴ δύναμις πᾶσα); III.8 [30] 9.33: “first life” (ζωὴ πρώτη). 
 
208
 Plotinus refers to intelligible or noetic matter with different expressions, most notably ἡ ἐκεῖ ὕλη (II.4 
[12] 4.6–9, II.5 [25] 3.9), ἡ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς ὕλη (II.4 [12] 5.13–14, 38, 15.18, III.8 [30] 11.4), and ἡ 
νοητὴ ὕλη (III.5 [50] 6.44; cf. Chapter Two note 89). Aristotle, too, speaks of an intelligible (νοητή) kind 
of matter in contrast with a perceptible (αἰσθητή) kind, but for him intelligible matter means either the 
matter of mathematical objects when these are abstracted from all that is perceptible (Metaphysics 
VII.1036a9–12) or else the generic element in a definition and in a species (Metaphysics VIII.1045a33–
35; see W. D. Ross 1924, 199–200, 238); cf. IGAL (I, 44). 
 
209
 On the indefinite dyad see V.1 [10] 5.14, V.4 [7] 2.7–8; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics XIII.1081a14–15; On 
the good, fragment 2 (= Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 55.20–57.28, 
85.16–18; Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 151.6–19, 453.25–455.14). 
 
210
 See II.4 [12] 5.28–30; at 5.30, the expression ἡ κίνησις ἡ πρώτη is not to be confused with ἡ πρώτη 
ἑτερότης found at V.1 [10] 1.4, where the expression refers to the separation of soul from Intellect, which 
as Atkinson (1983, 7) points out, presumably is called first only from the perspective of soul. However, 
the two expressions are not unrelated, as one can infer by comparing V.1 [10] 1.4 and 4.34–44: “in each 
case,” writes Atkinson, “the word suggests separation and distinct individuation.” 
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already to the One qua other.
211
 This connatural inclination toward the Principle is the 
very mark or trace (ἴχνος) of the One on all that is derived from it.212 And since the One 
was positively described in terms of eros, this mark is itself erotic in nature. Although 
Plotinus states this explicitly only once in the Enneads, the reference is significant. In 
describing the ascent of the soul toward the One, he remarks that “[a]s long as there is 
anything higher than that which is present to it [viz., the soul], it naturally goes on 
upwards, lifted by the giver of its love” (VI.7 [38] 22.17–19; my emphasis).213 In terms of 
the Principle of Double Activity (Subsection 3.2.3), we could say that this eros, the trace 
of a superior reality on an inferior one, constitutes the very essence of the lower reality 
and at the same time the second activity (or activity of the essence) of the higher one. In 
terms of the Principle of Reversion (pages 205–207), eros is the very force that allows for 
the reversion toward the Principle (and with it, the emergence of a new hypostasis) to 
take place.
214
 
Now, this primary otherness (i.e., Loving Nous or intelligible matter or the 
indeterminate dyad), being in its very nature erotically charged and directed toward the 
                                                 
211
 At V.1 [10] 6.53 Plotinus explicitly states that the One and its immediate offspring are separated only by 
otherness (τῇ ἑτερότητι μόνον κεχωρίσθαι). 
 
212
 On Plotinus’ use of the term ἴχνος see Appendix C. 
 
213
 VI.7 [38] 22.17–19: [17] Καὶ ἕως τί [18] ἐστιν ἀνωτέρω τοῦ παρόντος, αἴρεται φύσει ἄνω αἰρομένη [19] 
ὑπὸ τοῦ δόντος τὸν ἔρωτα. ARMSTRONG (VII, 157 note 2) aptly remarks about these lines: “This is the 
clearest statement by Plotinus of something implicit in his whole system, that our desire to return to the 
Good is given by the Good.” See also VI.7 [38] 34.1–2, where Plotinus refers to the One as “that which 
produces these strangely powerful longings” ([1] τὸ τοὺς δεινοὺς πόθους [2] παρέχον). See also Chapter 
Four note 167. 
 
214
 On the reversion of Nous toward the One see II.4 12] 5.28–35, III.4 [15] 1.8–10 (general statement on 
reversion), V.1 [10] 6.17–18, 7.5–6 (crux: see note 166 above) and 12–13, V.2 [11] 1.9–11, V.4 [7] 2.4–
7, VI.7 [38] 16.14–22, VI.8 [39] 6.30–35; cf. also V.3 [49] 16.38–42. 
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One, is described by Plotinus in visual and desiderative terms (see note 201). Before 
it fully constitutes itself as a hypostasis, Nous in its incipient stage is “only desire and 
unformed sight” (V.3 [49] 11.12: ἔφεσις μόνον καὶ ἀτύπωτος ὄψις). Successively, from 
the vision of its connatural desideratum, the One, Loving Intellect becomes Thinking 
Intellect. Plotinus offers a description of this transition at V.6 [24] 5.5–15:215 
[5] For thinking does not come first either in reality or in [6] value, but is 
second and is what has come into being when [7] the Good [already] 
existed and moved what had come into being [viz., Loving Nous] to itself, 
and it [8] was moved and saw. And this is what thinking is, a movement 
towards the Good [9] in its desire of that Good; for the desire generates 
thought and [10] establishes it in being along with itself: for desire of sight 
is seeing. The Good itself [11] then must not think anything: for the Good 
is not other than [12] itself. For when what is other than the Good thinks 
it, [13] it does so by being “like the Good”216 and having a resemblance to 
the [14] Good, and it thinks it as Good and as desired by itself, and [15] as 
if it had a mental image of the Good. 
 
Similarly, at V.3 [49] 11.8–12 Plotinus describes the emergence of Thinking Nous 
in terms of a fragmentation of the One’s unity grasped in the sight of Loving Nous:217 
[8] The sight, again, certainly has the impression of what is seen: 
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 V.6 [24] 5.5–15: [5] Τὸ γὰρ νοεῖν οὐ πρῶτον οὔτε τῷ εἶναι οὔτε τῷ [6] τίμιον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ δεύτερον καὶ 
γενόμενον, ἐπειδὴ ὑπέστη [7] τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ < τὸ > γενόμενον ἐκίνησε πρὸς αὐτό, τὸ δ’ ἐκινήθη [8] τε 
καὶ εἶδε. Καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι νοεῖν, κίνησις πρὸς ἀγαθὸν [9] ἐφιέμενον ἐκείνου· ἡ γὰρ ἔφεσις τὴν νόησιν 
ἐγέννησε καὶ [10] συνυπέστησεν αὐτῇ· ἔφεσις γὰρ ὄψεως ὅρασις. Οὐδὲν οὖν [11] δεῖ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν 
νοεῖν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο αὐτοῦ τὸ [12] ἀγαθόν. Ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν τὸ ἕτερον παρὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ νοῇ, [13] 
τῷ ἀγαθοειδὲς εἶναι νοεῖ καὶ ὁμοίωμα ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ [14] ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὡς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐφετὸν αὐτῷ 
γενόμενον νοεῖ καὶ [15] οἷον φαντασίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λαμβάνον. The passage continues (V.6 [24] 5.15–
19): “[15] And if it is like this for ever, it thinks the Good [16] for ever. And again, in thinking the Good 
it thinks itself [17] incidentally: for it is in looking to the Good that it thinks itself; for it thinks itself [18] 
in actual activity; and the actual activity of all things is directed to the [19] Good” ([19] Εἰ δ’ ἀεὶ οὕτως, 
ἀεὶ [16] τοῦτο. Καὶ γὰρ αὖ ἐν τῇ νοήσει αὐτοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς [17] αὐτὸ νοεῖ· πρὸς γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν 
βλέπων αὐτὸν νοεῖ. Ἐνεργοῦντα [18] γὰρ αὖ ἑαυτὸν νοεῖ· ἡ δ’ ἐνέργεια ἁπάντων πρὸς τὸ [19] ἀγαθόν). 
 
216
 V.6 [24] 5.13, ἀγαθοειδὲς: a likely reference to Plato, Republic VI.509a3; cf. also V.1 [10] 7.2: δεῖ πως 
εἶναι ἐκεῖνο (see notes 230 and 269). 
 
217
 V.3 [49] 11.8–12: [8] Καὶ γὰρ αὖ ἔχει τύπον τοῦ ὁράματος· ἢ οὐ παρεδέξατο [9] ἐν αὐτῇ γενέσθαι. 
Οὗτος δὲ πολὺς ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐγένετο, [10] καὶ οὕτως γνοὺς εἶδεν αὐτό καὶ τότε ἐγένετο ἰδοῦσα [11] ὄψις. 
Τοῦτο δὲ ἤδη νοῦς, ὅτε ἔχει, καὶ ὡς νοῦς ἔχει· πρὸ δὲ [12] τούτου ἔφεσις μόνον καὶ ἀτύπωτος ὄψις. 
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otherwise it would not have allowed it [9] to come into existence in itself. But 
this impression became many out of one, [10] and so Intellect knew it and 
saw it, and then it became a seeing [11] sight. It is already Intellect when it 
possesses this, and it possesses it as Intellect; but before [12] this it is only 
desire and unformed sight. 
 
This connatural desire and unformed sight of the One is as if impressed with the 
nature of its desideratum or object of vision. What this means is that the desire for the 
One which is intelligible matter, on the one hand is always naturally directed toward its 
desideratum, and, on the other, is already a desire to replicate the unity of the One, or to 
become that unity. But in order to do so while remaining other than the aim of its desire, 
this incipient Nous must break down its desideratum, as it were, into parts due to its 
inability to grasp it whole; in order to emerge as the thinking hypostasis, Nous must turn 
its vision into a multiplicity. 
The multiplicity of Nous is not a multiplicity of discrete parts, but a multiplicity 
internal to itself, the self-thinking and self-enclosed multiplicity of reciprocally 
implicating or interpenetrating parts: the intelligibles, Forms, or Ideas. Thus, on the one 
hand it would seem more precise to say that Loving Nous is not unqualifiedly simple 
rather than it is multiple, for it is not yet (logically) broken down into the plurality of the 
Ideas, but it is simply not identical with the aim of its desire. On the other hand Thinking 
Nous, or the actual second hypostasis, is rightly called multiple in at least two respects: 
first, because qua thinking it remains minimally other than its object (i.e., the 
intellgibles); and secondly, because its object itself is a multiplicity.
218
 This multiplicity is 
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 On the multiplicity of Nous as duality of thinker and object thought see III.8 [30] 8.30–31, 9.5–6, III.9 
[13] 1.12–15, 7.4–5, IV.3 [27] 1.12–13, V.3 [49] 10.44–46, V.4 [7] 2.8–11, VI.7 [38] 39.1–9, VI.9 [9] 
2.36–37. On the multiplicity of the object of noetic thinking (i.e., the Forms or Ideas), see II.4 [12] 4.2–3, 
IV.3 [27] 4.8–12, V.1 [10] 7.30, V.9 [5] 8.1–8, VI.2 [43] 21.53–59, VI.4 [22] 4.23–26, VI.5 [23] 6.1–3, 
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as highly unified a multiplicity one can conceive of, but a multiplicity nonetheless,
219
 
and to this extent a necessary failure to be unqualifiedly simple.
220
 Noetic multiplicity is 
due to the fact that since the One is, strictly, unthinkable, Nous exercises its thinking 
activity on itself as a diluted image or replica of the One.
221
 Its act of thought is its being, 
which alone is true being.
222
 The identity of thought and being
223
 in Nous constitutes the 
purest activity (V.3 [49] 6.5–8), a noetic-intuitive vision in which nothing external to be 
                                                                                                                                                 
VI.7 [38] 14.14–18, 37.18, VI.9 [9] 5.15–16. On Nous as multiplicity in general see IV.8 [6] 3.9–10, V.3 
[49] 10.9–16, VI.7 [38] 8.17–19, 39.14–16. 
 
219
 See III.8 [30] 8.31–48. 
 
220
 Thus, PIGLER (115) writes correctly that “[d]ans le Νοῦς s’achève ainsi l’acte de voir, qui est aussi acte 
de penser: parce que l’Intelligence ne peut posséder l’Un dans sa vision, elle le pense en elle-même dans 
la multiplicité des formes, et ce qu’elle pense, ce qu’elle contemple, a une « ressamblance avec le Bien ». 
La pensée est donc bien l’oeuvre du désir, désir de voir l’Un sans y pervenir (c’est pourquoi ce désir 
s’achève dans l’acte de penser), mais aussi désir de posséder l’Un sans y parvenir (c’est pourquoi ce désir 
s’achève dans la multiplicité des formes).” 
 
221
 Rist (1971, 83) writes: “The peculiar mark of νοῦς thinking is that it recognizes its own contents as they 
are, and they are a plurality (τὰ ἐν αὑτῷ βλέπει). Νοῦς in fact recognizes its own otherness. The peculiar 
mark of intuitive thought is that it is an attempt to think the One, but a failure to grasp the One without 
otherness; and otherness implies recognizable parts.” When in its ascent to the One the soul reaches the 
level of Loving Nous, its condition is a kind of blending (οἷον συγχέασα: VI.7 [38] 35.33) with the One, 
which it sees as a whole. To this extent, the loving state of Nous is superior to its thinking state due its 
greater proximity to the One and to the infinity of its love for the Principle, a love which is the very trace 
of the One. As PIGLER (107) remarks, “cette empreinte est, dans la hiérarchie ontologique, double: à la 
fois vie et amour; et c’est ainsi qu’elle constitue la meilleure image de l’unité absolument simple puisque, 
la Vie de l’Un est Amour.” 
 
222
 Cf. III.8 [30] 8.6–8, V.1 [10] 4.21–25, V.3 [49] 5.36–37, 13.28–31. In the Plotinian metaphysical 
schema, therefore, it is not the One, but Nous that represents the totality or plenitude of being, for being 
implies multiplicity: cf. III.3 [48] 3.22–24, III.8 [30] 8.40–48, IV.3 [27] 4.9–11, V.1 [10] 4.21–22, V.3 
[49] 11.20–22, V.5 [32] 3.1, V.9 [5] 6.1–3 (probably allusions to Anaxagoras: DK 59.B1 = Simplicius, 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics155.23–30), 7.11–12, 14.5, VI.2 [43] 21.27–32, VI.6 [34] 7.1–4, VI.7 
[38] 8.27–32, 17.33–34, VI.9 [9] 2.44–47. Intellect is thus a perfectly balanced mixture of identity and 
difference (or otherness): a multiplicity that is constantly unified both by intelligible matter, here 
understood as the “stuff” that is common to all the intelligibles, and by the eternal act of thinking of Nous 
that characterizes each of its parts. 
 
223
 This is Plotinus’ interpretation of Parmenides’ dictum, τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι (DK 28.B3, 
on which see Chapter Two note 126), appearing in the Enneads some seven times (see Index Fontium of 
HS2). The identity of thought and being is simultaneously an affirmation of Nous as pure actuality (V.3 
[49] 5.25–48, V.9 [5] 8.15–19; cf. note 233 below). 
 
  
231 
“seen” is needed (V.3 [49] 11.10–12). In this sense, the conversion of intelligible 
matter toward itself is its own self-knowledge
224
 and, indirectly, the attempt to reproduce, 
as thought, the unqualified unity from which it sprang. This act of self-knowledge is the 
very being or the life of Nous,
225
 but such a life, I must stress, is rooted in the 
superabundance of the One, which by leaving a trace of itself in its closest product, 
allows for the genesis of the second hypostasis as the noetic replica of the unqualified 
unity of the Principle.
226
 
The unity in multiplicity that is proper of Nous, the one-many, is also 
characterized by Plotinus as “friendship” (φιλία),227 a kind of internal eros or a perfect 
harmony of parts that are never separated and can be understood as an image of the self-
love of the One, where no multiplicity is to be found. As an image of the unqualified 
unity of the Principle, noetic unity expresses itself in the multiplicity of thought. Put 
differently, the One cannot be thought as it is, that is, as pure unity, and so in order to 
become thinkable, its unqualified unity needs to be made multiple: as we saw, this is the 
                                                 
224
 See V.3 [49] 7.18–19, V.5 [32] 5.14–19, VI.7 [38] 21.4–6. 
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 See II.4 [12] 5, 15, III.8 [30] 8.26–27, IV.7 [2] 9.10–13, V.2 [11] 1, V.3 [49] 8.38, V.4 [7] 2.44–46, VI.7 
[38] 13, 16, 17, 21, VI.9 [9] 9.17. PIGLER (102), to whom I owe most of these references, writes: “La vie 
représente dès lors le movement même per lequel la seconde hypastase s’auto-détermine et l’être s’auto-
actualise. Plus encore, elle est le mouvement par lequel la matière intelligible se donne à elle-même 
forme et détermination en se tournant vers son Principe. Ainsi l’être et la pensée, dont l’unité constitute 
l’Intelligence, apparaissent comme le produit de l’auto-détermination de la vie.” The life of Nous is a 
circular movement through which Nous realizes itself as thought, a thought which is completely 
transparent and eternal (see VI.7 [38] 13 and 33). 
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 See V.9 [5] 2.26–27, where Nous is explicitly described as being “like an impression of it [i.e., the One] 
in greater multiplicity, while the Good remains altogether in one” ([26] ὥσπερ ἐκείνου [27] τύπος 
μᾶλλον ἐν πλήθει ἐκείνου πάντη μένοντος ἐν ἑνί). And at V.4 [7] 2.26 the thought of Nous is called “an 
imitation and image [μίμημα καὶ εἴδωλον]” of the One. See also Appendix C. 
 
227
 See III.2 [47] 1.30–32, VI.7 [38] 14.20–23. 
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birth of Intellect as the thinking hypostasis. The thought of Nous, however, is not one 
whose object is external and whose parts unfold in (relatively) orderly succession (as in 
the Soul-Hypostasis), and whose contemplation is intermittent (as in a rational individual 
soul); it is rather a thought that contains all its parts as eternally present and mutually 
implicating or interpenetrating: not discursive thought (διάνοια, or διανόησις, as the 
proper mode of thought of soul), therefore, but intuitive thought (νόησις).228 
But what about the desire of Intellect? What kind of desire is it? What kind of 
eros is noetic eros? It is satisfied eros: desire fulfilled. Plotinus explains it in a passage 
that is worth citing in full, III.8 [30] 11.15–25:229 
[15] For Intellect needs the Good, but the Good does not [16] need it; 
hence too, when it attains the Good it becomes conformed to the Good
230
 
[17] and is completed by the Good, since the form [18] which comes upon 
                                                 
228
 On the thought proper of Nous as intuitive thought (νόησις) see V.3 [49] 6.7, V.4 [7] 2.3–4, 18–19, VI.2 
[43] 21.27–32; cf. also I.4 [46] 10.18–19, II.9 [33] 1.37–38, 46–50, III.9 [13] 7.3–4, IV.8 [6] 3.6–7, V.1 
[10] 7.10–11, V.3 [49] 5.31–43, V.9 [5] 8.16–19, VI.6 [34] 6.23–24, VI.9 [9] 5.12–20. As customary 
with Plotinus, the terminology is only somewhat technical (cf. note 261 below), and so νόησις and νοεῖν 
are not always used strictly to mean the activity of Nous (νόησις: e.g., I.6 [1] 6.12, VI.6 [34] 4.14; νοεῖν: 
e.g., I.2 [19] 3.15, 20, 24, II.4 [12] 10.20, II.9 [33] 1.60, IV.4 [28] 26.29, IV.7 [2] 8.1, 8
1
.7, IV.8 [6] 3.22, 
V.1 [10] 7.46, V.2 [11] 2.10, VI.9 [9] 9.14). In treatise I.1 [53] when νόησις is used in the plural, it 
means intellectual acts which may belong to soul (see I.1 [53] 1.8, 7.16, 9.21, and similarly 13.7 for 
νοεῖν; cf. III.5 [50] 7.56, III.6 [26] 1.10, IV.4 [28] 17.1), while when it is used in the singular it refers to 
pure noetic thought (I.1 [53] 2.28, 10.8, 13.5–6; cf. IV.3 [27] 30.12, VI.7 [38] 41.17–19); see Aubry 
(2004, 374, s.v. νόησις). At I.2 [19] 3.24–25 Plotinus is most explicit in emphasizing that the meaning of 
νοεῖν varies depending on the identity of the thinker: “[24] The soul’s intellectual activity is different: but 
of the realities There [25] one [i.e., Nous] thinks differently, and the other [i.e., the One] does not think at 
all” ([24] Νοεῖ τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἄλλως· τῶν δὲ ἐκεῖ [25] τὸ μὲν ἑτέρως, τὸ δὲ οὐδὲ ὅλως); cf. also V.3 [49] 6.2–
5. 
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 III.8 [30] 11.15–25: [15] Ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ δ’ ἀγαθὸν οὐ [16] δεῖται ἐκείνου· ὅθεν καὶ 
τυγχάνων τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθοειδὲς [17] γίνεται καὶ τελειοῦται παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ μὲν εἴδους [18] τοῦ 
ἐπ’ αὐτῷ παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἥκοντος ἀγαθοειδῆ [19] ποιοῦντος. Οἷον δὲ ἐνορᾶται ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ἴχνος τοῦ 
ἀγαθοῦ, [20] τοιοῦτον τὸ ἀρχέτυπον ἐννοεῖν προσήκει τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἐκείνου [21] ἐνθυμηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ 
τῷ νῷ ἐπιθέοντος ἴχνους. [22] Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ ἴχνος αὐτοῦ τῷ νῷ ὁρῶντι ἔδωκεν [23] ἔχειν· ὥστε 
ἐν μὲν τῷ νῷ ἡ ἔφεσις καὶ ἐφιέμενος ἀεὶ καὶ [24] ἀεὶ τυγχάνων, ἐκεῖ δὲ οὔτε ἐφιέμενος—τίνος γάρ οὔτε 
[25] τυγχάνων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐφίετο. 
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 III.8 [30] 11.16, 18 (ἀγαθοειδὲς, ἀγαθοειδῆ): again, echoes of Plato, Republic VI.509a3. See notes 216 
and 269. 
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it from the Good conforms it [19] to the Good. A trace of the Good is seen in 
it, [20] and it is in the likeness of this that one should conceive its true 
archetype, [21] forming an idea of it in oneself from the trace playing 
upon Intellect. [22] The Good therefore has given the trace of itself on 
Intellect to Intellect to have by seeing, [23] so that in Intellect there is 
desire, and it is always desiring and [24] always attaining, but the Good is 
not desiring—for what could it desire?—or attaining, for it did not desire 
[to attain anything]. 
 
It would seem that a desire which always possesses its desideratum as a matter of 
course could hardly be called desire. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that, 
although permanently attained, the desire of Nous remains desire, that is, unlike the eros 
of the One, a love for something which Intellect needs because it is not identical with it. 
The self-sufficiency of Nous,
231
 therefore, is due to the fact that Nous is always 
unfailingly in the condition of noetically contemplating the One, thanks to which Intellect 
can be the kind of unity it is, a one-many containing the object of thought within itself. 
But this self-sufficiency must be qualified by the fact that Nous is not the object of its 
own desire, but aims at the One, whose eros alone aims at nothing other than itself.
232
 
A similar qualification is in place with respect to the actuality of Intellect, that is, 
the identification of Intellect and pure actuality or being.
233
 Plotinus claims that the 
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 See for instance III.7 [45] 4.33–43, V.3 [49] 17.1–14. 
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 PIGLER (107) writes that the One represents for Intellect “la plenitude de la Vie et de l’Amour sans 
objet.” And she explains that noetic self-sufficiency is a trace of the One’s self-love, while the One, on its 
part, “n’a pas besoin de lui-même, car il se possède immédiatement, il est donc hypernoèsis, car en lui il 
n’y a nulle multiplicité à penser, nul besoin de conquerir l’unité qu’il est” (PIGLER 111). Cf. III.9 [13] 
9.4, V.1 [10] 6.42–43, V.3 [49] 16.25. 
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 On Nous as pure actuality see II.5 [25] 3.25–33, 38, II.9 [33] 1.29–30, 2.2–3, III.9 [13] 6.4–7, IV.4 [28] 
1.17–18, V.1 [10] 12.3–4, V.3 [49] 5.25–48, 6.5–8, 7.13–20, 25, 8.36, V.9 [5] 5.1–19, 7.8–9, VI.2 [43] 
21.24–25, VI.6 [34] 6.31–36, 8.19–20, VI.7 [38] 13.1–3, 21.2–6, 25.31; on the identity of activity and 
being in Nous see notes 222 and 223 above. On thinking, or more precisely self-thinking (i.e., identity of 
thinker and intelligible object), as the proper activity of Nous see V.3 [49] 5.41–48, 6.6–8, 7.13–20. At 
III.8 [30] 11.1–8, Plotinus describes Nous as a passage from potency to act (cf. III.9 [13] 8.4). I believe 
this does not detract from the description of Intellect as actuality because in this passage Plotinus is not 
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thinking of Nous is ever actual not simply because what we might refer to as its 
noematic side (i.e., the Ideas or intelligibles) is eternally contemporaneous with its noetic 
side (i.e., the act of thinking), but more fundamentally because the intelligibles are never 
external to Nous and so the two are a unity. However, even the actuality of this unity 
would cease to exist unless a prior actuality were already in place. This is the 
unqualifiedly first actuality of the One, an actuality which, as Plotinus remarks, is the 
actualization (ἐνέργημα) not of something else, but of itself.234 In other words, the 
actuality of Nous is the actualization of the unity or the self-love of the One in a noetic 
mode (much like soul is the actualization of Nous in a dianoetic or discursive mode). The 
actuality of the One, by contrast, only actualizes itself, for that toward which it is 
erotically directed is nothing but itself. Therefore, the actualization of Nous qua thinking 
hypostasis is posterior in being to, or is a consequence of, the infinite power of the 
One.
235
 The infinity of this power is replicated in Nous as the infinite movement of 
thought within the limits of the second hypostasis.
236
 
                                                                                                                                                 
saying that there ever was a moment in which Nous was in a state of potency from which it developed 
into actual (i.e., thinking) Nous, but rather that it is necessary to postulate a conceptual distinction of 
stages, potential and actual, although Intellect was always already actual (see Corrigan 2005, 184–185). 
In this passage Plotinus may also be hinting at the idea that the eternal activity of Nous is not self-
sufficient, because it depends for its actuality on the contemplation of the One much like vision depends 
on the object of sight. This is also true of soul with respect to Nous (V.1 [10] 3.15–16), but with the 
difference that the thought of Nous (νόησις), unlike the thinking of soul (διάνοια), is never potential, but 
is a sustained actual vision (cf. V.1 [10] 5.18–19). 
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 VI.8 [39] 16.16–17: [16] Νοῦς δὲ ἐνέργημα· ὥστε ἐνέργημα αὐτός. Ἀλλὰ [17] ἄλλου μὲν οὐδενός· 
ἑαυτοῦ ἄρα ἐνέργημα αὐτός. See also lines 35–39 in the same chapter. Cf. V.6 [24] 5.5–10, 6.1–9. 
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 See V.8 [31] 9.24–26, VI.9 [9] 6.10–11. 
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 The resemblance of the One in Nous is more precisely what in Nous lacks form, namely the unlimited 
and infinite life that constitutes Intellect in its first stage, the indeterminate life of intelligible matter as a 
trace of the One (see VI.7 [38] 17.12–14). For a treatment of this issue in terms of Beauty and light, see 
PIGLER (121–128) and Hadot (1988, 307–319); cf. V.5 [32] 7.16–35, V.8 [31] 4.3–15, VI.7 [38] 22.1–7. 
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Now, if the actuality which is Nous is the wholly self-enclosed effort to 
replicate noetically the unqualified unity or erotic self-identity of the Principle, how are 
we to justify the generation or procession of soul from Nous? The answer must be that a 
trace of the One in Intellect implies not only unity, though of a noetic kind, but also 
production, that is, not only an activity of the essence but also an activity from the 
essence. Thus, just as Nous is at the same time the activity of its own essence and the 
activity from the essence of the One, likewise soul will be at the same time the activity of 
its own essence and the activity from the essence of Intellect. Moreover, the generation of 
soul will not be arbitrary, but a necessary act of love springing from the very nature of its 
generator. And finally, it is by turning upon itself and toward its generator that soul will 
emerge as a distinct hypostasis, with its own proper mode of unity and of eros, to which I 
will refer as psychic unity and psychic eros. 
3.4.2 Psychic Eros: Soul as the Discursive Replica of the Unity and Eros of Nous 
and In-forming Principle of the Sensible Universe 
The third hypostasis is the most complex in Plotinian metaphysics, and 
understandably so, for by its nature soul is an intermediate reality between two very 
different realms: the intelligible and the sensible. This is not the place to try to provide a 
detailed mapping of the hypostasis of soul, but a basic outline is nonetheless necessary.
237
 
As I already had occasion to point out less schematically in the previous chapter 
(Subsection 2.3.2), the basic divisions of the structure of the third hypostasis are the 
following: 
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 For a valuable detailed exposition of the structure of the hypostasis soul see Andolfo (1996). 
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(1) The Soul-Hypostasis, sometimes called Whole Soul (πᾶσα ψυχή, ὅλη 
ψυχή),238 Separate Soul (χωριστὸν ψυχή or χωριστὴ ψυχή), and Pure Soul or Soul alone 
or simply (μόνον or μόνη ψυχή, ἁπλῶς ψυχή; here capitalized to avoid equivocation239), 
that is, soul eternally contemplating Intellect without directly interacting with the 
sensible.
240
  
(2) The soul which is involved in the ordering and maintenance of the sensible. 
This is in turn divided in: 
(a) The World-Soul (otherwise referred to as Soul of the Whole or of the All, and 
Cosmic Soul or Soul of the Cosmos: ἡ τοῦ παντός ψυχή, ἡ τοῦ ὅλου ψυχή, ἡ τοῦ κόσμου 
                                                 
238
 Thus far I have been unable to dispel some doubts about the adjectives ὅλη (whole) and πᾶσα (all, 
entire, every, nothing but) as they are used to qualify the term ψυχή (soul). Both adjectives can be used to 
refer alternately to the Soul-Hypostasis (ἡ ὅλη ψυχή: IV.3 [27] 1.33, 2.55; πᾶσα ψυχή: III.9 [13] 3.1, 
VI.7 [38] 12.21) and to the the World-Soul (ἡ ὅλη ψυχή: I.1 [53] 11.14, II.9 [33] 18.40, IV.3 [27] 4.30; 
πᾶσα ψυχή: e.g., II.2 [14] 1.39, II.9 [33] 7.11–12, III.3 [48] 1.4). Part of the doubts I have in grasping the 
usage of these qualifications of soul in Plotinus may depend on the fact that the distinction between Soul-
Hypostasis and World-Soul, although maintained in the exposition of IV.3 [27] 1–8, sometimes is either 
blurred or at least hard to pinpoint merely on the basis of terminological usage in the Enneads (for some 
valuable terminological clarifications on the usage of the adjectives πᾶσα and ὅλη in connection with 
soul, particularly as they occur in IV.3 [27] 1–8, see Helleman-Elgersma 1980, 132–147; for grammatical 
notes on the usage of πᾶς and ὅλος see Smyth 1956, §§ 1174–1175). For instance at II.3 [52] 17.15–16 
the World-Soul (here ἡ τοῦ παντός ψυχή) is mentioned immediately after Nous; and at IV.4 [28] 10.9–15 
the World-Soul’s (or at least its higher part’s: see Table 5 below) contemplation of Nous does not seem 
to differ from the Soul-Hypostasis’ contemplation of Nous. This problem of demarcation of boundaries 
may in turn be a consequence of another more fundamental, if only occasional, “blurring” of such 
boundaries, namely that between the Soul-Hypostasis and Nous (on which see Armstrong 1967, 250; 
Blumenthal 1974; Wallis 1995, 82). Patently, the issue requires more attention than I can reserve to it in 
the limited space of a footnote. 
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 For χωριστὸν ψυχή or ἡ χωριστὴ ψυχή see I.1 [53] 10.7–11, II.3 [52] 9.44, III.5 [50] 2.23, 3.22, 26, IV.3 
[27] 20.30, 41, 21.6, V.1 [10] 10.16; cf. I.8 [51] 14.17–19. For ἁπλῶς ψυχή see III.5 [50] 3.31, VI.7 [38] 
5.6. For μόνον ψυχή or ἡ μόνη ψυχή see I.2 [19] 3.11–15, I.6 [1] 5.57, 6.18, II.2 [14] 1.15, III.2 [47] 
7.21, III.3 [48] 3.25, III.5 [50] 3.31, IV.4 [28] 32.10; cf. also IV.3 [27] 27.14, IV.4 [28] 18.23, 24.2, VI.8 
[39] 2.15, VI.9 [9] 3.10–11. 
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 In the remainder of this chapter I will also refer to the Soul-Hypostasis as the higher or superior soul, ἡ 
ἄνω ψυχή (see III.5 [50] 3.19, III.9 [13] 3.5–6, V.2 [11] 1.23). 
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ψυχή),241 which makes of the sensible a cosmos by governing it in accordance with 
the contemplation of Nous via the Soul-Hypostasis. 
(b) Individual, particular, or partial souls (ἡ ἑκάστου ψυχή, ἡ ψυχὴ καθέκαστα; ἡ 
μερικὴ ψυχή),242 such as those of particular human beings, animals, and plants. 
(3) There is also a third distinction to keep in mind, that between vegetative soul 
(φυτική),243 sensitive soul (αἰσθητική),244 appetitive soul (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν),245 and 
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 For ἡ τοῦ παντός ψυχή see II.3 [52] 17.15, 18.8, II.9 [33] 7.5, 8.40, 9.32, 18.23–24, 39–40, III.1 [3] 8.4–
6, III.2 [47] 18.29, III.4 [15] 4.2–3, III.5 [50] 3.27–28, 6.29–33, III.7 [45] 13.65, IV.3 [27] 1.17 ad fin., 
2.59, 4.28, 6.1, 7.16–17, 8.49, 12.11, IV.4 [28] 6.7, 10.2, 13.17, 15.7, 16.27–28, 17.36, 24.31, 32.9, IV.7 
[2] 12.1–3, IV.8 [6] 1.41, 46, 2.34–35, IV.9 [8] 1.10, V.1 [10] 10.22, V.8 [31] 13.15, VI.7 [38] 7.9. For ἡ 
τοῦ ὅλου ψυχή see IV.3 [27] 1.36, IV.7 [2] 13.9 (τῆς τῶν ὅλων ψυχῆς). On ἡ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχή see I.2 
[19] 1.7–8, II.9 [33] 17.19, III.4 [15] 6.23, III.5 [50] 3.30–31, 5.12, V.9 [5] 4.14–15; cf. IV.8 [6] 2.19–21. 
As pointed out in note 238 above, the World-Soul at times is also qualified as ὅλη and πᾶσα. Sometimes 
in secondary literature on Plotinus the World-Soul is referred to as Universal Soul, even if, as Helleman-
Elgersma (1980, 134) points out, the expression would apply more properly to the Soul-Hypostasis. In 
order to avoid confusion, I will stay away from the expression altogether. For a concise reading of 
Plotinus’ retrieval of the psychology of the World-Soul in the Timaeus through Aristotelian lenses, see 
IGAL (I, 52–53). 
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 For ἡ ἑκάστου ψυχή see III.1 [3] 8.6, IV.3 [27] 6.2, IV.8 [6] 1.47, IV.9 [8] 1.1, V.7 [18] 1.8, VI.4 [22] 
14.1, VI.5 [23] 6.14. For ἡ ψυχὴ καθέκαστα see IV.8 [6] 4.1, V.7 [18] 1.6. For ἡ μερικὴ ψυχή see III.9 
[13] 3.7, IV.3 [27] 2.42, IV.8 [6] 8.16–17 (Αἱ δ’ ἐν μέρει), VI.4 [22] 16.22. For a clarification on the 
terminology of individual soul see Chapter Two note 83. 
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 For ἡ φυτικὴ ψυχή see II.9 [33] 11.20, IV.4 [24] 22.1–3, 14, 35.42, IV.9 [8] 3.10–11; elsewhere the 
vegetative soul is called τὸ φυτικόν (e.g., at I.4 [46] 9.28, III.4 [15] 2.23, 4.12, III.6 [26] 4.38, IV.3 [27] 
19.19, IV.4 [28] 28.16, 60, 66, IV.7 [2] 8
5
.25). The vegetative soul is naturally associated with its three 
characteristic activities, generation, nutrition, and growth, hence the distinction of a generative power (τὸ 
γεννητικόν: e.g., I.1 [53] 8.21, III.6 [26] 4.33, IV.4 [28] 28.50; ἡ γεννητικὴ ψυχή: II.9 [33] 11.20), a 
nutritive power (τὸ θρεπτικόν: III.6 [26] 4.32, IV.9 [8] 3.23, 25, IV.3 [27] 23.36), and the power for 
growth or accretive power (τὸ αὐξητικόν: see III.6 [26] 4.33, IV.3 [27] 19.20, 23.36; cf. I.1 [53] 8.21). 
Both for these powers and those referenced in the following few notes, Plotinus obviously ows much to 
the distinctions put forth by Aristotle in books II and III of De anima (cf. Igal 1979). 
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 For ἡ αἰσθητικὴ ψυχή see IV.3 [27] 23.22, IV.4 [28] 19.5, IV.9 [8] 1.5; more frequently, the sensitive 
soul is called τὸ αἰσθητικόν (e.g., at II.9 [33] 13.31, III.4 [15] 4.13, IV.3 [27] 19.11, 23.31, 29.6–7, V.1 
[10] 12.9, VI.7 [38] 3.22–30). 
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 For τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν see I.1 [53] 5.7, IV.3 [27] 23.40, IV.4 [28] 22.1, 28.65, IV.8 [6] 8.9; the appetitive 
soul is often called τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν (e.g., at III.6 [26] 2.28, 60, 4.4, 32, IV.3 [27] 28.10–11, 16, 21, IV.7 [2] 
8
5
.23). 
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spirited soul (τὸ θυμοειδές or τὸ θυμούμενον,246 which Plotinus seems to reduce to 
one, τὸ ὀρεκτικόν or desiring soul247), imagining soul (φανταστική),248 and rational or 
reasoning soul (λογική or λογιζομένη).249 It is evident, however, that the “souls” 
mentioned in this division are not to be taken as particular souls, but rather as powers, 
faculties, aspects, or parts of soul.
250
 
An individual human soul that identifies itself primarily with its lesser powers 
(i.e., those that function in relation to the sensible: basically all with the exception of the 
rational part) is a soul of an inferior kind and is variously called irrational (ἄλογος)251 and 
passive (τὸ παθητικόν).252 By contrast, a human soul which identifies primarily with its 
rational powers is a higher kind of soul.
253
 This soul, soul unmingled with body or, 
perhaps less extremely, soul not viewing bodily concerns as primary, is taken to be the 
human being itself or truly (IV.7 [2] 1.22: αὐτὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος): our true self, “we 
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 For τὸ θυμοειδές see III.6 [26] 4.4, IV.4 [28] 28.65; the alternative expression τὸ θυμούμενον is found at 
I.2 [19] 1.18 and IV.4 [28] 28.45. 
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 See I.1 [53] 5.21–23; cf. Aubry (2004, 177). 
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 For ἡ φανταστική ψυχή see IV.3 [27] 23.22; in the same treatise this power of the soul is also called τὸ 
φανταστικόν, e.g. at IV.3 [27] 23.32, 30.5–11. 
 
249
 For ἡ λογικὴ ψυχή see I.1 [53] 7.22, II.9 [33] 11.20, IV.3 [27] 3.29, IV.8 [6] 3.21–22 (λογικωτέρας), 
IV.9 [8] 3.10–11, V.9 [5] 7.1, VI.7 [38] 4.13, 34–36; the rational soul is also called ἡ λογιζομένη ψυχή at 
IV.7 [2] 8
5.17 and V.1 [10] 11.1, and λογιζομένη δύναμις at V.3 [49] 3.15. Alternative and frequently 
used expressions to refer to this part of the soul are τὸ λογιστικόν (e.g., III.6 [26] 2.22, III.8 [30] 5.10, 
V.3 [49] 3.20, 31, VI.1 [42] 12.6, VI.9 [9] 5.8) and τὸ λογιζόμενον (e.g., I.2 [19] 1.17, I.8 [51] 4.17, III.6 
[26] 2.31, 37, IV.3 [27] 19.4, 23.33, V.1 [10] 10.14, 11.6, V.3 [49] 2.7, VI.9 [9] 5.8). 
 
250
See II.3 [52] 17.5–6, IV.3 [27] 23.35–42, IV.4 [28] 28.64–65. 
 
251
 For ἡ ἄλογος ψυχή see I.8 [51] 4.8, IV.4 [28] 40.23, IV.9 [8] 3.10; cf. III.1 [3] 5.28, V.2 [11] 2.4–10; 
elsewhere the irrational soul is frequently called τὸ ἄλογον (e.g., at I.2 [19] 1.23, 5.22, IV.3 [27] 19.5, 
IV.4 [28] 28.64, 43.7). On the meaning of “irrational” see Chapter Two note 49. 
 
252
 For τὸ παθητικόν see III.6 [26] 1.19, 4.1–6, 31, 34, 44, 5.3, 23. 
 
253
 See V.1 [10] 3.17–20; cf. III.3 [48] 3.26–29, III.5 [50] 7.39–42, VI.7 [38] 6.23–36. 
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ourselves” (ἡμεῖς; cf. IV.4 [28] 18.10–19),254 “what we most are” (VI.8 [39] 12.5–6: 
ὃ μάλιστά ἐσμεν255).256 In its purity, the human soul is identical with the subject of one of 
Plotinus’ most peculiar doctrines, the doctrine of an undescended or unfallen part of the 
                                                 
254
 The use of the pronoun ἡμεῖς (“we”) and the related possessive ἡμέτερος in Plotinus is very complex, 
variously indicating “we” as members of the noetic realm, the higher part of our souls, the individual 
capable of deliberation and choice, etc. (see SP, s.v. ἡμεῖς; the entry, being marked with an asterisk, is 
incomplete and yet takes up about three columns of the Lexicon Plotinianum). Most importantly, the term 
ἡμεῖς seems to be Plotinus’ term of choice for what today we would call the “self.” Major treatments of 
Plotinus’ notion of the self are: O’Daly (1973), Gerson (1994, 139–151), Remes (2007), Aubry (2005, 
15–61; 2008), Tornau (2009); I refer to some of these studies in my discussion on Forms of individuals 
in Subsection 4.4.1. 
 
255
 The fuller text of VI.8 [39] 12.5–6 reads: [5] κατὰ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ὃ [6] μάλιστά ἐσμεν. I take the καὶ 
on line 5 to be epexegetical (so Leroux 1990 and Faggin 2002; also, implicitly, D’Ancona Costa 2002, 
540–541, but not necessarily ARMSTRONG, whose translation she follows). If this not the case (e.g., 
besides ARMSTRONG, in IGAL), the expression ὃ μάλιστά ἐσμεν could actually be taken to refer to the 
best (undescended) part of the soul of which I speak in the rest of the paragraph and in Subsection 4.3.2. 
 
256
 See I.1 [53] 7.21, III.5 [50] 5.14 (ἄνθρωπος ἡ ἀνθρώπου ψυχή), VI.7 [38] 4.10–12, 36–37, V.3 [49] 4; 
cf. also IV.7 [2] 1.1, 20–25. The background of this view is certainly Plato (especially Alcibiades I 
129e9–130c6, on which see Aubry 2004, 15–32; see also Phaedo 115c4–116a1, Republic IX.589a6–b6, 
Laws XII.959a4–b5; cf. Republic IX.590a9–b1, 588c7, X.611b5–612a6), as well as Aristotle (De anima 
III.430a10–25, Nicomachean Ethics IX.1166a16–23, 1168b28–1169a3, X.1178a2–7; On the 
Pythagoreans, fragment 2 = Iamblichus, On the Pythagorean Way of Life VI.31; Protrepticus, fragment 
6 = Iamblichus, Protrepticus VII.42.3–4). I will deal more extensively with the notion of the best part of 
the soul in Subsection 4.3.2. 
In other passages (i.e., VI.5 [23] 6.6–15 and VI.7 [38] 6.9–21), Plotinus speaks of a trinity of men 
within man, or rather, of three levels of humanity. The first man is the intelligible man (i.e., the Form of 
Man or the Man itself, corresponding to the αὐτοάνθρωπος of V.9 [5] 13.2, 14.18); the second man is the 
higher (i.e., rational) level of the soul, corresponding, I take it, to the subject of the references cited in the 
first paragraph of this note (and presumably to the undescended part of the soul, on which see the next 
note); finally, the third man is the embodied man, a reflection of the soul in body, or the subject of the 
affections related to the bodily condition. For an enlightening commentary on VI.7 [38] 6.9–21, see 
Hadot (1988, 209–225); for a shorter account see Kalligas (1997, 218–220). 
In connection to this, it may be asked what happened to Plato’s tripartition of the soul as presented in 
book IV of the Republic (as well as in the image of the charioteer in the Phaedrus, 246a3–d2, if this can 
legitimately be thought of as a parallel or a complementary account of Republic IV.434d2–441c3), and to 
what extent this view might be true of Plotinus’s conception of the individual human soul. More 
specifically, does tripartition apply to the human soul as such or only to the human the soul in its 
disembodied condition? With Gerson (1994, 155), I believe that the latter hypothesis is more sensible, 
although as Igal (1979; cf. also IGAL I, 87) argues, for Plotinus even the spirited and the appetitive parts 
are everlasting (this, as well as the fact that these parts are not necessarily connected to the body, would 
be confirmed by the image of the charioteer from the Phaedrus, in which the two horses are possessed by 
both human and divine souls in a disembodied condition: see Phaedrus 246a7–b1, b7–c4). Moreover, as 
Gerson points out on the same page, perhaps the view of tripartition already underwent modification in 
Plato himself (see especially Timaeus 69c5–d6, 41b7–d3, 90a2–7); cf. also IGAL (I, 83–88). 
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individual soul ever connected to the noetic realm.
257
 Analogously, the World-Soul 
might be divided in a higher and a lower part. The higher part is what in the previous 
chapter (page 129) was called its intellect and was found to be represented by Zeus in 
treatise III.5 [50]; the lower part is this soul as it is immanently at work in the cosmos.
258
 
Table 5. Basic Divisions of the Hypostasis Soul 
N 
 
O 
 
U 
 
S 
   
Soul- 
Hypostasis 
(Pure Soul, 
Whole Soul, 
Separate Soul, 
Soul simply, 
Soul alone) 
World-Soul (Nature) 
(Soul of the Whole, Soul of the 
All, Cosmic Soul) 
Higher part: intellect of 
the World-Soul 
 
Lower part: immanent 
Nature 
Individual souls and their 
powers 
(particular souls, partial souls 
and their faculties, aspects, parts) 
Lower (descended) soul: 
vegetative, sensitive, 
imaginative, desiring, etc. 
Higher (undescended) 
soul: rational part 
 
 
It is this complexity
259
 that justifies Plotinus’ description of the hypostasis soul as 
“one and many” (ἓν καὶ πολλά)260 and its presence at several levels of Plotinus’ 
                                                 
257
 On the undescended (part of the) soul see in particular IV.8 [6] 8 and V.1 [10] 10.13 ad fin.; see also a 
number of passages where this may be alluded: e.g., I.1 [53] 13.5–8, II.9 [33] 2.4–10, III.8 [30] 6.35–36, 
IV.3 [27] 12.1–8, IV.7 [2] 10, 13.2–3, VI.7 [38] 6.9–15, 28.22–23. Cf. Plato, Republic X.611b9–612a6. 
See Subsection 4.3.2 below, especially pages 341–345. 
 
258
 See IV.4 [28] 13.19–25. We may also call the totality of the World-Soul “Nature,” while mindful of the 
distinction between a higher and a lower part in it, that is, respectively its intellect and Nature proper, 
immanently at work in the cosmos. Cf. Subsection 2.3.2. 
 
259
 Let it be noticed again that Plotinus seems to follow the terminology outlined in the opening pages of 
the present subsection quite consistently, but not with technical strictness (cf. note 228 above). Thus, for 
example, at IV.8 [6] 8.13 the World-Soul is called “the soul which is a whole and is the soul of the 
whole” (ἡ μὲν ὅλη καὶ ὅλου; epexegetical καὶ; that it is the World-Soul, and not the Soul-Hypostasis, to 
be designated by ἡ μὲν ὅλη can be easily inferred from the context). A similar ambiguity can be detected 
in the different referents of πᾶσα ψυχή and ἡ ὅλη ψυχή (see note 238). See also the somewhat unusual 
designations of Nous as ἓν καὶ πολλά and εἷς καὶ πολλοί mentioned in note 260. 
 
260
 A description of soul as ἓν καὶ πολλά can be found at IV.2 [4] 2.40, 53, V.1 [10] 8.26, VI.2 [43] 4.18 
(πολλὰ καὶ ἓν). At VI.2 [43] 21.7, 48 it is Nous that is called ἓν καὶ πολλά, and at IV.8 [6] 3.10, εἷς καὶ 
πολλοί. Given the context, I believe that these references point to a noetic, rather than discursive, ἓν καὶ 
πολλά. The more common description of Nous is one-many (ἓν πολλά: cf. note 200). See Chapter Two 
note 28 for the Platonic background of this terminology. 
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metaphysical hierarchy.
261
 Table 5 above may suffice as an incomplete synopsis of 
the major divisions of the third hypostasis I just outlined. 
Despite its complex structure, of which I here introduced only a bare and 
incomplete outline,
262
 the entire reality of soul derives from one single psychic source, 
namely the Soul-Hypostasis,
263
 which is the immediate origin of both the World-Soul and 
of the multiplicity of individual souls that come to act on different portions of matter (see 
page 131 above).
264
 But how does Soul come into existence from Nous? The description 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
261
 Cf. III.4 [15] 3.21–27, where the soul is said to be present at different levels, most notably in the 
intelligible and, through some kind of outflow (ἀπόρροια), in the sensible. ARMSTRONG (I, 150, note 1) 
aptly comments: “Plotinus thinks of soul as a rich, complex unity capable of existing on many levels and 
operating in many ways, which can be distinguished but must not be separated.” He adds that this way of 
thinking will be rejected by later Platonists, who take the different levels of the hierarchy of being as 
more emphatically separate (e.g., Proclus’ remarks on Parmenides 134a in his Commentary on Plato’s 
Parmenides V.984.14–20); cf. also Chapter Four note 89. 
 
262
 To this classification we might add two more items found in the Enneads, namely that of Forms or Ideas 
of individuals or of particulars (τοῦ καθέκαστον ἰδέα; see especially V.7 [18] On the question whether 
there are Ideas of particulars; see Chapter Four note 110 for further references) and that of Soul itself, 
the Form or Idea of Soul (αὐτοψυχή; see V.9 [5] 13–14). For the latter see Schniewind (1988, 200–205); 
important observations are found also in F. Ferrari (1997, 36) and Kalligas (1997, 218 note 45). There is 
a considerable amount of literature (and controversy) on Forms of individuals and individuality in 
Plotinus; I briefly assess this issue in Subsection 4.4.1 below. 
 
263
 See especially treatise IV.9 [8] On whether all souls are one; cf. III.3 [48] 1.4–8, III.7 [45] 13.66–67, 
IV.3 [27] 2.1–10, 54–59, 6.10–15, 8.54–55, IV.4 [28] 10.15, VI.2 [43] 11.11, VI.4 [22] 4.3, 34–45, VI.6 
[34] 7.1–7. What this means is that psychic life, in spite of its variety, has a single origin. This, to be 
sure, is true also of noetic life and, ultimately, of all life as participating in the arch-Life of the One (see 
note 171 above). The basic insight, I surmise, is that life cannot be derived from what utterly lacks life, 
much like intelligence cannot be derived from what utterly lacks intelligence, and existence, from what is 
utterly non-existent. Or rather, one can claim that life might have emerged from the non-living, but I am 
not aware of a convincing explanation of how this is possible (cf. Clark 1999, 277–279). 
 
264
 Soul is said to be both indivisible (ἀμέριστος) and divisible (μεριστή), and this in two senses. In a 
general sense, it is indivisible insofar as it is wholly united to Nous, but it is divisible insofar as it leaves 
the intelligible realm in order to mix with body. In another sense, even when it is mixed with body, soul 
is said to be indivisible insofar as it gives itself whole to every part of the body; embodied soul is also 
divisible, however, insofar as the intrinsically divisible nature of body is unable to receive soul 
indivisibly. In neither sense does psychic divisibility entail divisibility of discrete parts. I hope I am not 
departing excessively from what Plotinus had in mind if I interpret the divisibility/indivisibility of soul in 
its relation to body as an instance of the later dictum, Quidquid recipitur per modum recipientis recipitur 
(see for instance Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super Sententiis I.d17.q1.a1.s.c.1, Summa theologiae 
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of its generation is similar to that of the generation of Nous from the One. Of the 
principal passages in which Plotinus describes the genesis of Soul,
265
 I will focus on V.1 
[10] 7.36–48:266 
[36] ...for Intellect generates soul, [37] since it is perfect Intellect. For 
since it was perfect it had to generate, [38] and not be without offspring 
when it was so great a power. But [39] its offspring could not be better 
than it in this case either, [40] but had to be a lesser image of it, and in the 
same way indefinite, [41] but defined by its parent and, so to speak, given 
a form. [42] And the offspring of Intellect is a rational form and an 
existing being, that which [43] thinks discursively; it is this that moves 
round Intellect and is [44] light and trace of Intellect and dependent on it, 
united to it [45] on one side and so filled with it and enjoying it [46] and 
sharing in it and thinking, but on the other side [47] in touch with the 
things which came after it, or rather itself generating what [48] must 
necessarily be worse than soul. 
 
This passage was worth citing in full because it clearly highlights some of the 
major themes of the derivation of a hypostasis from a higher one. 
One of these themes is the necessity of generation due to the perfection of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
I.q75.a5.co., De veritate q2.a3.co.; cf. also Chapter Four note 112). On this problem see the two short 
treatises On the Essence of the Soul, IV.2 [4] and IV.1 [21] and the respective commentaries by Chappuis 
(2006; 2008); cf. also IV.3 [27] 19–20. 
 
265
 Here is a list, analogous to the one given in note 201 for Nous, of the main passages in which Plotinus 
mentions the genesis of soul, with the main theme of each descriptions provided in parentheses: V.1 [10] 
3 (soul as image of Nous), V.1 [10] 7.36–48 (soul as a kind of thought derived from Nous), V.2 [11] 
1.16–18 (soul as the activity springing from the substance of Nous), V.3 [49] 8.15–20 (soul as light from 
noetic light), VI.2 [43] 22.25–28 (soul as the activity from the essence of Nous; cf. IV.4 [28] 16.18–19: 
ἐνέργεια δευτέρα μετὰ νοῦν ἐστι ψυχή). See also III.3 [48] 3.21–22, VI.6 [34] 7.4–7, 15.3–6, VI.7 [38] 
17.37–39. 
 
266
 V.1 [10] 7.36–48: [36] ψυχὴν γὰρ γεννᾷ [37] νοῦς, νοῦς ὢν τέλειος. Καὶ γὰρ τέλειον ὄντα γεννᾶν ἔδει, 
[38] καὶ μὴ δύναμιν οὖσαν τοσαύτην ἄγονον εἶναι. Κρεῖττον [39] δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν εἶναι οὐδ’ ἐνταῦθα τὸ 
γεννώμενον, [40] ἀλλ’ ἔλαττον ὂν εἴδωλον εἶναι αὐτοῦ, ἀόριστον μὲν ὡσαύτως, [41] ὁριζόμενον δὲ ὑπὸ 
τοῦ γεννήσαντος καὶ οἷον εἰδοποιούμενον. [42] Νοῦ δὲ γέννημα λόγος τις καὶ ὑπόστασις, τὸ [43] 
διανοούμενον· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ περὶ νοῦν κινούμενον καὶ [44] νοῦ φῶς καὶ ἴχνος ἐξηρτημένον ἐκείνου, 
κατὰ θάτερα μὲν [45] συνηγμένον ἐκείνῳ καὶ ταύτῃ ἀποπιμπλάμενον καὶ ἀπολαῦον [46] καὶ 
μεταλαμβάνον αὐτοῦ καὶ νοοῦν, κατὰ θάτερα δὲ [47] ἐφαπτόμενον τῶν μετ’ αὐτό, μᾶλλον δὲ γεννῶν καὶ 
αὐτό, ἃ [48] ψυχῆς ἀνάγκη εἶναι χείρονα. The translation that follows is from ARMSTRONG, with minimal 
modifications. 
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generating hypostasis (lines 36–38). This is a qualified replica of the Principle of 
Superabundance—qualified because it takes place at the noetic level. In this scheme, soul 
is the second activity of Nous, or the activity from Intellect’s essence.267 Another theme is 
the idea that the generated hypostasis is an image of the generating one, a notion which in 
our text is coupled with the Principle of Superiority of Cause to Effect (lines 38–40, and 
successively 47–48). Still another theme is the double stage of the generated hypostasis 
of soul, analogous to that found in the generation of Nous (pages 224–229), though not so 
explicitly formulated (lines 40–41). A final theme is the double activity of the generated 
hypostasis (lines 42–48), which here is described respectively as a kind of thinking (46: 
νοοῦν) which amounts to a discursive or dianoetic contemplation (line 43: διανοούμενον) 
of Nous (i.e., the activity of soul’s essence: 42–46), and the generation of something 
inferior after itself (i.e., the activity from soul’s essence: line 46–48).268 
A lesser image (line 40: ἔλαττον... εἴδωλον) of Intellect, soul is both similar to 
and different from its generator. Like Nous in its incipient state, soul is indeterminate 
(line 40: ἀόριστον) and needs to be given form by its generator. In this sense, soul is the 
very matter of Nous, “informed” (line 41: εἰδοποιούμενον) by Nous as soul reverts its 
                                                 
267
 For references about soul as the second activity of Nous see note 265 above. Incidentally, to ascribe a 
second activity to Intellect may be an implicit way for Plotinus to reject Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s 
Ideas as unsuitable to serve as causes (αἰτίαι) of things in the realm of becoming (γίγνεσθαι) on the 
premise that an efficient cause (τὸ κινῆσον) is needed to connect Ideas and things (e.g., Metaphysics 
I.991b3–9). If soul is understood both as the offspring of Intellect and as responsible for linking Ideas to 
sensibles (i.e., as the efficient cause required by Aristotle, as Plotinus in fact conceives it), then Nous can 
indeed be called cause of things in the realm of becoming, though in a qualified way, that is, remotely. 
As Dodds (1960, 3) remarks, “[t]he Platonic Forms are no mere static archetypes, as Aristotle mistakenly 
supposed.” I assume that the mistake Dodds (and Plotinus) has in mind is a philosophical one. 
Philologically, Aristotle is mistaken only if an interpretation of Platonic Ideas as somewhat identical with 
Plotinian Nous is tenable. 
 
268
 On the double activity of soul(s) see also IV.8 [6] 3.27–30, VI.2 [43] 22.28–33. 
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contemplative gaze toward its generator.
269
 As with Nous in relation to the One, so 
with soul in relation to Nous, the movement that allows for the emergence of a fully 
formed hypostasis is one of reversion (ἐπιστροφή, ἐπιστρέφειν) toward the generator, 
which in this case is Nous (see pages 204–207 above).270 Further, just like the One 
produced Nous while remaining in itself, so now Nous produces Soul without leaving 
itself, or without becoming something other than itself.
271
 And finally, just like Nous was 
an attempt to replicate the unqualified unity of the One, now too soul is an attempt to 
replicate noetic unity at its own level. The nature of this psychic replica of Nous is what 
concerns us here. 
In the passage from V.1 [10] 7 cited on page 242 Plotinus states that the proper 
activity of soul, or the activity of its essence, is an enjoyment of and participation in Nous 
                                                 
269
 On soul as matter in relation to Nous, see II.5 [25] 3.13–14, III.9 [13] 5, V.1 [10] 3.23, V9 [5] 3.20–37, 
VI.7 [38] 28.23, 33.36. On soul as form in relation to what is inanimate, see II.4 [12] 10.31–34, IV.3 [27] 
10.13–14, 20.38–39, IV.7 [2] 1.22–25, V.9 [5] 2.16–18, 3.20–37, 6.20–24, VI.7 [38] 25.24–26, 28.21–
22, 33.34–35. In all these references, we find again the hylomorphic relation that characterizes all genesis 
(see page 133 above); this includes the genesis of Nous from the One, although not literally, for as 
PIGLER (135 note 1) rightly remarks, “le Νοῦς n’est pas, à proprement parler, matière de l’Un, puisque 
l’Un ne relève pas la dimension eidétique. Si le Νοῦς était la matière de l’Un, il faudrait considérer ce 
dernier comme ce qui donne forme à cette matière et donc comme étant lui-même forme, ce qui est 
proprement impensable,” as Plotinus clearly states (VI.7 [38] 17.41–42). And Pigler concludes: “Ce n’est 
pas le cas de l’Âme qui est, au sense plein matière de l’Intelligence.” I am not wholly persuaded about 
this last remark, for even Plotinus feels the need to make his statement more precise by qualifying 
εἰδοποιούμενον with οἷον at V.1 [10] 7.41. After all, in-formation of matter refers literally to the in-
formation of lower matter, and is predicated of the relations among the three hypostases only figuratively 
(see Atkinson 1983, 181). These relations are brought out also terminologically: when Nous is in-formed 
by the One by thinking it (or, perhaps less imprecisely, by thinking about it) noetically, it is said to be 
made like the Good, or “boni-form” (ἀγαθοειδής: III.8 [30] 11.15–19, V.3 [49] 16.18–19, V.6 [24] 4.5, 
5.13, VI.2 [43] 17.28, VI.7 [38] 15.8–13, 23–24, 16.5, 18.1–27, 21.2–9; see Chapter One note 195 for 
references in Plato), and like the One, or “uni-form” (ἑνοιεδής: VI.9 [9] 5.26); and when soul is in-
formed by Nous, it is said to have the form of Nous (νοοειδής: V.1 [10] 3.23, V.3 [49] 8.49), or to be 
ἀγαθοειδής via Nous (I.7 [54] 2.7, I.8 [51] 11.16, V.3 [49] 3.10, VI.7 [38] 22.33). 
 
270
 On the reversion of Soul toward Nous see V.1 [10] 3 and particularly V.3 [49] 8.31; cf. also II.2 [14] 
3.9, III.4 [15] 1.8–10 (a general statement on reversion). 
 
271
 See V.1 [10] 11, V.2 [11] 1.13–18. 
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(line 45–46). Now, since Nous as a full-blown hypostasis is essentially thinking, the 
activity of soul must also be thinking. However, the thinking of soul is of a different kind 
than that of Intellect in at least three respects: first, it is not intuitive but discursive, not 
νόησις but διάνοια or διανόησις;272 second, it does not possess the object of its thinking 
within itself, but borrows it from without, namely from Intellect;
273
 and third, while the 
thought of Nous is permanently actual, the thought of soul implies a passage from 
potentiality to actuality (V.1 [10] 4.19–25).274 This difference between noetic and psychic 
thinking is what constitutes the alterity of soul vis-à–vis its generator. For like Nous, soul 
too is a kind of thought, but the unity of this thought is diminished when compared to the 
pure thought of Intellect. Being discursive, the thought of soul externalizes and unfolds in 
succession what in Nous is strictly simultaneous.
275
 Moreover, since it does not possess 
                                                 
272
 For διάνοια see I.1 [53] 9.15–23, III.9 [13] 1.34–37, IV.3 [27] 8.8, V.3 [49] 3.35, 4.9, 17.23, VI.2 [43] 
4.23; for διανόησις see II.9 [33] 1.45, IV.3 [27] 30.1, IV.4 [28] 6.13, V.8 [31] 6.9, VI.7 [38] 1.27; for 
διανοεῖσθαι see II.9 [33] 6.21–22, III.9 [13] 1.21–37, IV.3 [27] 29.15–16, V.1 [10] 7.42–43, V.3 [49] 
3.24, 34, 17.22. Plotinus remarks that the soul’s possession of intelligibles is like an unfolding or 
separation of the contents of Nous (cf. I.1 [53] 8.7–8: οἷον ἀνειλιγμένα καὶ οἷον κεχωρισμένα); this 
unfolding occurs in discourse, where soul sees the intelligibles as if in a mirror (I.4 [46] 10.6–10, IV.3 
[27] 30.7–11). 
 
273
 V.3 [49] 6.2–5: “[2] The thinking [Νοεῖ] is different when it is in soul but [3] is more properly 
[κυριώτερον] thinking in Intellect. For the soul [we observed] thought [ἐνόει] itself as [4] belonging to 
another, but Intellect did so as itself, and as what and who it is, and [5] [it started its thinking] from its 
own nature and thought by turning back to itself [ἐπιστρέφων εἰς αὑτόν].” Cf. III.8 [30] 6.25–26, IV.8 [6] 
3.25–26, V.3 [49] 8.8–9, V.6 [24] 4.16–22 (see in particular line 16, where soul is said to have Nous as 
borrowed or acquired from the outside: ἐπακτὸν; cf. also V.3 [49] 3.30–33). 
 
274
 The passage from potentiality to actuality in the discursive mode of thinking of soul is not meant to 
indicate that soul in its pure state does not possess the contents of Nous, but only that it possesses them 
piecemeal or, rather, that while these contents are constantly available to it, soul does not have the power 
to focus on all of them at once, but can do so only successively, though eternally (cf. Appendix D). 
 
275
 V.1 [10] 3.6–9: “[6] For, although it [i.e., soul] is a thing of the kind which [7] our discussion has shown 
it to be, it is an image [εἰκών] of Intellect; just as a thought in its utterance [λόγος ὁ ἐν προφορᾷ] [8] is an 
image of the thought in soul, so soul itself is the expressed thought [λόγος] of Intellect, and its [9] whole 
activity [ἐνέργεια], and the life which it sends out to establish another reality [ὑπόστασιν].” The 
distinction between inner (ἐνδιάθετος) and expressed (προφορικός) logos is first found in Chrysippus 
(SVF II, 135 = Galen, In Hippocratis de officina medici 3, XVIII/2.649–650; Sextus Empiricus, Against 
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the intelligibles within itself, soul must depend on Nous for thinking; therefore, its 
thinking is actual only to the extent that it is contemplatively directed toward its generator 
(a predicament in which the Soul-Hyopstasis and the World-Soul, but not all individual 
souls, find themselves permanently, if differently). 
As we saw (pages 224–229), in Nous Plotinus distinguished two stages (the 
prenoetic or loving stage, and the thinking stage). An analogue of these two stages can be 
found also in soul (V.1 [10] 7.40–48). Originally, soul is a pure indeterminate desire 
projected toward its generator, a stage which we might call pre-dianoetic or pre-
discursive. This desire is a desire to possess its desideratum as undividedly as possible, 
but in order for this to happen, this unity must be divided further due to soul’s lesser 
power compared to its generator. Therefore, just like Nous, in order to think the One, 
divided the latter’s unqualified unity noetically and in so doing emerged as the second 
hypostasis, so now soul, in order to think the superior unity of Intellect, divides it 
dianoetically or discursively and constitutes itself as the third hypostasis. Thus, soul is a 
kind of intelligence knowing itself not intuitively, but discursively.
276
 Soul’s essence, 
insofar as it is rational, is still intellection,
277
 but an intellection directed outside of itself, 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Mathematicians VIII.275) and is employed by Plotinus as another way to clarify the derivation of 
soul from Nous. For parallels of this distinction in the Enneads see I.2 [19] 3.28–30, IV.3 [27] 5.8–10, 
30.7–11; cf. also IV.8 [6] 5.24 ad fin. For antecedents of the distinction see Plato, Sophist 263e3–8; 
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I.76b24–25. Cf. Graeser (1972, 35). 
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 See VI.2 [43] 6.13–20; cf. also VI.9 [9] 4.3–6. 
 
277
 See III.6 [26] 6.1, III.3 [48] 5.17–18. It is because of its close connection to Nous (and, in turn, because 
of Nous’ connection to the One) that soul is also called divine (θεία: II.9 [33] 17.21, IV.2 [4] 1.68) or a 
divine thing (θεῖον: IV.8 [6] 5.24, V.1 [10] 3.1–6, 10.11), even in varying degrees depending on what 
soul Plotinus is referring to (III.2 [47] 18.27, III.5 [50] 2.20, IV.3 [27] 17.2, V.3 [49] 9.1, VI.7 [38] 5.21; 
at IV.8 [6] 2.31 it is the World-Soul that is called divine), and it is counted among the limited number of 
divine beings (τὰ θεῖα: V.1 [10] 7.49). In its purified state, soul is said to be similar or to belong 
completely to the divine (τὸ θεῖον: I.2 [19] 3.19–21, I.6 [1] 6.14–15, IV.3 [27] 24.23–26; cf. IV.2 [4] 1.5, 
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and so its ontological status is that of a trace and an image of Nous in that it possesses 
unity in an inferior way: not one-many, but one and many (VI.2 [43] 6.13–20; cf. note 
260). 
The eros of soul, therefore, is essentially directed toward Intellect, and like all 
eros, psychic eros too is desire to possess its desideratum (Plato, Symposium 206a6–7) 
even to the point of trying to become it. To the extent that soul remains contemplatively 
directed toward Nous (and, through Nous, toward the One
278), it “possesses” its 
desideratum; it does so, however, only in the inferior manner of discursivity and, more 
importantly, as something that remains other than itself.
279
 For this reason, soul has the 
additional desire to bring about the harmony it sees in Nous as something that belongs to 
itself. In trying to do this, soul, or rather, its lower part, directs itself toward what is 
inferior, that which lacks soul: lower matter.
280
 In its relation to matter, or in its lower 
part, soul is not only the contemplator of Nous, but it performs an organizing function as 
well, one by which it attempts to replicate, and thus appropriate, the unity of Intellect by 
imposing order (i.e., form and/or life) on the soulless. Thus, soul is naturally more than 
just discursive thought and an erotic relation to Nous; in addition to this eros, it also has a 
                                                                                                                                                 
IV.7 [2] 10, IV.8 [6] 7.6, VI.9 [9] 11.33). On Nous as divine see V.1 [10] 3.4–6, VI.4 [22] 15.18–19. 
 
278
 This is so because just like the discursive unity of soul is an imperfect image of the noetic unity of 
Intellect, the latter is in turn an imperfect image of the unqualified unity of the One. See the analogy at 
V.6 [24] 4.16–18: the One is light, Nous is the sun, and soul is the moon receiving light through the sun. 
 
279
 In this sense we could speak of a kind of alienation of a lower hypostasis in relation to a higher one. 
 
280
 For the time being, I will limit my remarks to the relation of soul to matter. I will deal with the questions 
of the origin and eros of matter and of the different kinds of matter distinguished by Plotinus in the next 
subsection. In the present subsection, I will refer to the matter informed by the lower soul as “lower 
matter” only to distinguish it from intelligible matter, although later the expression “lower matter” will 
be used to indicate both cosmic and pre-cosmic matter (see the opening paragraphs of the next 
subsection). 
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desire to express itself externally, a desire on which it acts by organizing lower 
matter.
281
 One could say, briefly, that the organizing activity of the soul over matter is the 
lower soul tout-court, that is, Nature or the World-Soul. This organizing activity, in turn, 
depends on the World-Soul’s connection to the contemplation of Nous by the Soul-
Hypostasis.
282
 
The desire of the lower soul is a power (δύναμις) by which time, Platonically 
understood as a sensible image of the intelligible,
283
 comes into being. Otherwise stated, 
the organizing activity of the lower soul is the temporalization of the higher soul’s 
contemplation of the eternal noetic model, and time is thus the very form of life of the 
lower soul, or the very modality of its activity (see III.7 [45] 11.30–43).284 This act of 
transmission of the logoi of higher realities to the sensible is called illumination 
                                                 
281
 See IV.7 [2] 13, IV.8 [6] 3.21–28. Notice that to manifest itself externally is something necessary to the 
nature of soul, which therefore comes to the sensible by a kind of “spontaneous inclination” (IV.8 [6] 
5.26: ῥοπῇ αὐτεξουσίῳ). Moreover, the lower (organizing) part of the soul is not another soul, but is the 
outer expression of a single reality whose inner reality is the higher (rational) one emerging from Nous 
(see note 260 above; cf. II.1 [40] 5.5–8, IV.8 [6] 7.18–23, V.2 [11] 1.19–21). As Plotinus points out, the 
lower (organizing) soul proceeds from the higher (rational) one eternally as life from a superior life (III.8 
[30] 5.9–17; cf. VI.7 [38] 31.2–4). This life is a vivifying and organizing activity brought about by the 
lower soul, which in its higher part (or intellect) remains constantly connected to the contemplative 
activity of the superior soul. PIGLER (156) writes: “Par son essence et son aspect rationnel, la partie 
supérieure est donc constituée par un désir (ἔφεσις) d’intelligence et de contemplation motivé par 
l’amour que l’Âme éprouve pour l’Intelligence, amour qui lui vient du supérieur et qui s’exprime en désir 
d’union avec son générateur. Mais par sa partie inférieure, qui rend raison de sa venue a l’être, l’Âme a 
pour fonction d’exprimer l’Intelligence, d’en être le logos. La partie inférieure est ainsi comme un logos 
extérieur et expanisf non immanent a l’Âme. Ce logos est ce qui permet l’expansion de l’être, parce qu’il 
est l’ἔρως de l’Âme.” 
 
282
 See IV.4 [28] 10.12–13; see also III.8 [30] 4.15–16, IV.4 [28] 13.3–5, 20.15–16. All these references 
should be read with note 238 in mind. 
 
283
 See III.7 [45] 11 (especially lines 20, 27–28, and 46–47), I.5 [36] 7.15; cf. Plato, Timaeus 37d5. 
 
284
 The issue of time (and eternity) in Plotinus is complex and to deal with it even in a merely introductory 
manner would take us too far afield from our main topic. Nevertheless, some general remarks are needed 
if we are to understand the activity and kind of eros of the lower soul, along with the discursive nature of 
soul as a whole. I placed these remarks in a separate appendix (Appendix D), to which I will refer 
whenever the questions of time, eternity, and discursiveness surface in our discussion. 
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(ἔλλαμψις, ἐλλάμπειν),285 and the active relation of the lower soul to lower matter is 
described as a relation of care (ἐπιμέλεια, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι286).287 In other words, for the soul 
to be embodied means to be engaged in the communication of form and life to that which 
lacks them by organizing or attending to it—literally to in-form it and to animate it. This 
activity of illumination of the sensible and care for it is the peculiar activity of the lower 
part of the soul, including the individual embodied souls.
288
 Soul is thus understood as the 
intermediary hypostasis, which in communicating the contents and life of Nous to lower 
                                                 
285
 In reference to soul, Trouillard (1955b, 12–14) divides the activity of illumination in illumination 
créatrice and illumination ordonnatrice, respectively belonging to the World-Soul and to individual 
souls. This classification is very helpful, although Plotinus usage is, as usual, not easy to pin down. The 
soul’s activity on the sensible as illumination (ἔλλαμψις, ἐλλάμπειν) is variously performed by different 
“subjects,” or different manifestations of soul: at I.1 [53] 10.10–11 and VI.4 [22] 3.22, 15.16 the 
(individual) soul illumines body with life; at I.1 [53] 11.14–15 the life of beasts is made to derive from 
the illumination of the World-Soul (ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης); at VI.7 [38] 7.12 the World-Soul illumines matter. 
And as already in the passages I just mentioned, so in other passages the activity of illumination has also 
different recipients: for instance, at II.3 [52] 9.33 it is the World-Soul that illumines souls that are in the 
body; at II.3 [52] 17.15 (cf. also IV.4 [28] 13.4) it is the Soul-Hypostasis that illumines the World-Soul 
(in fact, the whole of II.3 [52] 17 illustrates the chain of transmission of logoi from Nous down to the 
sensible, a transmission which starting at the level of soul is called “illumination”), while at III.5 [50] 
3.23 the Soul-Hypostasis illumines the heavens as “the original, intelligible source of light in the 
physical heavens” (WOLTERS 111); at IV.4 [28] 22.7, 26.27, the heavens irradiate the vegetative power 
on the earth; at V.3 [49] 8.23, the soul is made intelligent by illumination from Nous; at VI.9 [9] 7.14–16 
the soul is said to be illuminated by the One. Cf. also II.9 [33] 10.19–26, where Plotinus reports a 
Gnostic version of illumination. On the basis of these references, we see that the activity of illumination 
reflects the complexity of soul. 
 
286
 On the soul’s activity on the sensible as care (ἐπιμέλεια) see IV.3 [27] 1.33–37 (lines 33–34 are a 
reference to Plato, Phaedrus 246b6), 9.31; for ἐπιμελεῖσθαι see III.2 [47] 7.24, III.4 [15] 2.1 (again, a 
reference to Phaedrus 246b6), IV.3 [27] 1.33–37, 7.12–15, IV.7 [2] 81.6–9 (an echo of Plato, Laws 
X.897a1–2). 
 
287
 Both the World-Soul and individual souls care for the inanimate, but they do so in different ways. Most 
notably, the World-Soul is said to be always in control of and trancending (ὑπερέχειν: IV.3 [27] 4.22, 
IV.8 [6] 2.32, 8.14) its body because it is constantly linked to the Soul-Hypostasis and, through it, to 
Nous; by contrast, individual souls are connected to higher realities only intermittently and for this reason 
they are not always able to control the portions of matter that have become their bodies. See III.4 [15] 4, 
IV.3 [27] 3.12, 4.21 ad fin., 6, IV.8 [6] 4, 7.23–32; cf. also the next note and note 348 below. 
 
288
 Once again, it is important to stress that the activity of illumination and care of soul on the sensible is 
not wholly identical for the World-Soul and for individual souls. Rist (1967, 116) aptly writes that “[t]he 
individual soul governs what is short-lived and therefore partial; the World-Soul governs something that 
will endure in some sense in its completeness and perfection.” See the previous note. 
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matter brings about the sensible universe.
289
 Further still, soul is the energy or logos 
of Nous whereby the life of the One itself is transmitted to the sensible.
290
 
As we saw, every generated hypostasis is erotically directed toward the hypostasis 
that generated it. This eros is what arrests, or reverts, the flux of procession by 
introducing a movement contrary to it. At the same time, it is on the basis of this eros that 
a hypostasis can emerge as this particular hypostasis. So, as I argued in my analysis of 
Nous, it is because Intellect is originally an erotic energy directed toward the One that in 
a successive stage it can emerge as the thinking hypostasis, whose thought is a noetic 
fragmentation of the unity it contemplated in its loving stage. Something analogous 
happens with soul. The double direction in which the third hypostasis is spread out (i.e., 
toward the intelligible and toward the sensible) implies that the eros of the higher soul 
differs from that of the lower one and that as a hypostasis soul has not one but two types 
of eros. The eros of the higher soul is wholly and permanently directed toward Nous as 
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 See III.2 [47] 14.1–6, 16.20–31; II.3 [52] 17. Plotinus goes as far as saying that without body the soul 
would be wholly in the intelligible (IV.5 [29] 1.5), and that the body is the major impediment to this 
possibility (IV.7 [2] 10.19–21, IV.8 [6] 3.4–5). 
 
290
 See V.1 [10] 3.7–9, 6.44–45. Plotinus insists on this point because in his view everything must unfold 
according to reason, an originary logos which has its seat in Nous and does not happen by chance. The 
origin of this rational unfolding is beyond Nous, but it too is not a chance event, but the very self-love of 
the One as a necessary self-positing act that is beyond both dianoia and noesis while not being irrational 
(see the whole treatise VI.8 [39] On Free Will and the Will of the One, particularly 10, 14, 15.28–36; cf. 
also pages 188-191 and 202–204 above). In descending order, the last guarantor of this rational unfolding 
of reality, which is a communication of the unity originating in the One (cf. VI.9 [9] 1.20–31), is the 
World-Soul or Nature, which governs the sensible according to reason (κατὰ λόγον: II.3 [52] 13.4, 34, 
14.30, 16.5, III.2 [47] 8.30, 11.4, 17.24, 37, 63, 18.15, IV.3 [27] 10.10, 16.6, 16, 17.19, IV.4 [28] 35.8–
24, 39.12; see also V.8 [31] 1.24, VI.2 [43] 22.31, VI.9 [9] 1.29; cf. Plato, Phaedrus 246c1–2), that is, by 
never losing sight of what is above it, so that Plotinus explicitly refers to it with the appellative of λόγος 
(III.8 [30] 2.19 ad fin.). For a discussion of this point (and a negative answer to the question of whether 
Nous should be called the logos of the One), see PIGLER (165–173). In passing, we might add that logos, 
like Nature (see note 294 below), is not a separate hypostasis between Nous and soul: see II.9 [33] 1.31–
32, V.1 [10] 3.20–21, 6.49; cf. Rist (1967, 90–99), Wallis (1995, 68–69), Graeser (1972, 35). 
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its generator and, through it, to the One (cf. VI.7 [38] 35.19–45).291 The eros of the 
lower part, by contrast, is not unequivocally directed to the intelligible realm and the One 
but, upon receiving from the superior soul a report, as it were, of the latter’s 
contemplation of Nous, it organizes lower matter accordingly into a cosmos. Thus, 
through soul the sensible is able to participate, if only in a distant manner, in the 
intelligible (IV.3 [27] 12.30–32). The activity of the lower soul, insofar as this attempts to 
externalize a superior unity which it is unable to replicate within itself, is like a will of 
independence from Nous, although this activity occurs naturally as part of the process of 
derivation. 
*            *            * 
In this connection, it may be worth summarizing Pigler’s interpretation of the 
figure of Penia, an interpretation that bears directly on the reading of the treatise on eros 
(III.5 [50]) that I analyzed in Chapter Two and that sheds some light on the interplay 
between lower and higher soul.
292
 Pigler begins by arguing that intelligible matter can be 
understood as meaning two related things: on the one hand, it is the primary otherness 
derived from the One, or the raw erotic energy that constitutes Nous in its loving stage; 
on the other hand, it is “what remains of this product once the hypostases have achieved 
the status of complete and separate realities.”293 This “left over” or remainder, after Nous 
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 This eros is the one pure eros that belongs most properly to Aphrodite Urania, whom we found in 
Plotinus’ treatise on eros (III.5 [50] 2.19–32). 
 
292
 PIGLER (180–198). 
 
293
 PIGLER (181): “la matière intelligible peut donc se comprendre, d’une part, comme le produit dérivé de 
l’Origine absolue, la proto-vie, d’autre part, comme ce qui reste de ce produit de fois que les hypostases 
se sont constituées en réalités achevées et séparées.” 
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and the Soul-Hypostasis have constituted themselves as complete and separate 
realities, is an erotic energy whose intensity is insufficient to revert toward the reality 
above it so as to be “in-formed” and thus constituted as a separate hypostasis. 
Mostly on the basis of III.5 [50] 7 (especially lines1–9) and III.8 [30] 5 
(especially lines 10–17), Pigler identifies intelligible matter in its last degree of 
procession with the lower soul (i.e., the World-Soul or Nature),
294
 and thinks that in 
Plotinus’ reading of the Symposium myth of Eros’ birth this “remainder” of which I just 
spoke is represented by Penia.
295
 We thus find here a hierarchy of decreasing intelligible 
unity from Nous down to the lower soul, with Nous as both thinking (νοῦς) and object of 
thought (νοητόν), the higher soul or Soul-Hypostasis as only intellectual (νοερά; cf. II.9 
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 It is not clear to me whether in Pigler’s interpretation it is higher and lower soul (or Soul-Hypostasis and 
World-Soul) that constitute the psychic analogue of the double state of Nous, Loving and Thinking, or 
whether a double state of soul must be presupposed before the emergence of the World-Soul, with 
Loving Soul being the first remainder of intelligible matter after the constitution of Nous as a fully 
formed hypostasis, and (dianoetically) Thinking Soul being the fully formed third hypostasis (i.e., the 
Soul-Hypostasis). I take the second alternative to be the more plausible one, first, because the Soul-
Hypostasis is already a fully formed hypostasis and not raw erotic energy still to revert toward its 
generator, and second, because Nature, like logos (see note 290 above), is not a hypostasis in Plotinus 
(see Rist 1967, 92–93; pace ARMSTRONG I, xxii–xxiii). As we just saw, Pigler herself points out that the 
World-Soul or Nature is the second and last remainder of intelligible matter, which however, due to its 
diminished intensity, is unable to revert and become an independent hypostasis. 
 
295
 As PIGLER (184) herself puts it, “Pénia est donc le surplus, le reste, inhérent à toute information par la 
réalité supérieure, elle représente l’excédent de la puissance infinie et indéterminée, de la proto-vie qui 
n’a pas trouvé place dans le processus eidétique de constitution de l’hypostase, elle est cette pure énergie 
érotique qui sourd de l’Un et qui n’a pas pu s’achever en réalité eidétique.” Commenting on III.5 [50] 7, 
Dillon (1969, 35) had already observed about Penia that “[s]he is the as yet unformed Soul, animated by 
a vague desire for self-fulfillment,” although for him this unformed Soul seems to correspond, not to the 
remainder mentioned by Pigler which results in the World-Soul, but to a pre-hypostatic psychic 
intelligible matter that will become the fully formed Soul-Hypostasis. I agree with Dillon that it is 
plausible to recognize such an element in Plotinus’ view of soul (which I take to correspond with the 
second highlighted row in Table 4 above; see previous note), but I am not persuaded by his identification 
of this kind of matter with Penia, nor by his claim that the permanent “unboundedness” (ἀοριστία) of the 
soul corresponds to the the intelligible matter treated in Ennead II.4 [12] (see Dillon 1969, 36; cf. Chater 
2 note 89). I rather follow Pigler in identifying Penia with the remainder of intelligible psychic matter 
after the Soul-Hypostasis has already been formed and which will result in the World-Soul or Nature (cf. 
note 300 below). Once again, “before” and “after” do not indicate temporal succession, but priority and 
posteriority of being or power (cf. III.5 [50] 9.24–29). 
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[33] 1.32), and the lower soul or Nature as having no thought of its own but receiving 
it from its higher generator like a report of which it never loses sight and on whose basis 
it brings order to lower matter.
296
 Within this framework, what the higher soul 
communicates to the lower one is a kind of blueprint of its contemplation of Nous, a light 
beam which brings with itself intelligible content and that Plotinus identifies with 
logos.
297
 In III.5 [50] the product of logos is not so much a multiplicity of derivative logoi 
in the lower soul, but eros itself: an imperfect eros, of course, lacking what it desires 
(III.5 [50] 7.12–14), in contrast with the eros of Nous and the eros of the Soul-
Hypostasis, each possessing its desideratum according to its proper nature. The 
imperfection of the eros of the lower soul is due to the fact that it issues from a logos, that 
of the higher soul, which is not itself the perfect logos of Nous but is derived from it (III.5 
[50] 7.18–19).298 
Therefore that, as Pigler puts it, we see that 
in the order of hypostatic procession, unity is the result of a greater 
aptitude to think and to think oneself. However, we also know that, in the 
order of conversion, what determines the greatest approximation to the 
Good, and even the union with the Good, is the greatest purity of love, a 
love which must be superior to thought since the One that loves itself is 
ὑπερνόησις.299 
                                                 
296
 In light of this interpretation, what throughout Chapter Two I referred to as the “parts” of the World-
Soul (cf. Table 3) should be understood not as discrete independent entities but as aspects of the same 
entity. 
 
297
 See III.2 [47] 16.13–17; a mythical version of this explanation can be found at V.1 [10] 7.28–34. 
 
298
 PIGLER (180) calls the eros of the lower soul “l’ultime trace du Principe que l’Âme donne à l’obscurité 
que vient après elle.” 
 
299
 PIGLER (186): “dans l’ordre de la procession des hypostases, l’unité est le fruit d’une plus grande 
aptitude à penser et à se penser. Cependant, nous savons aussi que, dans l’ordre de la conversion, ce qui 
détermine le plus grand rapprochement avec le Bien, et même l’union au Bien, est la plus grande pureté 
de l’amour, un amour qui doit être supérieur à la pensée puisque l’Un qui s’aime lui-même est 
ὑπερνόησις.” 
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This means that the greatest resemblance with the Good is not in the field of 
thought, but in that of eros. And if for soul to love Nous as its proper desideratum means 
to acquire a certain (dianoetic) unity in thought, Nous already points to the One as the 
ultimate desideratum, the ἐρασμιώτατον (VI.7 [38] 32.25). This eros of the soul which, in 
contemplating Nous, is further directed to the One, is called divine and belongs to the 
soul essentially (III.5 [50] 3.19–23). As I showed in the previous chapter (Section 3.4), 
without this eros, the soul would be unable to see its true goal, the Good. This is the eros 
of a pure soul, proper of the Soul-Hypostasis and ever directed toward the One. And as 
Pigler argues, when soul is wholly directed in this way toward the One, it is similar not so 
much to the fully formed hypostasis of Nous, but to Nous in its loving state, always 
united with its object (see VI.7 [38] 35.30–41). It is only because of this prior tendency, 
or this “eye” already filled with vision (III.5 [50] 3.13), that soul can be directed to Nous 
and, by dianoetically contemplating it, can become a fully formed hypostasis. But prior to 
this formation, soul, like Nous in its first state, is an erotic energy naturally directed 
toward the Good.
300
 This energy is both indeterminate, insofar as it has not (yet) broken 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
300
 PIGLER (186–188). Pigler writes that the eros of the higher soul resembles that of Loving Intellect. 
Resemblance, of course, is not identity. What the difference is between Loving Intellect (pre-hyopstatic 
intelligible noetic matter, or, simply, intelligible matter) and the eros of the yet unformed Soul-
Hypostasis (to which we might conveniently refer to as Loving Soul, pre-hypostatic intelligible psychic 
matter or, simply, psychic matter) remains unclear. The reason for this lack of clarity is probably due to 
my own failure to understand whether according to Pigler we should admit a psychic analogue of Loving 
and Thinking Intellect prior to the emergence of the World-Soul: the problem I raised in note 294. If this 
analogue is admitted, then I take the difference between intelligible and psychic matter to be one of 
intensity. Intelligible matter, being closest to the One, is more intensely directed toward it than psychic 
matter. We can thus say that Pigler’s reading of eros in the Enneads has brought to light two stages of 
intelligible matter, (i) and (iii) below, to which I add a third, (ii) below, on the assumption that it is 
plausible to admit a psychic analogue of Loving and Thinking Intellect prior to the emergence of the 
World-Soul. These three stages, highlighted in Table 4 above, are: (i) intelligible matter (this is 
intelligible matter strictly, that is, the first stage of Nous or Loving Intellect, hence the appellative “pre-
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down discursively or dianoetically the content of its vision, and filled with its 
desideratum, insofar as it is directed toward it without reservations. The proper goodness 
of this erotic energy lies not so much in the possibility of being informed, thus putting an 
end to its indetermination, but in the very fact of being wholly taken up in its vision, fully 
in possession of what it desires. 
The eros of the lower soul (or of Penia), by contrast, is by nature deficient (III.5 
[50] 7.1–16). Its goodness is not derived from its indetermination, as was the case with 
the eros of higher realities, but from the fact that this indetermination can be “in-formed” 
or given a limit. This means that the lower soul (Penia) has the vague presentiment that 
its good lies in the One (V.5 [32] 12.8, VI.7 [38] 29.21) but it is unable to “revert” so as 
to synthesize within itself the intelligible contents it receives from above, thus failing to 
establish itself as an independent hypostasis. As a consequence, the lower soul orients its 
unsatisfied and agitated erotic power (III.7 [45] 11.20–21) outside of itself by generating 
the temporal realm, on which it bestows the intelligible content that it was unable to hold 
wholly and stably within itself. Thus, the World-Soul or Nature becomes a creative 
power active in the sensible.
301
 Strictly, although the lower soul does not proceed from 
                                                                                                                                                 
hypostatic”; this is elsewhere called the indefinite dyad or primary otherness: page 226); (ii) intelligible 
psychic matter (i.e., the analogue of Loving Intellect at the level of soul, hence also pre-hypostatic); (iii) 
the remainder (i.e., what is left of intelligible matter after soul has emerged as a fully formed hypostasis). 
Very generally, what distinguishes (i), (ii) and (iii) is the intensity of eros; more specifically, what 
distinguishes (iii) from both (i) and (ii) is the fact that (iii) is unable to revert toward its generator and 
emerge as a full hypostasis. For this reason, I maintain, the eros of (iii) is said to be deficient; for the 
same reason, the World-Soul or Nature is not a separate hypostasis (see again note 294), and hence it is 
subsumed under the hypostasis soul as the lower part of the latter. 
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 It should be observed that the erotic power of the lower soul is also a trace of the One, although it lacks 
the strength to revert and manifests itself rather as creative power. As PIGLER (192) writes, 
“l’engendrement du sensible est, quant à lui, l’effet d’une insatisfaction propre à l’Âme inférieure qui 
reproduit dans le sensible les logoi qu’elle ne peut contenir en elle-même. Pour le dire autrement, cette 
Âme exprime le dernier degré nécessaire de la procession pour qu’il puisse y avoir, après elle mais 
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the higher soul as a hypostasis, it is necessarily linked to it by its eros, and through 
this eros it is connected to the originary love of the One.
302
 The position and function of 
the lower soul, therefore, is an intermediary one: on the one hand, it is directed toward 
what lies above it as it tries to imitate the higher soul’s contemplation of Nous; on the 
other, this imitation occurs externally as the organization (i.e., illumination and care: see 
pages 248–250) of the sensible in accordance with that contemplation. For this reason, 
we can say that its eros is inextricably double: both for higher realities and for the 
sensible. 
We thus come to the last stage in the process of derivation of all reality from the 
One: lower matter. 
3.4.3 Hyletic Eros: Lower Matter as the Last Stage of Derivation, 
Utter Inability of Erotic Reversion, and Evil 
The issue of the erotic status of lower (as opposed to intelligible) matter (ὕλη) is 
closely related to several questions surrounding its origin and nature, most notably: Does 
Plotinus think that matter is generated or not? If it is not generated, can we still 
consistently refer to the One as the Principle of all reality? If, conversely, matter is 
generated, what generates it, why, and how? Does matter participate in higher 
hypostases? And finally, why does Plotinus associate it so closely with evil? These 
                                                                                                                                                 
venant d’elle, un monde sensible” (see IV.4 [28] 13.3–14). For this reason, here we can speak of 
production rather than procession, although necessary production (see PIGLER 192–193, note 1; cf. III.8 
[30] 4.18–27). 
 
302
 PIGLER (195) writes: “A partir donc de l’Âme inférieure, l’unité s’exprime non plus par la conversion 
mais par la participation: puisque la fonction de cette Âme est de donner forme et vie à la matière 
sensible, de créer le monde sensible, il y a bien, dans l’ordre de la procession, une raison à son 
avènement ontologique, car cette Âme a pour mission d’exprimer le Νοῦς et d’en être le logos.” 
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questions have not been met with answers that are widely agreed upon by those who 
investigated the subject extensively, and the controversy and literature surrounding them 
would provide enough material for a thick monograph. As a consequence, my treatment 
of these interrogatives in the present subsection amounts to a summation of my (at best 
tentative and likely provisional) conclusions on the subject. I will limit my exposition to 
sketching a bare outline of some of the main alternatives offered in reply to the questions 
asked above. Although I happen to agree with much of what Pigler has to say on the issue 
because of the arguments she offers, the reason for privileging her account and for 
endorsing much of what she says is also pragmatic: her solution throws light on a number 
of problems surrounding the status of matter from the standpoint of eros, a perspective 
which is central to the present study. Nevertheless, I believe that Pigler’s interpretation 
does not dispel all doubts about Plotinus’ views on matter, views about which no single 
solution has succeeded to free me from the sense that we might be dealing with an aporia 
in Plotinus himself. 
At the outset of our brief discussion, a classification of matter is in place. This 
classification is at the same time a summation of what I have said on the topic up to this 
point and an introduction of the concepts that I will consider in the next pages.
303
 
In descending order, first we have (1) intelligible matter (or the indeterminate 
dyad), that is, the erotic energy or primary otherness directly issuing from the One and 
constituting the first state of Nous (i.e., Loving Intellect; see pages 224–227); we might 
also refer to it as pre-hypostatic noetic matter. Less appropriately, (2) intelligible matter 
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 For an analogous classification see PIGLER (201 note 2, 217–225, 227 note 2). 
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is also the energy that remains, but with diminished intensity, “after” Nous has 
constituted itself as a full hypostasis (see note 300). This energy is the first state of soul, 
what we might refer to as pre-hypostatic psychic matter (i.e., Loving Soul as a psychic 
analogue of Loving Intellect; see pages 224–227 and notes 294 and 295 above), and, after 
soul has emerged as a fully formed hypostasis, (3) the last remainder of intelligible 
matter, which is unable to revert and become a full-blown hypostasis, namely Nature, or 
the World-Soul, or the lower soul, mythically represented by Penia (pages 251–256). 
Finally, we have lower matter (as distinguished from intelligible or higher matter), which 
comprises (4) sensible or cosmic matter (or body, whether merely informed or also 
animated) and (5) pre-cosmic matter (or matter tout court). Sensible matter is pre-cosmic 
matter after this has been informed by the lower soul. What distinguishes higher or 
intelligible matter, that is, (1), (2), and (3), from pre-cosmic matter is that while higher 
matter by itself is capable of “reversion,”304 lower matter is not, and so it needs an 
external agent (i.e., soul) to inform it and turn it into sensible matter. Moreover, pre-
cosmic and cosmic matter are not two kinds of matter, but rather the same matter 
respectively taken “before” and “after” (logically, rather than chronologically) this has 
been “illuminated” by the ordering activity of the lower soul. In short, we may say that 
Plotinus recognizes only two kinds of matter, higher or intelligible (which strictly is 
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 The difference between (1), (2), and (3) is that although in a sense they are all intelligible matter, only 
(1) and (2) are intense enough to constitute themselves as separate hypostases possessing their 
desideratum according to their proper mode of existence, while (3) lacks the intensity to constitute itself 
as an independent hypostasis and thus is always a desire that is not in possession of its desideratum. 
Alternately, the reversion of (3), the last remainder of intelligible matter constituting the World-Soul, 
must be considered at least partial, in the sense that although the World-Soul never emerges as a fully 
formed hypostasis in its own right, it does remain permanently linked to the Soul-Hypostasis’ 
contemplation of Nous. Cf. note 300 above. 
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identical with (1), and has (2) and (3) as remainders of considerably different 
decreasing intensity) and lower or sensible (which strictly is identical with (4) but has (5) 
as its logically necessary condition). 
*            *            * 
Plotinus states that divine things (V.1 [10] 7.49: τὰ θεῖα) or real beings (IV.4 [28] 
13.20: τὰ ὄντα), that is, the three hypostases, end at soul: what is under them is said to be 
but imitation (τὰ μιμήματα). The question here is about the origin, not merely of this 
imitation, which for Plotinus occurs as an act of care and illumination of soul on matter 
(see pages 248–250), but the origin of that which is illuminated and informed: pre-cosmic 
matter. The alternative around which revolves much of the controversy surrounding this 
problem is stated in an early text of the Enneads, IV.8 [6] 6.18–23:305 
[18] The nature of matter, then, either existed for ever, and it is impossible 
[19] for it, since it existed, not to participate in that which grants all things 
as much good as [20] each one of them can take; or else its coming into 
being [21] was a necessary consequence of the causes before it, and not 
even so [22] was it required to be separate because that which gave it 
existence as a kind of gracious gift [23] became stationary through a lack 
of power before it came to it. 
 
Before I take into account some of the major views about the generation of lower 
matter, it will be useful to supplement this passage with three other main texts that are 
objects of controversy. I will be referring constantly to these four passages as I report the 
views of other authors on the subject. The second text is III.4 [15] 1, from which I will 
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 IV.8 [6] 6.18–23: [18] Εἴτ’ οὖν ἦν ἀεὶ ἡ τῆς ὕλης φύσις, οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν [19] αὐτὴν μὴ μετασχεῖν οὖσαν 
τοῦ πᾶσι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καθόσον [20] δύναται ἕκαστον χορηγοῦντος· εἴτ’ ἠκολούθησεν ἐξ [21] ἀνάγκης ἡ 
γένεσις αὐτῆς τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῆς αἰτίοις, οὐδ’ ὧς [22] ἔδει χωρὶς εἶναι, ἀδυναμίᾳ πρὶν εἰς αὐτὴν ἐλθεῖν 
στάντος [23] τοῦ καὶ τὸ εἶναι οἷον ἐν χάριτι δόντος. The emphasis in the translation is mine. 
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cite only the lines most explicitly stating the generation of matter, 5–7 and 14–16.306 
At lines 5–7, Plotinus writes about the soul’s “power of growth which extends also to 
plants” (line 3: φύσιν καὶ μέχρι φυτῶν): 
[5] Does this power of growth, [6] then, produce nothing? It produces a 
thing altogether different than itself; for after it there is no [7] life, but 
what is produced is lifeless. 
 
Plotinus calls this lifeless product “absolute indefiniteness” (lines 11–12: 
ἀοριστίαν... παντελῆ; line 13: πάντη ἀόριστον) and goes on to write about this product: 
[14] When it is perfected it becomes [15] a body, receiving the form 
appropriate to its potentiality, a receptacle
307
 [16] for that which produced 
it and brought it to maturity. 
 
The third text is III.9 [13] 3.7–16:308 
[7] The partial soul, then, is illuminated [8] when it goes towards that 
which is before it—for then it meets reality—but when it goes towards [9] 
what comes after it, it goes towards non-existence. But it does this, when it 
goes towards [10] itself, for, wishing to be directed towards itself it makes 
[11] an image of itself, the non-existent, as if walking on emptiness and 
[12] becoming more indefinite; and the indefinite image of this [13] is in 
every way dark; for it is altogether without reason and unintelligent and 
[14] stands far removed from reality. [But if the soul goes] towards the 
intermediate region it is in its own [15] world, but when it looks at the 
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 III.4 [15] 1.5–7, 14–16: [5] Αὕτη [6] μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν γεννᾷ; Γεννᾷ πάντη ἕτερον αὑτῆς· οὐκέτι [7] γὰρ 
ζωὴ μετὰ ταύτην, ἀλλὰ τὸ γεννώμενον ἄζων. [...] [14] Τελειούμενον δὲ γίνεται [15] σῶμα μορφὴν λαβὸν 
τὴν τῇ δυνάμει πρόσφορον, ὑποδοχὴ [16] τοῦ γεννήσαντος καὶ ἐκθρέψαντος... The translation is by 
ARMSTRONG, slightly modified. 
 
307
 Cf. Plato, Phaedrus 246b6–7. Cf. note 14 above. 
 
308
 III.9 [13] 3.7–16: [7] Φωτίζεται μὲν οὖν ἡ μερικὴ [8] πρὸς τὸ πρὸ αὐτῆς φερομένη—ὄντι γὰρ 
ἐντυγχάνει—εἰς δὲ [9] τὸ μετ’ αὐτὴν εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν. Τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ, ὅταν πρὸς [10] αὑτήν πρὸς αὑτὴν γὰρ 
βουλομένη τὸ μετ’ αὐτὴν ποιεῖ [11] εἴδωλον αὐτῆς, τὸ μὴ ὄν, οἷον κενεμβατοῦσα καὶ ἀορισ- [12] τοτέρα 
γινομένη· καὶ τούτου τὸ εἴδωλον τὸ ἀόριστον [13] πάντη σκοτεινόν· ἄλογον γὰρ καὶ ἀνόητον πάντη καὶ 
πολὺ [14] τοῦ ὄντος ἀποστατοῦν. Εἰς δὲ τὸ μεταξύ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ [15] οἰκείῳ, πάλιν δὲ ἰδοῦσα οἷον δευτέρᾳ 
προσβολῇ τὸ εἴδωλον [13] ἐμόρφωσε καὶ ἡσθεῖσα ἔρχεται εἰς αὐτό. Again, the translation is 
ARMSTRONG’s, slightly modified. In particular, I follow IGAL in translating τὸ μεταξύ at line 15 with “the 
intermediate region” (ARMSTRONG: “the time between”). IGAL (II, 270 note 33) remarks: “La région 
intermedia es la región de l’Alma, limítrofe del mundo inteligible y del sensible” (cf. IV.4 [28] 3.11–12). 
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image again, as it were directing its attention to it a second time, it forms it 
and goes into it rejoicing. 
 
Finally, the fourth text is I.8 [51] 14.51–54:309 
[51] For if the soul itself generated matter, [52] being affected in some 
way, and if it associated with it and became evil, [53] the cause was the 
presence of matter; for [the soul] would not have come to it unless [54] its 
presence had given [the soul] the occasion to come to be [in it]. 
 
The alternative presented in IV.8 [6] 6.18–23 is generally taken to mean either 
that matter existed always (and thus that it is independent of the One for its existence) or 
that it was generated (and so that it depends on the One for its existence).
310
 The major 
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 I.8 [51] 14.51–54: [51] καὶ γὰρ εἰ αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν ὕλην ἐγέννησε [52] παθοῦσα, καὶ εἰ ἐκοινώνησεν 
αὐτῇ καὶ ἐγένετο κακή, [53] ἡ ὕλη αἰτία παροῦσα· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγένετο εἰς αὐτὴν μὴ τῇ [54] παρουσίᾳ 
αὐτῆς τὴν γένεσιν λαβοῦσα. In my translation I followed IGAL, who, unlike ARMSTRONG, renders the 
first condition on linfe 51 as simple past, not as unreal (ARMSTRONG: “Even if soul had produced 
matter...”)—rightly so, I maintain (see Smyth 1956, §§ 2297–3001). Here is IGAL’s translation: “[51] 
Porque si bien es verdad que el alma misma engendró la materia [52] como resultado de alguna pasión, y 
si bien es verdad que se asoció con ella y se hizo mala, [53] la causa está en la presencia de la materia. 
Porque el alma non se habría encarnado en la materia si no fuera porque por la [54] presencia de ésta 
tomó ocasión de encarnarse.” 
 
310
 There are four notable exceptions to this clear-cut reading of the alternative of IV.8 [6] 6.18–23: Bréhier 
(1961, 205–207), Rist (1961, 157–158; 1967, 118–119), IGAL (II, p. 539 note 45), and O’Brien (1981; 
1991, 22–25). Notice that what is at issue here is a reading of the alternative outlined at IV.8 [6] 6.18–23, 
not whether matter is generated or ungenerated. In fact, all these authors, though in different ways, argue 
that matter is indeed generated in Plotinus.  
(i) Bréhier believes that Plotinus outlines the alternative without taking a side, but rather espouses a 
double viewpoint (cf. also Narbonne 1993, 139–140). Bréhier’s position on the generation of lower 
matter is part of a broader reading of matter in Plotinus, whose views he understands as characterized by 
a constant conflict of perspectives on its status, namely a conception of matter as both an active principle 
of evil and as mere appearance and pure negativity. 
(ii) Rist, having expressly criticized Bréhier’s reading, goes on to argue that the alternative is not 
between whether matter is generated (and so ultimately dependent on the One) or ungenerated (and so 
independent of the One), but between whether it is generated temporally or a-temporally. He argues that 
Plotinus’ claim is that “even if” (οὐδ’ ὧς, at IV.8 [6] 6.21) matter was created in time, it would not be 
independent of the One for its existence. He concludes that matter is the last product in the process of 
derivation and is produced by the World-Soul. 
(iii) Igal thinks that the first alternative—that matter always existed—is based on a literal interpretation 
of the Timaeus, while the second one, that matter is a necessary consequence of causes prior to it, is 
Plotinus’ own philosophical interpretation of the state of affairs, through which he also rejects the literal 
reading of the Timaeus that he already attacked earlier in the treatise (cf. IV.8 [6] 4.35–42, 5.10–16, and 
IGAL’s notes ad loc.). Neither Rist nor Igal deny that matter is generated, therefore, but only that 
whatever this generation entails, it does not make matter independent of the One or altogether separated 
from it (cf. II.9 [33] 3.17–21). See also Henry (1962, lvi–lvii), who calls Plotinus a relaxed dualist. Henry 
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supporter of the first hypothesis is Schwyzer.
311
 A milder version of this hypothesis, 
and one with which I am in agreement on many counts, is that of Narbonne, who raises 
serious doubts about the generation of lower matter, arguing that the Enneads do not 
afford full clarity on the issue.
312
 Those who endorse the claim that for Plotinus lower 
                                                                                                                                                 
does not deny that matter may have an origin (cf. his remarks in Dörrie 1960, 236–237), but only echoes 
Plotinus in saying that it is not completely separated from the Good and somehow participates in it. 
(iv) For O’Brien when Plotinus speaks of “non-participating” matter, he has the matter of the sensible 
world in mind, while when he speaks of matter that “is” and cannot not participate, he is talking about 
intelligible matter. Both kinds are generated: the intelligible, by otherness and the primal movement; the 
sensible, by the partial soul (i.e., the vegetative principle which comes to be in plants mentioned in III.4 
[15] 1.3). For a critique of O’Brien’s views see Narbonne (1993, 143–144); see also PIGLER (212–213), 
who is otherwise very sympathetic to O’Brien’s thesis that lower matter is generated by the lower soul. 
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 Schwyzer (1973). Much of Schwyzer’s argument against the generation of lower matter hinges on an 
interpretation of the protasis of the crucial passage of I.8 [51] 14.51–54 as irrealis (so rendered by 
ARMSTRONG; see also Guthrie 1918, ad loc., who translates the correlative εἴτε/εἴτε at lines 18 and 20 
with “since”). Another of Schwyzer’s main points in arguing that matter is not generated in the Enneads 
concerns the text of III.9 [13] 3.7–16. In his view this passage describes, not the generation of matter, but 
of body, that is, the process by which soul gives form to a preexisting (i.e., ungenerated) formlessness or 
indefiniteness (see especially Schwyzer 1973, 275–276). For positions similar to Schwyzer’s see 
Pistorius (1952, 117–133), Armstrong (1954; but Armstrong 1967, 256 will modify his position), and 
Benz (1990, 110–111, 165). For a critique of Schwyzer’s overall position see O’Brien (1991, 27–41; 
1993, 61–68); cf. also Corrigan (1986, 172–176).  
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 Narbonne (1993; 2001a, 113–147; 2006b; 2007a; 2007b; 2009). Narbonne fundamentally argues that a 
careful analysis of the texts in which what he takes to be a merely alleged generation of matter is 
described shows that these texts are not only inconclusive but actually point to a rejection of the 
hypothesis favoring generation and, a fortiori, of generation by soul. In the order Narbonne (1993, 139–
169, 202–204) treats them, these texts are (passages cited above in the body of the text are given in 
italic): IV.8 [6] 6, IV.7 [2] 3, II.4 [12], III.4 [15] 1, IV.4 [28] 13.17–20, 22–23, III.8 [30] 2, V.8 [31] 2, 
VI.7 [38] 11, 27.11–13, 32.9–12, 33.30–38, VI.2 [43] 22, III.2 [47] 2, 12.1–2, III.3 [48] 1.4–7; III.9 [13] 
3; Narbonne (1993) earlier excepts I.8 [51] 14.51–54 from this list of passages, but in his later 
publications he argues that I.8 [51] 14.51–54 is not Plotinus’ own position, but an allusion to a Gnostic 
view he already rejected in II.9 [33] 12 (Narbonne 2006b; 2007a; 2007b, especially 123–141). Narbonne 
claims that if matter (which is identified with radical evil) ever came into existence, this event never 
occurred as a process of generation or production from higher realities, but as some kind of “by-product” 
(Narbonne 2007a, 85) or a “collateral damage” (Narbonne 2009, 73) of the overall process of derivation. 
Higher realities are thus thought to be innocent of the existence of matter; in fact, they do not generate it 
but rather curb its corrupting influence (I.8 [51] 15). Finally, what soul produces (since as a complete 
reality it is by nature productive) is not matter but a place (τόπος) for the body on which it exercises its 
ordering activity (cf. IV.3 [27] 9.15–26; see Narbonne 2007b, 135–137; 2009). Narbonne’s position is 
well summarized in the following statement: “Du déni pur et simple à l’affirmation inconditionné de 
l’engendrement de la matière, l’éventail est vast. Les écrits de Plotin ont pu susciter un tel éventail de 
solutions et un telle confusion que parce qu’il sont eux-même, sur ce point particulier, hesitants et 
confus” (Narbonne 2001a, 145). I am inclined to agree with this statement. 
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matter is generated
313
 find support in a number of texts, chief of which are III.4 [15] 1 
(which according to Corrigan constitutes the only positive unambiguous statement about 
the generation of lower matter in the Enneads
314
) and III.9 [13] 3. 
It is clear, however, that if lower matter is said to be generated at all in Plotinus, 
generation ought to be understood in non-temporal terms.
315
 In other words, there never 
was a moment in which lower matter did not exist,
316
 for if matter, just like everything 
else (though not in the same way), ultimately derives from the One by an activity that has 
no temporal beginning, then matter itself has no temporal beginning. To this extent, then, 
Plotinus may be understood as the epitome of the Greek tradtion, in which the cosmos 
itself is considered eternal.
317
 So, to say that matter is generated does not mean that it has 
a temporal beginning, but that it depends, not only for its in-formation but also for its 
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 Ficino (in Creuzer 1835 I, xiv, 134, col. 2), in his commentary to I.8 [51] 14, already voiced the view 
that in the Enneads matter is said to be generated: “Memento, Plotinum et hic et alibi nobis innuere, 
materiam a natura, id est, ab infima virtute animae generari.” Notable modern supporters of the 
generation thesis, perhaps influenced by Ficino’s views (cf. Narbonne 2007b, 153–154), are: Armstrong 
(1967, 256; but notice that Armstrong 1954, 277–278 thought otherwise). Rist (see note 310 (ii)), 
O’Brien (1971; 1981; 1991, particularly 11 and 15–25; 1993, particularly 55; 1999a; 1999b; cf. also note 
310 (iv)), Corrigan (1986; 1996, 258–263), IGAL (see note 310 (iii)), O’Meara (1993, 78; and, in the 
context of the question of matter as evil, 1999b, 30–39), and PIGLER (201–237, especially 202–207); see 
also Blumenthal (1971, 1 note 2), Gerson (1994, 115), Reale (2004, VIII, 131–132), Phillips (2009; see 
note 319). 
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 Corrigan (1986, 168; 1996, 258–259; 2005, 45). The ambiguous passages about the generation of matter 
for Corrigan are: II.3 [52] 18.10–13, 17.21–25; III.9 [13] 3; IV.3 [27] 9.20–26; V.2 [11] 1.18–27; cf. also 
V.2 [11] 2.29–31. 
 
315
 See Rist (1961, 157–158; 1967, 118–119), PIGLER (206, 235). Cf. note 21 above. 
 
316
 I am aware that positively to predicate the verb “to exist” of lower matter is an unfortunate choice of 
words, for Plotinus describes matter as non-being (see note 328 below), but I could not find a less 
unfortunate way to express myself. Suffice it to say that much like in speaking about the One, in talking 
of lower matter one ought to be conscious of the heightened ambiguity of such terms as “being” and 
“existence.” 
 
317
 See O’Meara (1993, 77–78); cf. references in notes 14 and 21. Evidently, the eternity of the cosmos is 
infinity of time, thus differing essentially from the eternity that is the proper way of being of Nous (see 
Appendix D). 
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existence, directly on its generator (and ultimately on the One), and in this precise 
sense it must be understood as something derived. Patently, therefore, generation here 
should not be understood as a chronological affair, but as derivation, that is, the radical 
inability, on the part of all that is generated (γενητός), to maintain itself in existence 
without a prior principle.
318
 We might add in passing that in this strict sense the only 
ungenerated (ἀγένητος or ἀγέννητος) reality is the One (V.4 [7] 1.18–19; cf. Plato, 
Phaedrus 245d3). 
As anticipated, a controversy within the controversy concerns the question of the 
identity of the generator of lower matter and the modality of this generative act. 
Concerning the first problem, the identity of the generator, those who agree that matter is 
generated generally also agree that the generator is soul,
319
 but they may disagree on 
whether this means simply the partial soul mentioned at III.9 [13] 3.7 and III.4 [15] 
1.3,
320
 the lower soul (i.e., the World-Soul or Nature),
321
 or, in light of the expression 
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 See II.9 [33] 3.13–21, II.4 [12] 5.24–29; cf. also VI.8 [39] 21.20–21. These meanings of γενητός and 
ἀγένητος (and of the related verbs γεννάω and γίγνομαι) are brought out clearly by O’Brien in his 
critique of Schwyzer (O’Brien 1991, 35–38; 1993, 61–64), whatever one might think of this critique and 
of the position of Plotinus’ editor on the issue. 
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 A fairly recent exception is Phillips (2009), who in an overall critique of O’Brien’s position argues that 
matter is certainly said to be generated in the Enneads, but that the identity of the generator is far from 
clear. In fact, he thinks that the passages on which O’Brien (see next note for references) comments to 
prove that the generator of matter is the “partial soul” or the soul “which comes to be in plants” (i.e., III.4 
[15] 1 and III.9 [13] 3.7–16) speak not of the generation of matter but of what he calls the “soul-trace” or 
“soul-image,” that is, the lowest level of soul, lower even than vegetation (cf. Phillips 2009, 122–133), 
and which elsewhere seems to be identified with the παθητικόν (see Igal 1979, 324–329; IGAL I, 86–87). 
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 O’Brien (1991, 25; 1993, 19–35, 61–68; 1999a, 181–182). 
 
321
 PIGLER (227–237). Pigler’s main thesis is that the lower soul engenders pre-cosmic matter by replicating 
the inaugural gesture of henologic superabundance. But this replica is an inverted analogue of the pre-
hypostatic intelligible matter that derived from that gesture because the production of lower matter is not 
a consequence of the perfection of soul. On the contrary, it occurs because in soul “il y a une perte 
d’unité et une perte d’energeia par rapport aux réalités intelligible qui lui sont antérieures” (PIGLER 232), 
so that pre-cosmic matter is but a residue of the primal energy springing from the One, “l’excédent qui 
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αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ at I.8 [51] 14.51, soul as including also the Soul-Hypostasis.322 
Concerning the mode of generation, there seems to be a certain agreement that 
while the One and Nous generate because of their perfection or completeness and by 
remaining in themselves, soul is unable to do so (V.2 [11] 1.7–9, 16–19). By contrast, 
(lower) soul generates matter out of its own indefiniteness
323
 and inability to constitute 
                                                                                                                                                 
n’a pu trouver place dans l’actualisation des hypostases” (PIGLER 233; cf. II.5 [25] 5.17–23; see also note 
325 below). The production of lower matter introduces a rupture with the intelligible world and 
constitutes a new order (or rather, the condition of possibility of a new order): the sensible (III.9 [13] 
3.9–12). For these reasons, the attributes of pre-cosmic matter are negative: it is an aberrant image of 
intelligible matter and a mere shadow of reason (VI.3 [44] 7.3–9); utterly unintelligible (III.6 [26] 7.7–
13, V.8 [31] 7.16–24, I.8 [51] 5.9–12), it can be spoken of only in negative terms; it totally lacks being, 
form and actuality, and thus is unable to revert so as to constitute itself as a hypostasis; it is the principle 
of entropy and of death; otherness itself. I will return to these descriptions of matter shortly, in the second 
part of this subsection. 
 
322
 Corrigan (1986, 172–176; 1996, 261–263). For a critique of Corrigan (1986) on this point, see O’Brien 
(1991, especially 81–82), to whom Corrigan (1996, 261–263) in turn replies; critical of Corrigan (1986) 
is also Narbonne (1987). In support of his views, among other things Corrigan (1996, 263 note 20) cites 
Ficino’s translation of the expression αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ at I.8 [51] 14.51 as “anima ipsa” (Ficino 1492; 1835) 
but from Ficino’s commentary to this passage it is not clear to me that this ought to mean the Soul-
Hypostasis. All Ficino says is that in generating matter, soul is not yet evil but good (“nondum mala sed 
bona” (in Creuzer 1835 I, 134); see also note 313. 
 
323
 Commenting on III.9 [13] 3.7–16, Corrigan (1996, 260) points out that for Plotinus soul can have three 
different inclinations: to what is above it, to itself, and to what comes after it. Corrigan (1996, 260) writes 
that the generation of matter takes place within the second inclination, and goes on to argue that this 
inclination includes an experience of indefiniteness which is related to form: “It is therefore an 
indefiniteness of soul, strictly speaking, although what is shaped is the indefiniteness of matter.” Two 
kinds of indefiniteness or of darkness are at issue here: that of soul as a kind of indefiniteness that can be 
formed, and that of matter, which is total indefiniteness. Corrigan writes on the same page: “In shaping 
matter, soul shapes body and at the same time brings its own indefiniteness under control.” Whether the 
kind of indefiniteness that is at issue in the generation of matter may belong also to the Soul-Hypostasis 
is debatable. Corrigan argues that the possibility of pure soul being involved in the generation of matter 
is seriously considered in the Enneads, specifically at I.8 [51] 14. But what are Plotinus’ reasons for 
considering this possibility? Corrigan (1996, 261–262) links the generation of matter to the issue of the 
corruption of the soul, namely the fact that in the mere act of generating matter soul is not yet corrupted 
but becomes so only later, when “matter is illuminated by soul but darkens the illumination, thereby 
hindering and cramping the full operation of soul which comes to identify itself with the darkened 
illumination” (cf. I.8 [51] 14.27–51; see also my previous note). In support of this, Corrigan also cites a 
good number of passages from the Enneads in which pure soul is said to undergo some affection (e.g., 
III.6 [26] 17.4–5, III.7 [45] 11.11–23, III.9 [13] 3.7–16, IV.8 [6] 4.12–17, 5.16–27, V.1 [10] 1.3–8). 
Without rejecting Corrigan’s reasoning as such, could we not restrict its application to lower soul, rather 
than involving pure soul (i.e., the Soul-Hypostasis)? I am aware that this is precisely what Corrigan 
wants to deny, but I believe that my question is not futile. In light of what I wrote in the final pages of the 
previous subsection, it would appear that the Soul-Hypostasis (or rather, pre-hypostatic psychic matter) 
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itself as a separate hypostasis. For this reason soul produces something other than 
itself, something toward which it may move (V.2 [11] 1.18–19; III.9 [13] 3.7–12) and 
which may receive it (IV.3 [27] 9.22–23, IV.8 [6] 5.24–27)324 in its attempt to replicate 
externally the unity above it.
325
 
Finally, as to why soul generates matter, there is virtually no disagreement that 
two main reasons are found in Plotinus: first, because matter is the necessary condition 
for the existence of contraries in the sensible universe; second, because there must be an 
end to the process of derivation from the One, and this end is matter.
326
 
                                                                                                                                                 
“brings its indefiniteness under control,” not by generating matter, but by contemplating Nous and 
coming about as a fully formed hypostasis, and so, if matter is generated at all, it would seem more 
plausible to reserve its generation to some lower manifestation of soul, whether the partial soul (O’Brien: 
note 320), the lower soul (Pigler; notes 321 and 325), or the soul-trace (Phillips: note 319). If I am not 
mistaken about this, then it may be asked what reasons are left in Plotinus, according to Corrigan, to 
involve pure soul in the generation of matter. 
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 See O’Brien (1999a, 182–183), to whom I owe most of the references in this paragraph. O’Brien 
(1999a, 183) remarks that the differences between the One/Nous and soul are not limited to the way they 
generate, but “continue ex parte prolis. Intellect, Soul, and intelligible matter, when they are generated, 
turn back of their own accord toward the principle from which they have issued, and intelligible matter, 
when it does this, ‘is defined’ (V.2 [11] 1.9–13 and 19–20; II.4 [12] 5.33–35). None of this is true of the 
matter of the sensible world.” 
 
325
 It may be worth summarizing Pigler’s position on this point (PIGLER 227–231). Her main thesis is that 
“l’Âme inférieure, en créant le sensible, rompt avec la continuité de la procession et qu’elle répète, tout 
en le pervertissant, en générant l’indétermination absolue qu’est la matière précosmique, le geste 
inaugural de l’Un” (PIGLER 228). As we already saw at the end of the previous subsection, within the 
intelligible what is superior necessarily engenders an inferior image of itself which, in turn, possesses the 
power to constitute itself as a hypostasis by “converting” toward its generator. “De cette façon, 
l’acte/conversion est le moment radicalement constituent de la procession, le coup d’arrêt qui place 
d’emblée l’image dans l’être. L’acte/conversion résorbe donc l’écart insitué par la procession et permet 
ce contact ineffable, immatériel, instauré par la contemplation de l’être génerateur” (PIGLER 229). This is 
true down to the higher soul, but no longer so with the lower soul. “En effet, lorsque cette dernière tente 
de se contempler elle-même dans un acte de conversion vers soi, lorsqu’elle désire être avec elle-même, 
elle fait, du même coup, avorter le processus auto-constituant qui va de pair, en règle générale, avec le 
regard contemplateur. L’échec de l’auto-constitution de l’Âme inférieure en hypostase produit 
néanmoins une image, mais celle-ci est sans réalité” (PIGLER 230). And as the lower soul tries to 
replicate the unity above it in the image below it, its activity and self-unification are never fully 
accomplished, and its desire never fulfilled. Cf. also note 321 above. 
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 On the necessity of matter (and of the sensible, hence of matter as its condition) see I.8 [51] 7.16–23, 
15.1–3, III.2 [47] 5.25–32, IV.8 [6] 3.27–30, 6.1–15; cf. also II.9 [33] 12.31–44. Cf. Plato, Timaeus 
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After this partial overview of the major themes and the basic literature 
surrounding the issue of the generation of matter, we can finally ask: What is the nature 
of matter? And what kind of eros belongs to it? I will try to answer the first question by 
briefly outlining the three chief descriptions of pre-cosmic matter discussed by Pigler: 
matter as non-being, matter as the principle of entropy, and matter as evil.
327
 
To describe matter as non-being (μὴ ὄν; μὴ εἶναι), as Plotinus often does,328 does 
not mean to say that matter does not exist in any way whatsoever; rather, non-being here 
means complete privation of form,
329
 complete indetermination (ἀοριστία330) in 
                                                                                                                                                 
47e5–48a1. See Gerson (1994, 114–115). 
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 PIGLER (239–266, respectively 239–244, 244–250, and 250–256). 
 
328
 On matter as non-being: τὸ μὴ ὄν at II.4 [12] 10.35, 16.3, II.5 [25] 4.6–14, 5.13, III.6 [26] 7.11–13, 
14.20 (πάντη μὴ ὂν; cf. also VI.9 [9] 11.36), VI.9 [9] 11.37; μὴ εἶναι at I.8 [51] 5.11–12, II.5 [25] 5.28, 
III.6 [26] 7.2. As I already pointed out earlier in the context of the question of Platonic hermeneutic (see 
Appendix E.4), O’Brien (1995, 19–25, 31–37, 43–88; 1999a, 172–174) argues that the notion of matter 
as non-being is to be traced back to the threefold distinction outlined by Plato in the Sophist: (i) absolute 
non-being as that which is not in any way at all (τὸ μηδαμῶς ὂν: Sophist 237b7–8), non-being itself by 
itself (τὸ μὴ ὂν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτό: 238c9), or Parmenidean non-being, absolute nothingness (a similar 
expression is found in the Enneads: τὸ παντελῶς μὴ ὄν at I.8 [51] 3.6–7, II.4 [12] 6.6; πάντη μὴ ὂν at 
VI.9 [9] 11.36; παντελὲς μὴ ὄν at VI.9 [9] 11.38); (ii) non-being as “an opposition between the form of 
being and that part of the form of otherness that is opposed to being” (Sophist 258a11–b4; O’Brien 
1999a, 172–173); (iii) non-being as “that part of the form of otherness which is opposed to the being of 
each thing” (Sophist 258d7–e3; O’Brien 1999a, 173). According to O’Brien, Plotinus takes (iii) as a 
definition of lower matter (cf. II.4 [12] 16.1–3). To this classification of non-being we might add, with 
Narbonne (1992, 117–119), (iv) a distinction not found in the Sophist, namely non-being as that which is 
beyond being, namely Plato’s Good, or Plotinus’ One. 
 
329
 On lower matter as formlessness (ἀμορφία) or formless (ἄμορφος) see I.8 [51] 9.15–18, II.4 [12] 2.3, 
10.27, 31–32, V.9 [5] 3.18–20, VI.7 [38] 33.30–31. In other similar passages, lower matter is said, by 
itself, to be deprived of, or opposed to all form (εἶδος: I.6 [1] 2.16–18, I.8 [51] 4.2, 9.11–18, II.4 [12] 
6.17–19, 13.23–24, III6 [26] 10.14–28, 19.23–25; μορφή: I.6 [1] 2.16–18, II.4 [12] 8.14–16, 13.23–24, 
VI.3 [44] 2.31–33, VI.7 [38] 33.32–33; cf. also VI.5 [23] 8, where the term ἰδέα is used). It may be 
objected that the the One, too, is formless (see note 59 above). Evidently, as in the case of power (see 
note 334 below) and unity (see note 332), formlessness is predicated differently of the One and of matter. 
In the former case, henologic formlessness is an indetermination of power, namely the nature of the One 
as that which is virtually all things but actually none (see note 74); in the latter case, by contrast, material 
formlessness is the indetermination of powerlessness, a perpetual state of potentiality (or, perhaps less 
imprecisely, of impotentiality: see note 334 below), which as such not only never turns into something 
actual, but which is also incapable of producing something after itself (cf. the next note and Chapter Four 
note 75). See also Hadot (1988, 329–336). 
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opposition to the complete determination of Intellect, absolute otherness 
(αὐτοετερότης: II.4 [12] 13.18),331 as opposed to the relative otherness of Nous (i.e., an 
otherness that also implies sameness), but also simplicity and continuity, once again in 
contrast with the qualified unity of Nous (i.e., a unity that already implies a plurality 
within itself and is productive of a plurality after itself).
332
 Thus, Plotinian matter is not 
like Aristotle’s bronze or silver, which can be shaped into a statue or a bowl (Physics 
II.194b24–26), but rather like a mirror (III.6 [26] 9.16–19), which only appears to take 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
330
 On matter as indetermination (ἀοριστία) or as undetermined (ἀόριστος) see I.8 [51] 4.25–32, II.4 [12] 
2.2–3, 10.13–17, 31–35, 11.29–43, 13.5–7, 14.24–30; almost synonymously with undetermined, matter is 
also called unmeasured (ἄμετρος, ἀμετρία: I.2 [19] 2.20–21, I.8 [51] 3, 4.27, 6.42, 8.37–43), and 
unlimited (ἄπειρος, ἀπειρία: II.4 [12] 14.29, 15, III.6 [26] 7.8; cf. also VI.6 [34] 1.1). As Plotinus argues 
in most of these passages and as we shall see in the next chapter, by associating with matter the 
individual soul becomes more undetermined, much like by associating with the intelligible realm it 
becomes more determined. It will be recalled that intelligible matter, too, is conceptualized as 
indetermination (see pages 224–227; Chapter Two note 89). This is not incoherent, however, for 
although Plotinus sees both lower and intelligible matter as undetermined, the former is what by itself 
remains deprived of form and lacks the power to revert upon itself and toward its generator, while the 
latter is what (logically) precedes the very realm of form, Nous, but, by being contemplatively and 
erotically turned toward the One, eventually becomes form (cf. II.4 [12] 5.13–20). The same argument 
can be made for the respective unlimitedness or infinity of intelligible and lower matter (cf. II.4 [12] 15–
16). 
 
331
 On matter as absolute otherness see II.4 [12] 3.9 ad fin. 
 
332
 Plotinus expressly recognizes the Stoic view of the unity of all matter (II.4 [12] 1.8–9; see Calcidius, 
Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus 292 = SVF I, 88; cf. also references in SVF II, 530–533). At II.4 [12] 
8.1–2, 13 he specifically calls matter one (μία, ἕν), continuous (συνεχής), without quality (ἄποιος), and 
simple (ἁπλοῦν); cf. also II.4 [12] 7.26, VI.1 [42] 25.29–33. It may be objected that although the contrast 
between pre-cosmic matter and Nous on this point is easily recognizable, the same characterizations 
attributed here to matter are elsewhere either explicitly inferred about the One, as in the cases of unity 
and simplicity (so obvious and frequent as to need no reference), and absence of quantity (ἀμεγέθης: e.g., 
VI.9 [9] 6.8; for matter as ἀμεγέθης see II.4 [12] 8–12), or else closely associated with it, as in the case 
of continuity (e.g., VI.6 [34] 13.25–26, VI.9 [9] 1.8–10, 32–33) and absence of quality (e.g., VI.9 [9] 
7.11–16). But as in the cases of formlessness (see note 329) and power (see note 334), here too the kind 
of unity, simplicity, continuity, and absence of quality predicated of matter are unlike those applied to the 
One, for whereas the One is the Principle from which, being virtually all things, all things actually derive, 
lower matter is a continuous field that merely reflects the form and life of higher realities while 
generating nothing after itself. Thus, the One is the simple power whence comes the differentiation of all 
reality; by contrast, when taken by itself, matter is that in which the differentiation of all reality ends. 
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the shape of whatever it reflects,
333
 while in fact assuming neither quality nor quantity 
(II.4 [12] 8–12, III.6 [26] 16–17), but remaining completely impassive to the informing 
action of what is ontologically prior to it (III.6 [26] 6–19). For this reason, matter is never 
actual but always potential (II.5 [25] 5
334
),
335
 and, by itself imperceptible (II.4 [12] 12.26–
30), can be grasped only through some kind of “spurious reasoning” (II.4 [12] 10.11336). 
Finally, by being called “mother” (III.6 [26] 19.1: ὥσπερ μητέρα), matter is associated to 
the Platonic receptacle (see note 14; cf. Plato, Timaeus 50d3, 51a4); however, it is called 
“mother” only in a manner of speaking, for by itself (παρ’ αὐτῆς: VI.7 [38] 33.32) it 
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 Cf. Plato, Republic VI.509e–510a. Matter reflects everything while actually never taking up any form 
because in itself it is pure privation of form. On matter as mere appearance: φάντασις (III.6 [26] 13.53), 
φαίνεσθαι (III.6 [26] 13.49–55, 15.24–31), φάντασμα (III.6 [26] 15.29). On the association of matter and 
privation (στέρησις; cf. also πενία and ἔνδεια), see I.8 [51] 5.24–25, II.4 [12] 14, III.6 [26] 19.23–25, V.9 
[5] 10.16–20. For a reading of matter as privation see O’Brien (1999a, 178–181); 
 
334
 Clearly, when matter is linked to potentiality (cf. II.5 [25] 4–5, on which see Narbonne 1998, 115–142), 
the meaning of the term δύναμις is not that of power, as we saw was the case with the One (pages 179–
187 above; cf. V.3 [49] 15.33–40). However, I think it would be mistaken to conflate the potentiality of 
Plotinian matter with Aristotelian potentiality, which is the genuine capacity to take on or develop into a 
given form. By contrast, the potentiality of matter for Plotinus is one that will never be actualized and to 
this extent, perhaps more appropriately, not potentiality at all (since for Aristotle every potentiality is the 
potentiality for something actual, and so a principle of change, once the appropriate conditions are 
granted: see Physics VIII.251a11, b1–5; Metaphysics VI.1019a15–16, IX.1046a9–11, 1048a1–2, 13–16; 
De anima II.417a28), but, perhaps more appropriately, a factor of pure “impotentiality” (ἀδυναμία: I.8 
[51] 14.14). Cf. note 329 above. 
 
335
 Matter’s lack of actuality is thus opposed to the pure actuality of Intellect (see the closing paragraphs of 
Subsection 3.4.2); for this reason, the only actuality matter is said to have is that of a mere image, or of a 
lie (II.5 [25] 5.23–24: ἐνεργείᾳ εἴδωλον, ἐνεργείᾳ ψεῦδος, ἀληθινῶς ψεῦδος; cf. III.6 [26] 7.21 ad fin.), 
and it is metaphorically associated to shadow (σκιά: III.6 [26] 18.29–31) and darkness (σκότος: I.8 [51] 
4.32, 5.1–5, II.4 [12] 10.13–17, V.1 [10] 2.26; σκοτεινή: II.4 [12] 5.7, in connection with intelligible 
matter; ἀμυδρά: II.4 [12] 12.26). It follows that the sensible universe, being impregnated with pre-cosmic 
matter, is itself in part an illusory realm (VI.3 [44] 8.10; cf. also II.3 [52] 17, II.4 [12] 15). However, 
unlike matter, the sensible has quantity, magnitude, and impenetrability (that is, a repugnance of bodies 
to a universal mixing with each other, the topic of treatise II.7 [37]). In this regard, space and time are the 
two principles of dispersion of the sensible (VI.4 [22] 8.14–15): the former makes extension possible, 
while in the latter bodies are corrupted and pass away (IV.3 [27] 8). See PIGLER (142–144). 
 
336
 II.4 [12] 10.11: νόθῳ λογισμῷ (cf. 10.6–11, 28–31; I.8 [51] 9.19–26). The reference is to the Timaeus, 
52b2, where Plato is discussing the “apprehension” of space (χώρα). Cf. also Aristotle, Metaphysics 
VII.1036a9, where matter is called “unknowable by itself” (ἄγνωστος καθ’ αὑτήν). Cf. note 14 above. 
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never has any form, but, in its permanent indetermination, it is sterile, it generates 
nothing (cf. III.6 [26] 19.14–25, VI.3 [44] 2.31–33, VI.7 [38] 33.32–33). 
It is because its nature is of such sort as I have just described it that Pigler’s calls 
matter the principle of entropy. As we saw in the generation of Nous and of soul, each 
reality generates something similar to itself (the Principle of Likeness of Cause and 
Effect), but in a weaker form (the Principle of Superiority of Cause to Effect); the 
“offspring,” in turn, becomes limited and determined by turning toward its generator (the 
Principle of Reversion). Pigler thinks that in the case of lower soul, its product is pre-
cosmic matter, in which the already weakened unity of the lower soul is weakened further 
to the point of becoming utter indetermination and lack of form. The lower soul has a 
desire to deploy its intelligible content in something external and does so in its product, 
matter. This is the birth of the sensible: thanks to the “in-forming” action of the lower 
soul, pre-cosmic matter is given order and limit and becomes body.
337
 But in spite of the 
ordering activity of the lower soul, matter remains fundamentally a dead thing (νεκρὸν: 
II.4 [12] 5.18; cf. also cf. also V.1 [10] 2.23–27); if it seems alive, it is only because of a 
life which it does not itself possess but merely receives from the lower soul,
338
 which is 
the only source of life in the sensible world (V.1 [10] 2.20–27). Therefore, matter is the 
principle of entropy because after it there is no further product; matter is the last term (τὸ 
ἔσχατον) in the process of derivation since with it the erotic energy that originated from 
the One comes to a stop, unable by itself both to revert and to produce something after 
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 This ordering activity is something that has been going on ab aeterno (IV.3 [27] 9.12–20). 
 
338
 On matter as by itself lifeless, see I.8 [51] 4.3 (ἐστέρηταί τε ζωῆς); cf. also IV.7 [2] 3, 11.14–15, IV.8 
[6] 6.7, VI.3 [44] 2.22–24. 
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itself.
339
 
But in the sensible cosmos matter is not left alone, invested as it is by the activity 
both of the World-Soul and of individual souls. While the World-Soul rules the sensible 
universe as a whole, individual souls take charge of portions of this universe and deploy 
their powers in them by informing them and endowing them with different forms of 
life.
340
 Thus attended to by the World-Soul and individual souls, matter is shaped into a 
sensible universe. Like all levels of reality in the Plotinian process of derivation, the 
sensible, too, has its own proper eros. We saw that the internal eros of Nous (as opposed 
to its external eros, which is directed toward the Principle), or the perfect harmony 
subsisting in the multiplicity of the Ideas, was figuratively spoken of as a kind of 
friendship among the intellgibles (see note 227). Similarly, at the level of the sensible 
Plotinus speaks of sympathy (συμπάθεια, συμπαθεῖν341). His usage of what originally 
appears to be a Stoic notion
342
 is quite nuanced, but in virtually all instances it basically 
indicates a coordination of discrete parts or distinct phenomena. This coordination is 
made possible on the basis of a single principle pervading those parts or phenomena, this 
principle being the one soul from which both the World-Souls and all individual souls 
                                                 
339
 Cf. III.6 [26] 7.8–9, 30, VI.3 [44] 2.31–33. 
 
340
 Cf. V.1 [10] 3.7–9, 6.44–45. 
 
341
 Occasionally συμπάσχειν: e.g., at IV.4 [28] 32.19, IV.9 [8] 2.20. 
 
342
 On συμπάθεια in ancient Stoicism see for example references in SVF II, 170.532.14, 546.172.39, 
912.264.8, 1013.302.25, 1211.347.24 (in all these passages sympathy is predicated of the different parts 
and phenomena of the cosmos and the organism). For a concise treatment of Plotinus’ use of this notion 
in relation to the Stoics see Graeser (1972, 68–72), Gurtler (1984). 
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originate.
343
 
At IV.3 [27] 8.1–3 all souls, including the World-Soul, are emphatically said to 
share in a relation of sympathy because they derive from the same Soul. What is 
important about this remark is that a sympathetic connection is possible only where there 
is a true principle of unity at work. Plotinus explicitly states that this principle cannot be 
something that is merely corporeal (i.e., an inanimate body), for inanimate bodies do not, 
by themselves, concur to form an organism (that is, the phenomenon to which the 
condition of sympathy belongs most conspicuously) unless soul is present. Most 
importantly, what displays sympathy is understood to be a kind of unity sympathizing 
with itself; this unity is soul (IV.7 [2] 3.5: ψυχὴ δὲ αὑτῇ συμπαθής344). Plotinus never 
                                                 
343
 Sympathy is used in a variety of contexts to explain phenomena as diverse as magic and sense-
perception. Thus at II.3 [52] 5 sympathy occurs between reason and the non-rational parts of the soul; in 
IV.4 [28] 32 the whole universe is interpreted as a living being whose parts are kept together in a 
sympathetic relation (cf. also IV.4 [28] 35.8–9 and II.3 [52] 12.29–32); at IV.4 [28] 8.52–62 the 
movement of the heavens is described both in terms of sympathy and of harmony; at IV.9 [8] 3.1–4 
different individual souls are said to stand in a mutual relation of sympathy; at IV.4 [28] 34.26–32 all the 
parts of the body harmonize (line 32: συμπαθοῦντα) in the activity of dancing. Notably, the whole 
treatise IV.5 [29] (On difficulties about the soul 3, or On sight) explains the phenomenon of vision 
through the notion of sympathy (the terms συμπάθεια and συμπαθής occur several times in this treatise: 
1.35, 2.17, 3.17; 1.36, 2.22, 26, 3.19, 38, 8.3; ὁμοπάθεια is likely used as a synonym of συμπάθεια at 
1.12, and see also IV.2 [4] 1.51, IV.7 [2] 3.2, IV.9 [8] 2.32. For a fruitful discussion of IV.5 [29] and the 
workings of sympathy in vision see Emilsson 1983, 36–62); and at IV.4 [28] 23.18–32 sympathy is 
singularly used to explain the phenomenon of sense-perception in a way vaguely reminiscent of 
adaequatio theories of truth common in the Middle Ages. See also III.1 [3] 5.1–15, where astrological 
theories exploit the relation of sympathy among different cosmic phenomena to try to foresee future 
events (ultimately going too far for Plotinus, since they end up denying the role of freedom and turn the 
sensible into a realm of determinism); similarly, at IV.4 [28] 26, 34, and 40–41 magical practices and 
even prayer are grounded in cosmic sympathy (see also IV.9 [8] 3.4–6). For a negative instance of 
sympathy, see I.2 [19] 6.23–27, where the soul endowed with higher virtue is said no longer to 
sympathize with what is inferior in it (contrast this with II.3 [52] 13.40–47; for the difference between 
higher and lower virtue see Subsection 4.6.1). 
 
344
 This expression is found in Plotinus’ attempt to refute the Epicurean theory that the soul is a 
convergence of atoms (IV.7 [2] 3.1–6; on the theory itself see scholium to Epicurus, Letter I.66 = 
EPICUREA fragment 311, 216.31–32; cf. also Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus 63 = EPICUREA 19–20; 
Lucretius, De rerum natura III.161–176) and is part of a larger portion of the treatise On the immortality 
of the soul (IV.7 [2] 2.1–85.43), in which Plotinus extensively argues that the soul can be thought of as 
neither a body nor a property of a body (for a discussion of IV.7 [2] 3.1–6 see Longo 2009, 118–121). 
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says it explicitly, but I think that the sympathy found in the sensible universe (i.e., in 
matter already illuminated and cared for by soul) can be interpreted as the eros properly 
belonging to this level of reality. It is, in a sense, one last attempt—the sensible attempt—
at replicating the unqualified unity and self-love of the Principle: Nous did it noetically 
and emerged as the realm of friendship among the intelligibles; soul did it at its own level 
by remaining contemplatively directed toward Nous and thus reproducing noetic unity 
discursively; finally, the lower soul, including individual souls, does it at the level of the 
sensible, by establishing a relation of sympathy among the different parts of individual 
organisms and of the sensible universe as a whole. 
Now, as each individual soul directs its attention to a portion of the sensible 
universe by making it its own body, a further level of fragmentation is reached in the 
process of derivation, for the individual soul, though stably fixed in Nous through its 
higher or undescended part, often, in its lower part, is as if caught in the activity of in-
formation and animation of matter, and as if scattered in the multiple chores that this 
activity requires. This is so because its power is inferior to that of the World-Soul, which 
by contrast has complete control over the body of the universe by maintaining its vision 
fixed in the Soul-Hypostasis’ contemplation of Nous (see note 282 for references). Thus, 
delighted by the beauty of its own work, the individual soul runs the constant risk of 
taking this work as true reality, like a Narcissus craving to seize his own image reflected 
                                                                                                                                                 
For this reason, in addition to the figurative feature of “friendship” found among the intelligibles (note 
227 above) and of “sympathy” found among souls of which I have been speaking, the sensible universe 
intrinsically includes enmity, a likewise figurative bellum omnium contra omnes of cosmic proportions: 
“[2] for it is many and [3] divided into a multiplicity, and one part stands away from another [4] and is 
alien [ἀλλότριον] to it, and there is not only friendship [φιλία] but [5] also enmity [ἔχθρα] because of the 
separation, and in their deficiency one part is of necessity [6] at war [πολέμιον] with another” (III.2 [47] 
2.2–6). 
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in water.
345
 
It is in this connection that the characterization of matter as evil comes into 
focus.
346
 The question here is not whether the generation of matter (if one is willing to 
concede that the Enneads hold that lower matter is generated at all) was evil, for as 
Plotinus points out, matter stands for the last necessary stage in the procession of all 
things from the One (see note 326). Rather, the problem is, first, whether the “descent”347 
of soul into matter is itself an evil act and, second, if it is not, in what sense matter can 
still be considered evil. Plotinus is unambiguous about the first half of the problem: the 
descent of soul into matter is not itself evil.
348
 After matter has been generated, the lower 
                                                 
345
 On Narcissus, see I.6 [1] 8.6–15, V.8 [31] 2.31–35; for a brief discussion of this myth in the Enneads 
see Pépin (1976, 199–200). 
 
346
 On matter as evil: κακή: I.8 [51] 14.50 (cf. also 4.1), III.6 [26] 11.43–44; τὸ κακόν: I.8 [51] 4.27, 5, 7.6, 
8.11, 14.51 (πρῶτον κακόν), II.4 [12] 16.16–21, VI.7 [38] 28.12 ad fin. Additionally, matter is called the 
cause of evil(s): I.8 [51] 8.27 (αἴτιον τῶν κακῶν), 14.50 (κακίας αἰτία), 53; cf. also II.3 [52] 11.10–13, 
V.9 [5] 10.16–20. Most radically and almost paradoxically, at I.8 [51] 3.21–40, particularly lines 24 and 
38–40, matter is called “the substance of evil” (κακοῦ οὐσία), “the first evil and evil by itself” (πρῶτον 
καὶ καθ’ αὑτὸ κακόν; at I.6 [1] 6.22: τὸ δ’αὐτὸ καὶ πρῶτον κακόν; on αὑτὸ κακόν see also I.8 [51] 
13.14–15); and again, at I.8 [51] 5.9, “the true evil” (τὸ ὄντως κακὸν). 
 
347
 The treatise where Plotinus deals with the so called descent of the soul into body is IV.8 [6] (on the topic 
see Rist 1967, 112–129). It should be noted that in chapter 6 of this treatise Plotinus seems to have a 
more positive view of matter than those espoused in later treatises, II.4 [12] and I.8 [51] (cf. ARMSTRONG 
IV, 394–395). 
 
348
 See O’Brien (1971, 142). PIGLER (247) comments: “Le descente de l’Âme inférieure ou, si l’on préfère, 
de la Nature, est un substitut de la conversion que l’Âme inférieure est incapable de produire car elle est 
déjà trop multiple. On peut pourtant analyser le fait de cette « descente » comme le moyen dont elle se 
sert pour se connaître elle-même, pour connaître ses propres contenus.” This descent is a necessity of the 
unfolding of the procession of all reality from the One (cf. IV.3 [27] 13). The World-Soul, is always 
completely in control of its body (and to this extent it differs from individual souls: II.9 [33] 7.7–18); cf. 
notes 287 and 288 above. Following Rist (1967, 112–129), PIGLER (248 note 1) argues that the descent of 
the lower soul must be distinguished from that of the individual soul, adding that while the former is an 
ontological necessity, the latter is the expression of a particular will. Rist (1967, 121–122) clarifies that 
what is voluntary in the descent is not the movement by which the individual soul comes into matter to 
inform and illuminate it, which like all movement of procession occurs of necessity; what is voluntary is 
rather the attitude that the individual soul takes toward that which it illuminates. As Rist (1967, 122) 
observes, “[t]he pure soul can act in its descent as does the World Soul, and no harm is done. Most souls, 
however, will be overwhelmed by their own handiwork and accept the necessity of descent so gladly as 
to forget the moral duty of return.” 
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soul turns toward it and gives it form, thus bringing about the sensible as a mixture of 
matter and form; successively, individual souls endow some portions of it with life and 
care for them. What remains to be discussed, then, is the second half of the problem, 
namely in what sense matter can still be called evil if we allow that its generation is a 
necessity of the overall process of derivation of everything from the One.
 
 
Briefly, the question can be answered by saying that matter is evil ontologically 
rather than morally.
349
 The matter at issue and which is called evil is not sensible, but pre-
cosmic matter, since the sensible universe, though material, already shares in form and to 
that extent cannot be radically evil.
350
 Pre-cosmic matter, by contrast, is wholly deprived 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
349
 I am tempted to argue that the distinction between metaphysical and moral evil corresponds 
terminologically to the difference between τὸ κακόν and κακία, but as usual Plotinus’ usage, while 
perhaps pointing at a solution of this kind, does not seem to be maintained strictly. As Rist (1971, 77–78) 
rightly remarks also in connection with other topics, this distinction is left implicit in the Enneads, 
although it can be made explicit on the basis of some passing remarks made by Plotinus. The clearest of 
these remarks is perhaps the one at I.8 [51] 5.30–34: “[30] Though there is matter with the visible 
[αἰσθητοῖς] [31] gods, evil [τὸ κακὸν] is not there, not the vice [τὴν κακίαν] which [32] men have—since 
not even all men have it; the visible gods master [κρατεῖν] [33] matter,—yet the gods with whom there is 
no matter are better—and they master it [34] by that in them which is not material [τῷ μὴ ἐν ὕλῃ].” What 
this text implies is precisely a distinction between metaphysical and moral evil. Matter is metaphysical 
evil insofar as it is the last necessary stage of the process of derivation from the One; and since the One is 
also the Good, what is farther away from it can rightly be called evil. But matter is not moral evil to the 
extent that it does not necessitate the performance of vicious actions. The sensible gods (i.e., the 
heavenly bodies) prove this by their ability to bring under complete control the bodies to which they are 
united; apparently this is true also of some better people, elsewhere called divine or godlike (θεῖοι: VI.9 
[9] 11.49; cf. also VI.7 [38] 5.21), among whom Plotinus numbers Plato, the ancients (cf. Charrue, 1978, 
18–23), and the Platonists (III.5 [50] 1.6, IV.8 [6] 1.23; II.9 [33] 6.36, 10.13; V.9 [5] 1.16). Matter does 
remain the necessary condition for moral evil, however, to the extent that the individual soul may 
succumb to it by making its own dealings with it its primary concern, thus losing sight of the fact that its 
own destiny lies elsewhere, namely in the intelligible. This defeat of the soul by matter is understood, not 
as the subtraction of something belonging to the soul, but as the addition of something alien to its nature, 
which in its pure or separate state is not weakened by matter (see I.8 [51] 14.17–24; on the notion of 
addition and subtraction in the context of the ascent of the soul to the One, cf. Section 4.5). For an 
account of how matter is evil for the individual soul (and a creative analogy of this relation), see O’Brien 
(1971; cf. also 1999a, 185–187), criticized for different reasons briefly by Blumenthal (1987, 559) and 
more extensively by Narbonne (2007, 125–128; see note 364 below). 
 
350
 On the sensible as not itself evil see I.8 [51] 11–12, III.2 [47] 3.1–9, IV.8 [6] 6; in connection with the 
polemic against the Gnostics, see II.9 [33] 8–9. It is fair to say that, being a hylomorphic entity, sensible 
matter or body still belongs somehow to the intelligible: in Platonic language, the sensible as an image of 
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of what, within the Plotinian universe, is considered good, and therefore it is called 
the first and true evil, by itself evil, and the substance of evil (see note 346). Thus, as we 
already saw, matter is non-being not in the sense that it has no existence, but in the sense 
that it is opposed to the realm of Being which is Intellect. In this view, matter reflects 
form like a mirror, but this reflection is like an illusion, for matter itself always remains 
devoid of form. Its status of evil, however, is not illusory, and so matter is truthfully a lie 
(II.5 [25] 5.24; see note 335). Evil, therefore, is not an illusion, but is real:
351
 it is pre-
cosmic matter as pure and continuous dispersion that will never achieve unification and 
so, as Pigler argues, the inverted image of intelligible matter. Unable to revert upon itself 
and toward its generator (cf. note 168 above), if any, lower matter can do nothing but 
scatter: while pre-hypostatic noetic matter was infinity without multiplicity (the 
multiplicity of Nous, in fact, is posterior to it), pre-cosmic matter is utter dispersion, 
scattering in an infinite flight away from the Source. The lower soul puts a partial stop to 
this flight by informing matter, but lower matter, by itself, would irreversibly disperse ad 
infinitum. 
Despite all this, matter is not deprived of all desire; and as with all desire inhering 
in what is posterior to the One, some lack is implied. Since matter is described as the 
                                                                                                                                                 
the intelligible (cf. for instance II.9 [33] 8.20–26, III.7 [45] 11.27–29, IV.4 [28] 36.7–8, V.3 [49] 7.33–
34, VI.3 [44] 1.19–21, VI.7 [38] 6.5–6, 7.21–23, 12.1–4); cf. Fielder (1977), Leroux (1992). 
 
351
 As the last stage in the process of derivation from the One, matter stands as the very opposite of the 
Principle and of the intelligible realm as a whole, hence Plotinus’ description of it as non-being and as 
evil. As PIGLER (263–264) rightly points out, this claim becomes problematic if we continue to 
understand contraries in Aristotelian terms, as for example Proclus and Simplicius did (see Proclus, On 
the Existence of Evils 31 and 37; Simplicius, Commentary on Arisotle’s Categories 109.5–110.25; cf. 
Narbonne 2007b, 158–163). For Aristotle, being has no contrary (Categories 3b25, De generatione et 
corruptione II.3 and 7; cf. also Physics I.192a13–25), while for Plotinus it does, and so evil is understood 
as itself substantial, and necessarily so within his own metaphysical parameters (cf. I.8 [51] 6; on the 
logical necessity of evil as the contrary of the Good in Plotinus see O’Meara 1999b, 124–133). 
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utter privation of being and form, its desire will be a desire of being and form; or, as 
Plotinus puts it, matter is “an aspiration to existence” (ὑποστάσεως ἔφεσις: III.6 [26] 
7.13). Here again I take it that Plotinus does not mean to say that matter, desiring 
existence, is pure nothingness, but that it is the kind of non-being that is opposed to the 
wholly determined being which is Intellect (and, derivatively, soul), or Being in the 
technical sense (cf. note 70 above and Chapter One note 187). It will be objected that if 
this is all that lower matter is, desire of form and being, then it does not differ very much 
from soul; the intensity of their respective desires may differ, but their desideratum is the 
same: form and being, or true Being as identical with Form. This may be conceded, but 
the difference between lower matter and soul lies, not in the ultimate identity of their 
desideratum, but in the way they approach it or receive it. More specifically, while soul is 
actually shaped or informed by erotically directing its regard toward Nous, matter’s 
participation in the intelligible (our fourth question in the opening paragraph of this 
subsection) is fictional;
352
 its “aspiration to existence” is destined to remain permanently 
                                                 
352
 As with the other questions posed at the beginning of this subsection, the issue of the participation 
(μετάληψις, μεταλαμβάνειν; μετοχή, μέθεξις, μετέχειν; cf. the relevant entries in SP for textual 
references) of matter in the intelligible received its fair share of somewhat conflicting interpretations (see 
for example the exchange between O’Brien and Corrigan: O’Brien 1981, 115; Corrigan 1986, 177; 
O’Brien 1991, 71–73; Corrigan 1996, 167, 263–266), with some texts seemingly suggesting a positive 
answer to it, and others, a negative one. Among the “positive” passages: IV.8 [6] 6 (especially line 14 ad 
fin.), VI.5 [23] 8 (in particular lines 10–14, 35–39), V.9 [5] 6.20–24, III.6 [26] 7.42–43, III.9 [13] 3.16, 
IV.3 [27] 9.26, VI.5 [23] 11.35–38, and, perhaps most of all, V.8 [31] 7.23 (matter as εἶδός τι ἔσχατον, a 
last form, or as less positively put by Cilento 1947–1949, ad. loc., “una certa forma—infima”; see 
ARMSTRONG V, 259 note 2, but contrast it with VI.7 [38] 27.11–13, where Plotinus writes, not that the 
last form is matter, but that the last form is next—προσεχὲς—to matter). Among the “negative” passages: 
I.2 [19] 2.20–22, I.8 [51] 5.9–10 and chapter 14 (especially lines 38–44), II.5 [25] 5.22, III.6 [26] 7, 11, 
12.3, 13.53–54, 14.21–22, and perhaps III.8 [30] 9.24. 
As O’Brien (1991, 71–73) already noticed, if matter participates in form at all, its way of doing so falls 
short of unqualified participation; in Plotinus’ somewhat paradoxical expressions, matter “participates 
without participating” (πῶς μὴ μετέχον μετέχει: III.6 [26] 14.21–22), or “it participates in some way” 
(ἀμῃγέπῃ μεταλαμβάνει: III.6 [26] 11.38). But as Corrigan (1996, 264) has pointed out, there does not 
seem to be such a thing as unqualified participation, for everything participates according to its capacity 
(IV.8 [6] 6.17: καθόσον ἕκαστον οἷόν τ’ ἦν μεταλαμβάνειν; 6.19–20: καθόσον δύναται ἕκαστον; VI.5 
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unfulfilled due to its nature, which is only able to reflect form without itself ever 
becoming actually informed. In Plotinus’ own words at III.6 [26] 7.16–29:353 
[16] It [viz., lower matter] always presents opposite appearances on its 
surface, [17] small and great, less and more, [18] deficient and 
superabundant, a phantom which does not remain and cannot get away 
                                                                                                                                                 
[23] 11.29–30: καθόσον οἷόν τε αὐτῇ μεταλαβεῖν). Against Corrigan, one may object, first, that matter’s 
capacity for participation is nil (hence it “participates without participating”), and second, that in the 
passages from IV.8 [6] 6 quoted by Corrigan, Plotinus speaks of participation in the Good rather than in 
form. I find it hard to take the first objection seriously, since the very meaning of “participating” in the 
statement that matter “participates in some way” would be utterly equivocal. Moreover, if it is true that 
matter has no capacity for participation in the Good, what prevents it from falling into absolute 
nothingness? Most importantly, I belive that the point of contention here should not be whether matter 
participates strictly (or without qualification), but whether it participates at all, for given its nature, even 
participation according to Plotinus’ paradoxical expressions qualifies as a modality of participation. As 
for the second objection, it may be countered by saying that the good of matter—itself formless, 
indeterminate, non-being, evil—is what it lacks precisely as its contrary, namely form, determination, 
Being, Good (cf. I.8 [51] 6). But even so, the participation of lower matter remains somewhat 
paradoxical. 
It would be tempting to argue that matter strictly participates, rather than in form, in whatever it is that 
the One gives, which, following Gerson, could be interpreted as existence (see note 47 above)—we 
might recall that matter is opposed to Being understood as form and determination, but it is not nothing 
altogether (see pages 267–268). This interpretation would allow us to bypass the causality proper to Nous 
and soul and make matter depend directly on the One for its existence (this would also allow us to 
maintain the thesis of the derivation of all reality from the One, while solving the problem of the identity 
of the generator of matter). We find such a solution already in Proclus, Elements of Theology 72 cor., as 
the result of proposition 60 of the same work, which states: “Whatever principle is the cause of a greater 
number of effects is superior to that which has a power limited to fewer objects and which gives rise to 
part of those existences constituted by the other as wholes” (see also Dodds’ comments ad loc.; cf. the 
anonymous Liber de causis 1–5). Thus for Proclus matter, though participating in neither form nor life, is 
not nothing; and since the principles of form and life are Nous and soul, the existence of matter must be 
explained by recourse to a cause whose power is greater than these, namely the One (see Proclus, 
Platonic Theology III.6.21.10–25.10, Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus I, 386.25–387.4, 437.2–11). 
This, however, is not Plotinus’ view, for as we saw, if matter is said to be generated at all in the 
Enneads, its generation seems to be the immediate work, not of the One, but either of (lower) soul or of 
some lower psychic power. For these reasons, I must admit that I have not (yet) been persuaded that in 
the Enneads the issue of the (non-?) participation of matter in higher realities, especially when coupled 
with the identification of matter and evil, has been met with a fully satisfactory interpretation. In fact, I 
tend to think that we may be dealing with an impasse intrinsic to Plotinus’ system. 
 
353
 III.6 [26] 7.16–29: [16] ...καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἀεὶ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ [17] φανταζόμενον, μικρὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ ἧττον 
καὶ μᾶλλον, [18] ἐλλεῖπόν τε καὶ ὑπερέχον, εἴδωλον οὐ μένον οὐδ’ αὖ φεύγειν [19] δυνάμενον· οὐδὲ γὰρ 
οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἰσχύει ἅτε μὴ ἰσχὺν παρὰ [20] νοῦ λαβόν, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἐλλείψει τοῦ ὄντος παντὸς γενόμενον. [21] 
Διὸ πᾶν ὃ ἂν ἐπαγγέλληται ψεύδεται, κἂν μέγα φαντασθῇ, [22] μικρόν ἐστι, κἂν μᾶλλον, ἧττόν ἐστι, καὶ 
τὸ ὂν αὐτοῦ ἐν [23] φαντάσει οὐκ ὄν ἐστιν, οἷον παίγνιον φεῦγον· ὅθεν καὶ τὰ [24] ἐν αὐτῷ ἐγγίγνεσθαι 
δοκοῦντα παίγνια, εἴδωλα ἐν εἰδώλῳ [25] ἀτεχνῶς, ὡς ἐν κατόπτρῳ τὸ ἀλλαχοῦ ἱδρυμένον ἀλλαχοῦ [26] 
φανταζόμενον καὶ πιμπλάμενον, ὡς δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔχον οὐδὲν καὶ [27] δοκοῦν τὰ πάντα. Τὰ δὲ εἰσιόντα καὶ 
ἐξιόντα τῶν [28] ὄντων μιμήματα καὶ εἴδωλα εἰς εἴδωλον ἄμορφον καὶ [29] διὰ τὸ ἄμορφον αὐτῆς 
ἐνορώμενα... 
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either, [19] for it has no strength for this, since it has not received strength 
from [20] intellect but is lacking in all being. [21] Whatever 
announcement it makes, therefore, is a lie, and if it appears great, [22] it is 
small, if more, it is less; its apparent being [23] is not real, but a sort of 
fleeting frivolity; hence the things which [24] seem to come to be in it are 
frivolities, nothing but phantoms in a phantom, [25] like something in a 
mirror which really exists in a place but is reflected in another; [26] it 
seems to be filled, and holds nothing; [27] it is all seeming. “Imitations of 
real beings pass [28] into and out of it,”354 ghosts into a formless ghost, 
visibly reflected in it
355
 [29] because of its formlessness. 
 
It is in light of passages like this that Plotinus interprets the Symposium character 
of Penia in I.8 [51] 14 (especially lines 34–44) and III.6 [26] 14.5–17, where Penia as 
representing, not intelligible matter, as in III.5 [50] (cf. Chapter Two note 89), but lower 
matter. In I.8 [51] 14, Penia as pre-cosmic matter steals from Poros, who in this context 
represents the soul, part of his wealth (i.e., it powers), and in doing so, she is identified 
with real evil, for despite all its merely negative descriptions, matter remains an actively 
weakening power.
356
 This weakening effect of matter on the individual soul is described 
as a darkening of the illumination it receives from the soul (see note 323 and 308). The 
illumination, which as an informing activity is not in itself evil, is made evil when it 
encounters lower matter because matter does not allow it to ever achieve actuality by 
reverting toward higher realities. On the contrary, as Plotinus argues in III.6 [26] 14, 
matter deceptively reflects the forms that the soul makes available to it in its illuminating 
activity and thus tricks the soul, as it were, to turn its attention to it by passing itself off as 
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 A reference to Plato, Timaeus 50c4–5, cited again later in the same treatise, at III.6 [26] 11.2–3. 
 
355
 I translate ἐνορώμενα at line 30 with “visibly reflected in it” to emphasize the mirror metaphor (cf. SP 
386.37; IGAL, ad loc.. ARMSTRONG, whose translation I otherwise follow, writes “visible”). 
 
356
 At I.8 [51] 14.35–36, lower matter, represented by Penia, is metaphorically attributed a kind of 
intentionality: “[35] and matter is there [viz., by the soul] and begs it and, [36] we may say [οἷον], 
bothers it and wants [θέλει] to come right inside.” See also note 359 below. 
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true being.
357
 
The power of matter, therefore, is at the same time a power of illusion, corruption, 
and death. Deception by matter for the individual soul often means falling (πτῶμα: I.8 
[51] 14.44) or sinking (καταδῦναι: I.8 [51] 13.23) into what is ontologically inferior to it 
and may lead to its death.
358
 For this reason, matter is equated to evil. Matter, in its ability 
to influence individual souls, has an active role in their “fall” or corruption;359 thus, 
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 PIGLER (260), commenting on III.6 [26] 14, puts it well: “En s’unissant au reflet issu de l’Âme-Poros, la 
matière-Pénia devient ainsi le substitute illusoire de la réalité authentique. Or, le pouvoir de la matière 
provident de ce que celle-ci « aspire à l’existence » [III.6 [26] 7.13], désire l’être, et ce désir devient 
violence lorsque la matière veut se rendre maîtress de l’image de la forme qui vient en elle [III.6 [26] 
14.8–9].” 
 
358
 For Plotinus the individual soul is immortal (cf. treatise IV.7 [2] On the immortality of the soul). It 
follows that the term death (θάνατος) applies to it metaphorically, since by “dying” the soul does not 
cease to be altogether, but rather its pure nature is turned into something worse, to wit, vice, and “[21] 
[s]o it dies as far as the soul can die, and its [22] death, while it is still plunged into the body, is to [23] 
sink in matter and be filled with it” (I.8 [51] 13.21–23: [21] Ἀποθνῄσκει οὖν, ὡς ψυχὴ ἂν θάνοι, καὶ ὁ 
[22] θάνατος αὐτῇ καὶ ἔτι ἐν τῷ σώματι βεβαπτισμένῃ ἐν ὕλῃ [23] ἐστὶ καταδῦναι καὶ πλησθῆναι αὐτῆς). 
Cf. Chapter Four note 153. 
 
359
 This is an important point and, like many other statements made about matter in the Enneads, the source 
of some controversy. I believe that in several passages Plotinus is emphatic about the active role played 
by matter in the corruption of individual souls. In I.6 [1] 5.31–50, Plotinus asks rhetorically about the 
already weakened soul whether its ugliness (line 31: τὸ αἶσχος) was not in fact imported from the outside 
(ἐπακτὸν), so that the soul is made impure (line 33: ἀκάθαρτον) and no longer able to see what it would 
naturally see in its pure condition (lines 36–37: οὐκέτι μὲν ὁρῶσαν ἃ δεῖ ψυχὴν ὁρᾶν). Thus, at lines 48–
50 he concludes: “So we shall be right in saying that the soul becomes ugly by mixture and dilution and 
inclination towards the body and matter” (I.6 [1] 5.48–50: [48] Αἰσχρὰν δὴ ψυχὴν λέγοντες μίξει καὶ [49] 
κράσει καὶ νεύσει τῇ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὕλην ὀρθῶς ἂν [50] λέγοιμεν). At III.6 [26] 14.7–10 once again 
Plotinus attributes to matter the kind of evil intentionality that he will assert again at I.8 [51] 14.35–36 
(see note 356): “[7] this other thing [viz., matter] by its presence [8] and its self-assertion and a kind of 
begging and its poverty makes a sort of violent attempt [9] to grasp, and is cheated by not grasping, so 
that its poverty may remain [10] and it may be always begging” ([7] τῇ δ’ αὐτοῦ παρουσίᾳ [8] καὶ τῇ 
τόλμῃ καὶ οἷον προσαιτήσει καὶ πενίᾳ οἷον βιασάμενον [9] λαβεῖν καὶ ἀπατηθὲν τῇ οὐ λήψει, ἵνα μένῃ ἡ 
πενία [10] καὶ ἀεὶ προσαιτῇ). And most explicitly, at I.8 [51] 14.40–54, matter is said to darken 
(ἐσκότωσε: line 41) the illumination coming from soul (lines 40–41); in this way, it weakens the soul 
(ἀσθενὲς πεποίηκε: line 42) by providing it with the reason to generate and the occasion to come into 
matter, and this weakening is called the fall (πτῶμα: line 44) of the soul (lines 41–47, 50–54); finally, 
matter is said to hinder the powers of the soul, thus “[47] producing a kind of cramped condition, [48] 
and making evil what it has got hold of by a sort of theft” ([47] οἷον συσπειραθῆναι ποιῆσαι [48] 
ἐκείνην, ὃ δ’ ἔλαβεν οἷον κλέψασα ποιῆσαι κακὸν εἶναι) (lines 47–50). Cf. also II.3 [52] 9.20–24. To 
what extent all these statements about the active involvement of matter in the fall of the soul and its 
status as evil should be taken metaphorically is, of course, a crucial point of disagreement in the debate. 
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matter is not merely an occasion or a condition for doing evil, but evil itself, for in its 
quasi-intentional deception of the individual souls, we could say that it enfeebles or 
clouds their power of reversion, that is, the eros that is given to them by the One. And yet 
matter cannot exist as a really independent principle; in fact, it becomes perceptible and 
desirable only because form comes to it through the soul, like a prisoner in golden 
chains.
360
 
O’Brien speaks of Plotinus’ views on matter as part of a kind of theodicy: “the 
designation of matter as evil is intended to be not so much a condemnation of matter as a 
means of protecting the realities of the higher world from any immediate responsibility 
for the evils which we see in this world.”361 I think this is basically correct; however, it 
may be misleading if it were to introduce the temptation of not recognizing the reality of 
evil, which Plotinus does identify with matter. This can be done, for instance, by 
interpreting evil merely as a kind of perspective emerging only when the soul comes to 
interact with matter.
362
 But in Plotinus lower matter is not called evil accidentally, but 
evil itself (see note 346); that is, matter is evil, not once soul interacts with it (in any 
event, there never was a moment in which soul did not interact with matter), but because 
whether something interacts with it or not, its nature is essentially deceitful (see note 
335). It is true that someone or something must be deceived in order for deception to 
occur; but matter is deceitful as soon as something approaches it, always and without 
                                                 
360
 I.8 [51] 15.25; probably an allusion to Sophocles, Electra 837–838. 
 
361
 O’Brien (1999a, 189–190). 
 
362
 This is argued, for example, in an article by Schäfer (2004), of which my last telegraphic statement in 
the body of the text obviously can be only a caricature. 
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exception, thereby not only being itself essentially incapable of reverting toward 
higher realities, but also by naturally “tricking” the individual soul into turning its 
attention away from them.
363
 This, I think, is where O’Brien’s idea of lower matter as a 
necessary but not sufficient condition or cause of evil in the soul
364
 does not seem to do 
full justice to the textual evidence, for Plotinus attributes to matter a much greater active 
power to influence the soul than O’Brien admits. 
The overall issue of the origin and nature of matter is part of a debate that goes 
back to antiquity. In On the Existence of Evils (De malorum subsistentia) 31.9–10, 
Proclus sharply drew the alternative facing the one arguing for a metaphysics of 
derivation of all reality from one single good source, or a system of “émanation intégral”: 
aut bonum mali causam facere aut duo entium principia. Proclus himself, in his 
discussion of the issue in On the Existence of Evils 30–37, escapes this alternative 
through a qualified denial of the reality of evil, or at least through a considerable 
weakening of evil as an active force. If one accepts a perspectival interpretation of 
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 The deviant kind of eros of which I spoke in the previous chapter, at the end of Subsection 2.3.1, could 
also be understood in these terms. 
 
364
 See O’Brien (1971, 143): “Thus matter is a necessary cause of evil in the soul. But it is not a sufficient 
cause, nor a sufficient condition, of there to be sin” (I take it that evil and sin are used synonymously in 
this context). O’Brien (1999a, 186): “But again matter is not a sufficient cause of evil in the soul, for, if it 
were, no soul where matter was present could be free from evil” (e.g., the soul of the visible gods I 
mentioned in note 349). “It is only the conjunction of the soul’s own excessive eagerness and of the 
presence of matter that will prove to be sufficient cause of evil in the soul. Even though each of those two 
elements on its own is causally necessary, it is only in conjunction that they are causally sufficient.” 
What O’Brien does not seem to see in the text—surely because it is not there, he would probably 
contend—is Plotinus’ insistence on the active character of this non-sufficient condition which is lower 
matter. In other words, matter does not merely await that the soul may or may not be deceived, but it is 
actively out to get it, as it were. Hence, I believe that O’Meara (1999b, 157) and especially Narbonne 
(2007b, 125–128) are right to criticize O’Brien on this point, although a thorough critique of O’Brien’s 
position should include a justification of why some souls can be and are deceived, others can be and are 
not deceived, and others still cannot be deceived at all even if regularly interacting with matter (see again 
note 349 on the identity of these souls). Compare also Bréhier’s position sketched in note 310 (i). 
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Plotinus’ understanding of matter as evil, then his or her views can be reconciled with 
those of Proclus.
365
 By contrast, I maintain that Plotinus accepts the tension of Proclus’ 
alternative and refuses to subscribe to a “perspectival” understanding, and so to a denial 
or weakening of the reality of evil. Thus, his position remains a paradoxical one, at least 
on the surface, namely: the affirmation of both one single good Principle and of the 
reality of evil.
366
 
The active role of matter in the soul’s “fall” from higher realities can hardly be 
underemphasized. And yet, the individual soul is not condemned in principle to be 
corrupted by matter. Plotinus is optimistic enough to think that the soul has the ability to 
purify itself through its own powers because there is a desire in it, its eros, which already 
directs it toward its origin, the One as the supremely loved. To investigate the workings 
of eros in the soul’s efforts to ascend to the One will be the task of the next chapter. 
3.5 Conclusive Remarks 
If the Principle of Prior Simplicity is taken seriously, neither soul nor Nous will 
                                                 
365
 This, I maintain, is what Schäfer (2004) does. For treatments of the issue supporting the difference 
between Plotinus’ and Proclus’ positions, though varying on other points, see O’Meara (1997; 1999b, 
30–39), Opsomer (2001), Narbonne (2001a, 126–133; 2007b, 123–125), van Riel (2001). Despite my 
general agreement with PIGLER (201–266) on most issues, including that of the status of matter, I find 
that her reading of Plotinian metaphysics of derivation is not sensitive enough to the paradox in which 
this metaphysics results, namely the problem of evil (her position remains substantially unmodified in 
Pigler 2004, 147–163). To be sure, my difference of opinion here is less a question of plain disagreement 
than a matter of emphasis. This is due to the fact that among the thorny problems of every metaphysical 
system, including Plotinus’, evil, along with transcendence, is probably the thorniest. As I already 
pointed out in the opening paragraph of this subsection (cf. also Preface note 4, and the end of note 352 
above), it is far from clear to me that Plotinus’ solution on the issue of evil is free of internal conflict, 
particularly if we espouse the thesis of “émanation integral” (cf. note 17 above) and admit that matter 
ultimately derives from the One. 
 
366
 One could sensibly argue that it is the very reality of evil that requires the paradox. In other words, 
without a paradox, evil would not be radical enough, hence not truly evil. However, I do not find any 
argument along these lines in the Enneads, an argument which one might find for instance in Philippe 
Nemo’s insightful reading of the Biblical book of Job (Nemo 1998). 
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suffice to account for the phenomenon of unity we experience in the sensible. In fact, 
while it is necessary to postulate soul in order to explain the unity of a body, soul does 
not explain its own higher but still qualified unity, for although the intelligible is eternally 
available to soul (in its disembodied state) as an object of contemplation, soul 
contemplates it as something external to, or other than itself; hence the necessity of 
postulating the hypostasis of Nous. But though correctly postulated, Intellect too is 
insufficient to explain its own unity, for not only does thinking imply the duality of 
thinker and thought, but the intelligible object (i.e., the Forms or Ideas) is itself multiple, 
and Intellect, while united eternally to the One as its desideratum, is also not identical 
with it. 
The question may be asked, then, from the other side of the spectrum: If the 
ultimate ἀρχή of all is the One, why do we need to postulate further hypostases? After 
having accepted the Principle of Prior Simplicity and the Principle of Superabundance, 
what prevents us from deriving the whole of reality from the Source directly? The reply 
is that the One alone would not explain such phenomena as essence and goal-directed 
motion or unfulfilled desire. In order to account for essence or form, Nous is required, for 
the One itself is beyond all form. And yet, Nous would not be sufficient either, for it 
would leave goal-directed motion unexplained. In fact, since it possesses itself eternally 
as a replica of the One, Nous amounts to fulfilled or achieved desire, that is, desire 
constantly united with its desideratum; hence the necessity of postulating the hypostasis 
soul as the explanation of the phenomenon of unfulfilled desire. From an explanatory 
viewpoint, therefore, neither the postulation of Nous nor that of soul in all its 
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manifestations is otiose. For this reason they, too, are rightly called ἁρχαί, though in a 
highly qualified sense (see Chapter Two note 96). 
In the present chapter I argued that the process of derivation of all reality from a 
single source, the One, can be explained in terms of eros. The One gives what it does not 
have, namely: love for something else (of something other, transcendent, and itself alone 
ultimately worth loving), which in the case of the multiplicity deriving from the Principle 
is an innate love for the One, an unqualified unity which multiplicity lacks precisely qua 
multiple. The One, on the other hand, is love of itself, not love of something else: pure 
erotic self-identity, self-positing, spontaneous self-diffusiveness. Table 4 above may be 
of help in visualizing the various (logical) stages of this process of derivation and the 
different kinds of eros and unity proper to each stage. 
In Plotinus’ universe, the eros that the One bears to itself is the source of the 
unfolding of all reality. This eros is found as a trace at each hypostatic level as that which 
allows each hypostasis to emerge as a fully formed reality different from every other 
hypostasis. At the level of lower matter, the original eros of the One diminishes to the 
point of (almost) disappearing altogether. For matter, therefore, there is no possibility of 
“conversion” and “return” to the Source, nor of constituting itself as a separate hypostasis 
by reverting upon itself and toward its generator.
367
 If a “conversion” toward to the One 
is possible at all, it will have its basis in the presence, in the reality experiencing the 
“conversion,” of the same eros that initiated the process of derivation. The purpose of the 
next chapter is to analyze the workings of eros in what I will refer to as the return journey 
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 See Subsection 4.4.2, especially pages 364–367, for a clarification of the difference between such 
expressions as “return,” “conversion,” and “reversion.” 
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of the individual rational soul to the One. Before we turn to it, I will try to summarize 
the major claims of the present chapter in seven brief points. 
(1) The source of the procession of all reality is the superabundance of the eros 
that the single principle of all, the One, bears to itself. Thus, the One is the source of all 
eros, and eros is originally a donative rather than an appetitive force: “the power of all 
things.” If this is not necessarily where Plotinus differs radically from Plato (see Chapter 
Two note 25), it is certainly where he makes the passing remarks by Plato which I listed 
at the end of Subsection 1.5.5 most explicit. 
(2) This eros, in being communicated to all derived reality, from self-love 
becomes love of another, and specifically love of the One qua Good. Thus, eros is the 
element of both continuity and differentiation in Plotinus’ metaphysics: it is a trace of the 
One that pervades all reality. And yet, eros signals not only the presence of the One but 
also its absence, for the One remains always infinitely transcendent and absolutely 
different even with respect to Nous. 
(3) The communication of all eros from the One is also what allows derived 
reality to structure itself hierarchically in fully formed hypostases. The unfolding of each 
hypostasis is to be understood as a threefold erotic process: first, the superabundance of 
erotic energy proceeding from the higher hypostasis; second, the erotic reversion to the 
generating hypostasis; third, the communication of (increasingly diminished) erotic 
energy that will constitute the first stage of the next hypostasis. 
(4) The difference between the hypostases as they unfold from the Principle is to 
be understood as a decrease of their internal unity and a widening of the gap between 
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their identity and the ultimate goal of all desire, the Good. The One gives what it does 
not have (i.e., love for something other than itself, hence form) to Nous, which comes 
about as a fully formed hypostasis by noetically replicating the unqualified unity of the 
Principle. Noetic eros is understood as a kind of friendship that binds all the intelligibles 
(i.e., the Forms or Ideas) in a unity in which each form interpenetrates, reflects, or 
implicates all the others. Nous, in turn, gives what it does have (i.e., form) to soul, which 
becomes a fully formed hypostasis by contemplating dianoetically the contents of Nous. 
Finally, soul in its lower part (i.e., the World-Soul or Nature), restless because unable to 
emerge as a separate hypostasis in its own right, tries to replicate the noetic unity 
contemplated by the Soul-Hypostasis externally, by communicating the forms it receives 
from above to what lies below itself. In this way it gives shape to the sensible universe, 
with pre-cosmic matter as the necessary substratum of forms, and individual souls 
informing and animating portions of this universe. The sensible cosmos is understood as 
a living being whose eros coincides with the sympathy of its parts. 
(5) The process of derivation does not reproduce a temporal sequence of events—
a point hardly ever overemphasized—but it illustrates the relation of dependence of 
ontologically different levels of reality. 
(6) At the lowest level of existence, we find pre-cosmic matter, which, whether 
generated or not and whether generated by soul or by something else, is the utterly un-
unified element in Plotinian metaphysics in that, a mere “aspiration to existence,” it is 
both unable to revert toward the One and to produce something after itself. (I also noticed 
how the figure of Penia alternately represents intelligible psychic matter, as in treatise 
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III.5 [50] On eros, dealt with in Chapter Two, and lower matter, as in III.6 [26] 14 
and I.8 [51] 14.) In addition to this, matter is the principle of evil in the sense that it 
actively deceives the individual soul by presenting itself as a surrogate of the forms it 
merely reflects, thus enticing the soul to take excessive interest in it and to forget its true 
destiny. 
(7) However, individual souls that are active in the sensible universe are not 
necessarily deceived by matter. In fact, the eros originating in the One is also 
connaturally present in them as the fundamental resource that allows them to turn away 
from the sensible and make their way back to the One as the Good. It is precisely this 
journey of the soul to the One that I will investigate in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
PLOTINUS’ METAPHYSICS OF LOVE: 
THE RETURN OF THE SOUL TO THE ONE AS EROTIC ASCENT 
Ἔστι γὰρ ἕκαστον ὅ ἐστιν ἐφ’ αὑτοῦ· ἐφετὸν δὲ γίνεται ἐπιχρώσαντος 
αὐτὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὥσπερ χάριτας δόντος αὐτοῖς καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐφιέμενα 
ἔρωτας. Καὶ τοίνυν ψυχὴ λαβοῦσα εἰς αὑτὴν τὴν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπορροὴν 
κινεῖται καὶ ἀναβακχεύεται, καὶ οἴστρων πίμπλαται καὶ ἔρως γίνεται. 
—Plotinus 
τοῖς δὲ ἑρασταῖς ἅπασι ταὐτόν ἐστι τέλος, ἡ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν οἰκείωσις... 
 
Πάσα τοίνουν ἡμῶν ἡ ζωὴ γυμνάσιόν ἐστι πρὸς ἐκείνην τὴν θέαν... 
—Proclus1 
4.1 Introduction 
If, as Plotinus claims, superabundance follows of necessity from the perfection or 
maturity of a given hypostasis, then the relation of the generator to the generated, and so 
the derivation of all reality ultimately from the One, cannot be interpreted as implying 
any need or lack in the Source. Even less can it be understood in terms of an undesirable 
excess, as if derivation were comparable to the drift of flotsam and jetsam from a 
universal shipwreck. That this cannot be the case for Plotinus becomes clear from his 
understanding of the nature of the primordial gift—eros. For if on the one hand the 
                                                 
1
 Plotinus VI.7 [38] 22.5–10: “For each is what it is by itself; but it becomes desirable when the Good 
colours it, giving a kind of grace to them and passionate love to the desirers. Then the soul, receiving into 
itself an overflow from thence, is moved and dances wildly and is all stung with longing and becomes 
love.” Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Alcibiades I 48.8–9: “The end is the same for all lovers: 
assimilation to Beauty” (my translation). Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides V.1015.38–39: 
“So all our life is an exercise in preparation to that vision...” 
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product of the One is determined by recourse to the specific character of its qualified 
unity, which separates it from the unqualified unity of the Principle, on the other, its 
nature is best grasped through the particular eros which characterizes the level it occupies 
in Plotinus’ metaphysical hierarchy. This eros, as I argued in the previous chapter 
(Subsection 3.3.2), is the gift of the One ultimately pointing back to the One itself. If no 
eros for the One were communicated to what derives from it, derivation would be the 
undesirable result of some momentous wreckage. But Plotinus understands eros as 
something connatural to the product,
2
 so that what from an “archeological” perspective is 
the derivation of all reality from one single source, from a “teleological” perspective is 
viewed as the possibility of return to that very source, here conceived of as the ultimate 
aim of all desire, or the universal final cause: the Good. 
The journey of return, otherwise referred to as the Ascent (henceforth capitalized 
for the sake of disambiguation), is the central theme of the present chapter, whose main 
material is divided in five sections. In the first section (4.2) I provide a summary account 
of Plotinus’ views of the One as the Good or as the universal aim of desire. As such, the 
One is understood as the universal final cause which from the perspective of the desirer is 
conceptually distinct but actually identical with the One qua Principle. This identity is 
what explains why eros is naturally directed toward the One: the giver of all eros is at the 
same time the supreme goal of all desire. In the remainder of the chapter I shift the focus 
from the One as the ultimate goal of the Ascent to all the other elements involved in the 
journey of Ascent. 
                                                 
2
 See the previous two chapters, particularly Subsection 2.3.1, Section 2.4, and pages 226–228. 
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In Section 4.3, I take into account two basic conditions of possibility of the 
soul’s Ascent to the One, namely the attunement that the soul needs to undergo in order 
to become assimilated to the One as the universal aim of desire (Subsection 4.3.1), and 
the fact that the Ascent to the One is possible on the basis of a prior affinity between the 
soul and the Good (4.3.2). In Section 4.4, I explain that the “subject” of the Ascent can be 
only the individual rational soul (Subsection 4.4.1), and provide some observations on the 
terminology of ascent (4.4.2) and on the distinction between eros as a method of ascent 
and eros as the regulative force of all ascending movement (4.4.3). In Section 4.5 I 
highlight four important features that are common to all stages of the Ascent: first, the 
movement from a lower to a higher stage entails, not an addition, but a subtraction of 
something that was present on the lower stage; second, the Ascent is an orderly 
movement, and therefore in ascending the soul cannot skip a stage; third, to move to a 
higher stage for the soul means an increase in unity and in the intensity of its eros; and 
fourth, whatever feature, practice or activity reintegrates the individual soul in the reality 
found on a higher states is not present in that reality. Finally, in Section 4.6 I describe the 
three fundamental steps that the individual rational soul is to take in order to return to the 
Source: purification (Subsection 4.6.1), intellification (4.6.2), and union (4.6.3). As with 
the other chapters, in the final section (4.7), I offer a summary of the conclusions reached 
in this chapter. 
The overarching thesis of this chapter is that the ascending movement toward the 
One has eros as its origin, as its guiding force, as well as its goal, and that for the 
individual rational soul to ascend means precisely to grow in erotic similarity to the 
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Principle. 
4.2 The One as ἐρασμιώτατον or Universal Final Cause 
As I pointed out earlier in Subsection 3.2.3 and 3.3.2, the One as the principle of 
all reality is endowed with a double causality, or, perhaps less imprecisely, with one 
causality which from the perspective of the inquirer displays two major aspects: efficient 
and final.
3
 Chapter Three focused mainly on the former aspect: there the One was 
understood as an infinite erotic δύναμις from which derives the whole of reality. In the 
present chapter the One is approached from the opposite side of the spectrum, that is, 
from the perspective of the ascending individual soul, and thus is conceptualized as final 
cause (τέλος),4 the highest and universal aim of desire or the summum desideratum of all 
derived reality. 
Plotinus writes at V.5 [32] 12.7–9: “For all things reach out to that [viz., the 
Good] and long for it by necessity of nature, as if divining by instinct that they cannot 
exist without it.”5 In an earlier treatise, at VI.5 [23] 1.8–9, he called a similar statement 
                                                 
3
 See pages 181, 188–191, and 217–218. For a concise treatment of the One as both efficient and final 
cause see Bussanich (1999, 45–57). 
 
4
 The One or the Good is explicitly referred to as end (τέλος) in the following passages: I.4 [46] 6.7–13, 
V.5 [32] 12.19–20, VI.2 [43] 11.37–39, VI.9 [9] 9.20–22; cf. also III.9 [13] 2, V.3 [49] 17.34. From the 
point of view of all derived reality, efficient and final cause are conceptually distinct but actually 
identical; from its own viewpoint, in itself the One is neither efficient nor final cause, neither Principle 
nor Good but simply the One as self-positing or causa sui (cf. Chapter Three note 53, where I explain in 
what sense the notion of self-causation may be applied to the One). 
 
5
 V.5 [32] 12.7–9: [7] Πάντα γὰρ ὀρέγεται ἐκείνου καὶ ἐφίεται αὐτοῦ [8] φύσεως ἀνάγκῃ, ὥσπερ 
ἀπομεμαντευμένα, ὡς ἄνευ αὐτοῦ [9] οὐ δύναται εἶναι. Plotinus often emphasizes the status of the One 
as universal desideratum in the Enneads. The following passages, though far from exhaustive, are worth 
noting (in parentheses I indicate the desiderative terms employed in each reference): I.6 [1] 7.1 
(ὀρέγεται), I.7 [54] 1.22–23 (ἐφίεται, ἐπιστρέφειν), I.8 [51] 2.2–3 (ἐφίεται),V.5 [32] 12.11 (ἔφεσιν 
σύμφυτον), V.6 [24] 5.18–19 ([18] ἡ δ’ ἐνέργεια ἁπάντων πρὸς τὸ [19] ἀγαθόν), VI.2 [43] 11.27–32 (line 
28: σπουδὴν), VI.5 [23] 1.8–20 (line 12: ὀρέγεσθαι; line 13, 18: σπεύδοι, σπεύδει; lines 14, 16: ὄρεξις), 
10.1–10 (line 3: πόθῳ, Ἔρως; line 4: ἐφιέμενος, ἀγαπῶν; line 5, 7: ἐραστὴς, ἐρασταὶ; lines 8, 9: ἐρῶντες, 
ἐρώμενον), 12.31–36 (line 33: ἐπιστρέφονται), VI.7 [38] 19.2–3 (ἐφετὸν), 20.16–18 (line 16: ἐφίεται), 
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the “firmest principle of all” (πάντων βεβαιοτάτη ἀρχή: VI.5 [23] 1.9).6 In the 
language of eros, focus of this study, the One is accordingly referred to as the most loved 
or desired: ἐρασμιώτατον.7 Here is the first of the two instances in which this superlative 
occurs in the Enneads, at VI.7 [38] 32.25:
8
 
[24] Truly, when you cannot grasp the form or shape [25] of what is 
longed for, it would be most longed for and most loved, [26] and love for it 
would be immeasurable. For [27] love is not limited here, because neither 
is the beloved, but [28] the love of this would be unbounded; so his 
Beauty is [29] of another kind and Beauty beyond Beauty. 
 
For our purposes, two points deserve particular attention in this passage: one 
concerns the nature of the One qua most loved; the other, the love by which the One is to 
be approached. The broader context of the passage I just cited is chapters 31–35 of 
treatise VI.7 [38] How the multitude of the Forms came into being and on the Good. Part 
of Plotinus’ goal in these chapters is to try to show that the One is the End that attracts all 
reality, and more particularly the individual soul, to itself. In other words, he is telling us 
                                                                                                                                                 
42.8–14 (line 12: ὀρέγεται); cf. also VI.7 [38] 31.17–18 (ἐρᾷ, ἐρᾶν), VI.8 [39] 7.3–8 (line 4: ἐφετὸν; line 
8: θέλει), 13.12–13 (line 12: ἐφιέμενον, βούλεται), 26.6–7 (line 6: ἔφεσις, ὠδὶς). See also the references 
in the previous note. Echoing this tradition, Proclus (Elements of Theology 8, 10.5–7) writes of the Good 
that it is “the unqualified Good which all beings desire” (τὸ απλῶς ἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἐφίεται), the 
“common desideratum of all beings” (κοινὸν πάντων ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων ἐφετόν) (my translation). Cf. also 
Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides VII.509.13–20, 511.12–33. 
 
6
 An echo of Aristotle, Metaphysics III.1005b8–11, 17–18. Plotinus’ statement to which I am referring, 
found at VI.5 [23] 1.11–12, is that “all things desire the good” (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πάντα ὀρέγεσθαι). 
 
7
 VI.7 [38] 32.25, 33.14: ἐρασμιώτατον; cf. Plato, Phaedrus 250e1 (see Chapter One note 175), Republic 
III.402d6. At VI.8 [39] 16.15, the One is also called ἀγαπητότατον. 
 
8
 VI.7 [38] 32.24–29: [24] Καὶ μήν, ὅτου ἂν ποθεινοῦ ὄντος μήτε [25] σχῆμα μήτε μορφὴν ἔχοις λαβεῖν, 
ποθεινότατον καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον [26] ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἂν ἄμετρος εἴη. Οὐ γὰρ [27] ὥρισται ἐνταῦθα ὁ 
ἔρως, ὅτι μηδὲ τὸ ἐρώμενον, ἀλλ’ [28] ἄπειρος ἂν εἴη ὁ τούτου ἔρως, ὥστε καὶ τὸ κάλλος αὐτοῦ [24] 
ἄλλον τρόπον καὶ κάλλος ὑπὲρ κάλλος. ARMSTRONG’s translation, minimally modified; the emphasis in 
the translation is mine. I briefly comment on the meaning of the expression “Beauty beyond Beauty” 
(VI.7 [38] 32.29) at pages 328–330. On the issue of the priority of the Good over Beauty see Chapter 
Two note 47. 
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that while any other thing can under certain circumstances be a good, only the One 
can be the Good.
9
 Secondly, Plotinus wants to show that in order to grow near to the One 
qua supreme object of love, the soul is required to assume a certain disposition, or ought 
to attune itself to the desired. And since the desired is the One understood as infinite 
erotic power, the soul, in short, must not only be a loving soul, but its love for the most 
lovable ought to be love of an infinite kind. I will briefly consider the first point (i.e., the 
universal final causality of the One) in the remainder of this section; the second point 
(i.e., the necessity of attunement) is one of what I will refer to as the two preconditions of 
the soul’s ascent to the One, with which I will deal in the next section (Subsection 4.3.1). 
In what sense is the One the only true universal desideratum? Why is the One not 
only the Simple, that is, the Principle whose postulation was said to be a necessity (a 
primarily explanatory necessity: see Appendix B) to be inferred from the inability of 
every multiplicity to account for its relative unity (see Subsection 3.2.1), but also at the 
same time the Good, that is, not any good, but the universal and ultimate goal of all 
desire? Or rather, granting that goodness conceived of in this sense can be predicated of 
the One only from the perspective of the desirer,
10
 why should it be predicated 
exclusively of the One? In what sense is any good other than the Good simply inadequate 
                                                 
9
 Throughout the Enneads, and especially in the last three treatises of the sixth Ennead, the One is 
associated with and explicitly called “the Good” (τὸ ἀγαθόν, or, in the contracted form, τἀγαθόν) so 
many times that a complete list of references would result almost superfluous minimally to establish such 
a universally recognized connection in Plotinus. Sleeman and Pollet provide over five columns of 
references for τὸ ἀγαθόν in the sense of the Good (SP, s.v. ἀγαθός (d)), while also alerting us to the fact 
that the term is “generally, but not always equivalent to τὸ ἕν, τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ ἐπέκεινα, ἡ ἀρχή” (SP 3.53–
55). 
 
10
 See Chapter Three note 84; cf. VI.7 [38] 24.13–16, 19–24. This is also true of causality, which can be 
predicated of the One strictly only from the perspective of the effect (see Chapter Three notes 131 and 
147). 
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to serve as the ultimate goal of all striving? And why should the final cause coincide 
with the efficient cause, the τέλος of all with the ἀρχή of all? 
The problem is vast and would require more attention than I could presently 
dedicate to it. In this context, I will limit my answer to a summary clarification of four 
points endorsed by Plotinus, all of which were established doctrine, if to different 
degrees, in the broad Platonic tradition of which he is both an heir and a representative. 
These points are: (i) that whatever is called good is generally understood to be an object 
of desire, and that desire, in turn, can only aim at something good;
11
 (ii) that the Good is 
not good because it is desired, but is desired because it is good;
12
 (iii) that if there is an 
unqualified good at all (i.e., the Good), this good cannot be desired for the sake of some 
other good, but only for itself;
13
 and (iv) that the Good cannot be identified with anything 
                                                 
11
 On desire as aiming essentially at some good, see for instance Socrates’ affirmation in Plato’s 
Symposium 205e1–3 that “love is neither of its other half nor of the whole, unless, my friend, this in 
some degree happened to be good” (see also 201a2–c9, especially c4–5, 205d1–206a13, and Subsection 
1.4.2 and 1.4.3; see also the references in Chapter One note 213; less explicit passages include Philebus 
20d7–10, 22b6–7, and Republic VI.505d11–e1). The locus classicus of the understanding of good as 
object not only desire, but of all goal-directed activity, is the beginning of Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics (I.1094a1–3): “[1] Every craft and every investigation, and likewise every action and [2] decision, 
seems to aim at some good [ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεται δοκεῖ]; hence the good has been well described [3] as 
that at which everything aims [διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθόν, οὗ πάντ’ ἐφίεται]” (Irwin and Fine’s 
translation). Cf. also the following references in Aristotle (with the desiderative terms he uses provided in 
parentheses): Topics III.116a19–20 (ἐφίεται), Physics II.195a23–26 (τέλος, ἐθέλει), De anima 
III.433a27–29 (ἀεὶ κινεῖ μὲν τὸ ὀρεκτόν...), Nicomachean Ethics III.1113a15–16 (βούλησις), X.1172b9–
15 (ἐφιέμενα, ἐφίεται), 1172b35–1173a5 (ἐφίεται), and Rhetoric I.1362a21–24 (ἐφίεται). As for Plotinus, 
when echoing the last line of the text of Aristotle’s Ethics I cited, he writes that the Good is “that ‘to 
which everything aspires’” (I.7 [54] 1.22: τὸ οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται), obviously he is already thinking, not of 
any good, but of the Good. The same passage of Aristotle is evoked also at I.8 [51] 2.3, VI.7 [38] 20.18 
(cf. also I.3 [20] 1.1–4, VI.8 [39] 7.3–4); for further references on the universal desire for the Good in the 
Enneads see notes 4 and 5 above. In post-Plotinian Neoplatonism, cf. Proclus, Elements of Theology 
7.23–24; Iamblichus, On the mysteries I.3.7.16–8.2. 
 
12
 Plotinus poses this problem explicitly at VI.7 [38] 24.4–7 and clearly states his position at 25.16–18 and 
27.26–27 of the same treatise. At VI.7 [38] 27.26–27 he declares: “it is not the desire which makes the 
good but there is desire because there is a good” ([26] οὐχ ἡ ἔφεσις ποιεῖ τὸ ἀγαθόν, [27] ἀλλ’ ἡ ἔφεσις, 
ὅτι ἀγαθόν); this is true a fortiori of the Good. See also I.6 [1] 7.3–4. 
 
13
 On the final Good as that which is not desired for the sake of some further good, see for example Plato, 
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which desires some (other) good, for being itself the Good, in it there is no desire for 
any (further) good.
14
 
I was unable to find a passage in which Plotinus states the first point—(i) that 
whatever is taken to be good is at the same time an object of desire, and that desire aims 
at something good—explicitly and formally.15 However, I believe that this point can be 
safely inferred from two claims generally endorsed by Plotinus, namely that whatever is 
good is good by reason of the Good (VI.7 [38] 22.6), and that the Good is naturally and 
eminently desirable (VI.8 [39] 7.3–4), so that whatever is in some way desirable must be 
to some extent good. Thus, nothing is desired which is not good at least in some respect 
(which I take to be part of Socrates’ point in the elenchos directed against Agathon in 
Plato’s Symposium 201a2–c9; cf. note 11 above). In other words, it is a matter of 
understanding what is good as the proper intentional object of desire and, vice versa, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lysis 220b4–5. In Nicomachean Ethics I.1094a18–22, Aristotle entertains the possibility of a universal 
final cause while not necessarily committing himself to it (see Irwin 1999, 173, and cf. my remarks at 
pages 309–313 below); cf. also De anima I.406b8–10 and the broader passages in which we find the 
references to Aristotle given in note 11 above. In Plotinus see most explicitly VI.8 [39] 7.31–32, where 
the Good is called the Good itself (line 31: τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ αὐτοῦ); cf. also I.6 [1] 6.21–32, 7.21–30 (in the 
context of the ascent to Beauty), VI.8 [39] 7.1–4 (the statement at lines 3–4 is especially telling: ἡ δὲ τοῦ 
ἀγαθοῦ φύσις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐφετὸν; this is an echo of Plato, Philebus 60b10, and as regards the content, of 
Philebus 20d7–10 and of Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.1094a2–3; cf. HS2 ad loc.), 13.16–17. 
 
14
 Again, Socrates’ remark that, even if I were to possess a desired good, I would still desire to possess it 
forever, points to the fundamental lack that characterizes all desire (Plato, Symposium 200c5–e6, 
205d10–206a1), a lack which as such must be absent in the Good. In Aristotle, the First Mover moves by 
being loved (Metaphysics XII.1072a26–b3, 1072b3) while itself not loving anything (its noetic activity is 
wholly self-contained: see pages 181–182 above). In an analogous way the Good, seeking nothing 
outside of itself, in the Enneads is called “most self-sufficient” (ἀνενδεέστατον: VI.9 [9] 6.18; 
αὐταρκέστατον: V.4 [7] 1.12, VI.7 [38] 23.7, VI.9 [9] 6.17, 24; ἱκανώτατον: VI.9 [9] 6.17). On the self-
sufficiency of the Good see also I.7 [54] 1.13–15, I.8 [51] 2.4–5, III.8 [30] 11.11, V.5 [32] 12.40–50, 
13.1–5, VI.7 [38] 24.13–16, 29.9–10, 41.28–31; cf. Plato, Republic II.381b1–2, Philebus 20d7–10, 
22b3–8, 53e4–54c12, 60b10–c4, and Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.1097b7–8, 15. On the One as 
beyond self-sufficiency see Chapter Three note 84. 
 
15
 It may appear that Plotinus suggests this point at I.6 [1] 7.3–4: “It is desired as good, and the desire for it 
is directed to good...” ([3] Ἐφετὸν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἔφεσις πρὸς [4] τοῦτο...). However, these 
lines are written specifically about the Good, not about any good. 
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desire as an intention essentially aiming at some good. This idea may become clearer 
if one considers the patent absurdity of a desire directed at an object in which nothing 
good can be detected. Ultimately, those who desire things considered evil in some way or 
another obviously desire them for the sake of some (at least prima facie) good that is 
attached to them, or for some aspect in them which is considered good, if not 
unqualifiedly, at least under certain circumstances.
16
 (This desire can include the hope or 
the inkling that some good may be found, by closer scrutiny, even in something which at 
first sight seems to lack all good.)
17
 
                                                 
16
 The example of the fictitious author of Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground mentioned earlier 
(Chapter Three note 161) may be again useful in this context. Although the self-debasing actions of this 
character are apparently absurd, self-debasement is not final, but is rather a means to individual self-
assertion, and to that extent good in a qualified sense. Also the extreme situations of the sadist and of the 
masochist do not contradict the claim that only the good is object of desire, in the sense that these are 
cases in which the suffering of others and one’s own are sought not as ends in themselves, but as means 
to pleasure and the reawakening the feeling of life, or as expressions of the death drive (cf. Laplanche 
and Pontalis 1973, 400–404 and 244–245), etc.—all factors which are, at least under certain conditions, 
good. Even something admittedly evil may be desired—i.e., desired qua good—when compared with and 
chosen over a greater evil; cf. Epicurus, Gnomologion Vaticanum Epicureum 16: “Nobody, seeing 
something evil, chooses it, but he catches the bait and is caught [when he takes it] as a good in 
comparison with a greater evil” (my translation). Cf. Plato, Philebus 22b6–8. 
 
17
 One might object that the very notion of something lacking all good is absurd, since insofar as such a 
thing has some existence, it may be envisioned as serving some purpose, and thus be intended as the aim 
of some desire, or as (a) good. This is so even in the limit case of Plotinian lower matter, which, although 
wholly undesirable as the principle of evil, serves a purpose as the necessary substrate of the sensible 
universe and as the endpoint of the process of derivation (see Subsection 3.4.3). The fact that with 
treatise I.8 [51] (On what are and whence come evils) lower matter is wholly undesirable in at least one 
of its aspects, namely as the principle of evil, obviously begs the question of whether this aspect might 
constitute the very object whose existence I claimed to be absurd—an object lacking all good. But this is 
precisely the one feature of Plotinian metaphysics which thus far I have been unable not to take as 
aporetic (see Subsection 3.4.3, particularly the opening paragraph and note 352; cf. Preface note 4). In 
399, when already bishop of Hippo for about three years, Augustine will tackle the issue of matter in the 
context of his confrontation with the Manicheans in his work De natura boni. The Augustinian solution 
can be interpreted not only as a rebuttal of the Manichean views, but indirectly also as a way out of what 
I take to be Plotinus’ impasse regarding the status of lower matter. In his solution, Augustine will 
introduce at least two important modifications to Plotinus’ metaphysical system: first, that matter, 
although in itself formless, or incapable of imparting form on itself, can actually take on form, and does 
not merely reflect it, as in Plotinus (cf. page 268 above); and second, that the principle of evil is, not 
matter, but a willful misuse of what is good (see Augustine, De natura boni 18, 34–36; see also the 
comments on the issue by Reale 2001, 34–41, 47–51). The problem of explaining how matter, qua evil, 
could possibly derive from the Good (or God) will now become that of showing how an evil will is 
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The second point—(ii) that the Good is good not because it is desired, but it is 
desired because it is good—is simultaneously a refutation of subjectivism and already an 
anticipation of the necessity of attuning one’s desires to the End, a point with which I will 
deal more specifically in the next section and broadly in the rest of the chapter. Support 
for this view may come from a confrontation with that which in popular opinion was (and 
is?) ordinarily considered the strongest candidate to the title of highest good, namely 
pleasure (ἡδονή). According to Plotinus pleasure cannot be the Good, for it is not so 
much that there is (a) good because there is pleasure, as that there is pleasure because 
there is (a) good. In other words, generally speaking pleasure is to be considered an 
affection (πάθος) which follows as matter of course from the presence of some good, on 
which the affection depends essentially. For Plotinus one would not be satisfied with the 
mere affection if the good on which the affection depends (e.g., the child in whom a 
parent rejoices, the food that satisfies one’s hunger, the woman with whom a lover shares 
the joys of sex) were absent.
18
 Thus, pleasure is not itself the good we seek when we are 
                                                                                                                                                 
possible in a being that derives its existence from an entirely good source. 
 
18
 See VI.7 [38] 24.10–11, 26.1–24. What about the sensation of pleasure dissociated from the 
corresponding reality/good on which pleasure is (supposedly) dependent? Is such a sensation even 
possible? Does neural stimulation detached from the reality/good which normally causes the stimulation 
(e.g., my brain’s artificially induced reception of apple flavor without my mouth’s actually being biting 
into an apple) prove that pleasure is possible without the reality/good on which it (allegedly) depends? If 
pleasure is not inherently dependent on the presence of (a) good, why should I not “plug” my brain into a 
device that induces pleasure (and/or neutralizes pain)—could we even say “that simulates pleasure” 
(and/or “the neutralization of pain”)?—by means of neural stimulations, without the need of the 
reality/good with which this pleasure (and/or absence of pain) is taken to be necessarily associated? Even 
if it were not unrealistic to foresee that developments in technology might actually bring about, in a not 
too distant future, what at the moment seems to be only a sci-fi scenario, I think that Plotinus would 
reject the possibilities opened by these developments for one simple reason, namely because they would 
fail to confront the main problem. The main problem, for the individual soul, is to become aware of the 
situation in which it often finds itself in its embodied condition, a situation in which the excessive 
dedication to the portion of matter allotted to it frequently distracts the soul from its higher possibility, 
that is, the coming to awareness of its true nature and origin, along with the endeavor to ascend to the 
One. To abandon oneself to a life of artificially induced pleasure might, on the surface, appear like a 
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in need of something, but is rather what essentially accompanies or completes the 
presence of that good, which alone satisfies the need.
19
 
In relation to the two higher hypostases, Plotinus thinks that since in the Good 
there is no need whatsoever, neither there will be pleasure—if, that is, “pleasure” is 
minimally taken to mean the state accompanying the presence of the good which satisfies 
a given need (see VI.7 [38] 25.1–16, 29.1–10). But the term “pleasure” can be used also 
figuratively, as Plotinus does in his discussion of the relation between pleasure and 
Intellect. In Nous, the fact that intellectual or spiritual activity is not accompanied by 
pleasure does not make of Nous less of a good, since Nous remains desirable to the extent 
that through it one already divines (ἀπομαντεύεται: VI.7 [38] 29.21) the Good which lies 
beyond it.
20
 Why, then, in Plato’s Philebus is it argued that the good to which human life 
should aim might have to be a mixture of pleasure and intelligence (φρόνησις, νοῦς)?21 
                                                                                                                                                 
blissful solution to this problem; what this abandonment does, however, is simply to sharpen the problem 
by attempting to bury the individual soul’s higher possibility under the weight of artifice. Unearthing this 
burial, if there ever was one: there’s some task for psychoanalysis, if there ever was one! 
 
19
 Plotinus’ indebtedness to Aristotle’s discussion of pleasure is palpable in Enneads VI.7 [38], chapters 
24–26 and 29–30 (see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VII.1152b1–1154b31 and especially X.1172a19–
1176a29). Another primary source on this point is Plato’s view of pleasure as the restoration 
(ἀναχώρησις) of a harmonious mixture in the Philebus (see particularly Philebus 32b2–4); pain, by 
contrast, is the corruption or disintegration (φθορά) of such mixture. For the Socrates of the Philebus 
pleasure as restoration depends essentially on a need or lack, of which desire, conceived of as an 
emptiness seeking to be filled, is the fundamental manifestation (see Philebus 34d1–36c2). Thus, 
pleasure is understood as the process (γένεσις)—as opposed to stable being, or being simply (οὐσία)—
which re-establishes the harmonious state. As such, pleasure stands to the harmonious state in a relation 
of a means to an end, and therefore it cannot be the good sought after (Philebus 53c4–55a11). 
 
20
 See VI.7 [38] 24.17–30, 27.28–29, 29.10–31. Nous, not being desired by all things, cannot be taken as 
the ultimate End (VI.7 [38] 20.16–24). In fact, if Nous is desirable at all, it is because it resembles the 
Good, as Plotinus argues at VI.7 [38] 15.1–13 (note the term ἀγαθοειδές at 15.9, an allusion to Plato, 
Republic VI.509a3; cf. pages 314–315 below). The question of what this resemblance consists of is 
posed repeatedly in this treatise (cf. VI.7 [38] 16.4–9, 18.1–3, 14–15, 48–51, 21.1–2). 
 
21
 See especially Plato, Philebus 20a1–22e3, 60b7–64c9. On Plotinus’ exegesis of the relation of pleasure 
and intelligence in the Philebus, see Enneads VI.7 [38] 25.1–16, 30.1–30. On Plotinus’ interpretation of 
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Plotinus thinks that this mixture does not mean that pleasure accompanies intelligence 
(νοῦς) in the usual way in which pleasure completes an activity, that is, “as a supervening 
end”22 extrinsically grafted into the substantial activity of intelligence. On the contrary, 
this distinctively noetic pleasure is itself intrinsically united with the activity of 
intelligence. It follows that if Plato speaks of “mixing” in the Philebus, he does so not 
literally but metaphorically (μεταφέροντες: Plotinus VI.7 [38] 30.27). Thus, by arguing 
that intelligence is mixed to pleasure, what Plato is (allegedly) saying is that the very 
activity (ἐνέργημα)23 and life of Intellect is itself a state (κατάστασις) “most pleasing and 
acceptable” (ἀσμενιστὴν καὶ αἱρετωτάτην: Plotinus VI.7 [38] 30.24). But since this is 
said figuratively, Plotinus insists that the pleasure at issue here is not to be conceived of 
as ordinary pleasure but as “pure and unmixed.”24 Thus, it can be associated to the kind 
of activity and life of Intellect,
25
 with which it constitutes an essential unity.
26
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Philebus see Schwyzer (1970). 
 
22
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X.1174b32–33: ὡς ἐπιγιγνόμενόν τι τέλος. 
 
23
 I believe that on this point Plotinus may again have Aristotle in mind when the latter describes pleasure 
as an activity (ἐνέργεια) as opposed to a movement or a process (κίνησις); cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean 
Ethics X, chapters 3 and 4. 
 
24
 Plato, Philebus 52d6–7: τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ εἰλικρινὲς (cf. Enneads VI.7 [38] 30.22). According to 
Plotinus’ peculiar exegesis (VI.7 [38] 30.25–29), this kind of “pure and unmixed” activity and pleasure 
are figuratively expressed in images from Plato (Symposium 203b5: “drunk with the nectar”; Phaedrus 
247a8: “to feast and entertainment”) and Homer (Iliad V.426, XV.47: “the father smiled”). 
 
25
 At first, there seems to be a patent discrepancy between different elements of Plotinus’ view of pleasure, 
specifically: in the Nicomachean Ethics, (i) the Aristotelian understanding of pleasure as a supervening 
end (see note 22 above) and (ii) the notion of pleasure as an activity as opposed to pleasure as a process 
or motion (see note 23 above); in the Philebus, (iii) the Platonic view of pleasure as a process of 
restoration (see note 19 above) and (iv) the understanding of pleasure as one of the two ingredients (the 
other being reason or intelligence) making up the mixture which is the human good. Plotinus seems to 
manage to salvage all these elements by interpretively relating them to different elements of his system. 
Thus, (i) Aristotle’s view of pleasure as a supervening end may still be true of ordinary pleasures but it 
applies to Nous only if the term “pleasure” is understood metaphorically and its accompanying of the 
activity of Nous is understood essentially rather than chronologically. By contrast, (ii) the Aristotelian 
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Once it is found impossible to identify pleasure with the Good, since pleasure 
essentially depends on the prior presence of goodness, Plotinus is in a position both to 
refute a subjective, that is, relativistic interpretation of the Good (i.e., that it is because of 
the desire attached to it that what is good is good) and at the same time to point us in the 
direction of what we might call an “education” of desire. I speak of “education” in the 
sense that, although for Plotinus all things instinctively desire the Good (according to the 
“firmest of principles” cited at the beginning of this section), among these some (i.e., 
individual rational souls) are also able to clarify this “instinctive” drive so as actually to 
dissociate themselves from their lower appetitive commitments and pursue the Good 
according to their proper (i.e., rational) nature. But for this “dissociation” to be possible, 
a process of education, or of attunement to the End, is necessary. I shall deal with this 
process particularly in Subsection 4.3.1 and Section 4.6 under the heading of the Ascent 
of the soul to the Good. What still needs to be clarified at this point is the nature of the 
Good itself. 
I will attempt such a clarification by focusing on the third and the fourth points 
                                                                                                                                                 
view of pleasure as an activity applies to the life of Intellect, but in light of (iii) the Platonic notion of 
pleasure as a process of restoration it cannot be true of ordinary pleasures. As for (iv) Plato’s 
understanding of pleasure as an ingredient in the mixture which is the human good, Plotinus subscribes to 
it, but changes its sphere of reference (i.e., not embodied human life, but the life of Nous) and takes the 
term “pleasure” metaphorically. Finally, (i) the Aristotelian notion of pleasure as a supervening activity 
and (iii) the Platonic view of it as a process of restoration must be thought of as compatible descriptions 
of ordinary pleasures (although not of pleasure in Nous, on which cf. McGroarty 2006, 168–169). 
 
26
 Hadot (1988, 318–319) clearly summarizes Plotinus’ reading of the Philebus on this point: “L’expression 
« mêlé au plasir » [VI.7 [38] 30.24–25: ἡδονῇ μεμίχθαι] est, en somme, employée par Platon pour deux 
raisons. Tout d’abord, pour faire désirer l’activité spirituelle, pour faire entrevoir qu’elle est un bien, 
qu’elle est desirable, ensuite, pour faire comprendre qu’elle produit, dans l’Esprit ou dans l’âme qui 
l’exercent, un état lumineux et calme qui correspond à ce que Platon appelle par ailleurs le plasir pur.” 
On the issue of pleasure in relation to the Good in chapters 24–26 and 29–30 of VI.7 [38], see Hadot’s 
detailed commentary (Hadot 1988, 303–305, 313–319). 
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outlined earlier (pages 295–296)—(iii) that the Good can only be desired for its own 
sake, and (iv) that the Good does not itself desire some further good. These two points 
essentially belong together. What they express is fundamental to the very nature of the 
One as Good, for if this were desired for the sake of some other good or if it itself desired 
some further good,
27
 it could not be truly final. Obviously, if one rejects the possibility of 
the unicity of the End (i.e., the fact that the highest desideratum is one and one only), 
these conclusions will be untenable. But even if one concedes that the End is unique, an 
important question remains: Why should such an ultimate desideratum be identical with 
the One, the absolutely simple Principle of all? Why not stop at Nous or something like it, 
such as the Aristotelian First Mover of book XII of the Metaphysics? 
I will try to answer these questions by way of a summary reading of the opening 
chapter of treatise I.7 [54] On the primal Good and the other goods.
28
 Here is the full text 
                                                 
27
 At VI.7 [38] 24.13–16 Plotinus asks whether the Good can be good for itself, and remarks that a positive 
answer to this question is laughable, for it would imply some kind of lack in the Good (VI.7 [38] 27.22–
24, and more explicitly 41.28–31). It may be objected that this does not seat well with our interpretation 
of henologic eros as an eros directed fundamentally to nothing other than itself (see particularly Section 
3.3 above). In reality, I think that when Plotinus first says that the Good is not good for itself (VI.7 [38] 
24.13–16, 27.22–24, 41.28–31) and then describes the One in terms of ἔρως (VI.8 [39] 15.1–2 and 
16.12–14), he is stressing a fairly similar point but in two different contexts, or he is emphasizing two 
different aspects of the same issue. The first context (that of the passages from VI.7 [38] referred to in 
this note) is that of a Platonic transposition of the Stoic notion of “appropriation” or “affinity” (οἰκείωσις: 
see for instance SVF III, 178–189), that is, the natural love that every being bears toward itself. Plotinus’ 
view is that while other things are good both for themselves and for other things, the Good is such (that 
is, good) only for others (see Hadot 1988, 307; cf. Chapter Three note 84). The second context (that of 
the passages from VI.8 [39]) is the discussion about the freedom of the One, in which eros is not the 
expression of a lack but a productive spontaneity that gives rise to multiplicity. Thus, in the first case 
Plotinus is stressing that what it takes for something to be the Good, or the universal final cause in the 
general context of desire, is the very cessation of desire understood in its appetitive aspect. In the second 
case, instead, Plotinus is showing that for an unqualifiedly simple principle to be considered productive 
of multiplicity, its simplicity must be understood in terms of an infinite erotic δύναμις, as I argued in 
Section 3.3. 
 
28
 Chronologically, this is the last treatise of the Enneads, written by Plotinus shortly before he died. At VP 
6.24, Porphyry titles this treatise On well-being. As IGAL (I, 295–296, note 1) rightly points out, the 
alternate title given at VP 24.30 and maintained by all major editors and translators of the Enneads (i.e., 
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of this passage (the divisions of the text, given in italic,
29
 are mine):
30
 
 I. Common presuppositions. 
   1. The good of each thing is the thing’s proper activity according to 
      nature. 
[1] Could one say that the good for each thing was anything else than the 
[2] activity of its life according to nature? And if something was made up 
of many parts [3] would not its good be the proper and never-failing 
activity [4] according to nature of the best part of it? 
   2. The good of the best soul is the Good. 
So the soul’s [5] activity will be its good according to nature. Now if it is 
of the [6] best sort itself and its activity is directed towards the best, this 
best will not only be the good [7] for it, but it will also be the good 
absolutely. 
II. The primal good (the Good) is... 
   1. ...that in which other beings participate... 
Then if something [8] does not direct its activity towards another thing, 
since it is the best of beings and beyond [9] all beings, and all other things 
direct their activities towards it, it is obvious that this will be [10] the 
Good, through which other things are enabled to participate in good. [11] 
                                                                                                                                                 
On the primal good and the other goods) fits the contents of the treatise better and at the same time 
allows us to avoid confusion with treatise I.4 [46] On well-being. There is a helpful commentary on 
treatise I.7 [54]—to my knowledge the only full commentary published on this short work by Plotinus—
by Pigler (2004, especially 51–81), to which I will occasionally refer in the next few pages. 
 
29
 For analogous divisions see IGAL (I, 296–297), Pigler (2004, 41–48). 
 
30
 I.7 [54] 1.1–28: [1] Ἆρ’ ἄν τις ἕτερον εἴποι ἀγαθὸν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι ἢ τὴν [2] κατὰ φύσιν τῆς ζωῆς 
ἐνέργειαν, καὶ εἴ τι ἐκ πολλῶν εἴη [3] τούτῳ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τὴν τοῦ ἀμείνονος ἐν αὐτῷ ἐνέργειαν [4] 
οἰκείαν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἀεὶ μηδὲν ἐλλείπουσαν; Ψυχῆς δὴ [5] ἐνέργεια τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ. Εἰ δὲ 
καὶ πρὸς τὸ [6] ἄριστον ἐνεργοῖ ἀρίστη οὖσα, οὐ μόνον πρὸς αὐτὴν τὸ [7] ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἁπλῶς τοῦτο 
ἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη. Εἰ οὖν τι [8] μὴ πρὸς ἄλλο ἐνεργοῖ ἄριστον ὂν τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἐπέκεινα [9] τῶν ὄντων, 
πρὸς αὐτὸ δὲ τὰ ἄλλα, δῆλον, ὡς τοῦτο ἂν εἴη [10] τὸ ἀγαθόν, δι’ ὃ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῦ 
μεταλαμβάνειν ἔστι· [11] τὰ δὲ ἄλλα διχῶς ἂν ἔχοι, ὅσα οὕτω τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τῷ [12] πρὸς αὐτὸ 
ὡμοιῶσθαι καὶ τῷ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ποιεῖσθαι. [13] Εἰ οὖν ἔφεσις καὶ ἐνέργεια πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον 
[14] ἀγαθόν, δεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν μὴ πρὸς ἄλλο βλέπον μηδ’ ἐφιέμενον [15] ἄλλου ἐν ἡσύχῳ οὖσαν πηγὴν καὶ 
ἀρχὴν ἐνεργειῶν [16] κατὰ φύσιν οὖσαν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθοειδῆ ποιοῦσαν οὐ τῇ [17] πρὸς ἐκεῖνα 
ἐνεργείᾳ—ἐκεῖνα γὰρ πρὸς αὐτήν—οὐ τῇ [18] ἐνεργείᾳ οὐδὲ τῇ νοήσει τἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ’ αὐτῇ μονῇ 
[19] τἀγαθὸν εἶναι. Καὶ γὰρ ὅτι ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας, ἐπέκεινα [20] καὶ ἐνεργείας καὶ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ καὶ 
νοήσεως. Καὶ γὰρ αὖ [21] τοῦτο δεῖ τἀγαθὸν τίθεσθαι, εἰς ὃ πάντα ἀνήρτηται, αὐτὸ [22] δὲ εἰς μηδέν· 
οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ἀληθὲς τὸ οὗ πάντα ἐφίεται. [23] Δεῖ οὖν μένειν αὐτό, πρὸς αὐτὸ δὲ ἐπιστρέφειν πάντα, 
[24] ὥσπερ κύκλον πρὸς κέντρον ἀφ’ οὗ πᾶσαι γραμμαί. Καὶ [25] παράδειγμα ὁ ἥλιος ὥσπερ κέντρον ὢν 
πρὸς τὸ φῶς τὸ [26] παρ’ αὐτοῦ ἀνηρτημένον πρὸς αὐτόν· πανταχοῦ γοῦν μετ’ [27] αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐκ 
ἀποτέτμηται· κἂν ἀποτεμεῖν ἐθελήσῃς ἐπὶ [28] θάτερα, πρὸς τὸν ἥλιόν ἐστι τὸ φῶς. The translation in the 
body of the text is from ARMSTRONG, slightly modified; most notably, I render the expression κατὰ 
φύσιν by “according to nature” rather than by Armstrong’s “natural.” On the textual crux at line 18 see 
my next note. 
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All the other things which have the good like this will have it in two ways, by 
[12] being made like it and by directing their activity towards it. 
   2. ...while itself abiding in itself beyond being, activity, and Intellect; ... 
[13] So if the aspiration and activity towards the best [14] is good, the 
Good must not look or aspire to something else, [15] but stay quiet and be 
the spring and origin of activities [16] according to nature, and make other 
things in the form of good, not by [17] its activity directed to them—for 
they are directed to it, their source. It must be the Good not by [18] 
activity or thought, but by reason of its very abiding.
31
 [19] For because it 
is “beyond being,”32 it is also [20] beyond activity, Intellect, and 
intellection. 
   3. ...it is that on which everything depends and which everything desires. 
For, to put it another way, [21] one must assume the Good to be that on 
which everything depends and which itself [22] depends on nothing; for so 
the statement is true that it is “that to which everything aspires.”33 
   4. The center of a circle and the sun as illustrations of the Good. 
[23] So it must itself abide, while all things turn back to it, [24] as a circle 
does to the center from which all the radii come. The [25] sun, too, is an 
example, since it is like a center in relation to the light which [26] comes 
from it and depends on it; for the light is everywhere with [27] it and is not 
cut off from it; even if you wanted to cut it off on [28] one side, the light 
remains with the sun. 
 
The questions asked at lines 1–4 of this passage seem to be rhetorical. They are 
initially directed to establishing some common ground between Plotinus and his 
                                                 
31
 At I.7 [54] 1.18 we have a textual crux. The major editors and translators variously endorse one of the 
following readings: (i) αὐτῇ μόνῃ (Harder 1956–1971, Cilento 1947–1949, HS1, IGAL); (ii) αὐτῇ < τῇ > 
μονῇ (Creuzer 1835, Kirchhoff 1856, Volkmann 1883, Pigler 2004); (iii) αὐτὴ μόνη (Bréhier 1924–
1938); (iv) αὐτῇ μονῇ (HS2, ARMSTRONG); (v) τῇ μονῇ (Theiler, in Harder 1956–1971). The chief 
difficulty lies in choosing between the adjective μόνος (alone) and the feminine noun μόνη (staying, 
abiding). The literal meaning of these words is obviously different, but it seems to me that it does not 
significantly affect the philosophical sense of the passage, as a comparison of some of the translations 
proposed might confirm (e.g., Ficino 1492: “seipso tantum”; Creuzer 1835: “ipsa permansione”; H. F. 
Müller 1878–1880: “durch sein Verharren in sich selbst”; McKenna 1917–1930, and McKenna and Page 
1969: “by its very rest within itself”; Bréhier 1924–1938: “parce qu’il rest ce qu’il est”; Harder 1956–
1971: “eben vermöge eines Stillestehens”; Cilento 1947–1949: “solo per quel suo quieto restare”; Faggin 
2002: “perché rimane quello che è”; ARMSTRONG: “by reason of its very abiding”; IGAL: “por sí solo”; 
Mizuchi, Tanogashira and Tanaka 1986–1988: ただただ自己自身にとどまっていること, tadatada 
jikojishin ni todomatte iru koto; Pigler 2004: “parce qu’il demeure lui-même”). The text printed in the 
previous note is from HS2. 
 
32
 Plato, Republic VI.509b9. 
 
33
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.1094a3. 
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predecessors, most notably Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. Thus, according to all 
these authors, including Plotinus, any given thing naturally possesses a specific operation 
(ἔργον), activity (ἐνέργεια), or excellence (ἀρετή), which is identical with the end (τέλος) 
or the good of that thing; if the thing is complex, its specific operation will be that of its 
best part or element.
34
 But this is also where the general agreement between these authors 
ends. In what follows I will limit my account to contrasting Plotinus’ and Aristotle’s 
positions on the matter, leaving aside the Stoics’ views.35 
 According to Aristotle the proper ἔργον of soul is life, and that of the human 
soul, which is a kind of soul endowed with reason (λόγος), is a particular kind of life, 
namely the good life or the life of virtue (ἀρετή).36 The centerpiece of this life is an 
activity for whose sake all other activities should be performed, hence an activity which 
constitutes the good of human life. This activity is contemplation or study (θεωρία), as 
Aristotle argues in chapters 6–8 of Nicomachean Ethics X. However, according to the 
                                                 
34
 See Plato, Republic I.352d–354c; Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics I.1098b15–18 (and more broadly 
I.1097b22–1098a20; cf. note 36 below), II.1106a15–24, X.1177a12–17, Eudemian Ethics II.1218b37–
1219a28, On the Heavens II.286a8–9, Protrepticus, fragment 6 (= Iamblichus, Protrepticus VII.41.15–
43.25); for the Stoics see SVF III, 13 (= Cicero, De finibus XIV.14), SVF III, 16 (= Stobaeus, 
Anthologion II, 77.16–27). In these contexts, I take the terms ἔργον, ἐνέργεια, and ἀρετή to be used 
almost synonymously. More on this in Subsection 4.3.2. 
 
35
 For a concise treatment of the contrast between the Plotinian and the Stoic positions on this point see 
Pigler (2004, 54–57), who regrettably fails to provide precise references to Stoic sources on the matter. 
 
36
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.1098a12–18: “[12] Thus, if [13] {we take the proper human operation to 
be a certain kind of life, and take this life to be an activity and action of the soul [14] that involve reason, 
and if the function of the excellent man is to do these things well and [15] finely, and finally if each thing 
is well accomplished [when done] in accordance with its proper virtue; if so,} [16] the human good will 
be an activity of the soul [17] in accordance with virtue, and if there are several virtues, in accordance 
with the best and [18] most perfect virtue” (my translation). The Greek text reads: [12] εἰ’ οὕτως [13] 
{ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον ζωήν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν [14] καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, 
σπουδαίου δ’ ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ [15] καλῶς, ἕκαστον δ’ εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται· [16] 
εἰ δ’ οὕτω,} τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται [17] κατ’ ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, 
κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ [18] τελειοτάτην. Bywater (1894, ad 1098a13–16) deletes the text between curly 
brackets at lines 13–15, noting: “repetitio esse videtur eorum quae praecedunt” (i.e., of 1098a3–8). 
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view that the soul is the first actuality (ἐντελέχεια) of the body,37 Aristotle does not 
admit of an end (a human end) prior to the interaction or joined status or the compound of 
soul and body,
38
 and so for a human being the activity of contemplation will always occur 
in an incarnate context. 
For Plotinus, by contrast, the good of the soul cannot be that of a particular kind 
of soul, but ought to be the good of soul tout-court, that is, an activity (ἐνέργεια) that 
belongs to soul as such, and not this or that type of soul. But what is soul as such, soul 
qua soul? I observed that according to Aristotle the activity of contemplation is possible 
only intermittently for human beings, even in their best condition, since our incarnate 
state requires that we pay some attention to the needs connected to this state 
(Nicomachean Ethics X.1179a34–36). For Plotinus, instead, the soul is attached to body 
only incidentally; by itself, the soul is an immaterial principle.
39
 And while in its 
incarnate condition, part of the activity of the soul is to care for the body with which it is 
associated, in its disincarnate or purified state, which ultimately amounts to its rational 
part or power (τὸ λογιστικόν; see Chapter Three note 249 for references in Plotinus), the 
soul turns toward higher realities and its proper activity is the constant contemplation of 
                                                 
37
 Aristotle, De anima II.412a27–28: “[27] the soul is the first actuality of a natural [28] body that is 
potentially alive” ([27] ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος [27] φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος). 
Cf. Chapter Two note 105. 
 
38
 For Aristotle all sensible substances are a concrete compound (τὸ σύνολον) of matter and form; as such, 
they cannot exist if these two elements are separated. The individual human being is, as a sensible 
substance, the composite of body and soul (see De anima II.412b6–9, 413a3–10, Metaphysics 
VII.1037a29–33, 1039b20–27; cf. also Parts of Animals I.641a17–b10, Metaphysics VII.1035b14–27, 
1036b28–32, VIII.1043a34–b4, XI.1060b23–30, XIII.1077b8–9). 
 
39
 On the immaterial or incorporeal nature of the soul see IV.7 [2] 10 (chapters 2–83 of the same treatise 
defend the thesis of the immateriality of the soul through a discussion and refutation of Stoic and 
Epicurean views; chapter 8
5
 defends the same thesis against Aristotle’s theory of the soul as actuality of 
the body documented in the previous note), IV.8 [6] 7.1–17, IV.9 [8] 4.5–26; cf. also VI.4 [22] 5. 
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Nous.
40
 
Even so, for Plotinus Nous as the object of contemplation is not ultimate but is 
only the last step to the higher contemplation of the One/Good. This is because, as I 
argued throughout Subsection 3.4.1, Nous is already a secondary kind of unity, or a unity 
in multiplicity, which as such is always already erotically directed beyond itself, toward 
the One as the Source of all reality. In other words, if the highest or best element in soul 
is the rational element whereby the soul is constantly connected to Nous to the point of 
having Nous within itself, so to speak (see Subsection 4.3.2 below),
41
 then this 
connection already implies a directedness toward that unity which is prior to Nous, 
namely the One. But the One is also the Source, the Good whereby every thing is; 
therefore, as Plotinus points out at lines 5–7 of the first chapter of our treatise, I.7 [54], 
the good of the soul will be at the same time the Good unqualifiedly or simply (ἁπλῶς: 
line 7), that is, the universal final cause. 
*            *            * 
Before we continue with our summary exegesis of I.7 [54] 1, we must ask: Why 
should the One be the universal good, the Good? And why should the One be both 
                                                 
40
 On the purification of the soul in its embodied state see I.6 [1] 7, III.6 [26] 5, VI.9 [9] 7; cf. Plato, 
Republic X.608c1–611a2. On noetic contemplation as the peculiar activity of the purified soul, see IV.8 
[6] 3.25–30, V.1 [10] 2.35–46, 3.16–20; cf. also I.5 [36] 10.10–23, III.8 [30] 5–6. The issue of the 
separation of the soul from the body is massive and a major hotbed of controversy between (Neo-) 
Platonists and pretty much all other Hellenistic schools of philosophy, including the Peripatetics. I will be 
unable to deal with it appropriately. I should only point out that in view of the soul’s ascent to the One, 
for Plotinus the actual separation of soul and body occurring in death is secondary; what truly matters is 
for the soul to be ready (i.e., to be purified) to come in contact with the Good. See pages 362–363 and 
note 174 below. 
 
41
 See I.1 [53] 13.5–8, III.8 [30] 5.10–16, V.3 [49] 3.15–34; cf. also I.1 [53] 11, IV.3 [27] 12.4–8, IV.7 [2] 
10.32–37, 13.12–14, VI.4 [22] 14. I owe some of these references to Pigler (2004, 63 note 28 and note 
29). However, Pigler’s primary reference (i.e., IV.8 [6] 10.32–36) seems to be incorrect (IV.8 [6] has 
only eight chapters). I have been unable to find the text she has in mind; perhaps IV.7 [2] 10.32–36. 
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efficient and final cause, ἀρχή and τέλος of all reality? Let us begin with an 
observation: all the questions asked in the paragraph running across pages 294–295 above 
could be answered analytically (in the Kantian sense) with reference to our interpretation 
of henologic superabundance given above in Subsection 3.3.2. Thus, that the Principle is 
also the final cause, or universal desideratum, is necessarily part of the very concept of a 
Principle which, in giving what it does not have (i.e., in giving to what is generated a love 
for something other than itself), it endows all derived reality with a love directed to that 
very Principle qua Good. In other words, the One is the universal beloved, truly the 
ἐρασμιώτατον, because for all derived reality to be or to exist means to be erotically 
directed toward it: we love it because it made us to love it; or rather, to avoid the notion 
that the One needs to be loved, we love it because we were made as lovers of it (to love it 
is good for us, while for the One it is a matter of indifference, since it abides 
transcendently in perfect self-sufficiency
42
). 
This argument is not explicitly worked out in the Enneads, but as I said, I believe 
it can be safely derived in analytic fashion from the concept of a universe in which what 
the Principle imparts on all that is derived from it is eros for the Principle qua Good and 
qua other. The point is less trivial than it might seem at first, for if one does not grant that 
it is the One itself that instills eros in the whole of derived reality, the very origin of eros 
is bound to remain unexplained and the identity of the final cause (if there is one to begin 
with, and whatever this may be) questionable. This argument is at the same time a 
necessary critical supplement to Aristotle’s observation that if there is no final aim of 
                                                 
42
 See note 14 above. 
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desire, desire itself will be empty and vain. The text where we find this observation is 
Nicomachean Ethics I.1094a18–22; it reads:43 
[18] Suppose, then, that the things [19] achievable by action have some 
end that we wish for because of itself, and because of which we wish for 
the other things, and that we do not [20] choose everything because of 
something else—for if we do, it will go on without limit, [21] so that 
desire will prove to be empty and futile. Clearly, this end will [22] be the 
good, that is to say, the best good. 
 
Now, if it is true that in order not to be in vain, all desire needs a truly final end 
(which is the core of Aristotle’s observation), it is likewise true that in order not to be left 
unexplained, desire also necessarily requires a truly original beginning (which is the 
supplement that one is allowed to infer from Plotinus, I believe).
44
 Moreover, if the truly 
final cause, formally understood as that which has no further end beyond itself (see notes 
13 and 14 for references), provides desire with an end and saves desire from the danger 
of being empty and vain, the specific identity of this final cause, which in Aristotle is 
thought thinking itself (Metaphysics XII.1074b34–35), will remain arbitrary, unless this 
cause is at the same time the origin of the desire by which it is desired (which is precisely 
the case of the Plotinian One). Thus it will not be enough to say, with Aristotle, that the 
final cause is the universal beloved and that this moves the heavens by being loved (ὡς 
ἐρώμενον: Metaphysics XII.1072b3), but it will be necessary to add that the final cause 
can be so loved because it is at the same time the origin of this love, or because love for 
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 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.1094a18–22: [18] Εἰ δή τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν [19] πρακτῶν ὃ δι’ αὑτὸ 
βουλόμεθα, τἆλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο, καὶ μὴ [20] πάντα δι’ ἕτερον αἱρούμεθα πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ’ εἰς 
ἄπειρον, [21] ὥστ’ εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὄρεξιν, δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ’ ἂν [22] εἴη τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ 
ἄριστον. The translation I adopted in the body of the text is by Irwin (1999). 
 
44
 The kind of necessity I am advocating is, again, principally explanatory: cf. Appendix B. 
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the Principle qua other is what the Principle bestows on derived reality.
45
 From this 
perspective, eros is indirectly also the key to Plotinus’ critique of the Aristotelian First 
Mover as unsuitable to serve as the ἀρχή of all, not only because, from Plotinus’ 
viewpoint, the inescapable duality of the Mover’s activity, self-thinking thought, is at 
once an index of its lack of unity and erotic self-identity (which are prerogatives of the 
universal ἀρχή),46 but also because qua universal ἀρχή the First Mover would leave the 
desire directed to it ultimately unexplained.
47
 
In the commentary to his translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, Irwin writes 
about the text of I.1094a18–22, which I cited on the previous page, that the options 
outlined by Aristotle in this passage are not two—i.e., either (a) we choose everything for 
the sake of something else or (b) we choose for the sake of a highest end—but three. In 
fact, “[t]he argument does not justify us in dismissing [(c)] the possibility of choosing 
                                                 
45
 See for instance VI.7 [38] 22.21–22; see Chapter Three note 213 for the Greek text of this passage. See 
also note 167 below. 
 
46
 See for instance VI.7 [38] 36–42; cf. pages 226–229 above. 
 
47
 The argument was already formulated by Proclus, who in his Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus (II, 
267.4–12) writes: “[4] If in fact the cosmos [5] loves [ἐρᾷ] nous, just as Aristotle says [Metaphysics 
XII.1072b3], and moves [κινεῖται] [6] toward it, whence does it have that desire [ἔφεσιν]? For [7] since 
the cosmos is not the First, it is necessary that it possesses that desire from a cause [απ’ ἀιτίας] [8] that 
moves it to love [εἰς τὸ ἐρᾶν]; in fact, [9] [Aristotle] himself says [Movement of Animals 701a1; 
Metaphysics XII.1072a26] that the desired is the mover of the desirer [κινητικὸν... τό ὀρεκτὸν τοῦ 
ὀρεκτικοῦ]. If [10] this is true, and the cosmos has such an aspiration [ὀρεκτικὸν... τοῦ εκεινοῦ] through 
its own being [τῷ εἶναι] and [11] according to its own nature [κατὰ φύσιν], it is manifest that the whole 
being of the cosmos [12] derives from that same [source] from which comes its desire [τὸ εἶναι 
ὀρεκτικόν]” (my translation). In a note to the French translation of this text from Proclus, Festugière 
(1966–1968, II, 108 note 4) aptly asks: “Pour desirer, il faut que le Monde existe: d’où lui vient l’être? Il 
est par nature désirant: d’où lui vient cette nature?” Cf. also Proclus, Elements of Theology 12 and 31 
(including Dodd’s comments ad loc.); Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides III.788.12–28 (the conclusion 
at lines 27–28 is most explicit: “that cause of all will be not only final [τελικόν] but also efficient 
[ποιητικόν]”; my translation). Plotinus employs a similar language at Enneads VI.2 [43] 11.25–26 and 
most emphatically at 11.38 of the same treatise and at VI.9 [9] 9.21, where the One is explicitly called 
ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος; at I.3 [20] 1.3 the Good is called ἀρχή. A similar jargon is found at V.8 [31] 7.44–47 
(where Plotinus borrows from Aristotle, Physics I.188a27–30), but the focus of this passage is not the 
One but Intellect. 
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several things for their own sakes, without choosing everything for the sake of just 
one end.”48 Irwin is correct about Aristotle as far as the argument goes at this point of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. But if the problem of having to juggle several options subsists at 
all, it is because Aristotle never deduces the desire for whatever is good from a universal 
ἀρχή whose paramount gift to all derived reality is precisely an eros which, if followed 
correctly, will lead back to its own source, the Good by which all things are good. In 
other words, the possibility of showing that desire as a path toward an end which is both 
non-arbitrary and truly final is precluded unless that end is at the same time the very 
origin of desire. Or yet again, all desire does have some end, but one will hardly be able 
to argue persuasively for an end over another (which is what Aristotle does argue in the 
Ethics), unless the end in question is at the same time the ultimate efficient cause of 
desire in the desirer, or unless desire for a certain end is understood as the distinctive 
“gift” of that end to the desirer, a gift whereby end and origin of desire coincide.49 Surely 
enough, this argument fulfills a primarily explanatory function (see Appendix B), but one 
which cannot escape being fulfilled, unless we resign ourselves to the view that desire is 
thoroughly arbitrary. (This view, obviously, would not be an explanation but a 
renunciation of all explanation, a renunciation which, in its turn, will also have to be 
justified).
50
 
                                                 
48
 Irwin (1999, 173). 
 
49
 Why couldn’t the End/Principle impart a love for something other than itself? At the very least, because 
it would not be the Good if it imparted a love for anything less than the Good, that is, less than itself. 
 
50
 Two (non-Aristotelian) objections to this way of thinking come to mind. First, it is not the One that 
imparts eros on reality; rather, the One is produced out of the desire for it. Second, the desire for the One 
is fictional and can be reduced to some other (allegedly more basic) form of desire. As we shall presently 
see, the two objections often work jointly. In reply to the first objection, it seems to me that both to admit 
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Aristotle himself does not seem to escape the logic which I see operative in 
Plotinus’ identification of efficient and final cause, although he does not go as far as 
Plotinus. In fact, in order to show that the virtue or excellence of what is best in us is the 
final end of human beings (which he conceptualizes in terms of happiness: εὐδαιμονία), 
he introduces the well known ἔργον argument (Nicomachean Ethics I.1097b22–
1098a20), resulting in the conclusion that what we desire is identical with the properly 
human ἔργον, which is “an active life of the [part of the soul] that has reason,”51 or an 
“activity of the soul in accordance with reason or not lacking reason.”52 But the question 
could be asked of Aristotle: Why should we desire such an activity? And where does this 
desire come from? The answer presumably would be: “Because it is our proper ἔργον,” 
which is like saying that we desire it in principle, or as a principle, a starting point 
                                                                                                                                                 
that the soul desires the One and to deny that the One actually exists prior to the desire for it is faulty 
reasoning, for it implies at least one of two incredible claims: (i) that this desire originally came into 
existence out of nothing (absolute nothing, Parmenidean non-being, that is); (ii) perhaps more incredibly, 
that the One (i.e., the actual One, not a fictitious representation of it!) can be brought into existence out of 
the desire for it. Against this reply, as far as I can tell there are two ways out of having to admit the 
actuality of the One prior to the soul’s desire for it. The first is to renounce the very task of explaining the 
nature of desire by claiming that there is not enough evidence to support the necessity of such an 
admission. In partial reply to this, see my remarks on explanatory necessity in Appendix B and the 
present discussion on the identity of efficient and final causality in the One. The other way of denying 
the actuality of the One prior to the soul’s desire for it is to resort to the second objection mentioned in 
the opening lines of this note and claim that what we call desire for the One is not what we say it is (i.e., 
desire for the actual One), and thus reject altogether that the soul has any potentiality for assimilation 
with it. This can be done, most notably, by reducing the desire for the One to some other factor, for 
example desire for material well-being, sexual desire, desire for power, desire for a misconceived One 
(which is ultimately an exteriorization of oneself: cf. Section 5.3 in the Epilogue), etc. This view (and the 
reductionisms almost inevitably associated with it) is not altogether implausible, but it should be given 
adequate phenomenological description, or else it will remain unjustified. The same requirement, to be 
sure, applies to the affirmation of the desire for the One. 
 
51
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.1098a3–4: πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος (my translation). 
 
52
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.1098a7–8: ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ λόγου (my 
translation). 
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beyond which we neither need nor should go.
53
 In other words, for an Aristotelian to 
ask for the origin of such desire would amount to taking one step too many, for the desire 
for intellectual activity, the pure actuality of the Unmoved Mover, is itself a primary 
given rooted in our nature, so that to ask why we have such a nature is simply excessive. 
On his part, Plotinus would be likely to contend that not only is this step not 
excessive, but that it is necessary, albeit in a primarily explanatory way (see again 
Appendix B). In fact, it is only by taking such a step that one is able to offer an account 
of the desire for the Principle. But in doing so, the very nature of the Principle undergoes 
a transformation: no longer the noetic ἐνέργεια of the First Mover, but the erotic δύναμις 
of the One. If this is granted, then the possibility of choosing several things for their own 
sakes (i.e., option (c) in Irwin’s commentary to Aristotle mentioned above at pages 310–
311) is no longer an option, for according to Plotinus no derived thing (whether taken 
singly, together with some other derived things, or with the totality of derived things) will 
ever be able to explain how it can possibly be desired, let alone desired for its own sake, 
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 Kant does something similar when in the first section of the Grundlegung he argues for a teleological 
view of reason (Vernunft) (Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals IV, 394–396). The 
difference between Kant and Aristotle, I believe, lies in their respective views of morality and happiness 
and in the place they assign to them in human life. For Kant reason is the key to a morality which is in 
absolute the highest end for all rational beings independently of whether reason in these beings is 
accompanied by sensible inclinations (Kant, Groundwork IV, 408, 425, 427, 442, 447–448; Critique of 
Practical Reason V, 32). The satisfaction of the sum total of these inclinations is called happiness 
(Glückseligkeit; cf. Kant, Groundwork IV, 399; Critique of Practical Reason V, 72, 147, 104, 147; cf. 
also Metaphysics of Morals VI, 480). For Aristotle, instead, happiness (εὐδαιμονία) is the virtue or 
excellence of what is best in us (or, as we just saw, our proper ἔργον as human beings), while morality 
consists of a virtuous life understood as the possession of the virtuous states plus friendship described in 
books II–IX of the Nicomachean Ethics. By the end of the Ethics, this life seems to be happiness only in 
a secondary way, true happiness being identified with the activity of θεωρία or contemplation, which in 
turn is the proper ἔργον of our best part, namely reason (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X.8, especially 
1178a9–10, 20–22). Plotinus is closer to Aristotle than he is to Kant on this count, in that for him all 
virtue (whether high or low), while necessary, is not ultimate but is for the sake of a higher end (see 
Subsection 4.6.1 below). However, Plotinus differs from Aristotle in at least one very important respect: 
for him the end of human life is not contemplation of the Aristotelian self-thinking Nous but assimilation 
to the One beyond Nous (see Subsection 4.3.1). 
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unless this thing is proved to be at the same time the origin of the very desire by 
which it is desired. But the only “thing” that can fulfill this condition is the One as both 
the universal ἀρχή and the universal τέλος.54 
In short, Plotinus simply thinks that the Aristotelian answer does not reach far 
enough. Therefore, he radicalizes Aristotle’s argument by making desire for the universal 
final end depend, not on the particular nature of a given being, but on the very end of this 
desire. This end thus becomes, quite literally, also the origin of the desire.
55
 
*            *            * 
Let us now resume our direct reading of the first chapter of I.7 [34] from where 
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 Consider my desire for a piece of fruit—say, an apple. Ordinarily, I seem to desire the apple either 
because I am actually seeing an apple or because I am reminded of an apple which I once tasted. Am I 
then justified in thinking that the apple is the origin—in the strong sense of ἀρχή—of my desire for 
apples I occasionally experience? For Plotinus the answer to this question can be positive only from a 
purely empirical standpoint, but ultimately and strictly it is negative. Put differently, I do desire an apple, 
empirically, either because I am actually seeing an apple or because I am reminded of one or more apples 
which I once tasted, but ultimately the apple as such cannot by itself ground the very phenomenon of 
desire which is in me, for the apple as such does not justify my desiring it any more than it justifies my 
hating it or my being indifferent to it, to mention but two other ways of relating affectively to an apple. I 
take it that for Plotinus the phenomenon of desire, in order not to be left unexplained, ultimately 
presupposes the identity of its efficient and final cause, an identity that obviously cannot be present in an 
apple nor in any other finite object of experience. For this reason, my desire for an apple cannot have the 
apple as its truly ultimate end, since the apple is only a means to some further desideratum or 
combination of desiderata (e.g., the satisfaction of hunger or thirst, of the desire for something sweet, of 
the reproduction of a memory in which the flavor of apple brings along a pleasant scenario, etc.). If so, 
then, the apple is only the proximate cause of a desire which points at something more remote, a desire 
which will not stop until it finds that which is sought after absolutely, for its own sake. This absolute 
desideratum or ultimate end of desire for Plotinus can be only that which is at the same time the origin of 
desire, namely the One as both the Principle and the End of all. Does this mean that the apple is in fact 
undesirable? No; it means rather that it is desirable when it is “colored” by the Good (VI.7 [38] 22.6). 
 
55
 In his opening notice to Enneads I.7 [54], Bréhier (1924–1938, I, 107) remarks that the Aristotelian 
argument (chiefly in chapter 6 of Nicomachean Ethics I) is directed against Plato’s Good, but that 
Aristotle’s refutation of Plato—Plotinus’ Plato, more precisely—makes sense primarily within a strictly 
Aristotelian framework. Thus, as Bréhier rightly points out, “les arguments d’Aristote contre Platon 
tiraient toute leur valeur du point de vue pratique d’Aristote; l’Idée platonicienne du Bien n’est point en 
effet quelque chose que l’on puisse acquérir par l’action; il perdent leur valeur, dès que le but devient une 
union au Bien par assimilation.” For this reason, the practical realm (i.e., ethics), though necessary, for 
Plotinus is not the ultimate goal of human endeavors, no matter how unpalatable the idea may come 
across to modern sensibility. I comment briefly on the status of ethics for Plotinus in Subsection 4.6.1 
(see especially note 202). 
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we left off at page 307. How is it that the Good is the Good? Plotinus’ answer, which 
we find at lines 7–10, is that the Good is such by granting all things participation (line 10: 
μεταλαμβάνειν) in goodness. It is by virtue of this participation that lower (i.e., 
qualified
56
) goods are desirable and exist at all. At lines 10–12 Plotinus sketches two 
ways in which a thing can participate in the Good: by similarity (line 12: ὡμοιῶσθαι) and 
by directing its activity toward the Good. The two modes of participation correspond to 
the double causality which I have been discussing in the last few pages, similarity being a 
direct consequence of the coincidence of the Good (final cause) with the universal ἀρχή 
(efficient cause), and directedness toward the Good being the clearest expression of final 
causality. Put differently, if I am directed toward τἀγαθόν, it is because I am ἀγαθοειδής 
(line 16); but I am ἀγαθοειδής because τἀγαθόν is at the same time both my and the 
universal ἀρχή. 
In Chapter Three we saw how the efficient causality of the Principle is operative 
in Plotinus’ metaphysics in accordance with the notion of eros. There the erotic 
superabundance of the Principle was the key to the hierachical structuring of reality. In 
the present chapter, and more specifically in the next two sections, it is a matter of 
showing how the same notion of eros is operative in conceiving of the Principle of all as 
identical with the End of all. For the moment, the point is simply to underline the fact that 
in Plotinus the two causalities are interdependent. Again, the soul desires τἀγαθόν 
because it is ἀγαθοειδής; but it is ἀγαθοειδής, in turn, because τἀγαθόν is the name of the 
ἀρχή of all from the perspective of the desirer, much like ἀρχή was its name from the 
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 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VII.1152b26–27. 
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perspective of the generated, for in itself the ἀρχή/τἀγαθόν, or Principle/Good, is 
simply the One. 
Now, to be ἀγαθοειδής for the soul, as for Nous (cf. Chapter Three note 269), 
means to participate in the superabundant life of the One. As I argued in Subsection 
3.3.2, this life is communicated to the whole of derived reality as eros for the Source, 
which qua universal and ultimate desideratum is identical with the Good. But this means 
that desire, or ἔρως followed correctly (Plato, Symposium 210a2, 4, e3, 211b5, 7; cf. page 
70 above), is the very “locus” in which the manifestation of the identity of Principle and 
End is first given, the “place” beginning from which the explication of this coincidence 
becomes possible. And since this is true not only for soul but also for Nous, we may 
understand why in this context Plotinus introduces the identity between his Good and the 
Good of Plato’s Republic (VI.509b6–10), which is beyond being, and hence beyond Nous 
and the Aristotelian νόησις νοήσεως (lines 19–20). To the extent that the One is the 
origin and end of all desire, it cannot have a desideratum beyond itself. For this reason, it 
is said to abide in itself.
57
 However, this restfulness (line 15: ἐν ἡσύχῳ; cf. VI.7 [38] 32–
33) of the One should not be understood statically but dynamically: what is at rest, or 
what in transcendently self-abiding does not change, is the fact that the One does not 
direct its primary activity outside of itself.
58
 
The two images employed in treatise I.7 [54] to express the self-abiding status of 
                                                 
57
 See I.7 [54] 1.18; cf. note 31 above for remarks on the textual crux in this line. See also Chapter Three 
notes 123 and 185 for further references on the notion of abiding (μένειν). 
 
58
 The activity in question here is the first activity, or activity of the essence, with which I dealt earlier in 
Subsection 3.2.3. 
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the Principle and the dependence of derived reality on it are those of the center of a 
circle (lines 23–24) and of the sun (lines 24–28).59 Concerning the first image, Pigler 
writes in her commentary:
60
  
Thus, the purpose of attraction by desire, developed through the 
mathematical image of the circle, is to unravel the eternalized sense of the 
production of the Good, as well as to frame the movement of procession 
within a necessary conversion to the Principle. This metaphor of the circle 
shows that the Good encompasses all things, that it is omnipresent, and 
that it guarantees the principle of a finality through which it is the good of 
all existing things. 
 
As for the second image, that of the sun, through it Plotinus does not only place 
himself in the tradition of books VI and VII of Plato’s Republic, but introduces at the 
same time an important development in this tradition. For if in Plato the sun/Good 
provides the attuned eye/soul with the knowledge of what it illumines, but affords 
existence, arguably, only to Ideas (cf. Chapter Three note 12), in Plotinus the sun is both 
the source and the sustainer of light (line 26). Out of metaphor, this means that the One is 
both the giver and the sustainer of the existence of all reality, or of Nous proximately and 
of all reality remotely (cf. Chapter Three note 52). To illustrate this point, Plotinus 
alludes to the experiment of placing a screen in front of the sun or light source.
61
 I believe 
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 It is in connection with the metaphor of the circle that Plotinus calls what derives from the center of the 
circle “centri-form” (κεντροειδής: VI.8 [39] 18.10), and what is akin to the sun, “sunlike” (ἡλιοειδής: I.6 
[1] 9.31; cf. Chapter One note 195 for occurrences of the same term in Plato). For a parallel of the 
metaphor of the circle in the context of cosmology, cf. II.2 [14] 2. For further references to these two 
metaphors in the Enneads see Chapter Three notes 78 and 79, as well as my remarks in notes 160 and 
278 of the same chapter. 
 
60
 Pigler (2004, 77): “L’actraction par le désir, déployée par l’image mathématique du cercle, a aussi pour 
finalité de libérer le sens éternizé, ainsi que d’enchâsser la procession dans une nécessaire conversion au 
Principle. Cette métaphore du cercle montre que le Bien englobe toutes choses, qu’il est omniprésent, 
qu’il assure le principe d’une finalité par laquelle il est le bien de tout existant.” 
 
61
 See also VI.4 [22] 7.42–44; cf. Galen, De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis VII.617.5–8. 
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that what this experiment is meant to prove is, first, that light cannot sustain its own 
existence independently of its source: what the screen does is precisely to break the link 
between light and sun, so that the former is no longer able to shine (i.e., to be light, or to 
be simply) when cut off from the latter. Secondly, the illustration shows that the screen, 
while affecting light, does not directly affect the light source, in the sense that the sun still 
generates light despite being faced by the screen. It may be objected that an affection on 
the product already tells us something about the inability of the producer to overcome 
absolutely the origin of the affection (i.e., in our experiment, the screen). Two counter-
objections to this. First, we should remind ourselves of the necessity, in Plotinus’ 
metaphysics, of the fundamental Principle of Superiority of Cause to Effect (cf. pages 
216–218 above), whereby the product must be ontologically inferior to the producer, and 
hence essentially open to varying degrees of affection depending on its “place” in the 
hypostatic hierarchy. Secondly, and no less fundamentally, we ought to emphasize the 
metaphorical character of the illustration (on which see also Chapter Three note 160). No 
illustration, precisely qua illustration, will do full justice to that which it is supposed to 
illustrate; this is true of the One to a particularly heightened degree. 
As it was implied in my discussion on the ineffability of the One (Subsection 
3.2.2), ultimately all attempts at grasping the One cognitively or theoretically (whether in 
noetic or dianoetic fashion) are bound to fail because for Plotinus the nature of the One is 
afforded only in the experience of union (cf. VI.7 [38] 36). And as we shall see more 
directly in Subsection 4.6.2 and 4.6.3, the fundamental feature of this experience is not 
cognition but love. For the moment we may turn briefly to the second point of interest in 
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the context of Plotinus’ description of the One as ἐρασμιώτατον at VI.7 [38] 32.25 
and 33.14, namely the disposition that the individual soul ought to adopt if it is erotically 
to attune itself to the beloved. 
4.3 Preconditions of the Ascent: Attunement and Affinity with the Beloved 
As anticipated in the opening pages of this chapter, with the present section I 
begin the treatment of the central theme of this portion of our study: the journey of return 
to the One, or the Ascent. Before I shift the focus of our discussion to the actual process 
of the Ascent in the sections that follow, I will first introduce two fundamental factors 
that make the Ascent possible, what we might call its preconditions. The first 
precondition is the idea that was hinted in the closing paragraph of the previous section: 
that the individual soul must adopt a certain disposition in order to be able to love its 
desideratum, the One, in a way that is suitable to the status of the One as ἐρασμιώτατον 
or universal final cause (Subsection 4.3.1). For this attunement to the beloved to be 
possible, the lover has to be capable of assuming this disposition upon itself. In other 
words, the soul must be of a certain nature, such that the very possibility of the Ascent as 
self-transformation or attunement to the beloved is essentially open for it. This openness 
or possibility is the second precondition of the Ascent, a precondition which from the 
perspective of the ascending soul appears to be even more fundamental than the first and 
which I will refer to as the essential affinity of the soul with the higher hypostases or, in 
the language of eros, the affinity between lover and beloved (Subsection 4.3.2). 
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4.3.1 First Precondition of the Ascent: 
Attunement, or the Infinite Eros by Which the Soul is to Love the One qua Good 
In the context of the Ascent, I am going to call the soul’s necessity to attune itself 
to its ultimate beloved (i.e., the One qua Good or universal final cause) the Principle of 
As-similation.
62
 Although Plotinus does not use such an expression, he does state the 
principle in concise, if not immediately transparent fashion at I.6 [1] 9.29–30: “For one 
must come to the sight with a seeing power made akin and like to what is seen” (the 
Greek text is given in note 65 below). The field from which Plotinus interpretively 
borrows this principle (or to which he applies it in this passage) is that of sense 
perception,
63
 and his likely source is Plato’s theory of vision in the Timaeus.64 The 
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 Cf. Darras-Worm (2007, 238); IGAL (I, 98) calls this principle “principio de la adecuación de la potencia 
con el objeto.” Here again I capitalize the expression “Principle of As-similation” in accordance with the 
indications given in Chapter Three note 10. I also hyphenate the term “assimilation” in this expression in 
order to underline its etymological meaning and to bring out its relation to a set of Greek terms which 
Plotinus uses to denote likeness or similarity: ὅμοιος, ὁμοειδής, ὁμοιόω, ὁμοιότης, and finally ὁμοίωσις, 
the particular term that I translate with “assimilation.” Here is a list of the occurrences of these terms in 
the Enneads when used to indicate likeness to higher realities broadly in the context of the Ascent to the 
One: for ὅμοιος see I.6 [1] 9.29, VI.9 [9] 11.32; for ὁμοειδής see IV.3 [49] 4.30, V.1 [10] 2.44; for 
ὁμοιόω see I.2 [19] (the verb alone is used some 22 times in this treatise, most notably 13 times in 
chapter 1, and 7 times in chapter 2), I.4 [46] 16.12, I.6 [1] 6.20, 7.28, I.7 [54] 1.12, I.8 [51] 8.43, V.3 [49] 
8.24, 54; for ὁμοιότης see I.6 [1] 2.11–12, IV.7 [2] 10.40, V.3 [49] 8.56, VI.7 [38] 31.11–18, 34.11, VI.9 
[9] 4.27, 8.28; for ὁμοίωσις see I.2 [19] 1.26, 3.1–11, 20, 5.2, 6.26, 7.27. The key Platonic texts at the 
basis of these references are those from Republic X.613a7–b1 and Theaetetus 176a8–b3, b8–c2 cited on 
page 92 above. As customary with Plotinus, this terminology is not rigid; thus, in the Enneads (and in the 
broad Neoplatonic tradition) the notion of assimilation in the context of the Ascent is conveyed not only 
by the group of terms I just listed in this note, but also by another cluster of words indicating kinship, 
affinity, appropriation, or adaptation (cf. SP 724–725): οἰκεῖος (III.8 [30] 6.21, 8.3, IV.7 [2] 10.13, V.5 
[32] 7.24, V.6 [24] 4.17, V.9 [5] 1.20), οἰκειόω (III.8 [30] 6.18, 22), οἰκείωσις (used negatively at III.6 
[26] 13.27); see also συγγενής (II.4 [19] 4.14, I.6 [1] 6.15, 9.29, VI.9 [9] 4.28, 8.29); cf. note 85 below. 
 
63
 Cf. IV.4 [28] 23.19–35, VI.7 [38] 31.8–11. The Principle of As-similation is very closely related to the 
Principle of Affinity, which I will be discussing in the next subsection. See note 87 below for a list of 
references to the Principle of Affinity. At VI.7 [38] 31.8–18 Plotinus seems to present these two 
principles as two aspects of the same reality. 
 
64
 See particularly Plato, Timaeus 45b4–d7, 47b5–c4; cf. Aristotle, De anima I.404b17–18. See the 
commentary on Enneads I.6 [1] 9.29–30 by Darras-Worms (2007, 237–238). 
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broader context of the principle itself is treatise I.6 [1] On beauty, one of the 
Enneads’ most read and anthologized treatises. This treatise may be summarily described 
as an ascent of the soul to the Good through an investigation of the experience of beauty. 
The Principle of As-similation is stated as a necessity to which the soul must submit if it 
is to meet its desired terminus at the end of the Ascent. It is worth citing the text of the 
principle in the wider context of the passage from which it is taken, I.6 [1] 9.24–34:65 
[24] ...this [25] alone is the eye that sees the great Beauty. But if anyone 
comes [26] to the sight blear-eyed with wickedness, and unpurified, or 
[27] weak and by cowardice unable to look at what is very bright, [28] he 
sees nothing, even if someone shows him what is there and possible [29] 
to see. For one must come to the sight with a seeing power made akin and 
like [30] to what is seen. No eye ever [31] saw the sun without becoming 
sun-like, nor [32] can a soul see Beauty without becoming beautiful. You 
must become [33] first all godlike and all beautiful if you intend to see 
God [34] and Beauty. 
 
Although Plotinus explicitly employs what I here called the Principle of As-
similation in the context of the Ascent, the formal structure proper to the principle is not 
exclusive to Plotinus, nor, for that matter, is its application limited to the Ascent.
66
 For 
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 I.6 [1] 9.24–34: [24] οὗτος [25] γὰρ μόνος ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς τὸ μέγα κάλλος βλέπει. Ἐὰν δὲ ἴῃ [26] ἐπὶ τὴν 
θέαν λημῶν κακίαις καὶ οὐ κεκαθαρμένος ἢ [27] ἀσθενής, ἀνανδρίᾳ οὐ δυνάμενος τὰ πάνυ λαμπρὰ 
βλέπειν, [28] οὐδὲν βλέπει κἂν ἄλλος δεικνύῃ παρὸν τὸ ὁραθῆναι [29] δυνάμενον. Τὸ γὰρ ὁρῶν πρὸς τὸ 
ὁρώμενον συγγενὲς καὶ ὅμοιον [30] ποιησάμενον δεῖ ἐπιβάλλειν τῇ θέᾳ. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν πώποτε [31] εἶδεν 
ὀφθαλμὸς ἥλιον ἡλιοειδὴς μὴ γεγενημένος, οὐδὲ τὸ [32] καλὸν ἂν ἴδοι ψυχὴ μὴ καλὴ γενομένη. Γενέσθω 
δὴ [33] πρῶτον θεοειδὴς πᾶς καὶ καλὸς πᾶς, εἰ μέλλει θεάσασθαι θεόν [34] τε καὶ καλόν. The translation 
is ARMSTRONG’s, minimally modified. 
 
66
 Possible antecedents of the idea conveyed by the Principle of As-similation in Plotinus can be found in 
the Presocratics, for example Parmenides (I take the initiation motif in the poem on nature to express this 
idea, e.g. at DK 28.B1.3, 22–32 = Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians VII.111), Empedocles 
(DK 31.B109 = Aristotle, De anima I.404b8–15), Philolaus (DK 44.A29 = Sextus Empiricus, Against the 
Mathematicians VII.92), and Democritus (DK 68.B164 = Galen, Definitiones medicae 439, XIX.449); in 
Plato (see all the references given in Chapter One note 263 and in note 62 above; cf. also Republic 
VI.508b9–10, VII.516a5–b2, 518a1–b2) and in Aristotle (see note 64 above; cf. also Nicomachean Ethics 
I.1094b11–14, 23–27); and if we are to trust Augustine’s account in Contra Academicos (see especially 
II.14–15, 24, III.37–43), the true reason of Academic skepticism was that of keeping the truth from as yet 
unpurified (i.e., unattuned) souls. Possible “echoes” of the principle may be heard through the history of 
philosophy after Plotinus in as different authors and contexts as Augustine’s insistence on purification 
  
322 
example, the principle can be found to be true also of the Aristotelian approach to the 
First Mover, which, as I already have mentioned several times, moves ὡς ἐρώμενον, by 
being loved (Metaphysics XII.1072b3). In fact, the kind of individual soul that can come 
lovingly to contemplate the divine Mover of Metaphysics XII, which I take to be identical 
with the highest object of contemplation (θεωρία) described in chapters 6–8 of the last 
book of the Nicomachean Ethics, is a rational one. Non-rational souls, and even rational 
souls that fail to actualize their rational power (which for Aristotle coincides “with the 
man himself”: Nicomachean Ethics IX.1166a16–17; see also 1168b35–1169a3; cf, 
Chapter Three note 256), are incapable of contemplation. That is, non-rational souls and 
souls which do not make an effort to become attuned to such an “object” will inevitably 
fail to contemplate it. From this perspective, the whole of the Ethics could be read as a 
journey of purification leading to happiness primarily conceived of as the contemplation 
of the object which in Aristotle’s view is most worth contemplating. 
Now, since this object for Aristotle is thought thinking itself (νοήσεως νόησις: 
Metaphysics XII.1074b34–35), Aristotelian contemplation will be essentially noetic in 
nature. For Plotinus it is otherwise, since the One, rather than thinking, is “beloved and 
                                                                                                                                                 
(e.g., Contra Academicos II.17, De ordine II.50–51, Soliloquia I.24–26, De quantitate animae 30.61, 
33.73–75, De doctrina Christiana I.10, De Trinitate I.3–4, 28, IV.24) and Husserl’s principle of all 
principles (Ideen I, §24 = Husserl 1982, 44). One can also read significant portions of two recent books 
in the fields of ethics and the philosophy of religion as possible variations of the assimilation theme. The 
first book, by Peperzak (2004, 98–120), is broader in scope and phenomenological in character. 
Explicitly recalling the names of Parmenides, Empedocles, and Plato, Peperzak establishes the concept of 
“correspondence” (which I here take to be analogous to that of assimilation) as the key to properly 
attuning one’s desires to what is truly desirable. The second “variation” is by Moser (2008, 83–143, 
especially 113–123); it is cast in the analytic style of practicing philosophy and its scope is more 
narrowly focused on the question of the available evidence for the Judeo-Christian God. In brief, Moser 
suggests that in order to grasp the plausibility of the evidence that is presented to us, we must first 
become attuned to this evidence. For some marginal remarks on an aspect of Moser’s thesis which he 
develops in a later book (i.e., Moser 2010) and which I find problematic, see Appendix E.7. 
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love and love of itself” (VI.8 [39] 15.1; see Subsection 3.3.1). It follows that if the 
soul wishes to attune itself to the One, it is not sufficient for it to reach the level of Nous, 
but it must become love, and love of an infinite kind, since the object itself is both 
infinite love and infinitely lovable.
67
 Moreover, as I already hinted in the previous 
paragraph, it would seem fair to infer that for Aristotle non-rational beings are absolutely 
cut off from enjoying the contemplation of the First Mover, since its intellectual nature 
makes the Mover completely unavailable to beings that do not have a share in the same 
nature. The situation is different in the case of Plotinus’ contemplation of the One, for 
what is required, minimally but also most of all, in order to have some access to the One 
is a bare and most basic desire of the Principle as that which bestows on each thing its 
unity (which in this context is identical with the thing’s being and eros). But since the 
Source is, negatively, other than Nous and, positively, both love and most lovable, it will 
not in principle be closed off to the love directed to it from non-rational beings; instead, it 
will allow to be partially approached in love also by beings that have no active share in 
intellection.
68
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 It is this idea, I maintain, that may be at the basis of the view, developed particularly in the Middle Ages, 
according to which the human soul is “capax infiniti” (e.g., Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super Sententiis 
II.d34.q1.a5.arg2), or “capax” Dei (e.g., Augustine, De Trinitate XIV.11: “capax eius [i.e., “Dei”]; cf. 
also XIII.8.11; XIV.4.6: “summae naturae capax”; XIV.12.15; contrast Augustine, Confessions IX.28. 
See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae III.q4.a1.ad2; De veritate q22.a2.ad5), with the important 
difference that for these authors, due to the debilitating effects of the Fall, divine Grace is needed as a 
gratuitous power superadded to human nature in order to restore that capacity in the human being (e.g., 
Augustine, De quantitate animae 38.34–35, Confessions VII.26, De Trinitate XV.14, De civitate Dei 
XV.21, XXII.22, De correptione et gratia 2.3; Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I–II.q109.co, and cf. 
also I–II.q113.a10.co2). For Plotinus, by contrast, effort suffices (cf. Epilogue note 9). 
 
68
 From the point of view of procession, or the derivation of all reality from the One, this translates in the 
Procline principle, later reformulated in the opening lines of the Liber de causis (1.1–2), that “[e]very 
cause both operates prior to its consequent and gives rise to a greater number of posterior terms” 
(Proclus, Elements of Theology 57, 54.23–24: Πᾶν αἴτιον καὶ πρὸ τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ ἐνεργεῖ καὶ μετ’ αὐτὸ 
πλειόνων ἐστὶν ὑποστατικόν). The difference between Proclus and Plotinus, I take it, is that in 
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Two critical observations on the idea of assimilation or attunement are in 
place before I turn to the second precondition of the Ascent. The first observation 
concerns the relation of love and knowledge (or intellection) as the soul becomes attuned 
to the One as universal final cause. I would like to emphasize that here it is not a matter 
of radically contrasting knowledge and love, as if the presence of the one would in 
principle imply the absence of the other, and vice versa.
69
 On the contrary, it is simply a 
question of understanding knowledge, both in its discursive and in its noetic form, as 
insufficient to relate to the One “correspondingly,” or as the specific “nature” of the 
desideratum requires.
70
 Thus, in the journey of return to the One, or the Ascent, it is 
                                                                                                                                                 
proposition 57 of the Elements of Theology Proclus goes on to attribute privations of Forms (αἱ στερήσεις 
τῶν εἰδῶν: 57, 56.16) directly to the One, thereby denying that resistance to Form is to be found in lower 
matter and indirectly supporting the idea that this matter, too, is derived from, and participates in the 
One. Plotinus, by contrast, at times not only tends to attribute to matter “an active power of resistance,” 
as Dodds puts it in his commentary to proposition 57 of Proclus’ Elements of Theology (Dodds 1963, 
231), but as we saw earlier he identifies matter with evil itself in treatise I.8 [51], thus making its 
derivation from the One at least problematic (see Subsection 3.4.3 above, especially pages 279–283). 
Therefore, I think it can be safely granted that for Plotinus beings that participate in Form but not in 
intellectual activity (e.g., beasts, plants, and rocks) are still endowed with a desire for the One that 
partially bypasses Nous, so to speak (partially, that is, because Form is still provided to these beings by 
soul on the basis of Nous, at least proximately: see pages 246–250 above). However, due to the 
ambiguous status of lower matter in Plotinian metaphysics (i.e., the likely aporia of which I speak in 
Subsection 3.4.3), it is not completely clear to me that one can easily maintain that the One is both the 
efficient and the final cause of lower matter. Put differently, I think that it remains at least problematic 
how in Plotinus lower matter, the principle of evil, could both derive from the One and desire the One. 
 
69
 In fact, I not only believe that such a stark incompatibility can hardly be attributed to Plotinus, but that as 
such this alleged incompatibility is essentially counterproductive, both speculatively and practically, and 
a misinterpretation of the matter at hand. 
 
70
 We may wonder whether the One is the only desideratum which, in order to be approached 
correspondingly, must be primarily loved rather than (merely) known; in fact, we can even ask whether 
the One is the only desideratum that ought to be loved with a love of an infinite kind in order to be loved 
correspondingly. Emmanuel Levinas’ reflection on the other human being, or simply the Other (Autrui), 
is a brilliant example of a thought in which a desire (Désir) of a very particular kind (i.e., very generally, 
one which in contrast to need—besoin—grows rather than decreases, as it approaches its desideratum) is 
required in order to relate to the Other qua Other (see especially Levinas 1969, 33–35, 114–117, 179–
180; 1993, 82–84, 112–115). Like Plotinus’ One, Levinas’ Other (as well as his God) is never present to 
consciousness as an object, but only as a trace: signified, not forced into presence (Levinas 1987, 65–66, 
102–107, especially 105, where Plotinus V.5 [32] 5.4–7, 12–14 is cited; the articles by Levinas that I am 
referring to are Phenomenon and Enigma and Meaning and Sense). However, from Plotinus’ perspective 
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essential that the soul come cognitively to discover the One as both the Principle and 
the End; but the “discovery,” no matter how important, by itself is strictly insufficient. 
What really matters is that with this discovery the soul becomes willing to be transformed 
through a process of attunement to that which it came to discover as its proper 
desideratum. If this attunement does not occur, all knowledge remains vain. We should 
therefore admit that knowledge is a crucial aspect or even a necessary condition of love 
(in the sense that it would be hard to imagine a love that knows, or even merely divines, 
if only metaphorically, as in the case of a plant or a rock, absolutely nothing about its 
beloved), but also that it is neither the whole of love nor the most important aspect of it. 
According to Plotinus, through reasoning (λόγος) it is possible to make this love explicit 
(cf. VI.7 [38] 33.11–13), but this operation brings the nature of love into focus without 
actually replacing love as the proper attitude to relate correspondingly to the One. Thus, 
for Plotinus knowledge is an essential element in the process of shedding light on the 
nature of love, but it is not a substitute for love, nor an overcoming of love, whose 
priority over knowledge never seems to be put into question. 
In order to grasp the nature of this priority in the context of the Ascent, one need 
only think of how utterly pointless knowledge would be in the Ascent if love were ever to 
                                                                                                                                                 
as I have interpreted it in Section 4.2, Levinas’ position remains problematic in the sense that although 
the Other is conceived of as the truly originary origin of both the desire for the Other in me and of my 
possibility of becoming a subject in substitution (see Levinas 1981, 99–102, 113–118, 126–127), it 
cannot be understood as ἀρχή in the absolute sense (e.g., the Other is not the origin—and sustainer—of 
my existence nor, for that matter of the existence of other beings. I am not sure about the extent to which 
this would apply to Levinas’ understanding of God). A somewhat similar point can be made about Kant’s 
notion of the human person as an end in itself (Zweck an sich selbst) highlighted in the third formulation 
of the categorical imperative (Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals IV, 427–429): never a 
means to a further end, the human person nevertheless cannot be conceived of as ἀρχή in the absolute 
sense intended by Plotinus. 
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be missing, and of how superfluous knowledge becomes once the individual soul has 
managed to reach the end of the return journey and to love the One correspondingly.
71
 
But love has priority over knowledge also in the sense that without it knowledge itself 
remains impeded. Consider the ordinary inability of someone whose love is not purified 
to think of the Ascent as something other than fancy. What I have in mind is not the case 
of the eros of plants and lower animals, whose connatural directedness toward the Good 
remains unreflectively obscure; in this case the very knowledge of what is truly worth 
loving is naturally impossible. What I am referring to is rather the condition of unpurified 
rational souls, in which the connatural erotic directedness toward the Good is resisted due 
to their attachment to lower goods; in this case a proper knowledge of what is truly worth 
loving remains hindered, and the soul cannot quite understand (or cannot help 
misunderstand) what is missing in the goods it is after. Plotinus seems to go as far as to 
saying that a full grasp of love’s nature is given only to those who have had an actual 
experience of the Good, as when he writes: “Anyone who has seen it [viz., the Good] 
knows what I mean when I say that it is beautiful.”72 In the present context this means: 
only the one who has experienced the beauty of the Good in love can understand. Thus, 
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 In fact, it remains arguable whether intellectual activity is desirable at all by itself, without the love of the 
truth(s) grasped in it and the joy connected to their attainment (cf. Damascius, commenting on Plato’s 
Philebus 21d6–e4, in his Lectures on Plato’s Philebus 86–88, and the copious references given by 
Westerink (1959, ad loc.), including Plotinus IV.3 [27] 26 and IV.6 [41] 2). Of course, this love and joy 
may be understood as essentially belonging to the true intellectual activity proper to Nous (cf. my 
remarks on the pleasure of Intellect at pages 299–301 above); if so, intellectual activity already means 
more than it does in the ordinary sense. 
 
72
 I.6 [1] 7.2–3: [2] Εἴ τις οὖν εἶδεν αὐτό, οἶδεν ὃ λέγω, ὅπως [3] καλόν. Compare VI.9 [9] 9.46–47: [46] 
Ὅστις δὲ εἶδεν, οἶδεν [47] ὃ λέγω... Cf. Pausanias, Description of Greece I.37.4–5. As ARMSTRONG 
points out in his note to VI.9 [9] 9.46–47, the phrase was probably used “by a mystery-initiate when 
addressing others to avoid divulging secrets” (ARMSTRONG VII, 338 note 1). See also VI.7 [38] 40.1–2, 
VI.9 [9] 4.15–35; cf. note 117 below. 
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for Plotinus love is not only prior to knowledge in the sense that in union knowledge 
is superseded while love remains (on which see Subsection 4.6.3), but also in the sense 
that knowledge is possible at all only on the basis of the experience of love. Further still, 
this priority does not imply that love makes knowledge possible as a means to an end. On 
the contrary, love is both the ground of knowledge and the end of knowledge: I can know 
something about the One because I first love it, and I know what I know of it in order to 
love it better. In other words, if the One is known at all, it is known only because it is 
loved and in order to be loved further.
73
 
Thus, it seems fair to say that for Plotinus love is the proper attitude that any 
given being ought to assume in order to draw near to the One. However, although non-
rational beings can indeed love the One, they remain incapable of loving it 
correspondingly, that is, of loving it with an infinite kind of love eventually leading to 
union (cf. Subsection 4.6.3). But then in what sense is the One the highest desideratum or 
universal final cause if, after all, only that which has a share in rationality possesses the 
ability to desire and love it correspondingly? Briefly, in the sense that even those beings 
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 There is a likely parallel here between Plotinian knowledge (and, as we shall see in Subsection 4.6.1, 
Plotinian lower virtue) and the Christian theological virtues of faith and hope: both that knowledge and 
these virtues are superseded once the end is reached. There also seems to be a difference, however: while 
Plotinian union appears to take place as a love in which knowledge is, rather than absent tout-court, 
fundamentally superseded (since knowledge implies multiplicity, thus essentially antagonizing the 
simplicity of union), in the Christian eschaton—or at least in a version of it which owes much to Plotinus 
and Platonism, such as that of Augustine—love alone survives faith and hope but at the same time it is 
supplemented by vision (visio, videre) (see for instance Augustine, De Trinitate I.17, 21, IV.24, VIII.8, 
XIII.3, XV.44, De civitate Dei XXII.29, De doctrina Christiana I.42–44). The main Biblical passage 
underlying most of these references are 1John 3:2 (Ἀγαπητοί, νῦν τέκνα θεοῦ ἐσμέν, καὶ οὔπω 
ἐφανερώθη τί ἐσόμεθα. οἴδαμεν ὅτι ἐὰν φανερωθῇ ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ ἐσόμεθα, ὅτι ὀψόμεθα αὐτὸν καθώς 
ἐστιν) and especially 1Corinthians 13:12 (βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι δι’ ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι, τότε δὲ 
πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον· ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους, τότε δὲ ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην). In 
this context, vision figures as an analogue of knowledge and as the proper replacement or apt reward of 
faith and hope, which are thus conceived of as strictly pre-eschatological virtues. 
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which are not endowed with reason need the One in order to exist and depend on it 
for their subsistence. Therefore, even these beings desire the One in some way and can 
relate to it in love according to their capabilities.
74
 Thus, I suggest that in Plotinus the 
superlative ἐρασμιώτατον as referred to the One should be understood both extensively 
and intensively: extensively, in the sense that the One is the universal final cause, truly 
the beloved of all beings, and desired insofar as these beings would cease to exist if they 
completely lacked this desire; intensively, in the sense that only the One can be loved 
with an infinite love, although not all beings are capable of so loving it. I will return to 
this in Subsection 4.4.1.  
My second observation concerns the formless nature of the One. This 
formlessness applies to the One qua Principle of all in the perspective of derivation as 
much as it does to the One qua End of all in the perspective of the Ascent. An argument 
supporting this conclusion can be found in chapters 32–33 of treatise VI.7 [38] How the 
multitude of the Forms came into being, and on the Good. We already saw that for 
Plotinus the One, in order to be the Principle of all, ought to be formless on the ground of 
the Principle of Superiority of Cause to Effect (cf. pages 216–218). In other words, since 
one of the universal features of derived reality is form (with the exceptions of both 
intelligible and lower matter: cf. pages 224–227 and Subsection 3.4.3), and since the One 
gives what it does not have (cf. Subsection 3.3.2), the Principle itself must be formless 
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 On the One as both the giver and sustainer of existence see Chapter Three notes 46, 47, and 52. On the 
ability of all things to participate in the One (and to love it), but in accordance with their natural 
capability, see note 112 below. 
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(cf. VI.7 [38] 32.4–24).75 Now, this is also true of the One conceived of as the 
universal final cause; Plotinus makes this point in the passage where we find the second 
occurrence of the superlative ἐρασμιώτατον, VI.7 [38] 33.7–16:76 
[7] When the Intellect [8] thinks one particular thing, it is diminished, as it 
is also even if it takes together all things that are in [9] the intelligible 
realm; if it thinks an individual thing, it has one intelligible form; if it [10] 
thinks all together it has a kind of variegated form, still in need: it must 
contemplate [11] that which is beyond the all-beautiful both variegated 
and not variegated;
77
 that which [12] the soul desires without saying why 
it longs for something like this, but our [13] reasoning says that this is the 
real thing, since the nature of the best [14] and the nature of the most 
lovable is in the altogether formless. Therefore, whatever [15] you bring 
into form and show to the soul, this seeks something else over it [16] 
which gave it form. 
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 The formlessness of the One can be explained in terms of hypostatic generation: it is the simple infinite, 
the limitless and formless power from which Nous emerges, first as intelligible matter and then as the 
realm of the unified totality of Forms (cf. Subsection 3.4.1). But unlike the formlessness of lower matter, 
the formlessness of the Principle is one that imparts form on all reality while itself remaining beyond 
form, or, in the language of “measure” (μέτρον) which Plotinus borrows from Plato’s Philebus, the One 
is the measuring measure, that is, that measure which itself is not measured by another measure (see 
Plato, Philebus 64d9–e7, 66ba4–8; on the association of the Good with measure see also Plato, 
Statesman 284a5–e8, Protagoras 356c4–357e8, Laws IV.716c1–d4; cf. particularly Aristotle, Politicus, 
fragment 2 = Syrianus, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 168.33–35). In the Enneads see 
particularly V.5 [32] 4.13–14, where it is said that the One is “measure, and not that which is measured” 
(μέτρον γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ οὐ μετρούμενον); at I.8 [51] 2.5, that it is the “measure and limit of all things” 
(μέτρον πάντων καὶ πέρας); and finally, at VI.8 [39] 18.3, that it is the “encompassment and measure of 
all things” (περίληψις πάντων καὶ μέτρον); cf. also I.6 [1] 9.21–22. The relation of all things to the One 
as their measure which is itself beyond measure is precisely what distinguishes the unmeasuredness of 
the One from the formlessness (ἀμορφία), indetermination (ἀοριστία), unmesuredness (ἀμετρία), or 
unlimitedness (ἀπειρία) of lower matter (cf. Chapter Three notes 329 and 330 for references). For a later 
interpretation of the Principle (or God) in terms of measure (modus, mensura), see Augustine, De natura 
boni 3 and 22 (cf. Reale 2001, 62–68, to which I owe most of the references in this note), De Genesi ad 
litteram I.26 and IV.8. 
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 VI.7 [38] 33.7–16: [7] Ἐπειδὴ ὁ νοῦς [8] ἴδιόν τι νοεῖ, ἠλάττωται, κἂν ὁμοῦ πάντα λάβῃ ὅσα ἐν [9] τῷ 
νοητῷ· κἂν ἕκαστον, μίαν μορφὴν νοητὴν ἔχει· ὁμοῦ δὲ [10] πάντα οἷον ποικίλην τινά, ἔτι ἐν δεήσει, 
οἷον δεῖ θεάσασθαι [11] ὂν ὑπὲρ ἐκεῖνο τὸ πάγκαλον καὶ ποικίλον, καὶ οὐ ποικίλον οὗ [12] ὀρέγεται μὲν 
ψυχὴ οὐ λέγουσα διὰ τί τοιοῦτον ποθεῖ, ὁ δὲ [13] λόγος λέγει, ὅτι τοῦτο τὸ ὄντως, εἴπερ ἐν τῷ πάντη 
ἀνειδέῳ [14] ἡ τοῦ ἀρίστου φύσις καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐρασμιωτάτου. Διὸ ὅ τι [15] ἂν εἰς εἶδος ἀνάγων τῇ ψυχῇ 
δεικνύῃς, ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἄλλο τὸ [16] μορφῶσαν ζητεῖ. The translation is by ARMSTRONG, slightly modified. 
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 The “all-beautiful both variegated and not variegated” (VI.7 [38] 33.11) is Nous, in which identity and 
difference come together (cf. VI.7 [38] 13). 
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In the broader context of this passage (i.e., chapters 32–33 of treatise VI.7 
[38]), we see resurface the Platonic theme of the intrinsic association of the Good and 
Beauty as the proper intentional objects of eros (see Plato, Symposium 204c7–206a13; cf. 
Subsection 1.4.3). Plotinus explains this association through a detour into the formless, 
but in order to understand what he has in mind we must first grasp what he means by the 
terms “form” (μορφή or εἶδος, here used synonymously: cf. VI.7 [38] 33.30–38) and 
“Beauty” (κάλλος) in this context. As Hadot rightly remarks, each of these terms is used 
in two different senses.
78
 (i) Form in the ordinary sense is what by being superimposed 
on matter makes matter beautiful; as such, that which has form has it as received from 
elsewhere. But (ii) form in a stricter sense is what not merely has form, but what itself is 
form, namely Intellect. For this reason Nous is said to be both formless (in the sense that 
it does not have form as received from something else which is form) and form (in the 
sense that it itself is form) (cf. VI.7 [38] 32.35–33.7). The same applies to Beauty, which 
in the second or stricter acceptation refers not so much to one among the Ideas, as to the 
entire noetic realm. 
Now, precisely qua form and Beauty in the second or stricter meaning, the 
hypostasis Nous is already a de-limitation of that boundless and formless power from 
which it springs. But this means that even Nous is formed form, yet not because like 
everything else it receives form from something else which is form, but because it derives 
it from that which is itself formless; or, in the language of measure (μέτρον) which I 
indicated in note 75 above, Nous owes its measure to a measure beyond measure or itself 
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 Hadot (1998, 332–336). 
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unmeasured, namely the formless One (see VI.7 [38] 33.16–19). As we saw in 
Subsection 3.4.1, Nous constitutes itself as a full hypostasis in reverting upon itself and 
toward its generator; by contemplating and trying to replicate the perfect simplicity of the 
One in itself, Nous in its incipient states (i.e., Loving Nous) becomes the hypostasis Nous 
proper (i.e., Thinking Nous).
79
 Therefore, the One is also called Beauty, but in an even 
more peculiar expression: it is not Beauty, but Beauty beyond Beauty,
80
 and as such it is 
the ultimate object of eros.
81
 For although the soul in love is initially attracted by that 
which is informed by form (i.e., all beautiful things informed by Nous qua Beauty) and 
successively by that which itself is form (i.e., Nous), ultimately its connatural erotic 
movement directs it toward that which gives form while itself remaining formless (i.e., 
the One). 
Here the formless nature of the One qua ἐρασμιώτατον also lends itself to be 
taken as a further reason for the priority of love over knowledge. What has form (or, as 
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 It follows that in the context of Plotinus’ metaphysics of derivation, the form and formlessness of Nous 
should also be understood as referring to the two states or stages of the second hypostasis: Loving or Pre-
noetic Intellect (i.e., intelligible matter) and Thinking Intellect respectively (see pages 224–229 above; cf. 
Hadot 1998, 332). 
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 See VI.7 [38] 32.29: κάλλος ὑπὲρ κάλλος; cf. also 33.11; in the specific expression “Beauty beyond 
Beauty,” the subject of the expression is Beauty as identical with the Good (for further references see 
Chapter Two note 47). Compare Plato, Republic VI.509a6–7, where the Good is called “an inconceivable 
beauty” (ἀμήχανον κάλλος), and provides knowledge and truth while being superior in beauty to both (εἰ 
ἐπιστήμην μὲν καὶ ἀλήθειαν παρέχει, αὐτὸ δ’ ὑπὲρ ταῦτα κάλλει). It may be also on the basis of these 
references from Plato that Plotinus identifies the Good of the Republic with the Beauty of the Symposium 
(see VI.7 [38] 40.26–28; cf. Hadot 1988, 336). 
 
81
 This understanding of Beauty will receive a more scholastic formulation in post-Plotinian metaphysics, 
for instance in Iamblichus (Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, fragment 54.6–7; cf. also 50.21–22) and 
Proclus (Elements of Theology 23–24; cf. also 53), for whom every order of reality is subject to a 
threefold classification: (i) unparticipated (τὸ ἀμέθεκτον; i.e., in the case of Beauty, the Beauty beyond 
Beauty or formless Beauty of the One), (ii) participated (τὸ μετεχόμενος; i.e., the Beauty of Nous, or 
form, in which all beautiful things share), and (iii) participating (τὸ μετέχον, τὸ κατὰ μέθεξιν; i.e., the 
beautiful things having a share in the Beauty of Nous). For comments on this point see Dillon (1973, 33, 
335–336); cf. IGAL (III. 470–471 note 81). 
 
  
332 
we pointed out more precisely, that which is form, namely Nous) can certainly be 
known, and perfect knowledge (νόησις) is the proper way of relating to it, in the sense 
that Nous itself neither exceeds nor falls short of such knowledge. (In fact, perfect 
knowledge takes place within Nous as the coincidence of knower and known object: see 
pages 231–232 above). But one may ask: Could we not relate to Nous through love? We 
certainly can insofar as Nous is desirable qua good, or qua ἀγαθοειδής. The question, 
however, is not whether Nous lends itself to be loved (for it does) but whether Intellect as 
such suffices to love (and this, it does not). Stated otherwise, love can be directed to Nous 
and find it lovable insofar as Nous is ἀγαθοειδής; but love will never find Intellect most 
lovable for one simple reason, namely because Intellect is identical with the realm of 
Form, while love is essentially (i.e., ultimately) directed toward the formless. 
One might insist: Why love the formless? Why does form not suffice to eros? 
Fundamentally, because love of all form, even love of that which is Form, is already 
essentially a limitation of love.
82
 In other words, love, in order to be infinite, must have 
an infinitely lovable object. More radically still, if it does not aim at that which is 
infinitely lovable, love itself is hardly love. That is, it is essential to the nature of love to 
seek what is infinitely lovable, not only because that which is infinitely lovable, in order 
to be loved correspondingly, must be loved infinitely, but also because love itself, in 
order to be truly love, must be directed to something that is infinitely lovable. These 
aspects of the problem, to be sure, are the two sides of the same coin, and the Principle of 
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 Hadot (1998, 331) aptly writes: “C’est parce que le Bien est sans form, sans mesure, sans limite, que 
l’amour est lui-même sans mesure et sans limite. L’infinité n’apparaît pas ici comme imperfection qui 
résulterait de la passivité, de la privation inhérentes au désir, mais au contraire comme une énergie 
immense resultant de la force d’attraction infinie exercée par le Bien.”  
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As-similation refers as much to the transformation of the soul’s love, by which the 
soul becomes able to relate correspondingly to its infinitely lovable object, as it does to 
the soul’s discovery of the nature of the love which connaturally belongs to it (see pages 
117–119 and Subsection 4.4.3). Thus, if love seeks something beyond Nous, it is because 
Nous itself does not suffice as the proper object of love (and if the totality of true Beings 
does not suffice for love, no thing will), or because by nature love aims at an object that 
is infinitely lovable. The infinite object of love cannot be lower matter, which in its utter 
indetermination is found to be, not the formless which gives form (VI.7 [38] 32.15–16), 
but that which by itself remains forever formless (on the knotty issue of the participation 
of lower matter in form, see Chapter Three note 352). Therefore, in Plotinus’ scheme this 
object can only be the One defined as infinite erotic δύναμις, an infinite power which as 
such, in turn, can be approached correspondingly not merely through love, but through a 
love that must itself be infinite. At this point, this conclusion should not come as a 
surprise, since as I suggested in Subsection 3.3.2 and further argued in Section 4.2, for 
Plotinus eros for the One qua infinite erotic δύναμις is the very “gift” of the Principle of 
all whereby the Principle comes to be qualified at the same time as the End of all.
83
 
4.3.2 Second Precondition of the Ascent: 
Affinity, or the Similarity between the Soul and the One 
The term “assimilation” in the sense used in the previous subsection implies a 
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 Is this circular reasoning? Without a doubt; but there is nothing wrong, in principle, with circles. In fact 
for Plotinus, once the One is explanatorily established as the necessary ἀρχή of all and, most importantly, 
of all eros, nothing less than a circle is required to account for the origin and nature of eros, for the erotic 
energy that springs from the One as the Principle of all is, circularly and simultaneously, the same energy 
that is directed to the One as the End of all. 
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movement, or a transformation toward that to which the soul becomes assimilated. 
But in order to become assimilated to something, the soul must already be of a certain 
nature such that the very possibility of assimilation is opened for it. Plotinus understands 
this possibility in terms of likeness or affinity between the two terms of the assimilation 
process. In other words, assimilation is possible only on the basis of a prior similarity 
between that which is undergoing the change and the terminus with which it is going to 
be assimilated. According to Plotinus, if one fails to grant the similarity between the two 
terms, assimilation remains impossible. The necessity of this similarity is understood as 
the fundamental factor that allows for some kind of contact between two given terms, and 
the field to which it applies is broader than that of the Ascent. In the present subsection I 
will refer to this necessity as the Principle of Affinity
84
 (again, capitalized according to 
the directions given in Chapter Three note 10). In the context of the soul’s erotic Ascent 
to the One, the wider applicability of the similarity between two given terms refers 
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 IGAL (I, 98–99) calls it “principio de ‘lo semejante por lo semejante’” (cf. II.4 [12] 10.3, VI.9 [9] 11.32). 
See the fourth chapter of Arnou (1967, especially 147–156), who uses this principle to explain the 
difficult question of the immanence and transcendence of the One with respect to all reality. As with the 
Principle of As-similation, also the idea expressed by the Principle of Affinity both predates Plotinus and 
is found after him. At De anima I.405b15, Aristotle attributes this principle loosely and collectively to his 
philosophical predecessors and there he states it briefly: γιγνώσκεσθαι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ (on the 
previous Bekker page, at De anima I.404b13–15, as well as at Metaphysics III.1000b5–9, the principle is 
associated to Empedocles: see DK 31.B109; but see also Philolaus, DK 44.A29, and Democritus, DK 
68.B164, all cited earlier in note 66); to limit my references to Aristotle to De anima, cf. also I.409b26–
27, 410a24–25, III.427a27–28. As expected, there is frequent mention of the principle in several contexts 
also in Plato, if not explicitly and formally (cf. Laws IV.716c2–3), at least implicitly, for instance at Lysis 
214a6 (= Homer, Odyssey XVII.218) and passim, Republic VI.490b4–5, X.611e2–3, and the references 
in Chapter One note 149; the principle is also assumed in Timaeus 37a2–c5 (cf. also 45b2–46c6), as 
Aristotle indicates at De anima I.404b17–18. Still prior to Plotinus, see also Corpus Hermeticum 
XI.20.12–13, while possible occurrences of the principle after Plotinus include: Porphyry, Sententieae 
XXV, 15.4–6; Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides VI.1081.4–6, Commentary on Plato’s 
Timaeus II, 208.8–9. It can be argued that Augustine’s frequently repeated idea that we may get a 
glimpse of the mystery of the Trinity by appealing to “trinities” found in the human soul (animus) or 
mind (mens) might be inspired, in part, by the Principle of Affinity he found in his reading of the 
Platonists (e.g., Augustine, De Trinitate IX.2–8, X.9–18, XI.18, XIV.4–5, Confessions XIII.12, 19, De 
civitate Dei XI.25). 
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specifically to the affinity between the soul qua lover and the One qua ultimate 
beloved (or the presence of the One in the soul) as a precondition of the Ascent.
85
 
Plotinus points us to the Principle of Affinity as he draws some conclusions about 
the mythical figure of Eros at III.5 [50] 9.44–45: “for certainly that which is without a 
share in the Good would not seek the Good.”86Among the several passages in which the 
principle is expressed, one in particular stands out, III.8 [30] 9.19–24. The translation of 
this text reads:
87
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 The kinship of soul to superior reality is often expressed in the same jargon of similarity and affinity 
already indicated in note 62 above in the context of assimilation. See for example I.6 [1] 6.17, V.1 [10] 
3.17, V.2 [11] 2.9 for οἰκεῖος; III.5 [50] 1.18 for οἰκειότης; III.5 [50] 1.25 for οἰκειόω; V.2 [11] 1.13–16 
for ὅμοιος (cf. also IV.3 [27] 6.27–30); V.1 [10] 2.44 for ὁμοειδής (cf. also IV.3 [27] 4.30); I.2 [19] 2.19, 
I.6 [1] 6.20 (a clear echo of Plato, Theaetetus 176b1 and Republic X.613b1), V.1 [10] 2.38 for ὁμοιόω; 
VI.9 [9] 4.27, 8.28 for ὁμοιότης (cf. also V.3 [49] 8.55); V.3 [49] 8.48 for ὁμοίωμα; IV.7 [2] 10.19 for 
ὁμοούσιος; III.5 [50] 1.18, 44, IV.7 [2] 10.19 for συγγένεια; I.2 [19] 2.24, 4.14, I.6 [1] 2.8, 6.15, III.5 
[50] 1.45, IV.7 [2] 10.1, V.1 [10] 1.35, V.3 [49] 6.26, VI.5 [23] 5.36 for συγγενής. See also Appendix C 
(2.a). Cf. Chapter One note 149 for further references in Plato. 
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 III.5 [50] 9.44–45: [44] οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ πάμπαν ἄμοιρον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ [45] τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄν ποτε ζητήσειεν. 
ARMSTRONG’s translation, slightly adapted. Compare Plato, Philebus 35b6–7: “Then, something in the 
one who is thirsty would have to possess quenching” ([6] Πληρώσεώς γ’ ἄρα πῄ τι τῶν τοῦ διψῶντος ἂν 
[7] ἐφάπτοιτο)—to possess (see LSJ, s.v. ἐφάπτω II.4) it qua desideratum, that is, but to possess it 
nonetheless (see pages 44–45 above). It is indicative that in the broader context of this passage from the 
Philebus (33c–36c) Plato makes desire depend on memory (Philebus 35b11–c1), but shows awareness of 
the case of “someone who is empty for the first time” (Philebus 35a6). In her comments to the text, Frede 
calls this a “negligible case” (Frede 1993, 37 note 1) and denies reference to ἀνάμνησις of a previous 
existence (Frede 1993, 35 note 1). The case may indeed be considered negligible and ἀνάμνησις of a 
former life does not appear to be an issue in the context of the Philebus, yet one cannot help wondering 
whether Plato is subtly suggesting the possibility of a different context. Pascal also comes to mind: 
“Console-toi, tu ne me chercherais pas, si tu ne m’avais trouvé” (Pensées 736 [89], Brunschvicg 553 = 
Pascal 1954, 1313). 
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 III.8 [30] 9.19–24: [19] Καὶ γὰρ αὖ τῆς γνώσεως διὰ νοῦ τῶν [20] ἄλλων γινομένης καὶ τῷ νῷ νοῦν 
γινώσκειν δυναμένων [21] ὑπερβεβηκὸς τοῦτο τὴν νοῦ φύσιν τίνι ἂν ἁλίσκοιτο ἐπιβολῇ [22] ἀθρόᾳ; 
Πρὸς ὃν δεῖ σημῆναι, ὅπως οἷόν τε, τῷ ἐν [23] ἡμῖν ὁμοίῳ φήσομεν. Ἔστι γάρ τι καὶ παρ’ ἡμῖν αὐτοῦ· ἢ 
[24] οὐκ ἔστιν, ὅπου μὴ ἔστιν, οἷς ἐστι μετέχειν αὐτοῦ. The translation is from ARMSTRONG, with minor 
changes. Several versions or variations of what I called the Principle of Affinity can be found in the 
Enneads. In the following list, which is by no means exhaustive, each reference is followed by the field 
from which the principle is borrowed (or to which it is applied): I.8 [51] 1.7–9 (knowledge of evil), II.4 
[12] 10.3–4 and 13–17 (knowledge of matter), III.8 [30] 9.19–24, and VI.7 [38] 31.11–18 (contact with 
the One), IV.5 [29] 8.20–30 (sense perception), VI.1 [42] 28.21–25 (refutation of the Stoic notion of 
ὑποκείμενον), VI.9 [9] 4.25–30 (vision of the One), VI.9 [9] 11.31–32 (union with the One). Proclus 
states the principle generally in the context of the procession and reversion of all reality to the One (see 
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[19] For, again, since knowledge of other things comes to us [20] from 
Intellect, and we are able to know Intellect by intellect, [21] by what sort 
of simple intuition could one grasp this which transcends the nature of 
Intellect? [22] We shall say to the person to whom we have to explain how 
this is possible, that it is by the [23] likeness in ourselves. For there is 
something of it in us too; or rather [24] there is nowhere where it is not, in 
the things that can participate in it. 
 
Lines 20–21 of this passage clearly indicate that we can know Intellect only 
through intellect, but since the One transcends Intellect (i.e., the realm of Form or true 
Being with which Plotinus identifies the οὐσία in the expression ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσία of 
Republic VI.509b9), something other than Intellect is needed in order to grasp it. In this 
passage, the modality by which the One may be “apprehended” is what Armstrong 
translates as “simple intuition” (ἐπιβολή ἀθρόα).88 For the moment let us simply notice 
that the necessity of something other than intellect is required in order to grasp the One 
                                                                                                                                                 
pages 364–367 below for a clarification of the term “reversion”): “All reversion is accomplished through 
a likeness [δι’ ὁμοιότητος] of the reverting terms to the goal of reversion” (Proclus, Elements of Theology 
32, 36.3–4). An antecedent of what I have called the Principle of Affinity is clearly hinted in Plato, 
Republic VI.490a8–b7, where the affinity is said of the soul with respect to the intelligibles, and the 
imagery is explicitly erotic. The text is worth citing in full: “[a8] Then may we not also fairly plead in his 
defense that the [9] real lover of learning naturally strives toward what is real [πρὸς τὸ ὂν πεφυκὼς εἴη 
ἁμιλλᾶσθαι ὅ γε ὄντως φιλομαθής], and does not [b1] linger among the many particular things which are 
objects of opinion [τοῖς δοξαζομένοις]? [2] Keen and unremitting in his love [τοῦ ἔρωτος], he will go on 
[3] till he touches that nature of each thing which is by itself with that part [4] of his soul which is suited 
to grasp it [πρὶν αὐτοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἑκάστου τῆς φύσεως ἅψασθαι ᾧ προσήκει ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι]. But it is 
suited to what it is akin [συγγενεῖ]. [5] Drawing near it and having intercourse with what is really real 
[μιγεὶς τῷ ὄντι ὄντως], begetting thought [6] and truth [νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν], he knows and truly lives and 
is nourished, and [7] thus, but not before, ceases from his travail [ὠδῖνος]” (the translation is by R. E. 
Allen 2006, slightly modified). 
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 LSJ, s.v. ἐπιβολή A.2.b: “act of direct apprehension.” The expression ἐπιβολή ἀθρόα (see also προσβολή 
ἀθρόα at V.5 [32] 7.8) is not reserved to indicate the direct apprehension of the One as in III.8 [30] 9.21–
22 (at VI.7 [38] 35.21 without the adjective ἀθρόα). Plotinus uses it also to name the apprehension of 
Nous by soul (IV.4 [28] 1.20), the apprehension of time and eternity by soul (III.7 [45] 1.4: ἀθροωτέραις 
ἐπιβολαῖς), as well as the apprehension of objects of vision (II.8 [35] 1.40: ἀθρόως [...] ἡ ἐπιβολὴ). On its 
own, the term ἐπιβολή is variously employed to indicate the apprehension of all things in one’s self (IV.4 
[28] 2.12), the apprehension of matter (II.4 [12] 10.3, 5), and in the context of the self-apprehension of 
Nous (VI.3 [44] 18.12, VI.6 [34] 6.25, VI.7 [38] 39.2). Cf. also IV.4 [28] 8.6, IV.6 [41] 3.73, VI.2 [43] 
4.23, VI.6 [34] 9.14, VI.8 [39] 11.23. The term ἐπιβολή is part of the conceptual jargon of Hellenistic 
philosophy, typically in Epicureanism (cf. Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus 35 = EPICUREA 3.11–12: 
ἐπιβολή ἀθρόα. See Bailey 1926, 259–274). 
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and is justified by recourse to the Principle of Affinity. Our immediate purpose is to 
indicate what the element in us is which is akin to the One and by which we are capable 
of coming in contact with the One.  
As we already saw, for Plotinus the human being ultimately is identical with his 
or her soul (and within the soul, its best part: see Chapter Three note 256; cf. note 34 
above), which is incorporeal, preexists the body, and is immortal (see especially treatise 
IV.7 [2] On the immortality of the soul). We also saw that in its incarnate state, the 
human soul, analogously to the World-Soul, comprises two distinct levels: the superior 
(i.e., rational or intellective) and the inferior (i.e., sensitive, vegetative, and sub-
vegetative).
89
 Since for Plotinus soul qua soul (i.e., soul in its pure or unmixed state) is 
incorporeal, the several psychic functions or parts (i.e., the inferior level as a whole) are 
understood as something superadded to soul as this comes to interact with body. 
However, soul as such, or soul insofar as it is soul, independently of the body to which it 
has become attached, is ultimately identical with its higher level. 
To this bare sketch, we must now add an important element, which constitutes the 
key to understand the affinity of the human soul with higher realities in general and with 
the One in particular. This element is the presence of the higher hypostases in the 
individual human soul, a point with which I already dealt more extensively in Subsection 
3.2.4. There I remarked that the presence of higher realities in the human soul means 
precisely the ability of the latter to turn toward them and become assimilated with them. 
In the present context, this ability is grounded in the necessary affinity between the 
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 See the opening pages of Subsection 3.4.2 above. 
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individual soul and those realities. In other words, for the soul to be able to turn 
toward higher hypostases and become like them, a point of contact between the two terms 
is needed. This was already somewhat true for Plato, who insisted on the affinity between 
soul and Ideas (see Chapter One note 149).
90
 Plotinus explicitly radicalizes this Platonic 
insight: since what is ultimate (both as Principle and as End) is not the realm of Form 
(i.e., Nous) but the One, if we are to become assimilated to the One there ought to be 
something in us which is akin to it.
91
 Thus, for Plotinus our Ascent to the One truly 
begins as an introspective dynamic, when we become aware of our inner affinity with the 
universal goal of our eros.
92
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 As I argued in Chapter One (see particularly Subsection 1.5.1 and 1.5.2), the soul’s final grasp of the 
Good can only be hypernoetic. If I am correct in thinking this, it must be observed that unlike Plotinus, 
Plato did not feel the necessity to posit a supra-intellective element in the soul (cf. IGAL I, 98), although 
Plato’s own versions of the Principle of Affinity (see note 84 above) may be read as at least implicitly 
necessitating the postulation of such an element. 
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 How are we to understand this affinity? The question is somewhat tricky, for if the One cannot be the 
object of intellection, the same may hold for whatever is akin to it in the soul. If we understand the One 
minimally as the unqualifiedly simple, we might say that what in the soul is akin to it ought at least to be 
simple. As I will argue in Subsection 4.6.3, this simplicity consists of the soul’s ability to have its eros 
wholly, permanently, and unswervingly directed toward the One. 
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 On the importance of introspection for the Ascent, see I.6 [1] 5.5–19, and, most emphatically, the 
invitation at 9.7 of the same treatise: “Go back into yourself and look” (Ἄναγε ἐπὶ σαυτὸν καὶ ἴδε). At 
VI.5 [23] 1.16–21 Plotinus writes: “[16] but the ancient nature [ἀρχαία φύσις] and the desire [17] of the 
good, that is of itself [ἡ ὄρεξις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὅπερ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ], leads to what is really one [ἓν ὄντως], and 
[18] every nature presses on to this, to itself. For this is the [19] good to this one nature, belonging to 
itself and being itself [τὸ εἶναι αὐτῆς καὶ εἶναι αὐτήν]: [20] but this is being one [τὸ εἶναι μίαν]. It is in 
this sense that the good is rightly [21] said to be our own [οἰκεῖον]; therefore one must not seek it outside 
[ἔξω].” See also I.4 [46] 11.8 and 16–17, V.9 [5] 5.31 (cf. Heraclitus: DK 22.B101 = Plutarch, Adversus 
Coloten 20: Moralia XIV.1118c), VI.9 [9] 2.35–36, 3.20–21, 7.16–18, 9.38–40. On this count, as on 
several others, Plotinus is an essential link in the tradition which goes from the Pythian γνῶθι σαυτόν 
through Plato (see e.g. Seven Sages: DK 10.A2 = Plato, Charmides 164d4, e7, 165a4–5, Protagoras 
343b3; DK 10.A3.III.1, IV.9 = Stobaeus, Anthologion III, 1.172) to the Augustinian homo interior (see 
e.g. De vera religione 39.72; cf. also Contra Academicos III.42, De ordine II.30, Soliloquia II.1, 
Confessions V.2, X.3) and beyond. This tradition has been masterfully reconstructed by Pierre Courcelle 
(1974–1975, I). Thesleff (1980, 107–108, 113) is correct to emphasize the inward tendency of Plotinus’ 
thought; however, I believe he overstates his case when he plays it against the upward tendency implied 
by the idea of Ascent; a quick look at the references in the notes throughout Subsection 4.4.2 should 
suffice to support my point. 
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Three questions will occupy us in the remainder of this subsection. First, what 
reason(s) do we find in Plotinus to justify the plausibility of the Principle of Affinity (at 
least as it is referred to the affinity between the soul qua lover and the One qua universal 
final cause)? Second, what is the element in us that is akin to the One? And third, how or 
in what sense is this element akin to the One? 
The reason serving as the justification for the Principle of Affinity comprises two 
aspects, one that is negative and general, and another that is positive and particular. 
Negatively and generally, one will likely agree that a certain likeness between two given 
terms is necessary (if, that is, any “contact” between them is to be admitted) as soon as 
we think of what would happen when all similarity is denied. If two terms have 
absolutely nothing in common, all contact between them becomes impossible.
93
 
However, even if this were conceded generally as a matter of principle, one might still 
ask: Why should I admit that the kind of similarity we just conceded is at work between 
the soul and the One? That is, the Principle of Affinity (i.e., the necessity of a similarity 
between two terms, no matter how remote, as the basis for their “interaction”) may very 
well be true; but why should it be true of precisely these two terms, the soul and the One? 
The answer to this question is the positive and particular aspect of the justification of the 
Principle of Affinity. It is an answer that constitutes one of the fundamental cornerstones 
of Plotinus’ metaphysical edifice, namely the Principle of Likeness of Cause and Effect 
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 Let us remind ourselves that although the contact between two terms ordinarily implies some kind of 
change in both terms involved, in the case of the “contact” (see note 253 below for references) between 
the soul and the One it is only the soul that undergoes change—a change which is identical to the notion 
of assimilation which was introduced in the previous subsection. The One, on its part, remains 
completely unaffected. As we saw, this is already true of the process of derivation, where in generating, 
the One abides unchanged and does not get involved with derived reality (cf. also Chapter Three note 
185). See also my discussion of the Principle of Participation in Section 4.5 below. 
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(see page 219 above). 
In its core, this principle states that the cause communicates something of itself to 
the effect. A very general formulation of the Principle of Likeness of Cause and Effect is 
found at IV.3 [27] 10.34–35 in the context of the discussion of the soul’s communication 
of life and form to lifeless and formless matter: “and this is of course common to all that 
exists, to bring things to likeness with themselves.”94 What might appear problematic in 
the Principle of Likeness of Cause and Effect is that since in Plotinus’ universe there is 
only one source of all reality, the One, and since as it was argued in the previous chapter, 
this source is understood as a simple infinite erotic power, all reality should share in the 
same similarity with the Source. In the context of the Ascent, this means that absolutely 
everything should possess the ability to return to the One precisely on the basis of the 
similarity it bears with the Source. This is basically true, but in a highly qualified sense. 
First, as I shall argue more extensively in Subsection 4.4.1, it is only that which is of a 
certain nature and has enough strength (i.e., enough erotic power or, simply, enough eros) 
to turn or convert toward the Principle that can ascend to it.
95
 Secondly, even that which 
is capable of turning toward the Principle ought to leave behind lower commitments in 
order actually to ascend (this is, rephrased, the Principle of As-similation). Thus, every 
soul is in principle capable of reverting toward the One, but in order to do so, it ought to 
free or purify itself of everything that is foreign to its nature so as to find within itself that 
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 IV.3 [27] 10.34–35: [34] καὶ κοινὸν δὴ [35] τοῦτο παντὶ τῷ ὄντι εἰς ὁμοίωσιν ἑαυτῷ ἄγειν. 
 
95
 As I indicated in Subsection 3.4.3, lower matter as such or by itself (i.e., prior to its being fashioned into 
sensible matter, or body, by soul) is the terminus of the process of derivation, or the point at which all 
eros comes to a stall; as such, it remains incapable of turning toward the One. 
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“element” which is most similar to the One and identify with it completely. 
Now, what is the nature of this element? In order to answer this question we 
should return to a point on which I touch briefly at the beginning of my discussion of soul 
in the previous chapter (Subsection 3.4.2). There I spoke of the typically Plotinian 
doctrine concerning an undescended “part” of the soul which is permanently connected to 
higher hypostases, and to Nous in particular.
96
 Plotinus uses several expression to name 
the undescended soul: he calls it the sovereign part of the soul (V.3 [49] 3.37: τὸ κύριον 
τῆς ψυχῆς; IV.4 [28] 18.14–15: ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὸ κύριον; cf. IV.7 [2] 1.22: Τὸ δὲ 
κυριώτατον καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἄνθρωπος97), the primary part of the soul (I.6 [53] 8.6: ψυχῇ τῇ 
πρώτῃ), the most divine (part) of the soul (V.3 [49] 9.1: τὸ ψυχῆς θειότατον; cf. IV.3 [27] 
17.2: θειοτέρας; V.3 [49] 8.48: θεοειδῆ),98 the best (part) of the soul (V.3 [49] 4.13: τὸ 
τῆς ψυχῆς ἄμεινον; V.9 [5] 1.12: τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κρείττων; IV.8 [6] 1.3: τῆς κρείττονος 
μοίρας; cf. also IV.4 [28] 17.33–35), the best (part) of one’s nature (III.9 [13] 2.6, 7: τὸ 
τῆς φύσεως ἄριστον, τῷ ἀρίστῳ αὐτοῦ), the superior (part) of the soul (IV.8 [6] 8.4: τὸ 
                                                 
96
 See Chapter Three note 257 for references to the doctrine of an undescended part of soul in the Enneads. 
Later Neoplatonists will be divided on the issue; for instance, Theodorus of Asine will endorse it (so also 
Damascius, De principiis 400, II.254.3–7), while Iamblichus and Proclus will reject it (see Proclus, 
Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus III, 333.28–334.28; cf. also Elements of Theology 211); see further 
references in Dodds (1963, 309). For what concerns Plotinus, I think it is reasonable to see a connection 
between the concept of an undescended part of the soul permanently abiding in Nous and the 
controversial notion of Ideas or Forms of individuals, on which see Subsection 4.4.1 below. 
 
97
 See O’Daly (1973, 29). Cf. Chapter Three note 254. 
 
98
 The undescended (part of the) soul is very likely what Plotinus was referring to with the expression “τὸ 
ἐν ἡμῖν θεῖον” (accepting the reading of HS1 and Brisson et al. 1992, as against τὸν ἐν ὑμῖν θεὸν of HS2), 
which according to Porphyry’s report in VP 2.26–27 was part of the last words that the dying Plotinus 
uttered to Eustochius: “Try to bring back the divine in you to the divine in the All” (ARMSTRONG’S 
translation, modified to fit the reading I follow). Cf. D’Ancona Costa (2002). 
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τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνω99), the intellect of the soul (V.3 [49] 2.14: νοῦς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς), or 
intellect in us (V.1 [10] 11.6: νοῦν ἐν ἡμῖν; cf. also III.4 [15] 3.25: μένομεν τῷ μὲν ἄλλῳ 
παντὶ νοητῷ ἄνω), or the soul which is about Nous (at I.4 [46] 10.4: ἡ ψυχὴ περὶ αὐτὸν; 
100
 cf. V.3 [49] 8.49: νοοειδῆ). We can think of the undescended soul as of an ideal self of 
which we, in our embodied or empirical self, are aware only intermittently, if at all.
101
 
The intermediate goals of the work of the embodied individual soul in its process of 
ascent toward the One are, first, to become pure (καθαρά, ἀκήρατος) soul102 by leaving 
behind everything that hinders its assimilation to higher realities, and then to identify 
itself completely with its undescended part in Nous.
103
 
However, to stop at the general notion of an undescended soul permanently 
abiding in the noetic realm will not suffice as an answer to the question concerning the 
nature of our higher element, for as I mentioned in Section 4.2 and we will see in 
Subsection 4.6.3, the end of the Ascent is not Nous but the One. It follows that if 
assimilation to the One is to be possible, in keeping with the Principle of Affinity there 
ought to be something, either above the undescended soul or in it as its uppermost “part,” 
“element,” or “aspect,”104 which bears some resemblance not only to Nous, but to the 
                                                 
99
 This should not be confused with the superior or higher soul as referring to the Soul-Hypostasis (see 
Chapter Three note 240). 
 
100
 Cf. McGroarty (2006, 152). 
 
101
 See V.1 [10] 12.1–5; cf. also I.4 [46] 4.4–17, IV.3 [27] 8.11–17. 
 
102
 On pure soul: καθαρά (I.8 [51] 4.25–27, III.1 [3] 9.13, III.3 [48] 5.18, IV.3 [27] 9.11, IV.7 [2] 10.46, 
V.3 [49] 9.19); ἀκήρατος (III.5 [50] 2.21, 3.27). 
 
103
 On soul’s assimilation to Intellect, see I.6 [1] 6.13–18, V.3 [49] 4. On the purity of the intellectual 
activity in individual souls, see III.5 [50] 7.53–54, IV.4 [28] 2.24, V.3 [49] 3.21, 28. 
 
104
 As I already pointed out with regard to the process of derivation (Chapter Three note 5), so also in the 
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One itself; in Plotinus’ own words: “something of the One which the soul has within 
itself” (VI.7 [38] 31.8: ἐν αὐτῇ ἔχουσά τι αὐτοῦ) or “that which in us is similar to it” 
(III.8 [30] 9.22–23: τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν ὁμοίῳ), “the power in oneself akin to that which comes 
from the One” (VI.9 [9] 4.27–28: τῇ ἐν αὐτῷ δυνάμει συγγενεῖ τῷ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ), “the god 
who is in each one of us one and the same” (VI.5 [23] 1.3–4: τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν θεὸν 
ὡς ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτόν), or, simply, “what is akin to the One” (VI.9 [9] 8.29: τῷ συγγενεῖ). 
All these descriptions confirm Plotinus’ commitment to the Principle of Affinity, 
but tell us little about the nature of this finest element in us. Plotinus is somewhat more 
explicit in other passages. To begin, he designates this element with several expressions, 
all of which point at its privileged status in Plotinian psychology. For example, in the 
chapter following the passage cited earlier on page 336 Plotinus refers to it as “the inside 
of oneself” (ἐντὸς αὐτοῦ: III.8 [30] 10.33). More in keeping with the theme of the kinship 
of this element with the One, he describes it with some of the images already employed 
to talk about the One, such as “origin” (see Chapter Three note 9) and “center” (see note 
59 above, and Chapter Three note 78); thus, at VI.9 [9] 3.20–21 he calls this element “the 
origin in oneself” (τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρχὴν; cf. also VI.9 [9] 11.31–32), and at VI.9 [9] 8.19–
20 he speaks of it as “one’s center” (τὸ ἑαυτῶν κέντρον; see also VI.9 [9] 10.17, V.1 [10] 
11.10–14). Moreover, since this element of the soul can only be the best aspect of its best 
part, and the soul’s best part is its rational part, elsewhere Plotinus shifts his descriptive 
focus to its noetic dimension and calls this element “pure intellect” or “the primary part 
of intellect” (VI.9 [9] 3.26, 27: καθαρῷ τῷ νῷ, τοῦ νοῦ τῷ πρώτῳ). But such 
                                                                                                                                                 
present context all such terms as “above,” “in,” “beyond,” “level,” “part,” and so forth, are not to be 
understood spatially. 
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qualifications as “pure” and “primary” already point to the idea that the relation of 
our best element to the noetic realm implies a significant difference from Intellect. This 
difference consists not only of the fact that our best element, being an element of our 
intellect, is not strictly identical with the hypostasis Nous; what is more essential here is 
that the primary part of intellect implies at the same time a transcendence of the noetic 
altogether. In order to express this, Plotinus, as he habitually does when he speaks about 
the One (see Subsection 3.2.2), employs the language of both negation and 
transcendence. Thus, he refers to the best element of the rational part of the soul as “that 
of it which is not intellect” (V.5 [32] 8.22–23: τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μὴ νῷ), and “the origin, cause, 
and god of Intellect [...] in us” (V.1 [10] 11.6–7: ἐν ἡμῖν [...] τὴν νοῦ ἀρχὴν καὶ αἰτίαν καὶ 
θεόν).105 
But it is perhaps in the treatise On free will and the will of the One (VI.8 [39]) that 
we find the most extensive positive description of what from now on we may refer to as 
the center of the soul. Here is what Plotinus writes at VI.8 [39] 15.14–23:106 
                                                 
105
 One will notice that in all the references given in the last paragraph the best element of the 
(undescended) soul is described either in terms of negation or of transcendence. Far from being a 
problem for Plotinus, this simply points to the fact that the term of comparison of this highest element 
(i.e., the One) is itself ultimately ineffable (see Subsection 3.2.2). The similarity between the One and 
this highest element of the soul is not a purely verbal matter: the type of language used to describe these 
realities is due to their nature, or that factor which makes them similar and allows for the possibility of 
assimilation of the soul to the One. This nature, I maintain, can be positively, if tentatively, described in 
two ways: as unity and as love. Thus, the best aspect of the best element in us is where our eros is 
simplest (i.e., most focused). Here again Plotinus may be the indirect source of Augustine’s notion of the 
“acies mentis” (e.g., De Trinitate II.1, XI.11, XII.23, De Genesi ad litteram IV.25, De vera religione 3.4, 
De libero arbitrio II.36, Sermones 4.7, Enarrationes in Psalmos 150.1) or “acies animi” (De Trinitate 
II.1); cf. also the references in Chapter Two note 105 above. 
 
106
 VI.8 [39] 15.14–23: [14] εἴ ποτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνίδοιμέν τινα φύσιν τοιαύτην [15] οὐδὲν ἔχουσαν 
τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσα συνήρτηται ἡμῖν, καθὰ [16] πάσχειν ὅ τί περ ἂν συμβῇ [καὶ] κατὰ τύχην ὑπάρχει—[17] 
πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα, ὅσα ἡμῶν, δοῦλα κἀκκείμενα τύχαις [18] καὶ οἷον κατὰ τύχην προσελθόντα τούτῳ 
δὲ μόνῳ τὸ κύριον [19] αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον φωτὸς ἀγαθοειδοῦς καὶ ἀγαθοῦ [20] ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ 
μείζονος ἢ κατὰ νοῦν, οὐκ ἐπακτὸν τὸ ὑπὲρ [21] τὸ νοεῖν ἐχούσης· εἰς ὃ δὴ ἀναβάντες καὶ γενόμενοι 
τοῦτο [22] μόνον, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα ἀφέντες, τί ἂν εἴποιμεν αὐτὸ ἢ ὅτι πλέον [23] ἢ ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ πλέον ἢ 
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[14] if we ever see in ourselves a nature of this kind [15] which has nothing of 
the other things which are attached to us by which [16] we have to 
experience whatever happens by chance—[17] for all the other things 
which belong to us are enslaved to and exposed to chances [18] and come 
to us in a way by chance, but this alone has self-mastery [19] and self-
determination by the activity of a light that has the form of the Good
107
 
and is itself good, [20] and greater than that which belongs to Intellect, 
having its transcendence of Intellect [21] not as something brought in from 
the outside; surely, when we ascend to this and become this [22] alone and 
let the rest go,
108
 what can we say of it except that we are more [23] than 
free and more than self-determined? 
 
The context of the discussion is that of the freedom of the One, or rather, of its 
spontaneous self-positing in which freedom and necessity coincide (cf. pages 202–204 
and 189–191 above). What I believe can be safely inferred from this passage about the 
nature of the similarity between the One and the best element in us is that the affinity of 
these two poles should be understood in terms of self-determination (τὸ αὐτεξούσιον),109 
which for the soul follows directly from the activity (ἐνεργείᾳ) of its best element. This 
kind of self-determination is analogous to the freedom or spontaneous self-positing of the 
One, which I referred to as henologic freedom or necessity (see Chapter Three, page 190 
and note 161). As I observed there, what constitutes the essential feature of henologic 
freedom is the total absence of distance between what the One is and that which it 
desires: a complete identity justifying the description of the One as simultaneously 
beloved, love, and love of itself (VI.8 [29] 15.1). 
                                                                                                                                                 
αὐτεξούσιοι; The translation in the main text is by ARMSTRONG, with minor changes; the emphasis in the 
translation is mine. 
 
107
 See again Plato, Republic VI.509a3. 
 
108
 Cf. V.3 [49] 17.32–38, cited in note 268 below. 
 
109
 See Leroux (1990, 257–258) for some helpful comments on the meaning of the term αὐτεξούσιον. 
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Now, if the interpretation I just sketched in the previous paragraph is correct, 
the affinity between our best element and the One lies in the very possibility we have to 
identify ourselves with what is best in us, our ideal self. In this identification the gap 
between what we are (or what we have finally become) and what we desire has been 
reduced to a minimum;
110
 everything spurious has been left behind and does not 
determine our identity anymore, for we no longer desire it: we are no longer erotically 
committed to it. This identification of the soul with its finest element is a fundamental 
and unconditional “yes” that the soul says to what it has become. The soul is, in its purity, 
this “yes”: an eros gathered unto itself, no longer scattered into a multiplicity of (often 
competing) directions and trajectories, but fully focused on the One as that which, being 
most worthy of love, in the end is actually most loved (ἐρασμιώτατον). 
But in its embodied condition the soul is far from pure. Identification with its best 
element is real, but partial, and much needs to done if the soul is to reintegrate the eros 
invested into all its lower commitments in its one true nature. This work of reintegration 
is what I referred to as the Ascent, which will be the direct focus of the rest of this 
chapter. 
*            *            * 
In bringing this section to a close, let it be noticed that the second precondition of 
the Ascent (i.e., affinity between the One and soul) is prior to the first (i.e., assimilation 
of the soul to the One) only when we look at both conditions from the perspective of the 
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 I speak of “a minimum” rather than of “nothing” because I maintain that for Plotinus even one’s 
identification with one’s best element is still not an unqualified identification with the One (i.e., an 
annihilation of the individual soul). I will have the occasion to comment further on this point in 
Subsection 4.6.3 as I deal with the issue of the soul’s union with the One. 
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ascending soul. The priority becomes at least blurred, however, if we consider that the 
incipient stage of the generation of a lower hypostasis from a higher one is that in which 
the generated is not only most akin to its generator but also already most assimilated to it. 
Perhaps it will be better to say that affinity and assimilation are mutually implicating, for 
if on the one hand it is true that assimilation of a lower term to a higher one depends on a 
prior affinity between two terms, on the other, the affinity of the two terms is either de 
facto the most intense assimilation possible of the lower to the higher (e.g., of pre-
hypostatic noetic matter to the One, or again, of pre-hypostatic psychic matter to Nous; 
cf. Table 4 above), or else it is already for the sake of a more intense assimilation (thus, 
awareness of the affinity of the best element of a yet unpurified, or partially purified soul 
with higher realities already points to the task of perfecting its still partial assimilation to 
them). 
4.4 Three General Observations on the Ascent and Its Relation to Eros 
I will offer my account of the stages of the Ascent in Section 4.6. At this point, 
that account has already been prefaced by a clarification of the final destination of the 
ascent journey in Section 4.2 (i.e., the One as ἐρασμιώτατον or universal final cause), 
and, in the previous section, by an overview of the necessity of the assimilation of soul to 
the One (Subsection 4.3.1) and of the affinity of these two terms (4.3.2) as the 
reciprocally implicating preconditions of the Ascent. To all this I shall add the following: 
in this section, three general points about the Ascent and its relation to eros; in the next 
section, some remarks on four features that are common to all the stages of the Ascent. 
The material of the present section is so divided: first, some important observations about 
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what we might loosely call the “subject” of the Ascent, namely the individual rational 
soul of a human being (Subsection 4.4.1); second, a word on Plotinus’ terminology of 
ascent, including the clarification of the notion of flight or escape (φυγή) and of an 
ambiguity concerning the term ἐπιστροφή (4.4.2); and third, an observation about the 
difference between eros as one of the possible paths of the Ascent, and eros as the 
fundamental regulative concept of all movement of ascent toward the One (4.4.3). 
4.4.1 The “Subject” of the Ascent: The Individual Rational Soul 
(with Some General Remarks on the Issue of Forms of Individuals) 
Let us begin with the fundamental issue of the “subject” of the Ascent. So far, 
both in this chapter and in Chapter Two, I have been speaking generally of soul as that 
which ascends. This way of speaking needs to be made more precise. We can ask the 
question simply: Who or what ascends? That is, who or what undergoes the process of 
gradual transformation and assimilation to higher realities? Can a rock, an oak tree, or a 
trout ascend and thus be assimilated to the One? Or is the Ascent a prerogative of a 
human being? Can daimons and heroes ascend? And what about such higher realities as 
the World-Soul, the Soul-Hypostasis, and Nous: do they ascend? Does the whole of 
reality ultimately undergo a process of assimilation to its source, the One? I take it that 
Plotinus’ answer to these questions is unambiguous, but, as we shall see presently, not 
free of interpretive difficulties. This answer is that it is the human soul (by which I mean 
individual, or particular, rational soul belonging to a human being), and only the human 
soul, which is capable of Ascent.
111
 Neither what is below this kind of soul in the 
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 As Lloyd (1990, 123–124) argues, this answer applies not only to Plotinus, but to the Neoplatonic 
tradition as a whole. Ousager (2004, 33) cites I.3 [20] 1.1–18 as evidence of the fact that only human 
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metaphysical hierarchy (i.e., body and lower matter) nor what is above it (i.e., 
Intellect and, in a more qualified way, the World-Soul and the Soul-Hypostasis) do or can 
ascend. From this point on, when I use the expressions “soul,” “individual soul,” and 
“individual rational soul,” I will mean generally the soul of a human being. 
To my knowledge, Plotinus never offers an extensive and explicit statement of 
what I take to be his position on this issue and of the reasons undergirding it, but I believe 
that it is possible to infer that this is in fact his position from some of the main tenets of 
his metaphysics outlined in the previous chapter. In the first place, plants and lower 
animals, while undeniably alive (i.e., possessed by soul), are incapable to ascend simply 
because, despite being particular expressions of soul at the sensible level, they lack 
reason and with it, I surmise, the highest element of the soul with which to identify in 
order to ascend. In fact, we could say that to be a plant or a lower animal means to be 
fully identified with the lower functions or aspects that characterize embodied souls (i.e., 
vegetation and sensation). In the language of eros, for all we can tell, a plant and an 
animal do not possess that particular kind of eros which is βούλησις or rational desire,112 
                                                                                                                                                 
souls can ascend. This passage actually speaks of methods or practices of ascent for human souls but 
does not state explicitly that only human souls can ascend, although I believe it is reasonable to 
conjecture that this is what Plotinus has in mind. 
 
112
 See Chapter Two note 107; cf. also pages 74–77. This does not mean that plants and lower animals do 
not desire the One, since as I already pointed out, for Plotinus it is plain that all reality seeks it (see 
references in notes 4 and 5 above). However, they desire it in an unreflective manner at their proper level 
of existence (i.e., vegetative life for plants, and vegetative plus sensitive life for lower animals), without 
being capable of reflectively rising above this level. As Plotinus argues, everything seeks the One and 
tries to attain it as far as its natural capacity allows (II.9 [33] 2.4, 3.3, 9.50, VI.5 [23] 11.29–30, VI.2 [43] 
11.21, 27–32, VI.4 [22] 5.9–11, 8.38–40, 11.3–8, 15.1–6). That participation occurs in accordance with 
the ability of any given thing is true of all participation of lower in higher reality (e.g., of soul in Nous at 
I.8 [51] 2.20–21; of soul in the One at VI.7 [38] 31.7; of bodies in beauty through soul at I.6 [1] 6.30–32. 
Cf. also II.9 [33] 9.46–50, 75–79, III.2 [47] 1.1–12, 9.28–29, IV.8 [6] 6.16–20, V.3 [49] 7.3–4, V.4 [7] 
1.26, V.6 [24] 6.35). For a clear treatment of the Plotinian axiom that each thing receives whatever is 
capable of receiving (or that each thing participates in something according to its capability) see Pradeau 
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and thus their way of being lacks the projection toward the assimilation to higher 
realities which is proper of an individual rational soul. This is a fortiori true of lower 
matter, which by itself not only lacks any psychic function, but is also utterly devoid of 
all erotic power of reversion toward higher realities. 
The cases of the World-Soul and of the Soul-Hypostasis are different, since 
neither is descended, fallen, or otherwise inclined to identify itself with body (or with the 
activity of caring for the body): the latter, because it is thoroughly disembodied and never 
turned toward the sensible;
113
 the former, because while itself a particular embodied soul 
(cf. Chapter Two note 83), it remains in complete control of the body to which it is 
permanently united
114
 (see Chapter Three notes 287 and 348).
115
 In both cases, their eros 
is constantly directed toward the noetic realm, and so for them there is no Ascent 
understood as the active transformation or assimilation into a higher hypostasis.
116
 As for 
Intellect, not only did it never “descend,” but the self-contained immutability that is 
proper to its nature, along with the fulfilled character of its eros, are intrinsically at 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2003, 89–96). Cf. also Chapter Three note 264. 
 
113
 On the issue of the Form or Idea of soul (αὐτοψυχή) see Chapter Three note 262. 
 
114
 This applies also to the souls of the gods and of the heavenly bodies (see Chapter Three note 349). On 
gods, daimons, and heroes see Lloyd (1990, 126). 
 
115
 A question may be raised about the fact that World-Soul, like individual human souls, has a higher part 
(i.e., its intellect, represented by Zeus: see pages 129, 239–240). If the individual human soul ascends to 
its higher part, why doesn’t the World-Soul also do that, since it, too, has a higher part? I think the basic 
answer to this question is that if the World-Soul were to retreat completely from the sensible, this would 
remain soulless, devoid of Providence. As I argued in Subsection 3.4.2, the specific eros of the World-
Soul necessarily includes the care and in-formation of the sensible universe (cf. III.7 [45] 12, 13.29–30, 
IV.8 [6] 7.23–32). 
 
116
 I take it that the term ἀναβαίνειν (to ascend) at IV.7 [2] 12.8 in reference to the World-Soul (and the 
human soul) does not have the quasi-technical sense of Ascent as assimilation to the One, but it simply 
means the ability to envisage the One qua Principle and to be connected to it. 
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variance with the concept of Ascent (cf. IV.7 [2] 13.2–4, IV.3 [27] 13.22–23). In 
other words, Nous, in order to be Nous, ought to be such a determined entity, immutable 
in its kind: fulfilled desire that swings in neither direction of the metaphysical hierarchy 
(see pages 232–233). In different ways, this is also true of lower matter, of bodies, of the 
World-Soul, and of the Soul-Hypostasis, in the sense that none of them can leave its 
proper level of reality without ceasing to be the kind of thing it is. 
By contrast, the individual rational soul can be conceived of as a fluid entity, one 
which is capable to move across the hierarchical layers of Plotinus’ metaphysics without 
losing its proper nature, that is, without becoming something other than an individual 
rational soul. Thus, an individual rational soul does not cease to be what it is when it is 
engaged in the information of the body to which it is united; likewise, it is still an 
individual rational soul when it turns its attention to the realm of Nous and dianoetically 
contemplates its contents; and as I will argue in Subsection 4.6.3, it will still be an 
individual soul even if it will succeed in moving beyond Intellect to be erotically 
assimilated to the One qua universal End and Principle. In short, none of the entities that 
we encounter in the Plotinian universe can ascend (in the strong sense of becoming 
assimilated to the One) and still be the kind of thing it is, except an individual rational 
soul, the soul of a human being.
117
 
A solution of this kind, even if plausible is not free of difficulty. The core of the 
                                                 
117
 Lloyd (1990, 125) argues that there is no full answer as to why the human soul has “this apparently 
unique privilege” in Neoplatonism. I hope that the reasons I have sketched in the last three paragraphs 
might provide at least a feasible starting point for a less partial answer. To these reasons, Lloyd (1990, 
125–126) adds a very important one, namely personal experience. I already cited Plotinus’ poignant 
statement in this regard in note 72 above: “Anyone who has seen it knows what I mean...” (I.6 [1] 7.2). 
As for Plotinus’ own experience, see VP 23.17–19. 
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difficulty (and of the scholarly controversy surrounding it), lies, I believe, in Plotinus’ 
understanding of individuality. The issue comprises at least two interconnected questions: 
First, what is that makes an individual (τὸ καθέκαστον, τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον)118 an 
individual? In other words, what is the Plotinian principle of individuation?
119
 Second, 
based on the answer given to the first question, who or what can be an individual in 
Plotinus’ universe? The issue is as thorny as the question concerning the status of lower 
matter, both for a certain reticence on the topic in the Enneads
120
 and for the difficulty of 
systematically integrating it with the other elements of Plotinus’ metaphysics, as well as 
for a lack of substantial agreement among Plotinus scholars concerning the answers to be 
given to the two questions I just asked—a lack of agreement which, once again, suggests 
that we may be in the presence of an impasse in Plotinus’ system.121 For these reasons, I 
                                                 
118
 Τὸ καθέκαστον and τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον (also used in the plural and adverbially) are the standard 
expressions to indicate what is taken individually, the individual or the particular: see SP, s.v. καθέκαστα 
and καθ’ ἕκαστα. Another term sometimes used to designate the individual as contrasted with the species 
(εἶδος) is ἄτομον: see VI.2 [43] 2.8, 13, 33, 22.12, VI.3 [44] 1.15, 9.37, VI.7 [38] 17.22. Cf. Tornau 
(2009, 339 note 1) for further references and terminological observations. 
 
119
 Put in the terms of the principium individuationis (or principium individui) the question will be 
elaborated explicitly only later in the history of Western philosophy (e.g., in the Middle Ages, cf. 
Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super Sententiis I.d25.q1.a1.arg6, IV.d11.q1.a3.qc1, IV.d12.q1.a1.qc3.ad3; in 
modernity, cf. Leibniz, Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui of 1663 = Leibniz 1875–1890, IV, 
15–26; see also Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding II.27 = Leibniz 1875–1890, V, 213–214). 
This does not mean that the concept of a principle of individuation is absent in Plotinus, although the 
background of the question and the answer given to it differ. 
 
120
 Cf. Bréhier (1924–1938, V, 122). F. Ferrari (1997, 37, 46, 60–61; 1998, 629–631, 652–653) rightly 
insists that V.7 [18], the treatise on whether there are Forms of individuals, should not be read as an 
organic discussion of such Forms, but rather as a quaestio whose purpose is to present some of the 
difficulties (and some tentative solutions) by which Plotinus’ system is faced once we accept the 
hypothesis of the existence of Forms of individuals (so also Tornau 2009, 337 note 1). 
 
121
 Obviously, whether the problems related to the issue of individuality are a consequence of a merely 
exegetical difficulty may be established only after the difficulty itself has been removed through a 
persuasive reading of the text of the Enneads (most notably of V.7 [18], V.9 [5] 12, and VI.5 [23] 8; cf. 
note 130 below for further references). Until this is done, the issue itself may have to be taken as another 
genuinely philosophical impasse of Plotinian metaphysics (along with the one concerning the status of 
lower matter: see Subsection 3.4.3). So far, I have been unable to find a satisfactory and widely shared 
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will limit my account to a bare sketch of the problem, providing the basic tenets of 
my (rather tentative) position in the main text and confining some of the controversial 
points to the footnotes. 
In Plotinian scholarship, traditionally the issue of individuality has been discussed 
under the heading of “Forms of individuals.”122 O’Meara sharply remarks that “the 
question whether or not there are Forms of individuals must seem to the Platonist about 
as valid as the question whether or not there are square circles.”123 This is so because 
normally the role of Forms is minimally understood to be that of providing an 
explanation for whatever is taken to be identical (and thus referred to with the same 
name) in a plurality of different individuals (cf. Plato, Republic X.596a6–7).124 Thus, 
                                                                                                                                                 
solution to the problem, hence my suspicion that we may be in the presence of an aporia. To this extent I 
tend to side with Reale and Gatti on considering the issue of Forms of individuals as substantially an 
open problem in the Enneads (see note 130 (v) below). 
 
122
 In addition to the comments ad loc. by editors and/or translators of the Enneads (on which see the first 
subsection of the section of the Bibliography titled “Plotinus”) for the passages reported in note 130 
below, here is an incomplete list of scholarly contributions to the discussion on the question of Forms of 
individuals in Plotinus: Heinemann (1921, 63–73), Arnou (1967, 208–212), Capone Braga (1928; 1954, 
157–163), Covotti (1935, 215–219), Trouillard (1955b, 76–80), Cilento (1961, 205–211), Rist (1963; 
1967, 86–88, 110–111; 1970a), Blumenthal (1966; 1971, 112–133; 1998, 119; 1999, 99–101), Mamo 
(1969), Igal (1973, 92–98), Armstrong (1977), Helleman-Elgersma (1980, 338–345), Gatti (1996, 157–
161), Gerson (1994, 72–78), F. Ferrari (1997; 1998), Kalligas (1997), O’Meara (1999c), Petit (1999), 
Sorabji (2000), Aubry (2001, 201, 236–238; 2008, 277–289), D’Ancona Costa (2002), Ousager (2004, 
32–38), Nikulin (2005, 297–299), Remes (2007, 59–91), Vassilopoulou (2006), Chiaradonna (2008, 
especially 284–286), Tornau (2009); see also the pioneering study of O’Daly (1973) on the self in 
Plotinus. For an overview of the problem beyond Plotinus see Graeser (1996). 
 
123
 O’Meara (1999c, 263). 
 
124
 According to Aristotle a Platonic Form is, in his own expression, a “one-over-many” (ἕν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς: 
On Ideas, fragment 3 = Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 80.14; ἕν ἐπὶ 
πολλῶν: Metaphysics VII.1040b29), namely an Aristotelian universal (τὸ καθόλου; see De 
interpretatione 17a39–40, Posterior Analytics II.100a6–7; cf. also Metaphysics III.1003a11, V.1023b29–
32, VII.1038b16, 1040b25–30, Eudemian Ethics I.1218a7). D’Ancona Costa (2002, 533–541, especially 
530–541) emphasizes this key feature of Forms in Platonism as one of the fundamental difficulties in 
dealing with the question of Forms of individuals in Plotinus. The question remains as to whether 
Platonic Forms should in fact be considered identical with Aristotelian universals. For a negative answer 
to this question as implicitly operative in the broader context of Plato’s Parmenides 131e8–132b2, see M. 
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Gerson points out that according to this general view “Forms may themselves be 
individuals” (by which I take him to mean relative unities more than numerically distinct 
from other relative unities, given that the only absolute unity is the One), “but they are 
not of individuals.”125 
This view notwithstanding, the issue of whether or not there are Forms of 
individuals has a long history antedating Plotinus.
126
 What might have led some 
Platonists to consider the possibility of postulating Forms of individuals is the 
Aristotelian criticism of the (Platonic) argument that to establish the existence of Forms 
or Ideas from thinking (νοεῖν)—i.e., from the fact that the thought of a particular thing 
remains even when that thing has perished—will lead to postulate Forms of both 
particular (καθ’ ἕκαστα) and perishable (φθαρτά) things, such as Socrates and Plato.127 
                                                                                                                                                 
L. Gill (in Gill and Ryan 1996, 29–38); for a negative answer in Platonism in general, see Gerson (2004). 
 
125
 Gerson (1994, 72). As Gerson (1994, 76–77 and 278 note 24) explains, the main difference between 
Forms of individuals and other Forms is that while the latter (e.g., the Form of man) stand in a one-many 
relation (in the sense that the same Form of man applies simultaneously to both Socrates and Plato; see 
previous note), Forms of individuals stand in a one-one relation (in the sense that what we have come to 
call the Form of Socrates applies only to one embodied individual at a time, although it may apply to 
other embodied individuals, e.g. Pythagoras, at other times: see Plotinus V.7 [18] 1). On this view, 
Plotinus alludes to the doctrine of metempsychosis, whereby what he calls “an absolute Socrates” (V.7 
[18] 1.4: Αὐτοσωκράτης) is capable of becoming instantiated in different people (i.e., different embodied 
individuals) at different times, although only one at any given time (V.7 [18] 1). Plotinus’ support of the 
traditional Platonic doctrine of reincarnation can be inferred from several passages, (see for instance III.2 
[47] 13.14–17, III.3 [48] 4.34–44, III.4 [15] 2, IV.3 [27] 8.50–60, 25.1–5, IV.7 [2] 14, IV.8 [6] 1, V.7 
[18] 1, VI.7 [38] 6.21–36); cf. Rich (1957). He is aware, however, of the problem of admitting the 
reincarnation of the soul of a human being into a lower animal and even a plant, although he does not 
seem openly to deny it (cf. III.4 [15] 2.17–30, VI.7 [38] 6.21–23, 33–36); see Cole (1992). For a view 
denying that Plotinus endorsed the doctrine of metempsychosis, see Mamo (1969, 93–95), followed on 
this point by Vassilopoulou (2006, 375). 
 
126
 See Gerson (1994, 73–74), F. Ferrari (1997, 26–33; 1998, 631–636), Kalligas (1997, 206–208), 
O’Meara (1999c, 263–266). 
 
127
 See Aristotle, On Ideas, fragment 3 (= Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics 81.25–82.7); cf. Metaphysics I.990b14. However, notice that the notion of something 
analogous to Forms of individuals might have been envisioned even by Aristotle (see Metaphysics 
XII.1071a26–29). Aristotelian passages that may point at Forms of individuals include: De anima 
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Thus, Platonists supporting the existence of Forms of individuals might have 
articulated their support for such a view as a consequence of this criticism by Aristotle 
(arguably stressing the “particular” and downplaying the “perishable” in the criticism), 
while those who opposed it would have had to make the initial Platonic argument in favor 
of Forms stronger, find a flaw in Aristotle’s criticism, or both.128 
Now, it appears that in contrast with most of his Platonic predecessors,
129
 Plotinus 
did think that there were Forms of individuals.
130
 The reason for this, other than that he 
                                                                                                                                                 
I.408a20–23, II.413b24–27, Metaphysics III.999b19–20, VII.1037a5–10, 1038b8–16, and the already 
cited fragment 3 of On Ideas. 
 
128
 For a rebuttal of Aristotle’s criticism, arguing for an equivocal use of the term νοεῖν in fragment 3 of On 
Ideas, see Gerson (1994, 73). 
 
129
 Cf. Alcinous, Didaskalikos IX.163.24–30. Other ancient sources attesting the issue of Forms of 
individuals include: Iamblichus, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, fragment 1 (=Syrianus, 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 38.36–39.11, particularly 38.36–39), Proclus, Commentary on 
Plato’s Parmenides III.815.15–833.23 (especially 824.12–825.35) and IV.888.34–35. If one concedes 
the possibility of equating Forms of individuals and undescended souls (cf. page 359 below), Plotinus 
himself recognizes his heterodoxy on this point: see IV.8 [6] 8.1–3; cf. also V.1 [10] 10.13–18, V.3 [49] 
3.21–26. 
 
130
 As I mentioned earlier, the texts in which the issue of Forms of individuals emerges explicitly are V.7 
[18], V.9 [5] 12, and VI.5 [23] 8 (particularly lines 22–46). Other texts may include IV.3 [27] 5 
(especially lines 8–11) and 6.15–17, VI.2 [43] 22.11–17, VI.4 [22] 14.17–31, VI.5 [23] 7, VI.7 [38] 8.1–
5, 9.20–46, 11.14–15. Scholarly opinion is not unanimous about the import of the second set of passages, 
and even about the first set there is no agreement as to whether Plotinus always thought that there were in 
fact Forms of individuals. Most scholars now tend to favor a positive answer (although disagreeing as to 
the precise status of such “Forms”); on this point, see the fruitful debate between Rist (1963; 1970a) and 
Blumenthal (1966; 1971, 112–133). What follows in this note is only a rough outline of some of the 
major views in the debate about the issue. 
(i) A positive answer to the question of whether Plotinus endorses the existence of Forms of 
individuals has been formulated, with conspicuous differences, by: Capone Braga (1928; 1954, 157–
163), Bréhier (1924–1938, V, 119–122), Covotti (1935, 215–219), Rist (1963; 1970a), Mamo (1969), 
Igal (1973, 96–98), Armstrong (1977; ARMSTRONG I, xxi–xxii and V, 220–221, 314–315 note 1), 
Helleman-Elgersma (1980, 338–345), Gerson (1994, 77–78), Kalligas (1997), F. Ferrari (1997; 1998), 
Petit (1999), Ousager (2004, 32–38), Tornau (2009); more cautiously IGAL (III, 131); granting it in 
preliminary fashion, O’Meara (1999c, 268–269). In a full monograph, Remes (2007) offers a systematic 
account of Plotinus’s theory of self; with regard to the issue of Forms of individuals, Remes’ position is 
quite nuanced, stressing both the plausibility of Plotinus’ espousing the existence of such Forms and his 
view of the embodied self as a diluted copy of the unified and permanent individuality residing in Nous 
(see particularly Remes 2007, 59–91). 
 (ii) D’Ancona Costa (2002, especially 559–561) argues for the view that what individualizes Socrates 
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was very likely aware of Aristotle’s criticism, which reasonably he might have 
wanted to counter, is that within his system the principle of individuation cannot be 
matter, since individuation is a kind of determination, while matter is not only free of all 
determination but is itself the principle of indetermination and privation of form. As such, 
matter is naturally incapable of serving as a determining or in-forming factor in any 
way.
131
 If this is correct, it must follow that the principle of individuation, if we are to 
                                                                                                                                                 
is certainly an intelligible principle, but this is his undescended soul, not a Form, since a fundamental 
feature of Forms accepted by Plotinus is that they act causally as a “one over many” (see note 124 
above), that is, they are those features which their particular participants only have. This implies that in 
the intelligible realm there are both Forms and souls. Unlike some authors gathered under (i) above, who 
tend to blur the distinction between souls and Forms in the intelligible to varying degrees (e.g., Kalligas 
1997, 220, who speaks of “soul-forms”; cf. note 135 below), D’Ancona Costa seems to maintain a 
sharper distinction between the two entities. 
(iii) Aubry (2008, especially 275–281) also favors the individual’s presence in the intelligible and 
agrees that for Plotinus individuality is determined by an intelligible principle, but, based on a reading of 
II.6 [17], the treatise chronologically prior to the one about Forms of individuals (V.7 [18]), she argues 
that this principle is not a Form but a λόγος, that is to say, the expression of a superior reality at a lower 
hypostatic level (cf. Ferrari 1997, 51), or as Aubry herself puts it, “la forme formatrice par 
l’intermédiaire de laquelle l’âme va déployer dans le sensible la Forme intelligible qu’elle contemple. A 
l’âme, ou l’intellect, individuell, s’ajoute donc le logos qui contient les caractéristiques de la Forme de 
l’Homme (plutôt que du démon, de l’animal etc)” (Aubry 2008, 276). 
(iv) Blumenthal (1966; 1971, 112–133; 1999, 99–101), followed by Nikulin (2005, 298), argues that 
Plotinus holds different views in different treatises (i.e., positive in V.7 [18], and negative in the earlier 
V.9 [5] 12); cf. Blumenthal (1971, 129) for a clear summary of Plotinus’ (allegedly) “fluctuating” 
position on the issue. 
(v) Reale (2004, VIII, 101) claims that the view according to which Plotinus endorsed the existence of 
Forms of individual is “molto equivoco, dato che a Plotino manca proprio il concetto di individuo come 
singolarità irripetibile.” Along the same lines, Gatti (1998, 161) stresses the aporetic character of 
Plotinus’ position on the issue. For an earlier, different critique see Capone Braga (1954, 161–163). 
(vi) Chiaradonna (2008, 284–286), echoed by Tornau (2009, 338 note 3) and against D’Ancona Costa 
(2002; see also other references in Chiaradonna), remarks that Plotinus’ purpose in speaking of Forms of 
individuals is not so much to establish an intelligible foundation of individuality, as to guarantee the 
possibility of Ascent for individual souls (see note 133 below). According to Chiaradonna (2008, 285–
286), the issue of individuality was of little interest to Plotinus. 
(vii) Heinemann (1921) goes so far as to consider treatise V.7 [18] spurious. 
(viii) Vassilopoulou (2006) argues that Plotinus never postulated (and never needed to postulate) the 
existence of Forms of individuals. 
 
131
 For this reason, according to Plotinus all that matter can “contribute” are either types of privation, such 
as things which originate from putrefaction, savage beasts, dirt, and mud (V.9 [5] 14.7–11), or evils (I.8 
[51] 1.11–12, V.9 [5] 10.17–20), both of which find no place in the intelligible world (see Blumenthal 
1971, 113–114; Gerson 1994, 115; Gatti 1996, 159; O’Meara 1999c, 267; Reale 2004, VIII, 101; Aubry 
2008, 283). Plotinus does recognize that there are some physical differences that may appear 
problematic, such as: (i) the difference between a snub nose and an aquiline nose (V.9 [5] 12.5–8); (ii) 
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admit that there are individuals at all,
132
 is to be “situated” in the intelligible realm.133 
In other words, at least for each human being (and arguably only for a human being), that 
                                                                                                                                                 
the difference between two aquiline noses belonging to two different individuals (V.9 [5] 12.8–9), or 
again between certain colors, as the differing hues of the skin of the hands and feet of the same 
individual, as well as the hues of the skin of two like-skinned individuals respectively living in Iceland 
and Sicily (V.9 [5] 12.9–11, VI.4 [22] 1.23–26; cf. Schniewind 1988, 200); (iii) the merely numerical 
distinction of two or more (at least apparently indistinguishable) bits of fire participating in the same 
Form of Fire (VI.5 [23] 8.39–46). The recognition of such differences certainly does not prove that 
matter contributes to individuation in the first case, (i), for it is still the Form of man that determines the 
snub and aquiline shape of the noses of different individuals as two specific differences (διαφοραὶ ἐν 
εἴδει) belonging to that Form, as Plotinus himself points out at V.9 [5] 12.6–8. The same holds for the 
third case, (iii), since two bits of fire are simply a case of separate instantiations of the same Form—the 
Form of Fire—differing solo numero. However, the question remains as to whether it may be precisely 
multiple instantiation that constitutes individuality in the case of particulars participating in the same 
Form. In fact, to say that there is no need to postulate a different Form for individual bits of fire is 
different than saying that these individual bits of fire are not individual bits of fire; that is, their 
individuality or particularity is hardly explained by mere reference to a common Form. But in this case 
one would have to admit that it may be matter that accounts for individuality, although still not for formal 
determination (which is precisely what is at issue here). The same reasoning may apply to the second 
case, (ii), with the addition that here Plotinus explicitly admits that the differences are due to matter or 
place (V.9 [5] 12.8–11). However, as Tornau (2009, 340 note 1) observes, in V.7 [18] (especially 1.18–
23, 2.13–18, and 3.13–17), Plotinus grounds even purely material differences in principles called λόγοι, 
whose foundation is the intelligible realm of Forms (contrast Aubry’s position in note 130 (iii); cf. 
Plotinus V.9 [5] 3.30–37). Perhaps we may say that for Plotinus, if the differences mentioned in the three 
cases presented above are all that distinguish the things listed in those cases, then there is no necessity to 
postulate Forms of individuals. Put positively, it seems that for Plotinus Forms of individuals are needed 
to account for differences that are more than (i) specific differences of the same εἶδος, (ii) due only to 
matter or place, or (iii) merely numerical, although I believe that cases (ii) and (iii) remain somewhat 
problematic. According to O’Meara (1999c, 267), at V.9 [5] 10.1–2 Plotinus explicitly provides the 
formula that regulates the casuistry concerning Forms of individuals: “[1] All things, then, which exist as 
forms in the world of sense come [2] from that intelligible world; those which do not, do not” ([1] Ὅσα 
μὲν οὖν ὡς εἴδη ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ ἐστι, ταῦτα [2] ἐκεῖθεν· ὅσα δὲ μή, οὔ). A parallel of this formula is 
found at VI.7 [38] 11.3–4, as O’Meara also suggests. 
 
132
 It is obvious that if by individuality one means indivisibility or utter simplicity, the only possible 
individual in Plotinus’ system will be the One, and human individuality will be only a likeness of it. This 
is the position of Ousager (2004, 15–119), which I will briefly discuss in Subsection 4.6.3. 
 
133
 But see the position of Chiaradonna (2008, 284–286) mentioned in note 130 (vi) above. For this author, 
Plotinus is not interested in establishing a principle of (human) individuality, but simply in providing a 
theoretical reason for the Ascent. F. Ferrari (1997, 38) already pointed out this reason (found the Enneads 
at V.7 [18] 1.1–3) for Plotinus’ discussion of the issue of Forms of individuals. To this reason, Ferrrari 
adds two more. One, which he calls “macrosistematica,” is the fact that to deprive individuals of all 
intelligible content (and/or to assume that individuals of the same species have the same intelligible 
content; cf. Gerson 1994, 74) would mean to diminish the instrumental causality of Intellect and, 
consequently, of the One. Another reason emerges in the context of the quarrel with the Gnostics, for 
whom all that is sensible is evil; for Plotinus, by contrast, sensible beings—and a fortiori rational 
individuals—are expressions of the intelligible. 
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is, for a sensible individual endowed with intellect, there is one Form, which as such 
is “located” in Intellect as an integral member of Intellect.134  
If this is how matters stand, it would not seem unreasonable to identify the Form 
of an individual human being with the undescended (part of the) soul of the same 
individual (see pages 341–345 above), which is thought of as both one’s origin and the 
condition of possibility of the Ascent (see notes 130 (vi) and 133).
135
 Thus, Plotinus 
writes at V.7 [18] 1.1–5 (my emphasis):136 
[1] Is there also an idea of each particular thing? Yes, if I and [2] each one 
of us has a way of ascent to the intelligible, the principle of each of us [3] 
is also there. If Socrates, that is the soul of Socrates, always exists, [4] 
there will be an absolute Socrates in the sense that, insofar as they are 
                                                 
134
 Tornau (2009, 344 note 3) points out that for Plotinus “individual soul” (IV.8 [6] 4.1: Τὰς δὴ καθέκαστα 
ψυχὰς) basically means “human soul” (IV.8 [6] 3.1: τῆς ἀνθρωπείας ψυχῆς). However, there is 
disagreement as to whether we should postulate Forms of individuals only for individuals with intellects 
or admit such Forms also for other sensible particulars. Authors who argue that Plotinus postulates Forms 
of individuals only for human beings include Gerson (1994, 76), Kalligas (1997), and Tornau (2009). 
More cautiously, Rist (1970a, 1999) writes that “although it is probable that Plotinus accepts Ideas of all 
individuals, he seems to find Ideas of men the most acceptable, Ideas of animals less so, and presumably 
Ideas of inanimate things least of all.” Among those who support a wider reading and contend that 
Plotinus might have envisaged the possibility of such Forms also for other sensible particulars are F. 
Ferrari (1997, 43–44, 59, 61) and O’Meara (1999c, 268). 
 
135
 The identification of Forms of individuals with souls (in particular with the undescended part of the 
soul) was voiced by Cherniss (1962, 508) and is variously advocated and developed, for example, by 
Kalligas (1997), F. Ferrari (1997, 47–53), who however points out that Plotinus (V.7 [18] 3.7–23) may 
be open to the idea that there may be Forms also for other sensible particulars (see previous note), 
D’Ancona Costa (2002, 560) and, most recently, Tornau (2009). This identification may be supported by 
reference to other passages from the Enneads where souls are said to be Forms and as such they abide 
permanently in Intellect: see for instance I.1 [53] 2.5–7, 4.18–19, I.6 [1] 6.13–18, III.6 [26] 18.24–25, 
IV.4 [28] 16.18–19, VI.5 [23] 7; cf. also references in note 223 below. However, this position is far from 
having been accepted unanimously. Rist (1967, 86–87), for example, openly criticizes Cherniss, arguing 
that a solution of this kind would blur Plotinus’ distinction between soul and Nous to the point of making 
it “worthless” (cf. Gerson 1994, 254–255 note 19). See also the discussion in Remes (2007, 76–85). 
 
136
 V.7 [18] 1.1–5: [1] Εἰ καὶ τοῦ καθέκαστόν ἐστιν ἰδέα; Ἢ εἰ ἐγὼ καὶ [2] ἕκαστος τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ἐπὶ τὸ 
νοητὸν ἔχει, καὶ ἑκάστου [3] ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐκεῖ. Ἢ εἰ μὲν ἀεὶ Σωκράτης καὶ ψυχὴ Σωκράτους [4] ἔσται 
Αὐτοσωκράτης, καθὸ ᾗ ψυχὴ καθέκαστα καὶ < ὡς [5] λέγεται > ἐκεῖ [ὡς λέγεται ἐκεῖ]. I follow the text 
accepting the transposition of ὡς λέγεται from line 5 to lines 4–5 (as with Volkmann 1883, HS2, 
ARMSTRONG, Igal 1973, 91–92 and IGAL; contra Cilento 1947–1949). The translation in the main text is 
by ARMSTRONG, minimally modified. 
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soul, individuals are also [5] said to exist in this way in the intelligible world. 
 
However, it would be wrong to think that just because Plotinus in all likeness 
endorses the view that there are Forms at least for sensible individuals endowed with 
intellect or rationality, he must also equate this individual with its Form. For a human 
being (which, again, in the present context is what I understand by a rational individual or 
a sensible individual endowed with intellect), to be an individual is not necessarily the 
same as to be the Form of that individual. Two things, I believe, are likely to be true here. 
The first is that the issue of human individuality in the Enneads is broader than the issue 
of Forms of individuals; the second is that a speculative interest in individuality (whether 
in terms of the medieval question of the principle of individuation or in light of the 
modern emphasis on the uniqueness of the individual) is probably not Plotinus’ main 
purpose for breaching the issue of Forms of individuals. 
The second point can be settled quickly by looking back to the previous page and 
to notes 130 (vi) and 135, where I already hinted that one of Plotinus’ major reasons to 
introduce Forms of individuals is to establish a permanent connection between the 
individual embodied soul and the noetic realm. From this perspective it is reasonable to 
believe that the Form of an individual is the undescended part of its soul. As for my first 
claim, authors generally agree that the question of individuality in Plotinus is broader that 
the issue of Forms of individuals. In fact, in addition to a specifically intelligible principle 
(whatever this may be: a Form, the undescended soul, a set of λόγοι), two other factors 
are involved in the composition of the human individual: the sensible living body and 
what Plotinus calls the “we” (ἡμεῖς), namely the historical person endowed with 
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consciousness and freedom of choice and who is a combination of the two previous 
factors (i.e., the intelligible principle and the sensible living body).
137
 The interaction of 
these three factors is what constitutes the texture of individuality, allowing some authors 
to speak of a double-self theory, with an ideal self on the one hand (i.e., the undescended 
soul, or the Form of the individual) and an endowed self (i.e., the embodied human soul, 
seat of consciousness and freedom choice) on the other. We can also speak of a lower and 
a higher self or of an ontological and an empirical self.
138
 What directly concerns us here 
is the fact that this distinction is directly connected to the major reason for which Plotinus 
might have introduced the issue of Forms of individuals, namely the Ascent. More 
specifically, the ideal self or ontological ground of individuality is not immediately 
available to the endowed self or empirical individual. On the contrary, to become 
identified with one’s ideal self depends on a decision which can rightly be called 
ethical.
139
 To act in accordance with this decision is identical with the process of ascent to 
that which, though always available to each individual soul, is not quite realized or 
integrated (yet). As Tornau writes, “the ‘ascent of the soul toward Intellect is the 
restoration of a state of happiness that always already exists, which the soul never truly 
loses, but which it has to actualize and bring to consciousness.”140 In a famous passage, 
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 Cf. Aubry (2008). On Plotinus’ use of the term ἡμεῖς cf. Chapter Three note 254. 
 
138
 The expressions “ideal self” and “endowed self” are by Gerson (1994, 139–151). Trouillard (1955b, 17–
19) speaks of “homme intelligible” and “homme empirique.” 
 
139
 Cf. Tornau (2009, 334). 
 
140
 Tornau (2009, 335): “l’ ‘ascension’ de l’âme vers l’Intellect est la restauration d’un état de bonheur qui 
existe toujour déjà, qu’elle ne perd jamais vraiment, mais qu’elle doit actualiser et faire advenir à sa 
conscience.” 
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IV.8 [6] 4.31–34, Plotinus himself speaks of this double self, or rather, of this twofold 
condition of individual souls as “amphibious”:141 
[31] Souls, then become, one might say, [32] amphibious, compelled to 
live by turns the life There and the life here: [33] those which are able to 
be more in the company of [34] Intellect live the life there more, [34] but 
those whose normal condition is, by nature or chance, the opposite, live 
more [35] the life here below. 
 
Needless to say, the purpose of the Ascent is to bring the individual soul to 
identify with higher realities, or to live “There” as much as possible. 
4.4.2 The Terminology of Ascent 
Plotinus uses several expressions to speak of the soul’s process of identification 
with its highest element leading to union with the One. Among the most frequently used 
terms are “ascent” (ἀναγωγή,142 ἀνάβασις,143 ἄνοδος144), “elevation” or “return” 
(ἐπανάγειν, ἐπανέρχεσθαι, ἐπανιέναι),145 “escape” or “flight” (φυγή146), and “reversion” 
                                                 
141
 IV.8 [6] 4.31–34: [31] Γίγνονται οὖν οἷον [32] ἀμφίβιοι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τόν τε ἐκεῖ βίον τόν τε ἐνταῦθα 
παρὰ [33] μέρος βιοῦσαι, πλεῖον μὲν τὸν ἐκεῖ, αἳ δύνανται πλεῖον τῷ [34] νῷ συνεῖναι, τὸν δὲ ἐνθάδε 
πλεῖον, αἷς τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ φύσει [35] ἢ τύχαις ὑπῆρξεν. 
 
142
 On ἀναγωγή in the sense of Ascent, see I.3 [20] 1.5, 18, V.5 [32] 4.1, V.7 [18] 1.2. See also ἀνάγειν, in 
the sense of both ascending (I.3 [20] 1.2, 6, 10, I.6 [1] 6.16, V.1 [10] 1.24; cf. also IV.4 [28] 5.10, V.1 
[10] 6.8, V.3 [49] 10.46, VI.5 [23] 7.1) and returning, going back, retiring (I.6 [1] 9.7). 
 
143
 On ἀνάβασις in the sense of Ascent, see I.6 [1] 7.8, II.9 [33] 6.8. See also ἀναβαίνειν: I.3 [20] 1.13, 
2.12, I.6 [1] 4.2, 7.1 and 4, 9.24 and 34, III.8 [30] 8.1, IV.4 28] 5.11, IV.7 [2] 10.39, IV.8 [6] 4.29, V.1 
[10] 3.3, 4.6, V.3 [49] 9.30 and 34, 17.6, V.9 [5] 3.25, VI.5 [23] 7.2, VI.8 [39] 7.7, 9.35, 15.21, VI.9 [9] 
3.21, 4.21 and 23, 11.10; ἐπανάβασις: VI.7 [38] 27.25; ἐπαναβαίνειν: V.9 [5] 2.7, VI.7 [38] 28.21. 
 
144
 On ἄνοδος in the sense of Ascent, see IV.8 [6] 1.35 (an echo of the ascent from the Cave of Plato’s 
Republic VII). See also ἀνιέναι (-εἶμι, ibo): I.1 [53] 13.8 (cf. also I.6 [1] 7.6, III.1 [3] 2.4). 
 
145
 On ἐπανάγειν in the sense of elevation or return in the context of the Ascent, see VI.9 [9] 3.18. See also 
ἐπανέρχεσθαι: II.9 [33] 4.12; ἐπανιέναι (-εἶμι, ibo): III.8 [30] 6.35, V.5 [32] 5.1. 
 
146
 On φυγή in the context of the Ascent, see I.2 [19] 1.3, 3.6, I.6 [1] 8.17 and 22, I.8 [51] 6.10, VI.9 [9] 
11.51 (the often quoted closing line of the Enneads in Porphyry’s order: φυγὴ μόνου πρὸς μόνον). See 
also φεύγειν: I.2 [19] 1.2–3, I.6 [1] 6.8, 8.8 and 16, I.8 [51] 6.9 and 12 (cf. Plato, Theaetetus 176a8–b3, 
cited earlier on page 92, and Phaedo 67b7–c3; the same Platonic passages are alluded to at II.3 [52] 9.20, 
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or “conversion” (ἐπιστροφή147). As a quick look at Sleeman and Pollet’s Lexicon 
Plotinianum will confirm, in none of the references listed in notes 142 through 147 are 
these terms used strictly or technically to indicate the soul’s process of assimilation to the 
One, what I have otherwise been referring to with the expression “Ascent.” Instead, they 
are borrowed from ordinary language and used metaphorically to express an experience 
of a different order. 
With the exception of the last one (ἐπιστροφή), I believe that these metaphors are 
not particularly hard to explain if one bears in mind the broader framework of Plotinian 
metaphysics. Thus, the upward movement indicated by the terms for “ascent” can be 
explained as being very closely dependent on what Plotinus takes to be the superiority 
(with respect to unity, being, power, self-determination, eros, and overall perfection) of 
the hypostases of Nous and the One in comparison with soul.
148
 Similarly, the idea of 
“return” is conceptually implied by the fact that in the Enneads and through the 
Neoplatonic tradition the endpoint of the Ascent is identical with the source or origin of 
all reality (see particularly Chapter Three note 9, and Section 4.2 above), so that for the 
soul to become assimilated to the One may be understood as a sort of homecoming, a 
purifying journey leading the traveling soul to a final destination which is at the same 
                                                                                                                                                 
II.9 [33] 6.40–41, and III.4 [15] 2.12), 8.29, IV.3 [27] 32.19, IV.8 [6] 5.27, VI.7 [38] 28.27; ἀποφυγή: I.8 
[51] 5.29 (cf. Plato, Phaedo 107d1); ἀναφεύγειν: V.9 [5] 2.5; ἐκφεύγειν: I.8 [51] 7.12. 
 
147
 On ἐπιστροφή in the sense of conversion in the context of the Ascent, see I.2 [19] 4.18, IV.8 [6] 4.2, 
7.26, V.8 [31] 11.9. See also ἐπιστρέφειν: I.2 [19] 4.16–17, I.6 [1] 7.5, IV.4 [28] 2.27, IV.8 [6] 4.28 (an 
allusion to the Cave of Plato’s Republic VII), V.1 [10] 1.23, VI.7 [38] 31.6, VI.9 [9] 2.35–36, 7.17; 
στροφή: I.2 [19] 6.25; στρέφειν: I.6 [1] 7.39, III.4 [15] 4.2, IV.4 [28] 2.27, V.8 [31] 10.7, 11.9, VI.9 [9] 
11.19; ἀναστρέφειν: III.5 [50] 3.35. For references to the use of ἐπιστροφή and related terms in the sense 
conveyed by the Principle of Reversion, see Chapter Three notes 166–168, 214, and 270. 
 
148
 Plato’s use of a similar language in the Symposium and elsewhere should also be mentioned as a source 
of inspiration on this point for Plotinus (cf. Chapter One notes 142 and 143). 
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time its true origin (see note 47 above): a journey back to what Plotinus calls its 
beloved fatherland or native country (πατρίς).149 
As for the concept of “escape” or “flight,” the focus of the metaphor shifts 
without changing its overall meaning and purpose: from the Good as that toward which 
the individual soul proceeds, to the lower involvements from which the same soul moves 
away in order to become assimilated to the Principle.
150
 In this context, it is important 
clearly to determine the identity of that which is to be left behind in this flight. What is 
that the individual soul should flee in its journey to the One? The answer to this question 
is at the same time a statement of Plotinus’ view about the sensible world in connection 
with the Ascent. If Plotinus is saying that it is the sensible as such that ought to be fled, 
his position will be no different than the radical dualism, both cosmological and 
anthropological, of certain Gnostics.
151
 If, on the other hand, it is not the sensible qua 
sensible that constitutes a problem in the perspective of the Ascent, from what exactly 
should the soul escape? Plotinus answers this question unambiguously at I.8 [51] 6.9–13, 
                                                 
149
 See I.6 [1] 8.16 (an echo of Homer, Iliad II.140) and 21, V.9 [5] 1.21. Obviously the theme of return to 
one’s native country, the fil rouge of Homer’s second epic poem, is a perfectly familiar one for someone 
steeped into the Greek tradition like Plotinus. References to the Odyssey in relation to this theme are 
explicit in the Enneads (i.e., Odyssey IX.29 and X.483–484 at Enneads I.6 [1] 8.17–20, and Odyssey 
V.37 at Enneads V.9 [5] 1.22). The same theme will be explored at greater length by later Neoplatonists 
(see Pépin 1982, 5–9 for references and an interpretation). The notion of return to one’s native land 
clearly squares well also with the metaphorical description of the One as Father (see Chapter Three note 
9 for references; cf. also V.1 [10] 6.50–53). 
 
150
 Thus, we find that in the Enneads metaphors of escape are conceptually and terminologically related to 
expressions indicating death, such as “withdrawal” (ἐξάγειν: I.9 [16] 1.1 and 19, IV.4 [28] 44.24; 
ἐξαγωγή: I.9 [16] 1.14), and “leaving” or “exit” (ἐξέρχεσθαι: I.8 [51] 13.23, I.9 [16] 1.1–2, III.4 [15] 
2.11, IV.3 [27] 18.2, 24.1, 25.2, 27.21, 31.17, IV.4 [28] 29.2, and cf. also II.9 [33] 18.10, VI.9 [9] 9.53, 
10.1; ἐξιέναι, -εἶμι, ibo: I.9 [16] 1.1 and 17; ἔξοδος: I.9 [16] 1.15, and cf. also III.2 [47] 15.26). 
 
151
 See for instance Corpus Hermeticum IV.4; Nag Hammadi Codices II.5.97.24–98.11. For a concise 
account of Gnostic cosmological and anthropological dualism see Rudolph (1984, 59–67, 88–94). 
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a passage that contains a sequence of echoes from Plato’s Theaetetus 176a–b:152 
[9] But when he [i.e., Plato] says that “we must take flight from thence” he 
is no longer [10] referring to life on earth. For “flight,” he says, is not 
going away from earth [11] but being on earth “just and holy with the help 
of [12] wisdom”; what he means is that we must fly from wickedness; [13] 
so evil for him is wickedness and all that comes from wickedness...  
 
As Plotinus points out in the sequel of this passage and as we shall see more 
explicitly in Subsection 4.6.1, flight from wickedness is possible through virtue (ἁρετή), 
by which the soul both begins to regain access to its original nature and becomes able to 
master lower matter and its negative influence.
153
 
If the metaphors used thus far to illustrate the process of assimilation to the One 
(ascent, return, flight) have been relatively easy to explain, the same cannot be said of the 
last image I introduced in the opening paragraph of the present subsection, the image of 
“conversion.” The difficulty is due mainly to the ambiguous use of the term ἐπιστροφή, 
and in particular to the fact that Plotinus expresses one of his most characteristic 
doctrines by means of the same term. This doctrine is well summarized in what in the 
previous chapter I referred to as the Principle of Reversion (cf. pages 204–206). Broadly, 
the principle states that every hypostasis (with the exception of the One, which is 
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 I.8 [51] 6.9–13: [9] Ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐντεῦθεν φεύγειν δεῖ οὐκέτι περὶ [10] τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς λέγεται. Φυγὴ γάρ, 
φησιν, οὐ τὸ ἐκ γῆς ἀπελθεῖν, [11] ἀλλὰ καὶ ὄντα ἐπὶ γῆς δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον εἶναι μετὰ [12] φρονήσεως, 
ὡς εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον φεύγειν κακίαν δεῖν, [13] ὥστε τὰ κακὰ αὐτῷ ἡ κακία καὶ ὅσα ἐκ κακίας. 
 
153
 See I.8 [51] 6.19–20, II.9 [33] 18.1–17; for references on the negative influence of lower matter on soul, 
see Chapter Three note 359. In this context, it is not necessary to take separation of soul from body in a 
literal sense, or as death. (It is indicative that at I.8 [51] 13.14–25 the condition of vice—κακία—is 
metaphorically called the death of the soul, not in the sense that the soul ceases to exist altogether in the 
way the composite ceases to exist in literal death, but in the sense that it “has changed to another nature, 
a worse one”—I.8 [51] 13.19–20: [19] ἑτέραν φύσιν τὴν [20] χείρω ἠλλάξατο. Cf. Chapter Three note 
358). Rather, separation should be understood chiefly as a turning away from making one’s commitment 
to the body a primary matter of concern (cf. V.1 [10] 1.24–30, VI.5 [23] 12.27–29). Thus it follows that 
the sensible world is not itself evil (see III.2 [47] 3, II.9 [33] 8–9); in fact, since the sensible is a 
hylomorphic entity, it still belongs somehow to the intelligible, even if in a highly qualified way.  
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ungenerated: cf. V.4 [7] 1.18–19) emerges or establishes its identity as that particular 
hypostasis through a process of self-reversion which is at the same time a reversion 
toward its generator. If in the previous subsection I was correct in claming that for 
Plotinus the Ascent to the Principle is possible only for an individual rational soul, the 
meaning of ἐπιστροφή which is at work in the Ascent cannot be that of the double 
movement (i.e., self-reversion and the reversion toward its generator) of a hypostasis that 
is expressed in the Principle of Reversion. What the term means in the context of the 
Ascent is rather a turning of the individual soul’s attention from lower commitments to 
higher realities, in order to be able to identify as much as possible with its best part (in 
this sense, the movement of conversion is also an inner turn toward oneself). But as we 
saw, this can never be the case for Nous and the Soul-Hypostasis (as well as the World-
Soul). For this reason in the previous chapter I used the term “reversion” to express the 
former meaning of ἐπιστροφή (i.e., ἐπιστροφή as the movement whereby Nous and Soul 
emerge as full hypostases by erotically turning upon themselves and toward their 
respective generator), while reserving the term “conversion” to convey the latter meaning 
(i.e., ἐπιστροφή in the context of the Ascent). 
Lloyd observes that “for practical purposes writers [i.e., Neoplatonists] often saw 
no need to distinguish reversion from the general notion of ascent to the One.”154 This 
seems to be the case in several of the post-Plotinian texts I cited in Chapter Three note 
167. But Lloyd rightly qualifies the term “ascent” in his claim as a “general notion.” I do 
not believe that the Neoplatonists, least of all Plotinus, fail conceptually to distinguish 
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 Lloyd (1990, 128). 
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this “general notion of ascent” from the Ascent technically understood as the process 
of assimilation of the individual soul to the One. Thus, I take it that the ascent of which 
Lloyd speaks means the (non-temporal) process by which a given hypostasis gains its 
identity or becomes that particular hypostasis (with all the problems that such a notion 
implies
155). Such an “ascent,” or reversion, is unthinkable without the other two phases, 
rest and procession, with which it constitutes a single whole (see again Chapter Three 
note 167). This is something different than the Ascent of the individual rational soul, 
which by ascending to the One does not become the kind of thing it is but deliberately 
“moves” to, or becomes integrated in a higher level of existence while remaining the kind 
of thing it already was. 
There is another important difference between the two “ascents,” or between what 
I have technically referred to as “reversion” and “conversion” respectively: the former 
occurs of necessity; the latter does not, not only in the sense that consciousness, 
deliberation and choice are needed for it to happen, but also in the more fundamental 
sense that it may not happen at all.
156
 This disheartening possibility is explicitly 
recognized by Plotinus at I.8 [51] 5.29–30, where he writes: “[29] there is ‘an escape 
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 See Lloyd (1990, 128–130); cf. Damascius, De principiis 75–78, II.123–137. 
 
156
 Dillon (in Dillon and Morrow 1987, xviii) mentions VI.5 [23] 7 as an instance of the threefold process 
of rest, procession and reversion that will become standard Neoplatonic doctrine after Plotinus (see 
Chapter Three note 167). If so, in this passage the term ἐπιστραφῆναι at line 11 will mean reversion in 
the sense I outlined above. I am not sure that this is the case, however. If one concedes (i) that the Ascent 
is possible only for the individual rational soul and does not occur of necessity, and (ii) the basic 
ambiguity of Plotinus’ use of term ἐπιστροφή which I have pointed out, I believe that the word 
ἐπιστραφῆναι at VI.5 [23] 7.11 means conversion rather than reversion. Thus the context of the passage 
will not be the emergence of a hypostasis through the movement of reversion upon itself and toward its 
generator, but rather that of the Ascent, the return of the soul to the One. 
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from the evils in the soul’ for those who [30] are capable of it, though not all men 
are.”157 As we saw throughout Chapter Two (as well as in my analysis of the Symposium 
ascent in Chapter One), even this possibility is not foreign to the dynamic of eros, for 
those who fail to ascend are not utterly deprived of all eros, but merely decide (at times 
against their better judgment, other times merely out of habit, other times still out of 
ignorance) to invest the eros with which they have been connaturally endowed in lower 
manifestations of higher realities, rather than direct it toward that of which these are 
manifestations: Intellect and, ultimately, the One. 
4.4.3 Eros as the Fundamental Force Regulating All Movement of Ascent to the One 
Contrasted with Hypostatic Eros and Eros as a Method of Ascent 
The wide spectrum of eros at which I just hinted in the closing paragraph of the 
previous subsection brings me to my final observation for this section. Eros should be 
understood as a rather complex phenomenon whose internal divisions are essential to a 
proper understanding of it in the dynamics of the Ascent. In this subsection I will try to 
shed some further light on the classification I drew in my analysis of Plotinus’ treatise on 
eros, III.5 [50], in Chapter Two. Or rather, the classification of eros drawn in Chapter 
Two on the textual basis of treatise III.5 [50] will be supplemented here by a threefold 
division of the same phenomenon on the basis of my systematic treatment of eros in this 
and the previous chapter. The three types of eros at issue here are the following: 
hypostatic eros, eros as a method of ascent, and the connatural or inborn eros that 
regulates all movement of ascent to the One. 
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 I.8 [51] 5.29–30: [29] εἶναι μὲν ἀποφυγὴν κακῶν τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ τοῖς [30] δυνηθεῖσι, πάντας δὲ οὐ 
δύνασθαι. The reference within the reference is to Plato, Phaedo 107d1. 
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First, a word on what I called “hypostatic eros.” The context of this division is 
that of the procession or derivation of all reality from the One presented in Chapter 
Three. In short, hypostatic eros is the love that each hypostasis naturally and immediately 
bears proximately for its generator, and ultimately for the One, which in turn is the very 
source of this eros. This distinction is important to the extent that it reminds us that the 
very formation or structuring of the Plotinian universe can be understood in terms of eros 
and as a result of eros (a work of love: the general thesis of Chapter Three), and that the 
One as the universal source of this eros is only conceptually distinct from the One qua 
Good, universal desideratum or final cause (see Section 4.2). But more relevant for our 
present discussion of the Ascent are the next two distinctions and what differentiates 
them. 
In the second distinction eros is understood as a method of ascent. This view of 
eros is found in the relatively short treatise On dialectic, I.3 [20], in which Plotinus 
outlines three arts, methods or practices (I.3 [20] 1.1: τέχνη ἢ μέθοδος ἢ ἐπιτήδευσις) of 
ascent, namely music, eros, and dialectic (or philosophy).
158
 Strictly, however, there is 
only one Ascent and the three “methods” are in fact practices that seem to apply to two 
different stages of the same journey. At I.3 [20] 1.12–18, Plotinus writes about these 
stages and those engaged in the journey:
159
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 An interpretation of a twofold method of ascent (i.e., eros and dialectic) in Plato such as the one 
presented in Subsection 1.5.2 above obviously reflects two of the distinctions drawn by Plotinus in I.3 
[20]. As for the third method or distinction (i.e., music), I already mentioned that Plotinus may still have 
Plato in mind, who in several places seems to allude to an ascent to the Good under the aspect of 
Measure or Proportion, which can be understood as the regulative concept of music (see Chapter One 
note 176 for references; see also Jankélévitch 1998, 34–40). 
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 I.3 [20] 1.12–18: [12] Ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ πορεία διττὴ πᾶσιν [13] ἢ ἀναβαίνουσιν ἢ ἄνω ἐλθοῦσιν· ἡ μὲν 
γὰρ προτέρα ἀπὸ [14] τῶν κάτω, ἡ δέ γε δευτέρα, οἷς ἤδη ἐν τῷ νοητῷ [15] γενομένοις καὶ οἷον ἴχνος 
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[12] There are two stages of the journey for all, [13] one when they are going 
up and one when they have arrived above. The first leads from [14] the 
regions below, the second is for those who are already in the intelligible 
realm [15] and have gained their footing There, but must still travel till 
[16] they reach the furthest point of the region, that is the “end of the [17] 
journey,”160 when you reach the top of the [18] intelligible. 
 
Thus, in his commentary to Ennead I.3 [20], Jankélévitch rightly speaks of an 
inferior and a superior dialectic.
161
 According to this view, inferior dialectic includes both 
music and eros, while superior dialectic is identical with dialectic proper, or philosophy. 
Plotinus sketches the differences between these three arts or methods of ascent through a 
summary description of their practitioners: the musician (ὁ μουσικός), the lover (ὁ 
ἐρωτικός), and the philosopher (ὁ φιλόσοφος). 
The musician is described as “easily moved and excited [εὐκίνητον καὶ 
ἐπτοημένον] by beauty, but not quite capable of being moved by absolute [παρ’ αὐτοῦ] 
[B]eauty” (I.3 [20] 1.21–23), so that “he must be led and taught to make abstraction of 
the material element [χωρίζοντα τὴν ὕλην]” found in sounds, rhythms, and forms in order 
to be able to grasp “the principles from which their proportions and ordering forces [αἱ 
ἀναλογίαι καὶ οἱ λόγοι] derive” and “the beauty which is in these principles” (I.3 [20] 
1.29–31). 
In addition to this inclination toward beautiful things proper of the musician, the 
lover “has a kind of memory of beauty [μνημονικός ἐστί πως κάλλους]” (I.3 [20] 2.2–3). 
                                                                                                                                                 
θεῖσιν ἐκεῖ πορεύεσθαι ἀνάγκη, ἕως [16] ἂν εἰς τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ τόπου ἀφίκωνται, ὃ δὴ τέλος τῆς [17] 
πορείας ὂν τυγχάνει, ὅταν τις ἐπ’ ἄκρῳ γένηται τῷ [18] νοητῷ. 
 
160
 An echo of Plato, Republic VII.532e3. ARMSTRONG (I, 153 note 2) writes: “The ‘end of the journey’ is 
the vision of the Good.” 
 
161
 Jankélévitch (1998, 27–50 for inferior dialectic, and 51–127 for superior dialectic). For a useful guided 
overview of treatise I.3 [20] see Catapano (1995, 163–179). 
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But, adds Plotinus, the lover is unable to “grasp it in separateness, but he is 
overwhelmingly amazed and excited by visible beauties” (I.3 [20] 2.3–4).162 The lover’s 
goal is obviously to become capable to see Beauty by itself. Plotinus’ description of the 
way in which the lover may reach his goal, given in the second chapter of I.3 [20], is 
clearly patterned after the Greater Mysteries of love of Symposium 209e5–212a7, 
especially the synoptic view of the ladder of love at 211b7–d1 (see Subsection 1.4.1 and 
1.5.1 above). Here is Plotinus’ text on the lover at I.3 [20] 2.5–13 (in italic within the 
text, I provide the headings for what I take to be loose parallels of the steps of eros’ 
ladder in the Symposium as given at page 49 above):
163
 
[5] So he must be taught not to cling round... 
   (1.b)A single body 
...one body and be excited by that, [6] but... 
   (1.b) All bodies 
...must be led by the course of reasoning to consider all bodies and show 
the [7] beauty that is the same in all of them, and... 
   (2.a) Souls 
...that it is something other than bodies and must be said to come from 
elsewhere, [8] and... 
   (2.b) Practices (ways of life) and laws 
...that it is better manifested in other things, by showing him, for instance, 
beautiful ways of life and [9] beautiful laws—this will accustom him to 
[10] loveliness in things which are not bodies—and... 
                                                 
162
 I.3 [20] 2.3–4: [3] χωρὶς δὲ ὂν ἀδυνατεῖ καταμαθεῖν, [4] πληττόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ὄψει καλῶν περὶ 
αὐτὰ ἐπτόηται]. In this light, it seems possible to draw a loose parallel between music in I.3 [20] 1.19–35 
and the eros without recollection (whether pure or mixed) presented in the treatise on eros, III.5 [50], as 
well as between the love of I.3 [20] 2 and the eros with recollection (whether pure or mixed) of III.5 [50] 
(see Subsection 2.3.1 above). 
 
163
 I.3 [20] 2.5–13: [5] Διδακτέον οὖν αὐτὸν μὴ περὶ ἓν σῶμα πεσόντα ἐπτοῆσθαι, [6] ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ πάντα 
ἀκτέον τῷ λόγῳ σώματα δεικνύντα τὸ [7] ἐν πᾶσι ταὐτὸν καὶ ὅτι ἕτερον τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ὅτι ἄλλοθεν 
[8] λεκτέον καὶ ὅτι ἐν ἄλλοις μᾶλλον, οἷον ἐπιτηδεύματα [9] καλὰ καὶ νόμους καλοὺς δεικνύντα—ἐν 
ἀσωμάτοις γὰρ ὁ [10] ἐθισμὸς τοῦ ἐρασμίου ἤδη—καὶ ὅτι καὶ ἐν τέχναις καὶ ἐν [11] ἐπιστήμαις καὶ ἐν 
ἀρεταῖς. Εἶτα ἓν ποιητέον καὶ [12] διδακτέον, ὅπως ἐγγίνονται. Ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἤδη ἀναβαίνειν [13] 
ἐπὶ νοῦν, ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν· κἀκεῖ βαδιστέον τὴν ἄνω πορείαν. The translation is ARMSTRONG’s, minimally 
modified. Compare V.9 [5] 2. Catapano (1995, 166 note 16) provides Plotinus’ specific allusions to and 
verbatim citations of the Symposium ascent found in this passage. 
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   (3.a) Arts, sciences, virtues 
...that there is beauty in arts and [11] sciences and virtues. Then... 
   (3.b)Unity of beauties in Intellect 
...all these beauties must be reduced to unity, and [12] he must be shown 
their origin. But from virtues he can at once ascend [13] to Intellect, to 
Being; and There he must go the higher way. 
 
The introduction of the last step, (3.b), in this “Plotinian ladder of love” is at first 
problematic for two reasons, one internal and one external. First, within Plotinus’ own 
division, when the lover reaches Intellect, he is no longer a lover in the narrow sense in 
which the term ἐρωτικός is used in the context of treatise I.3 [20], but is ready to take on 
the practice of higher dialectic (i.e., dialectic proper or the peak of philosophical activity) 
in order to be at home in Intellect and, eventually, be able to move past it in the direction 
of the One. In this view, step (3.b) would seem to be, rather than the final step of the 
lover’s ascent, the trait d’union between lower and higher dialectic. 
The second or external reason why step (3.b) may appear problematic is that if we 
compare my division of the “Plotinian ladder of love” at I.3 [20] 2.5–13 with the division 
of the parallel Platonic text of the Greater Mysteries of love from the Symposium given at 
page 49 above, we will immediately realize that in the Platonic scala amoris there is one 
further step (i.e., step (4): the vision of Beauty itself) which seems to be missing in the 
text from the Enneads.
164
 However, if we grant that what in Plato is Beauty itself can here 
be legitimately linked to the Plotinian Good (see Chapter Two note 47, and note 80 
above), the Plotinian ladder of love will also have a fourth and truly final step, namely 
union with the One. For Plotinus, in order to be able to take this further step, the 
                                                 
164
 The importance of other differences between the two “ladders”—Plato’s and Plotinus’—especially in 
their respective steps (3.a) and (3.b), should not be underemphasized, but here I will not be able to deal 
with these differences explicitly in any detail. 
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individual soul has first to move not only beyond love as narrowly understood in I.3 
[20], but also beyond the philosophical practice of superior dialectic, which in the present 
text is introduced as “the higher way” (I.3 [20] 2.13: τὴν ἄνω πορείαν). 
The fundamental feature distinguishing superior dialectic from both music and 
love is the fact that the philosopher, in contrast with the practitioners of the other two 
disciplines, is spontaneously directed toward the intelligible or, as Plotinus writes 
borrowing the language of the Phaedrus (246c1, 249c4–5), naturally “winged” (I.3 [20] 
3.2: ἐπτερωμένο; cf. also 1.9–10), disposed to learning (φιλομαθὴς) and virtuous 
(ἐνάρετον) (I.3 [20] 3.7–8). What the philosopher still needs is a deeper familiarity with 
the immaterial realm of Intellect, a familiarity which, like the student in the program of 
higher studies of the Republic, one can acquire through mathematical studies,
165
 and then 
through the practice of dialectic itself, until one becomes “a complete dialectician” (I.3 
[20] 3.9: ὅλως διαλεκτικὸν).166 
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 Plato, Republic VII.523a1–3, 525d5–8; cf. also Alcinous, Didaskalikos XXVIII.182.8–14. 
 
166
 For our purposes, it is not necessary to dwell on the details of the nature of dialectic. Let it suffice to cite 
the description provided by Plotinus at I.3 [20] 4.2–6: dialectic “[2] is the condition [ἕξις] which can 
speak about everything in a reasoned way [λόγῳ], [3] and say what it is and how it differs from other 
things and what it has in [4] common with them; in what class each thing is and where it stands in that 
class, and if it really is [5] what it is, and how many real beings [τὰ ὄντα; i.e., intelligibles] there are, and 
again how many non-real beings [τὰ μὴ ὄντα; i.e., sensibles, on which see I.8 [51] 3.1–12 and IGAL (I, 
229 note 18)], different from [6] real beings” (ARMSTRONG’s translation, with minor changes). As 
ARMSTRONG (I, 156–157 note 2) rightly remarks, it does not seem necessary to postulate any Stoic 
influence in this description of dialectic; all its elements can safely be derived from Plato (see in 
particular Sophist 253b8–254b6, Statesman 262a8–263a1, Philebus 14c1–17a7, Phaedrus 265c5–266b2, 
Republic VII.531c9–535a2); see also IGAL (I, 228 note 17). In the remaining chapters of the treatise, 5 
and 6, Plotinus adds two further qualifications of dialectic. First (I.3 [20] 5), rather than being identical 
with philosophy, dialectic is “the valuable part of philosophy” (I.3 [20] 5.9: Ἢ φιλοσοφίας μέρος τὸ 
τίμιον; see also the reference to Philebus 58d6–7 at 5.4–5). As such, it differs from logic (I.3 [20] 5.10: 
ὄργανον, according to Aristotelian usage) because it does not deal merely with “bare theories and rules” 
(5.11: ψιλὰ θεωρήματά [...] καὶ κανόνες) but with “real beings” (5.12: τὰ ὄντα). Secondly (I.3 [20] 6), it 
is because it knows real beings that dialectic is also the foundation of the other parts of philosophy, 
namely, physics and ethics (I.3 [20] 6.1–5 and 6.5–24 respectively). 
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We thus come to our third division of eros announced in the title of this 
subsection: eros as the fundamental force regulating all movement of ascent. This is what 
in our present threefold distinction I referred to as “connatural eros” or “innate eros.” I 
already touched on it briefly in Chapter Two (pages 117–119), but I think it is important 
here clearly to distinguish it both from the eros by which a given stage of pre-hypostatic 
matter turns toward its generator and, in-formed by it, becomes a definite hypostasis, and, 
more sharply, from eros as a method of ascent as it is presented in the treatise on 
dialectic, I.3 [20]. That connatural eros and hypostatic eros are conceptually different 
should be clear from their respective outcomes: the latter brings about a hypostasis, 
whether Nous or soul, as a matter of necessity (in accordance with the Principle of 
Superabundance); the former is like a natural inclination toward the One but its outcome, 
rather than itself a hypostasis, is an assimilation to a hypostasis, or to a higher level of 
reality—leaving aside the fact that the soul is free to disregard the direction in which its 
inborn eros points and reject the possibility of such an assimilation (cf. the end of 
Subsection 4.4.2). 
But more important for our discussion of the Ascent is the difference between 
eros as a method of ascent and that eros which here I have called connatural, a distinction 
that has generally gone unnoticed in studies of Plotinus’ thought. Put simply, connatural 
eros is not a method at all but rather the all-encompassing condition of possibility of all 
ascending movement (and, as such, of all “methods” of ascent). We might describe this 
eros as an inborn orientation of the soul toward the One qua Good. 
In notes 4 and 5 above I provided references to passages in which Plotinus thinks 
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that the whole of reality desires and is oriented toward the Good. Only in some of 
those references does ἔρως (and its verbal and adjectival cognates) appear as the 
operative word of desire. But there are other places in which Plotinus uses the term 
precisely to express the soul’s inborn desire for the Good. Thus, while at V.5 [32] 12.7–9 
Plotinus will write that all things desire (ἐφίεται) the Good by a necessity of nature 
(φύσεως ἀνάγκῃ), in an earlier treatise, at VI.9 [9] 9.24–26, he refers to the inborn 
character of the soul’s desire for the Good with the term ἔρως: “And the souls innate love 
makes clear that the Good is there, and this is why Eros is coupled with the Psyches in 
pictures and stories.” And just a little later in the same chapter, at lines 33–34: “The soul 
then in her natural state is in love with God and wants to be united with him; it is like the 
noble love of a girl for her noble father” (cf. Chapter Three note 9, and note 149 above on 
this image). Perhaps even more emphatically, at III.5 [50] 4.22–23, speaking of 
Aphrodite as the mythical representation of the soul, Plotinus writes: “Aphrodite is soul, 
and Eros is the activity of soul reaching out after the Good.” And close to the end of the 
same treatise, at III.5 [50] 9.39–41: “And so this being, Love, has from everlasting come 
into existence from the soul’s aspiration toward the higher and the good, and he was there 
always, as long as Soul, too, existed.”  In addition to this, in two passages from VI.7 [38] 
Plotinus makes clear that it is the One itself that provides the soul with this eros: “And as 
long as there is something higher than that which is present to it [viz. to soul], it naturally 
goes on upwards, lifted by the giver of its love” (VI.7 [38] 22.17–19); and so the soul 
loves the Good, “moved by it from the beginning” (VI.7 [38] 31.17–18).167 
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 Here is the Greek text of all the passages from the Enneads mentioned in the present paragraph in the 
order in which I referred to them. V.5 [32] 12.7–9: [7] Πάντα γὰρ ὀρέγεται ἐκείνου καὶ ἐφίεται αὐτοῦ [8] 
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Thus, for Plotinus connatural eros is an inborn orientation toward the Good 
belonging to every soul. In particular, it is that factor which allows the individual rational 
soul metaphorically to climb the levels of the Plotinian hierarchy and approach the One. 
Like hypostatic eros, the innate character of connatural eros brings within itself an 
element of necessity, in the sense that the individual soul does not choose to desire the 
Good but simply desires it. Even if in its embodied state oftentimes the soul remains 
uncertain about the aim of its desire and only divines it in a distant manner (cf. V.5 [32] 
12.7–9), it still desires the Good: “And the soul which has its love ready at hand, does not 
wait for a reminder from the beauties here, but because it has its love, even if it does not 
know that it has it, it is always searching...” (VI.7 [38] 31.18–21).168 This sense of 
necessity, however, is by no means identical with coercion, although it does seem to be 
something like a brute fact in manifestations of soul other than individual human souls. 
The difference, once again, seems to be that all other ensouled entities in the Plotinian 
universe possess a natural tendency toward the Good but in a manner that does not allow 
                                                                                                                                                 
φύσεως ἀνάγκῃ, ὥσπερ ἀπομεμαντευμένα, ὡς ἄνευ αὐτοῦ [9] οὐ δύναται εἶναι. VI.9 [9] 9.24–26: [24] 
Δηλοῖ δὲ ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκεῖ καὶ ὁ ἔρως [25] ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁ σύμφυτος, καθὸ καὶ συνέζευκται Ἔρως [26] 
ταῖς Ψυχαῖς καὶ ἐν γραφαῖς καὶ ἐν μύθοις. VI.9 [9] 9.33–34: [33] Ἐρᾷ οὖν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα ψυχὴ θεοῦ 
ἑνωθῆναι θέλουσα, [34] ὥσπερ παρθένος καλοῦ πατρὸς καλὸν ἔρωτα. III.5 [50] 4.22–23: [22] Ἀφροδίτη 
δὲ ψυχή, ἔρως δὲ ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς [23] ἀγαθοῦ ὀριγνωμένης. III.5 [50] 9.39–41: [39] Ἀεὶ δὲ οὕτως [40] 
ὑπέστη ὅδε ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐφέσεως πρὸς τὸ [41] κρεῖττον καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἦν ἀεί, ἐξ οὗπερ καὶ 
ψυχή, Ἔρως. VI.7 [38] 22.17–19:  see Chapter Three note 213. VI.7 [38] 31.17–18: [17] ψυχὴ ἐρᾷ μὲν 
ἐκείνου ὑπ’ [18] αὐτοῦ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς τὸ ἐρᾶν κινηθεῖσα. On a page that may sum up the meaning of these 
passages, Hadot (1993, 50–51) writes: “What Plotinus calls the Good is thus, at the same time, that 
which, by bestowing grace, gives rise to love, and that which, by awakening love, causes grace to appear. 
The Good is what all things desire; it is what is desirable in an absolute sense. We asserted that love and 
grace are unjustified; likewise, the Good is absolutely unjustified. It is not random or accidental, but by 
willing itself and being what it wants to be, it freely creates the love that beings feel for it, as well as the 
grace they receive from it.” 
 
168
 VI.7 [38] 31.18–21: [18] Καὶ ἡ πρόχειρον [19] ἔχουσα τὸν ἔρωτα ὑπόμνησιν οὐ περιμένει ἐκ τῶν καλῶν 
[20] τῶν τῇδε, ἔχουσα δὲ τὸν ἔρωτα, καὶ ἂν ἀγνοῇ ὅτι ἔχει, [21] ζητεῖ ἀεὶ. 
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them to depart from their assigned “position” in the hierarchical order and thus to 
become assimilated to the One. By contrast, while it remains true that the individual 
human soul is naturally (i.e., necessarily) endowed with a desire for the Good, or its 
connatural eros, this same soul can always choose either to follow the upward direction 
toward which its eros urges it, or else to turn away from the Good and commit itself to 
the pursuit of what for Plotinus are mere images of beauties. But even this “turning 
away” remains possible only insofar as the individual soul recognizes something 
desirable (i.e., something good, although qualifiedly so) in such images. 
One will object: What is the significance of positing an inborn tendency toward 
the Good in individual souls (connatural eros), if, after all, these can disregard the 
direction to which this tendency points? That is, in what sense does connatural eros 
necessarily belong to soul if at least some souls, that is, individual rational souls or 
human souls, can move away from the goal indicated by their eros? A similar question 
can be asked about the doctrine of the undescended soul: In what sense is the best part of 
a human soul undescended if the individual human being to whom that part belongs has 
to struggle to ascend? The answer to these questions, as already in Plato (see pages 79, 
96–97, and 99 above), is that although eros names an essential force or power present in 
the soul (a power without which no Ascent to the Good nor recognition of lesser goods 
would be possible, and in this sense the regulating force of all ascending movement), in 
order for the Ascent to be actualized, the direction indicated by this power needs to be 
recognized and the power itself needs to be put to work so as to bring about an active 
transformation of the soul. This transformation, the assimilation of the soul to higher 
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realities, is the fulfillment of the task indicated by its connatural eros: the Ascent 
itself. Plotinus expresses this metaphorically when in the oldest treatise of the Enneads, a 
description of the work that the soul ought to do in order to ascend to Beauty itself, he 
borrows and recontextualizes an image from Plato and writes: “never stop ‘working on 
your statue’” (I.6 [1] 9.13).169 The statue is one’s soul, and working on it means putting 
one’s efforts into reintegrating one’s endowed self into one’s ideal self (I will come back 
to this at the beginning of the next section). Less metaphorically, in the more technical 
language of his own metaphysical system, Plotinus states at V.1 [10] 12.5–21:170 
[5] Not everything which is in [6] soul is immediately perceptible, but it 
reaches “us” only when [7] it reaches sense-perception. Whenever 
something is active and does not communicate with the [8] faculty of 
perception, it has not yet permeated the whole soul. So [9] we have no 
knowledge as yet, since we are involved with the sense faculty, and are 
not a part [10] of soul but the whole soul. Furthermore, each of the [11] 
parts of the soul is always alive and active by itself, but there is [12] 
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 I.6 [1] 9.13: μὴ παύσῃ τεκταίνων τὸ σὸν ἄγαλμα. The allusion is to Plato, Phaedrus 252d7, with the 
difference that “in Plato it is the lover who works on the soul of his beloved, fashioning it into the 
likeness of the god they once followed together” (ARMSTRONG I, 259 note 1). For Plotinus one’s staute is 
one’s individual soul. See also I.6 [1] 5.24–58, where Plotinus expresses the same idea through the 
metaphor of the soul’s purifying itself from ugliness (τὸ αἰσχρόν) and impurity (ἀκάθαρτον); at lines 45–
48 he writes of the soul: “[45] its [46] ugliness has come from an addition of something alien, and its 
business, [47] if it is to be beautiful again, is to wash and purify itself and so be again [48] what it was 
before” ([45] ᾧ δὴ [46] τὸ αἰσχρὸν προσθήκῃ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου προσῆλθε καὶ ἔργον [47] αὐτῷ, εἴπερ ἔσται 
πάλιν καλός, ἀπονιψαμένῳ καὶ καθηραμένῳ [48] ὅπερ ἦν εἶναι. ARMSTRONG’s translation, with minor 
changes). 
 
170
 V.1 [10] 12.5–21: [5] Οὐ γὰρ πᾶν, ὃ ἐν [6] ψυχῇ, ἤδη αἰσθητόν, ἀλλὰ ἔρχεται εἰς ἡμᾶς, ὅταν εἰς [7] 
αἴσθησιν ἴῃ· ὅταν δὲ ἐνεργοῦν ἕκαστον μὴ μεταδιδῷ τῷ [8] αἰσθανομένῳ, οὔπω δι’ ὅλης ψυχῆς 
ἐλήλυθεν. Οὔπω οὖν [9] γιγνώσκομεν ἅτε μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ὄντες. καὶ οὐ μόριον [10] ψυχῆς ἀλλ’ ἡ 
ἅπασα ψυχὴ ὄντες. Καὶ ἔτι ἕκαστον τῶν [11] ψυχικῶν ζῶν ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖ ἀεὶ καθ’ αὑτὸ τὸ αὑτοῦ· τὸ δὲ [12] 
γνωρίζειν, ὅταν μετάδοσις γένηται καὶ ἀντίληψις. Δεῖ τοίνυν, [13] εἰ τῶν οὕτω παρόντων ἀντίληψις 
ἔσται, καὶ τὸ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον [14] εἰς τὸ εἴσω ἐπιστρέφειν, κἀκεῖ ποιεῖν τὴν [15] προσοχὴν ἔχειν. 
Ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἀκοῦσαι ἀναμένων ἣν ἐθέλει [16] φωνήν, τῶν ἄλλων φωνῶν ἀποστὰς τὸ οὖς ἐγείροι πρὸς 
τὸ [17] ἄμεινον τῶν ἀκουστῶν, ὁπότε ἐκεῖνο προσέλθοι, οὕτω τοι [18] καὶ ἐνταῦθα δεῖ τὰς μὲν αἰσθητὰς 
ἀκούσεις ἀφέντα, εἰ μὴ [19] καθόσον ἀνάγκη, τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς τὸ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι [20] δύναμιν 
φυλάττειν καθαρὰν καὶ ἕτοιμον ἀκούειν φθόγγων [21] τῶν ἄνω. The translation of this text is from 
Atkinson (1983), with minor changes. Cf. IV.3 [27] 30.11–16, IV.8 [6] 8.3–9. For an enlightening 
commentary and parallels to V.1 [10] 12, see Atkinson (1983, 241–250). 
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recognition only when communication and perception takes place. Thus, [13] 
if there is to be perception of what we have described as present, the 
power of apprehension [14] must turn inwards, and must be made to [15] 
attend there. Just as someone listening for a voice which he particularly 
wishes to hear [16] stands aside from the other voices and pricks up his 
ears for the [17] preferable sound until this arrives, so too in this case [18] 
perceptible noises must be left aside, except [19] insofar as is necessary, 
and the soul’s power of apprehension [20] must be kept pure and ready to 
hear the sounds [21] from above. 
  
We are not always aware of what is already in us, nor do we always activate it, 
but higher realities in general and the One in particular are always present to the 
individual soul, as Plotinus remarks: “But if you went away, it was not from it [viz. the 
One]—for it is present—and you did not even go away then, but were present and turned 
the opposite way” (VI.5 [23] 12.27–29).171 In this light, the task indicated by our 
connatural eros is to turn our attention back to the One. 
Elsewhere, in a quasi-Kantian tone that highlights the necessity of the efforts 
required to achieve happiness (εὐδαιμονία, which from this perspective may be 
understood as the stable condition of the individual soul in Nous; cf. Subsection 4.6.2), 
Plotinus states: “people must not demand to be happy who have not done what deserves 
happiness” (III.2 [47] 4.45–47).172 The patient polishing and chiseling of our statue, the 
work of activation of what is always already in us, the movement of conversion that 
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 VI.5 [23] 12.27–29: [27] Εἰ δ’ ἀπῆλθες, οὐκ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ—αὐτὸ γὰρ [28] πάρεστιν—οὐδὲ τότε ἀπῆλθες, 
ἀλλὰ παρὼν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία [29] ἐστράφης. 
 
172
 III.2 [47] 4.45–47: [45] οὐδ’ ἀπαιτητέον [46] τούτοις τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὑπάρχειν, οἷς μὴ εἴργασται 
εὐδαιμονίας [47] ἄξια (ARMSTRONG’s translation, modified). Kant’s passages I have in mind are his 
definition of morality in the Critique of Practical Reason (V, 130: “morals [die Moral] is not properly 
the doctrine of how we are to make ourselves happy but of how we are to become worthy [würdig] of 
happiness [Glückseligkeit]”) and his description of the good will (der gute Wille) as “the indispensable 
condition even of worthiness [Würdigkeit] to be happy” (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals IV, 
393); translations are by M. Gregor (in Kant 1996). Clearly, and as I already remarked earlier in note 53, 
Kant’s and Plotinus’ respective concepts of εὐδαιμονία and Glückseligkeit, which in English are both 
loosely rendered with “happiness,” do not coincide. 
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reverses our having turned away from the One, or the efforts, deserving of happiness, 
that we put into reintegrating our lower part or endowed self into our undescended part or 
ideal self: these are all complementary ways of naming the Ascent, whose general 
features and major steps or stages I will proceed to sketch in the next two sections. 
4.5 Four Features Common to All the Stages of the Ascent: Subtraction, 
Implication of Lower stages, Intensification of Eros, Non-reciprocal Participation 
Before I deal with the actual stages of the Ascent, I will provide an overview of 
four features of the Ascent that I take to be common to all its stages. In the order in which 
I will present them in this section, these features are: first, in relation to the sage 
preceding it, each stage implies, not the addition, but the subtraction of something that 
was present at a lower stage; second, every stage presupposes the ones prior to it; third, 
proceeding upwards, each stage implies an increase in unity and in the intensity of eros; 
fourth, that which assimilates the individual soul to a higher stage is not necessarily 
found on the higher stage. 
The first of these features is the idea that each of the stages of the Ascent implies 
not the addition of an element previously absent to the individual soul, but the subtraction 
of something which is only incidentally present and hinders one’s reintegration into what 
is present always and essentially. In this light, the metaphor of the sculptor working on 
his statue (cf. page 377 above), initially chipping away the surplus material, next 
carefully smoothening its rough edges, and finally patiently polishing its uneven surface, 
should not be understood as a description of the efforts by which an originally or 
naturally shapeless and coarse piece of material is turned into an artwork through some 
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technique or art—artificially. It is just the other way around. What is original is the 
statue itself, perfectly formed and polished. The surplus material does not belong to it 
naturally but came to it as something added from without, subsequently and incidentally. 
The work of the sculptor is to bring the statue back to its original splendor, now lying 
hidden under layers of impurities, rather than imparting on it a form and a look alien to 
it.
173
 Thus the artist is strictly not a sculptor, but a restorer of a work not of his own 
making. The responsibility for the restoration, however, is entirely his, for he is that 
statue, the soul itself. An appropriate understanding of this metaphor is important in order 
to grasp the nature of the Ascent. For the individual soul, to make its way to the Good 
does not mean to take upon itself something that originally was not its own. On the 
contrary, it means precisely to eliminate that which does not belong to it essentially, 
something which is fundamentally foreign to its nature and which ultimately causes the 
soul to lose sight of the direction indicated by its connatural eros. Every stage of the 
Ascent is understood as much in terms of what is left behind as it is in terms of the 
plateau to which it leads the individual soul. Thus, Plotinus writes with his customary 
brevity: “You will increase yourself then by rejecting all else, and the All will be present 
to you in your rejection” (VI.5 [23] 12.24–25). More laconically still, on the very last line 
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 In the dramatic poem Michael Angelo by Henry W. Longfellow, the aging Renaissance sculptor 
Michelangelo, perhaps influenced by Platonizing ideas that had been recently popularized in the Latin 
West by Ficino’s translations of Plato’s dialogues and of the Enneads into Latin, is portrayed as saying to 
his helper, Urbino: “Some have eyes | That see not; but in every block of marble | I see a statue, — see it 
as distinctly | As if it stood before me shaped and perfect | In attitude and action. I have only | To hew 
away the stone walls that imprison | The lovely apparition, and reveal it | To other eyes as mine already 
see it” (Longfellow 1922, 582). In a letter to Benedetto Varchi, Michelangelo himself wrote: “Io intendo 
scultura, quella che si fa per forza di levare...” (Letter 462 = Buonarroti 1875, 522); cf. Aristotle, Physics 
I.190b8–9. 
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of treatise V.3 [49]: “Take away everything!”174  
The second feature common to all the stages of the Ascent is the fact that for 
Plotinus every stage presupposes the one(s) prior to it.
175
 Thus, union is not possible 
                                                 
174
 VI.5 [23] 12.24–25: [24] Αὔξεις τοίνυν σεαυτὸν ἀφεὶς τὰ ἄλλα καὶ πάρεστί σοι τὸ [24] πᾶν ἀφέντι. V.3 
[49] 17.38: Ἄφελε πάντα (besides VI.5 [23] 12.24–25, this formula has several parallels in the Enneads, 
most notably I.2 [19] 4.6, I.6 [1] 8.25, V.5 [32] 13.11, 6.19; cf. also V.1 [10] 12.18, VI.9 [9] 9.50, VI.7 
[38] 34.4). See Gatti (1996, 211–216), who speaks of this ἀφαίρεσις precisely as a subtraction of alterity, 
the elimination of what in the soul is alien to its nature. As I pointed out earlier in my remarks on the 
term φυγή in Subsection 4.4.2, the concept of flight or escape cannot be reduced to the simplistic idea of 
a literal departure from the body, but rather a voluntary dissociation from wickedness. In the present 
context, too, restoration should not be understood immediately as separation from the body. If this were 
the case, suicide would suffice to bring one’s statue back to its original splendor: a shortcut to the Good 
and a substitute for the Ascent. But as Plotinus makes clear in the last, brief treatise of the first Ennead 
(I.9 [16] On going out of the body), suicide is not admitted (see also II.9 [33] 18.14–17), though both in 
the same treatise (I.9 [16] 1.9–14, 17) and elsewhere (I.4 [46] 7.31–32, 43–45, 8.5–10, 16.17–29) he 
seems to consider it an acceptable way to release the soul from the body, but only for someone who 
cannot advance further toward εὐδαιμονία, and only if the decision to commit suicide springs from a 
rational disposition. In other words, only the one who is already a sage (σπουδαῖος) can discern when 
suicide is opportune. It is significant that Plotinus advised Porphyry against suicide, as testified in VP 
11.11–19. The sixth-century commentator Elias, in his Prolegomena to Philosophy VI.15.23–16.2 (a text 
reported and translated at the end of the first Ennead in ARMSTRONG I, 324–325) refers to a treatise by 
Plotinus “On reasonable departure” (περί εὐλόγου ἐξαγωγῆς) and writes that Plotinus rejects all the five 
reasons for suicide considered acceptable by the Stoics (these are listed in SVF III, 768 = Anecdota 
Graeca IV.403.27–405.2: a grave emergency, coercion to act immorally, a prolonged illness impeding 
the use of the body, extreme poverty, and madness; cf. Olympiodorus, Commentary on Plato’s Phaedo 
I.8.19–39). In light of the actual contents of Plotinus’ treatise I.9 [16], it is not clear that this is the 
treatise that Elias had in mind (as Olympiodorus confirms in his Commentary on Plato’s Phaedo I.8.17–
18), though we have no other treatise on suicide in the Enneads (in I.9 [16] and in the passages from I.4 
[46] cited in the present footnote Plotinus seems to accept the second, third, and fifth reason given by the 
Stoics). For a discussion of suicide in Plotinus see McGroarty (2006, 126, 128–129, 131–132, 199, and 
especially 205–206). Thus, restoration, much like flight, must be conceived of as a process of 
dissociation from what does not originally belong to the soul, in particular from the morbid attachments 
to—and even the identification with—the needs and desires of the body. It follows that although 
separation can be understood also literally, its literal meaning is not its primary meaning. Put simply, for 
Plotinus dissociation from the body appears to be a necessary condition only for a permanent 
reintegration of oneself into higher realities, but a temporary reintegration can be experienced even in 
(spite of) one’s embodied condition, as Plotinus’ own experience as reported by Porphyry (VP 23.17–19) 
seems to confirm. 
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 One will find the theme of the Ascent treated explicitly in a number of passages in the Enneads, most 
notably I.6 [1], III.8 [30], V.8 [31] and V.5 [32], II.9 [33], VI.7 [38] 31–36. The three “ascents” in (i) 
III.8 [30], (ii) V.8 [31] and V.5 [32], and (iii) II.9 [33] are part of what according to Harder (1956–1971, 
IIIb, 365) is one single treatise, the so-called Großschrift (cf. Cilento 1971 and Elsas 1975; against 
Harder, see Wolters 1981, criticized in turn by IGAL II, 231–232 note 2). Notice that the third ascent of 
the Großschrift, that of II.9 [33], is spurious: in it Plotinus presents a Gnostic view of the ascent only to 
contrast it with the true (i.e., Platonic) view given in V.8 [31] and V.5 [32]. I will not focus on any of 
these passages in particular, but draw freely from them and, particularly in the first two stages 
(purification and intellification), from I.2 [19] On virtues. 
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without either intellification or purification (on which see Section 4.6), and 
intellification is pure fancy if it is not preceded by purification. This is an important 
aspect of the Ascent to bear in mind, for it simply tells us that there are no shortcuts to the 
end of the journey. Plotinus’ earlier quoted remark that “people must not demand to be 
happy who have not done what deserves happiness” (III.2 [47] 4.45–47; see note 172 
above) becomes understandable in the light of this feature of the Ascent. The task 
indicated by one’s connatural eros is an orderly affair: skipping steps only brings to 
failure in the Ascent. So, for example, a moral life, which is the clear sign of a purified 
soul, is by no means superfluous to a life in Intellect; not in the sense that one acts 
virtuously in Intellect qua member of the noetic realm, but in that one will never come to 
be reintegrated in Intellect without having first become virtuous in an ordinary sense.
176
 
Therefore, higher steps of the Ascent do not obliterate lower ones, nor do they simply 
overcome them in the sense of making them no longer necessary. Rather, a higher stage 
subsumes a lower one under itself by completing it and by fulfilling its purpose, thus 
maintaining it in existence as an accomplished task. But since this accomplishment is a 
matter of subtraction, what is maintained in existence is present precisely qua subtracted. 
We could say that a lower step would be pointless (i.e., it would not be what it claims to 
be) if it were not taken up as accomplished in a higher one; conversely, at least from the 
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 When in the treatise on dialectic Plotinus writes that the philosopher is naturally predisposed to the 
noetic and “winged” (I.3 [20] 3.1–3), this does not mean that as a philosopher one may disregard 
morality, but that he or she is already living morally; if not, that person is simply not a philosopher in the 
sense in which Plotinus understands the term. At VI.7 [38] 36.6–10 Plotinus writes that we learn about 
the One by comparing and negating what we know about its effects, but that “[8] we are put on the way 
to it by purifications [καθάρσεις] [9] and virtues [ἀρεταὶ] and adornings [κοσμήσεις] and by gaining 
footholds in the intelligible and [10] settling ourselves firmly there and feasting on its contents.” Cf. Rist 
(1967, 220), ARMSTRONG (I, xxvi–xxvii). 
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perspective of the ascending individual soul, a higher step would be pure fancy if 
what was achieved in a lower one were completely effaced.
177
 One wonders if we would 
even be capable of desiring an existence at the level of Intellect without purification, and 
union without intellification. Ascent, therefore, is not only a work of purification of the 
soul indicated by its connatural eros, but a purification of eros itself, which if followed 
aright and purified or educated, leads the soul to a newly desirable desideratum. 
In this connection, it should be observed that the division in clear-cut stages is 
somewhat artificial, and this for two reasons. First, because it is not always given 
explicitly by Plotinus, although I believe that it can be derived safely from the text, and 
certainly that it may serve a pedagogical purpose. The second reason for considering a 
division of the Ascent in rigid stages as somewhat artificial is that not only the Ascent as 
a whole is fundamentally a movement comprising several stages, but each of its stages is 
also a movement made up of sub-stages. In this movement, the last sub-stage of a given 
stage is simultaneously the first sub-stage of the next stage (with the obvious exception of 
perfect union). It follows that, although it is possible conceptually to distinguish precise 
stages in the Ascent, the division in stages should point less to the independence of these 
stages from the movement taken as a whole than to the continuity in the process 
understood as a trajectory toward union. This fact is significant because it indicates that 
eros, while displaying internal qualitative differences (i.e., the stages of the Ascent), is 
fundamentally a unitary phenomenon; it also shows that the erotic Ascent is an orderly 
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 Thus, just because each of us “possesses” an undescended soul, it does not mean that we do not need to 
be purified. Purification is precisely the beginning of a process of identification with what is best in us—
our undescended soul—and what in it is most similar to the One (the so called center of the soul, on 
which see pages 341–345 above). 
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process, and that precisely because lower stages are essentially implicated in higher 
ones and lower ones essentially point to higher ones, either to skip a stage or to stop at an 
intermediary stage will result in the failure to ascend.
178
 
We thus come to our third general feature of the Ascent. While the process of 
derivation of all reality from the One qua Principle implied an increase in multiplicity and 
a decrease of unity in derived reality, the movement of assimilation toward the One qua 
Good implies a reverse dynamics: a decrease of multiplicity and an increase in unity. 
Thus, the artist’s work of restoration is at the same time a work of “simplification” or 
“unification,” an increase in the inner unity of the individual soul. More importantly for 
the subject of our study, while in derivation the eros of derived reality implied an 
increase in the gap between oneself and one’s desideratum, the soul’s the ascending 
movement toward the Good displays a decrease in this same gap (see Chapter Three, 
particularly pages 222 and 203–204). In other words, to become assimilated to the One 
qua Good means at the same time to reduce the distance that occurs between oneself and 
the aim of one’s desire. The result of this “reduction” can be understood as a fundamental 
transformation not only of the individual soul, but also of its eros. The breadth of eros 
decreases, in the sense that things that were desired at a lower stage of the Ascent (e.g., 
bodily pleasures and superfluous needs, memory, and even consciousness: see Subsection 
4.6.2) are left behind as no longer necessary nor, strictly, desirable. At the same time, the 
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 The implication of lower in higher stages of the Ascent (an implication which may be called vertical) is 
present also within smaller steps within each stage; thus, for instance, the possession of higher virtues 
presupposes the possession of lower ones (I.2 [19] 7.10–30). But there is also another type of implication 
(which we may call horizontal), as that by which virtues on a given level reciprocally imply each another, 
on the model of the virtues in Nous (I.2 [19] 7.1–10). Cf. Catapano (2006, 30, 191–208). On virtue in the 
context of the Ascent, see Subsection 4.6.1 below. 
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intensity of eros grows, in the sense that as the individual soul becomes aware of the 
increasing superiority of its desideratum, the very eros which is connatural to it increases 
and is transformed to suit its goal, ultimately aiming at becoming infinite eros in order to 
meet that which is infinite love and infinitely lovable (ἐρασμιώτατον), that which alone is 
at the same time “beloved and love and love of itself” (VI.8 [39] 15.1). 
The fourth and final feature which I take to be common to all the stages of the 
Ascent is the idea that what assimilates the individual soul to a higher stage is not 
necessarily found on that higher stage. We may take this formula as a preliminary version 
of what I will call the Principle of Participation. This last feature of the Ascent will 
require a more extensive treatment than the previous three. The issue can be clarified 
with reference to the first two chapters of Plotinus’ treatise On virtues, I.2 [19], more 
precisely to I.2 [19] 1.1–2.10.179 I will focus on the rest of this treatise in my account of 
the first stage of the Ascent (purification) in Subsection 4.6.1, where I will provide a 
sketch of Plotinus’ understanding of virtue and its degrees. For the moment, what we 
need to know is that for Plotinus the individual soul is assimilated to the divine World-
Soul through virtue, both lower and higher (I.2 [19] 1.21–26), but, in accordance with our 
preliminary formulation of the Principle of Participation, he maintains that virtue is 
absent in the divine. How is this possible? And why does Plotinus think that? Put 
differently, how is the individual soul made godlike by coming to possess a feature, 
virtue, which the god does not itself possess? 
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 There is an excellent commentary on treatise I.2 [19] by Catapano (2006), to which I already referred in 
the previous note and of which I will make abundant use in my discussion of the issue of purification in 
the remainder of this section and in Subsection 4.6.1. 
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Plotinus’ answer to these questions is found at I.2 [19] 1.6–2.10. As suggested 
by Bréhier, this answer may be Plotinus’ implicit reply to one of the objections that the 
old Parmenides raises against the young Socrates’ defense of the Forms as paradigms 
(παραδείγματα) in Plato’s Parmenides.180 The relevant passage of the dialogue between 
the two characters is Parmenides 132c12–133a7; the text reads:181 
[SOCRATES:] [132c12] This, he said, is not reasonable, Parmenides; 
[132d1] what seems much more reasonable to me is this: these Forms [d2] 
are like paradigms fixed in nature, while other things [d3] resemble them 
and are likenesses of them; and for the other things this participation [d4] 
in the Forms is nothing other than to resemble them. [d5] 
[PARMENIDES:] Well, he said, if something resembles the Form, is it 
possible for that Form [d6] not to be like that which has come to resemble 
it, insofar as it has become like it? [d7] Is there any way in which what is 
like is like what is not like it? [d8] 
[SOCRATES:] There is not. [d9] 
[PARMENIDES:] Rather, is it not indeed necessary for what is like to 
participate in one [e1] and the same Form? [e2] 
[SOCRATES:] It is. [e3] 
[PARMENIDES:] But if like things are like by participating in something, 
will that not be [e4] the Form itself? [e5] 
[SOCRATES:] By all means. [e6] 
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 Bréhier (1924–1938, I, 50 note 1); cf. also ARMSTRONG (I, 132 note 1), Dillon (1983, 96–97), Pradeau 
(2003, 124–125); see especially Catapano (2006, 22, 34–37, 106–107), who gives a clear account of the 
problem and provides further bibliographical references. 
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 Plato, Parmenides 132d5–133a7: [SOCRATES:] [132c12] Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τοῦτο, φάναι, ἔχει λόγον ἀλλ’, ὦ 
Παρμενίδη, [132d1] μάλιστα ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται ὧδε ἔχειν· τὰ μὲν εἴδη ταῦτα [d2] ὥσπερ 
παραδείγματα ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις [d3] ἐοικέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα, καὶ ἡ μέθεξις 
αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις [d4] γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς. [d5] [PARMENIDES:] Εἰ οὖν 
τι, ἔφη, ἔοικεν τῷ εἴδει, οἷόν τε ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος [d6] μὴ ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ εἰκασθέντι, καθ’ ὅσον αὐτῷ 
ἀφωμοιώθη; [d7] ἢ ἔστι τις μηχανὴ τὸ ὅμοιον μὴ ὁμοίῳ ὅμοιον εἶναι; [d8] [S:] Οὐκ ἔστι. [d9] [P:] Τὸ δὲ 
ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἆρ’ οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη ἑνὸς τοῦ [e1] αὐτοῦ [εἴδους] μετέχειν; [e2] [S:] Ἀνάγκη. [e3] 
[P:] Οὗ δ’ ἂν τὰ ὅμοια μετέχοντα ὅμοια ᾖ, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται [e4] αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος; [e5] [S:] Παντάπασι μὲν 
οὖν. [e6] [P:] Οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τέ τι τῷ εἴδει ὅμοιον εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος [e7] ἄλλῳ· εἰ δὲ μή παρὰ τὸ εἶδος 
ἀεὶ ἄλλο ἀναφανήσεται εἶδος, [133a1] καὶ ἂν ἐκεῖνό τῳ ὅμοιον ᾖ, ἕτερον αὖ, καὶ οὐδέποτε παύσεται [a2] 
ἀεὶ καινὸν εἶδος γιγνόμενον, ἐὰν τὸ εἶδος τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μετέχοντι [a3] ὅμοιον γίγνηται. [a4] [S:] 
Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις. [a5] [P:] Οὐκ ἄρα ὁμοιότητι τἆλλα τῶν εἰδῶν μεταλαμβάνει, ἀλλά [a6] τι ἄλλο δεῖ 
ζητεῖν ᾧ μεταλαμβάνει. [a7] [S:] Ἔοικεν. The translation is by R. E. Allen (1997), modified; most 
notably, I translate εἶδος with “Form” rather than Allen’s “character.” At 132e1, Burnet (1899–1907) 
brackets the word εἴδους; I follow the manuscript tradition and maintain it, with R. E. Allen (1997), M. 
L. Gill and P. Ryan (1996). 
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[PARMENIDES:] Then it is not possible for anything to be like the Form, or for 
the Form to be like [e7] anything else; otherwise another Form will always 
appear alongside the Form, [133a1] and should that [other Form] be like 
something, another again; and a new Form [a2] will never stop coming 
into being, if the Form comes to be like that which [a3] participates in it. 
[a4] 
[SOCRATES:] You are quite right. [a5] 
[PARMENIDES:] Then it is not by likeness that the other things participate 
in the Forms, but [a6] it is necessary to look for something else by which 
they participate. [a7] 
[SOCRATES:] So it seems. 
 
The main point of Parmenides’ objection can be summed up thus: if two things 
(‘X’ and ‘Y’) are similar, or alike, in virtue of their participation in a common Form 
(‘F’), it follows that ‘F’ is like ‘Y’ and ‘X’. But then ‘X’, ‘Y’ and ‘F’ will be like in 
virtue of their participation in a second Form (‘F-1’). The same argument applies to the 
similarity between ‘X’, ‘Y’, ‘F’ and ‘F-1’, so that a third Form (‘F-2’) is required; and so 
on ad infinitum. 
For Plotinus’ refusal to assign virtue to the god, Parmenides’ objection would 
translate in the observation that if it is through virtue that the individual soul becomes 
godlike, then the god must be virtuous (cf. I.2 [19] 1.5–6). Plotinus’ reply to this 
objection presupposes that the nature of the divine World-Soul (which is the god in 
question here) is superior to that of the individual soul precisely by not possessing that by 
which the individual soul becomes like it, that is, virtue. But how is this possible? 
Plotinus’ answer is based on a fundamental clarification of the meaning of participation 
(μεταλαμβάνειν: I.2 [19] 1.40, 44, 47).182 The leading principle of his solution, the 
                                                 
182
 Before outlining his solution, Plotinus had introduced two arguments in the form of questions, whose 
answers he must have taken to be negative. First, “if something is hot by the presence of heat, must that 
from which the heat comes also be heated?” (I.2 [19] 1.31–33). A negative answer to this question will 
give rise to the objection that the heated thing (i.e., the individual soul) becomes hot (i.e., virtuous) by 
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Principle of Participation, may be reconstructed more precisely from I.2 [19] 1.40–42 
(numbered terms in italic indicate the elements involved in this principle):
183
 
(i) that in which (ii) something participates is other than (iii) that because 
of which (ii) it participates in (i) it. 
 
Plotinus throws light on this principle by distinguishing two ways in which 
likeness or assimilation (ὁμοίωσις: I.2 [19] 2.4) can occur (I.2 [19] 2.1–10). The first is 
reciprocal or symmetrical, as that between particular items deriving from the same 
principle (e.g., several particular reflections of myself in a series of mirrors). The second 
way is non-reciprocal or asymmetrical (I.2 [19] 2.7: οὐκ ἀντιστρέφον), as when of two 
similar things one is primary (e.g., I and my reflection in a mirror). The first kind of 
likeness is that between several copies deriving from the same original; the second is 
                                                                                                                                                 
receiving heat (i.e., virtue) from fire understood as a heat-source external to the heated thing and 
possessing heat connaturally (i.e., the World-Soul as the external source of virtue possessing virtue 
connaturally) (I.2 [19] 1.35–38). Second, “if something is made hot by the presence of fire, must the fire 
itself be heated by the presence of fire?” (I.2 [19] 1.33–35)? Again, a negative answer would be met by 
an objection: fire (i.e., the World-Soul) is not heated (i.e., made virtuous) by the presence of fire simply 
because fire is the principle of heat, or heat itself (i.e., virtue itself) (I.2 [19] 1.38–39). As Catapano 
(2006, 20) rightly comments, “[p]er sfuggire a tali difficoltà occorre abbandonare il piano degli esempi e 
spiegarsi in termini strettamente metafisici,” which is precisely what Plotinus is going to do. 
 
183
 Here is I.2 [19] 1.40–42, Plotinus’ text from which the Principle of Participation can be derived: [40] 
Ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν οὗ μεταλαμβάνει [41] ψυχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἦν τῷ ἀφ’ οὗ, οὕτως ἔδει λέγειν· νῦν δὲ [42] ἕτερον μὲν 
ἐκεῖνο, ἕτερον δὲ τοῦτο. ARMSTRONG’s translation reads: “[40] But if that in which the soul [41] 
participates was the same as the source from which it comes, it would be right to speak in this way; but in 
fact [42] the two are distinct.” In his commentary on I.2 [19] Catapano provides several useful variations 
of roughly the same principle: “ciò di cui (οὗ) un soggetto partecipa è diverso da ciò a causa di cui (ἀφ’ 
οὗ) ne partecipa (μεταλαμβάνει) e a cui si assimila grazie a tale partecipazione”; “il modello non è ciò di 
cui (οὗ) le copie partecipano, ma ciò a causa di cui (ἀφ’ οὗ) esse partecipano di una proprietà comune”; 
“[i]l principio della partecipazione è altro dal partecipato; il partecipante dunque non partecipa del 
principio, ma dal principio, ossia a causa (causa esemplare) di esso” (Catapano 2006, 20, 36, and 100 
respectively). Plotinus exemplifies his point in the ensuing lines of the treatise, at I.2 [19] 1.42–52, where 
he explains that arrangement, order, and proportion are the way in which a perceptible house is a likeness 
of the intelligible house, but that these features do not exist in the intelligible. Similarly, virtue is a form 
of harmony, order, and arrangement of the soul by which we participate in the divine; but since in the 
divine there is no such arrangement, neither will there be virtue. As ARMSTRONG (I, 130, note 1) 
explains, “[o]rder, arrangement, and proportion only appear when a form is ‘extended’ in matter, and are 
not present in the archetypal unity of the intelligible form; they are its expressions on a lower level. This 
is a principle of great importance in Plotinus’s theory of art; cp. V.8 [31] 1.” 
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between copy and original.
184
 It seems fair to maintain that while in the former case 
the similarity between several items requires a common principle that acts as the cause of 
their similarity (both ontologically and explanatorily),
185
 in the latter case no further 
principle is necessary since the thing which between the two is primary is such a 
principle. It is only in the reciprocal similarity between copies of the same original that 
recourse to a third thing, that is, the “paradigmatic” original, is necessary to explain the 
similarity; the explanation of the non-reciprocal similarity between a copy and its 
original, on the other hand, needs no third thing beyond the original involved in the 
similarity. 
Plotinus must conceive the assimilation to the divine through virtue envisioned in 
I.2 [19] as an instance of non-reciprocal participation, from which he can conclude that it 
is not necessary for the divine to be virtuous in order to explain the soul’s assimilation to 
it by virtue.
186
 As for the objection from the Parmenides, Plotinus’ reply, never formally 
stated in the Enneads but rather assumed and made operational in the discussion of topics 
such as virtue,
187
 must be that this objection relies on an inadequate understanding of 
participation. It is only if participation is taken to be a strictly reciprocal affair that an 
infinite regress in the postulation of Forms ensues; but matters are different if 
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 See Dillon (1983, 96), IGAL (I, 204), Catapano (2006, 106). 
 
185
 On an interpretation of Plotinus’ view of the causality of Forms as instrumental causality, in part against 
Aristotle’s critique of Plato (e.g., Aristotle, Metaphysics VII.1033b26–29, XII.1070a26–29, 1071b14–
17), see Gerson (1994, 42–58). 
 
186
 We hear Psellus still echoing a similar conclusion some eight centuries after Plotinus: ὁ γὰρ θεὸς 
ἐπέκεινα ἀρετῆς (De omnifaria doctrina 66.12 [On virtues] = PG 122, 718d). 
 
187
 See Catapano (2006, 37 note 68). 
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participation is understood as non-reciprocal. Thus, the relation of Forms to things is 
not one between items partaking in the same property, but one of cause to effect, like the 
relation between myself and several images of myself in a series of
188
 mirrors.
189
 
In the particular context of the treatise on virtues, I.2 [19], the Principle of 
Participation and the argument against a reciprocal view of participation concern the 
assimilation of the purified (i.e., virtuous) individual soul to the divinity of the World-
Soul. But one might ask: Do the same argument and principle hold for the soul’s 
assimilation to Nous and, further still, to the One? That is, can intellification and union 
also be regulated by the Principle of Participation? To be able to answer these questions 
is of fundamental importance for our broader discussion of the Ascent qua erotic Ascent. 
For the eros of all derived reality is directed toward something other than the reality in 
which it inheres (i.e., precisely to the One qua Good and qua other), while the eros of the 
One, henologic eros, is a wholly self-contained eros, a pure self-positing in which 
nothing is affirmed, loved or desired beyond itself. But if the endpoint of the Ascent is 
the assimilation to an eros of an altogether different kind than the one regulating the 
soul’s ascending movement toward the Good, how can it be through the latter that we 
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 We could say that a gap is maintained between Forms and things, which is the gap that exists between a 
cause and its effects. So, when just acts participate in Justice, these are like Justice in the sense that they 
are possible because the agent somehow grasps Justice; however, Justice is not like them, in the sense 
that while these are images of likenesses of Justice, Justice itself is not an image, but the cause of all such 
images. If this explanation is feasible, the next task, I surmise, would be to reply to the (Aristotelian) 
objection that Forms cannot be causes. For reasons of space, I will be unable to deal with this objection; 
cf. note 185 above. 
 
189
 Thus, Plotinus’ view of participation should be understood at the same time as a refutation of the so-
called third man argument, which is based on a strictly reciprocal notion of participation (see Aristotle, 
On Ideas, fragment 4 = Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics 84.21–85.12, 
and see also 92.30–93.7; Sophistical Refutations 178b36–179a10, Metaphysics I.990b17, VII.1039a2–3, 
XI.1059b8–9; cf. Plato, Parmenides 131e8–132b2). See Catapano (2006, 36). 
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achieve assimilation to the former? In other words, how can the eros at work in the 
Ascent be a trace of, or a participation in henologic eros if the two are fundamentally 
different kinds of eros? One can immediately see that if the argument and principle 
concerning participation which we derived from the first two chapters of I.2 [19] may be 
legitimately extended beyond the relatively limited context of the treatise in which they 
are found, the questions just asked about the process of Ascent would be met with an 
answer whose systematic import for Plotinus’ metaphysics is enormous. 
What I am suggesting is precisely that (i) the Principle of Participation should 
indeed be extended beyond the limited field of application of treatise I.2 [19], to the point 
that a non-reciprocal relation of participation will be said to apply universally to the 
relation of lower to higher realities. I am also suggesting that (ii) such a systematic 
“extension” of the Principle of Participation is a consequence of the concomitance of 
several other principles that we have encountered thus far in this study (i.e., most notably, 
the Principle of Superiority of Cause to Effect, the Principle of Likeness of Cause and 
Effect, and, ultimately, the Principle of Henologic Giving) from the vantage point of the 
Ascent.
190
 Stated otherwise, what the Principle of Henologic Giving (along with its 
corollary principles: of Superiority of Cause to Effect, and of Likeness of Cause and 
Effect) accomplishes from the perspective of derivation, the Principle of Participation 
accomplishes from the perspective of the Ascent, namely, to secure both the 
transcendence of the eros of the One and the continuity of all eros as ultimately 
dependent on henologic eros. 
                                                 
190
 For a synoptic view of the principles introduced in this study see Table 6 on the last page of the present 
chapter. 
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My first suggestion—(i) that in Plotinus’ metaphysical hierarchy the Principle 
of Participation (or a non-reciprocal view of participation) applies universally to every 
relation of things of an inferior level to those of a superior level—would seem to be 
standard Plotinian doctrine. For example, when soul turns matter into a sensible body by 
communicating life to it, the body participates in the life of soul in the way in which an 
effect participates in its cause, that is, non-reciprocally in the sense outlined above. 
Therefore, both body and soul are said to be alive, but their similarity is not measured by 
a third kind of life that applies to them in the manner of an Aristotelian universal, for 
their ways of being alive are fundamentally different: the former is a life principle, while 
the latter is alive as a recipient of life. The same reasoning applies to Form and 
everything that participates in it: the participation is of the latter in the former, not of both 
in a third term. Likewise with the One: every unity, even the unity of Nous, is a likeness 
of a unity which, not participating in any further unity, is unlike any other unity; this 
unity is the perfectly Simple from which all complexity and multiplicity must be derived 
(in accordance with the Principle of Prior Simplicity). Thus, even what in us is most 
similar to the One, the center of the soul (see pages 341–345 above) participates in the 
One in a non-reciprocal way. From the perspective of the Ascent, this means that we 
achieve union through a reintegration in what in us is most similar to the One (according 
to the Principle of Affinity and, implicitly, the Principle of As-similation); however, this 
similarity does not imply that our best part and the One share in a common property, but 
rather that our best part (specifically, the unity of its eros) is like the One in the sense that 
it is related to it like an effect is related to its cause. 
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As for my second suggestion, (ii), the universal applicability of the Principle 
of Participation is the necessary counterpart of the Principles of Superiority of Cause to 
Effect and the Principle of Likeness of Cause and Effect from the vantage point of the 
Ascent and, ultimately, a consequence of the Principle of Henologic Giving. Thus if it is 
true that, according to the Principle of Likeness of Cause and Effect, an effect resembles 
its cause, it is likewise true, in accordance with the Principle of Participation, that this 
resemblance is precisely the resemblance between an effect and its cause, not the 
resemblance of both to a third item, hence the necessity of the Principle of Superiority of 
Cause to Effect as the natural companion of the Principle of Likeness of Cause and Effect 
(and vice versa). That is, the two terms in question do not stand in a reciprocal relation of 
participation of effects in a common cause, but resemble each other non-reciprocally 
precisely qua cause and effect. Further, this is so because the cause gives what it does not 
itself have: the Principle of Henologic Giving. Strictly, this principle applies only to the 
One (see Chapter Three note 187). However, I believe that a loose applicability can be 
envisioned also with respect to the other hypostases. Thus, Intellect is Form and gives 
form to soul; but soul possesses form without being Form, and so to this extent Intellect, 
too, gives what it does not have, that is, form as possessed form, while Intellect is Form. 
Similarly, soul is life and gives life to what is lifeless; but what is made alive possesses 
life without being life, and so to this extent also soul gives what it does not have: life as 
possessed life, whereas soul causes life while itself being essentially alive. 
We thus come to the One: what does the One give which it does not itself have? 
As I argued in Subsection 3.3.2, the One is described in terms of eros: itself “beloved and 
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love and love if itself” (VI.8 [39] 15.1). As the erotic δύναμις which is the One 
overflows and generates something other than itself (cf. the Principle of Double Activity 
and the Principle of Superabundance), its “gift” to all derived reality (or derived reality as 
this very gift) is also erotic in nature (per the Principle of Likeness of Cause and Effect): 
it is love for the One qua other. The One alone, however, possesses an eros which is not 
directed to something other than itself, in accordance with the Principle of Superiority of 
Cause to Effect. Therefore, the One gives what it does not have: the Principle of 
Henologic Giving. Both the One and all that derives from it are characterized by eros, 
and to this extent there is a clear continuity in Plotinus’ metaphysics. However, since 
nothing in derived reality can be legitimately called the cause of eros except the One, the 
similarity between the One and everything derived from it is not a horizontal relation in 
which they both depend for their eros on a third erotic nature, but precisely a similarity 
between that whose eros is directed outwardly (i.e., the eros of all derived reality for the 
One qua Good) and that whose eros is a pure self-positing in which nothing further is 
sought (i.e., henologic eros: the eros of the One), as per the Principle of Participation. 
Therefore, it seems that the Principle of Participation can be applied consistently to every 
level of Plotinus’ hierarchy and that it is systematically connected with the other basic 
metaphysical principles introduced in this and the previous chapter. 
Having outlined four major features that are common to all the stages of the 
Ascent, I shall now turn to the stages themselves. 
4.6 The Stages of the Ascent: Purification, Intellification, Union 
I will present the work of reintegration of one’s soul into higher realities, or the 
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task indicated by the soul’s connatural eros, in what traditionally have been 
understood as the three main stages of the Ascent:
191
 reintegration into soul or 
purification (Subsection 4.6.1), reintegration into Nous or intellification (4.6.2), and 
reintegration into the One or union (4.6.3). 
4.6.1 Ascent to Soul: Purification 
The goal of this stage of the Ascent is to realize that one’s deeper identity lies 
neither in the body nor in the association with it at the level of the composite 
(συναμφότερον), but rather in the soul taken by itself (see Chapter Three note 256 for 
references). The result of this realization is a turning away from the material and a 
conversion (ἐπιστροφή) toward the immaterial, Nous, as that to which the soul is most 
akin (cf. I.2 [19] 4.13–18). 
One might conjecture that since first and foremost we are souls, what we do in our 
embodied condition is of little or no consequence to our deepest identity. This is 
definitely not Plotinus’ position; on the contrary, the process of identification with one’s 
soul immediately requires a disciplining of our empirical or endowed self, both with 
respect to our body and in our relations with the world, including others.
192
 Thus, 
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 See most explicitly O’Meara (1993, 103–106) and Ousager (2004, 19–119); cf. also Arnou (1967, 195–
259), Hadot (1995, 48–73), Rist (1967, 213–230), Wallis (1995, 82–90), Gatti (1996, 179–236), Gerson 
(1994, 185–224), Reale (2004, VIII, 171–186). 
 
192
 It is significant that Porphyry records some facts about Plotinus’ life that clearly indicate his master’s 
ethical stance, a stance that one will not hesitate to call ascetic (so Inge 1918, II, 167; Dillon 1999, 315). 
Thus, we are told that Plotinus was a vegetarian, to the point of refusing to take medicines containing 
parts of wild animals (VP 2.3–5). From Enneads I.2 [19] 5.18–19, one might also infer that Plotinus 
advocated and practiced celibacy (cf. Porphyry, Sententiae XXXII, 34.7–8; see Inge 1918, II, 167–168; 
for a different opinion on the matter see Ousager 2004, 270–274, especially 271). In his public life, we 
know not only that he was the active leader of a philosophical circle, but that one of his main activities 
was the care of orphans (both for their education and for the administration their property) entrusted to 
him by wealthy parents, who held him in high esteem and thought that he would make “a holy and 
godlike guardian” (VP 9.9: ἱερῷ τινι καὶ θείῳ φύλακι). From Porphyry we also learn that Plotinus had an 
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purification in a general sense means identification with, or reintegration in soul, but 
still as members of this material universe. This condition is what in treatise I.2 [19] On 
virtues Plotinus, echoing Plato’s famous text from Theaetetus 176a3–177c5 (especially 
176b1–3; see page 92 above), calls “to be made like god” or “to be assimilated to god” 
(I.2 [19] 1.3–4: θεῷ... ὁμοιωθῆναι). As I already mentioned in the previous section, the 
specific “god” that Plotinus has in mind at this stage is the soul that rules this universe 
while remaining intent on higher realities, that is, the World-Soul (I.2 [19] 1.13–14). But 
how does this “divinization” take place? How does a human individual not only come to 
the basic awareness that his or her deeper identity lies in soul, but also become like the 
most divine soul in this universe? Plotinus’ answer is plain: through virtue (ἀρετή; cf. I.2 
[19] 1.5). While using material from other treatises as well, in this subsection I will 
primarily engage the arguments presented in the treatise On virtues, I.2 [19]. 
According to Plotinus, from the perspective of the individual soul that is still in 
the process of ascent, virtue is of two kinds, or has two degrees. There are (i) lower, 
inferior or lesser virtues (ἐλάττους: see I.2 [19] 5.11, 7.11–14), more commonly called 
political or civic (πολιτικαί: see I.2 [19] 1.16, 30, 2.14, 23, 3.2–10, 7.25), and there are 
(ii) higher, superior or greater (μείζους: see I.2 [19] 1.22, 26, 3.1–5) virtues, more 
commonly called purificatory
193
 or, strictly, purifications (καθάρσεις: see I.2 [19] 3.8, 
                                                                                                                                                 
accommodating character when dealing with others, but was inflexible when it came to self-discipline: 
“Yet, though he shielded so many from the worries and cares of ordinary life, he never, while awake, 
relaxed his intent concentration upon the intellect [τὴν πρὸς τὸν νοῦν τάσιν]. He was gentle [πρᾷος], too, 
and at the disposal of all who had any sort of acquaintance with him. Though he spent twenty-six whole 
years in Rome and acted as arbitrator in very many people’s disputes, he never made an enemy of any of 
the officials” (VP 9.16–22). Cf. also Brisson (1992, 14–25). 
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 The adjective “purificatory” (καθαρτικαί) as referred to higher virtues is found, not in Plotinus, but in 
Porphyry (Sententiae XXXII.26.1, 27.1, 8, 30.8, 31.6, 9), who also calls these virtues “contemplative” 
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11).
194
 But as Plotinus points out at I.2 [19] 7.9, all virtues are purifications, hence the 
collective designation of this stage of the Ascent as “purification.”195 In addition to civic 
virtues and purifications, Plotinus distinguishes two further kinds or degrees of virtues, 
although without assigning them any technical name: (iii) the virtues of the one who has 
                                                                                                                                                 
(θεωρητικαί: Sententiae XXXII.25.9; cf. also 22.15, 23.1, 24.1). Being an interpretive paraphrasis of 
Plotinus’ treatise on virtues (I.2 [19]), the same sententia (reproduced in Stobaeus, Anthologium III, 
1.123, 89.18–96.12) distinguishes also the lower kind of virtues (i.e., the civic or political virtues; cf. 
Sententiae XXXII.23.8, 24.5, 7, 25.6–7, 26.14, 27.8, 30.6), which Porphyry also calls “practical” 
(πρακτικαί: Sententiae XXXII.31.5). See note 196 below for further distinctions in Porphyry. 
 
194
 Passages from Plato in which Plotinus is likely to have read this division of the virtues are: (i) for lower 
or political virtues, Republic IV.427e6–434d1 (see the adjective πολιτική referred to courage at 
IV.430c3) and VI. 500d4–8 (notice the adjective δημοτική, “of the people,” referred to virtue at line d8), 
and Phaedo 82a11–b1 (where the phrase τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν occurs); (ii) for higher 
virtues or purifications, Phaedo 69a6–c3 (at b1–2, 8 virtue is described as true: τῷ ὄντι, ἀληθής; at c1–2, 
the virtues considered true are said to be a purification and a cleansing: κάθαρσις, καθαρμός). Plotinus 
voices the necessity of both kinds of virtues on the background of the theme of assimilation to the divine 
of Theaetetus 176a8–c2 as well as key passages from the second speech in praise of love in the Phaedrus 
(cf. pages 92 and 59 respectively). 
Prior to Plotinus, we find several attempts at classifying virtue of more or less overt Platonic 
inspiration. In the pagan milieu, some 150 year before Plotinus, Plutarch divided virtue in moral or 
ethical (ἠθική) and contemplative or theoretical (θεωρητική) in the treatise On Moral Virtue in the sixth 
book of his Moralia. However, Catapano (2006, 42 note 83) rightly notices that Plutarch’s classification 
was “una distinzione non di grado, bensí di sede e di natura, la virtú morale essendo insita nella parte 
irrazionale e consistendo di una medietà rispetto alle passioni, la virtú contemplativa inerendo invece alla 
ragione e all’intelletto di per sé impassibile” (see Plutarch, De virtute Morali 1: Moralia VI.440d–2–3, 
3.441d5–442c6, and 5.444c9–d9). The same appears to be true of the division between “rational” 
(λογικαί) and “irrational” (αἱ περὶ τὸ ἄλογον αὐτῆς μέρος συνιστάμεναι) virtues found in chapters 
XXIX–XXXI of Alcinous’ Didaskalikos (see especially XXIX.182.19–31); Alcinous follows Plato’s 
division of the soul and the virtues proper to each of its parts as presented in the fourth book of the 
Republic. Prior to both Plutarch and Alcinous, one can find a division of virtue by Philo, in the Jewish 
milieu (Philo, Legum allegoriae I.56–108, III.125–147), while in the context of Christianity there are 
classifications by Plotinus’ older contemporary, Origen (Homily on Numbers XXVII.12 = PG 12, 793b–
800b; Commentary on Matthew’s Gospel XII.13 = PG 13, 1007b–1012a; Commentary on Paul’s Letter 
to the Romans II.7 = PG 14, 886a–890a; Exhortation to Martyrdom 5 = PG 11, 567c–570b). Dillon 
rightly points out that, compared to Plotinus’ division, the articulations found in both Philo and Origen 
appear “somewhat vague and inchoate” (Dillon 1983, 102). 
 
195
 This seems to be Plotinus’ position also in chapters 4–6 of his earliest treatise, I.6 [1]; in particular, at I.6 
[1] 6.2 he writes that “every virtue is a purification” (πᾶσα ἀρετὴ κάθαρσις). It is possible to detect a 
parallel between the division of civic virtues and purifications of I.2 [19], and the distinction between 
natural (φυσικαί) and perfect (τέλειαι) virtues found in I.3 [20] 6.18–24 (probably a re-elaboration of 
Aristotle’s distinction between natural virtue and virtue in the proper sense—φυσική and κυρία—found 
in Nicomachean Ethics VI.1144b1–21, which Plotinus may be combining with the affirmations found in 
the references from the Phaedo cited in the previous note); on this issue see Catapano (2006, 198–199). 
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already achieved purification (I.2 [19] 4.4–5), and (iv) the virtues that are in Intellect 
as paradigms, that is, the Forms of the virtues (I.2 [19] 7.1–3).196 
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 In reference to I.2 [19], Dillon (1999, 333 note 10) writes that “it does not in fact seem to be Plotinus’s 
intention to postulate further grades of virtue,” but I am not sure that this is the case. It rather seems to 
me that these two further distinctions are in fact drawn (cf. Olympiodorus, Commentary on Plato’s 
Phaedo VIII.2.12–14), but that they play a relatively small role in I.2 [19]. It is Porphyry who will make 
them explicit: he will qualify the former distinction, (iii), with a periphrasis, as “the [virtues] of the one 
who has already achieved perfect contemplation and already enjoys vision” (Sententiae XXXII.23.1–2: 
αἱ τοῦ ἤδη τελείου θεωρετικοῦ καὶ ἤδη θεατοῦ; see also 28.6–29.7), and will call the latter kind of 
virtues, (iv), “paradigmatic” (παραδιγματικαί: Sententiae XXXII.28.6, 29.9, 31.8, and cf. 23.2–3). In the 
XI century, Psellus will refer to the nameless virtues, (iii), as both νοεραί and, perhaps depending on 
Proclus (e.g., Commentary on Plato’s Republic I, 13.5) but against Porphyry’s own usage indicated in 
note 193 above, θεωρητικαί (Psellus, De omnifaria doctrina 66.6–7 [On virtues] = PG 122, 717c). 
However, in other places Psellus follows the Porphyrian division and reserves the adjective θεωρητικαί 
for the purificatory virtues or purifications, i.e., (ii) in the body of our text (see Psellus, Philosophica 
Minora II, 32.109.20–22 [On virtues]; Theologica I, 30.54–64 [Interpretation of Climacus’ dictum]). 
In post-Porphyrian Neoplatonism, other distinctions or degrees of virtue will eventually be 
incorporated in this basic fourfold division, in particular: (a) below the civic virtues, Proclus (e.g., 
Commentary on Plato’s Alcibiades I 96.7–10), probably following Iamblichus (cf. Westerink 1976, 117), 
and later Olympiodorus (Commentary on Plato’s Alcibiades I 30.4, 155.3–7, 159.5; Commentary on 
Plato’s Phaedo VIII.2.2–3) speak of “natural” (φυσικαί) and “ethical” (ἠθικαί) virtues; (b) at an even 
lower level than natural virtues, there are those that Damascius calls “servile” (ἀνδραποδώδεις) but these 
are only “so-called” (καλούμεναι) virtues, since they are mixed with their contrasting vices (Damascius, 
Commentary on Plato’s Phaedo I.145; cf. Plato, Phaedo 69b7); (c) at the top of the hierarchy, 
Iamblichus (cf. Marinus, Life of Proclus 26.22; Damascius, Commentary on Plato’s Phaedo I.143.1–
144.4) places the “theurgical” (θεουργικαί) or “priestly” (ἱερατικαί) virtues (cf. also Psellus, De 
omnifaria doctrina 67.6 [Still on virtues] = PG 122, 720a). As shown by Westerink (1962, xxxix–xl), the 
order of ten of Plato’s dialogues found at the end of the tenth chapter of the Anonymous Prolegomena to 
Platonic Philosophy (X.219.17–220.45) is based on a more complex division of virtue which apparently 
had become common by the late sixth century A.D., the probable date of composition of that work (cf. 
also Damascius, Commentary on Plato’s Phaedo I.138–145; Olympiodorus, Commentary on Plato’s 
Phaedo VIII.2). Several classifications of virtue, both simpler and more complex than the fourfould 
Porphyrian (and, I believe, Plotinian) division, are still attested in the XI century by Psellus (De 
omnifaria doctrina 66–69 = PG 122, 717c–720d; 70, 71–74 = PG 122, 720d–724a). 
In the Latin Christian tradition we hear likely echoes of the original Plotinian-Porphyrian division in 
Augustine’s Contra Academicos III.37 (where he mentions only the twofold division between civic 
virtues and purifications, which he calls civiles, or veri similes, and verae), possibly in De animae 
quantitate 33.73–76 and De musica VI.13.37–16.55, and, if of Augustinian origin (as argued by Dolbeau 
1996), especially in the Liber XXI sententiarum 15.248–251, repeated verbatim at 19b.450–453 (where 
we find three genera virtutum: civiles politicorum, purgatoriae, and exemplares). The full fourfold 
division of the virtues will be endorsed again by Bonaventure (Collationes in Hexaëmeron VI.24–32) and 
Thomas Aquinas (Summa theologiae I–II.q61.a5.s.c.), both of whom refer to Plotinus via Macrobius’ 
Commentary on Scipio’s Dream I.8.5–11, where we find the Latin version of the four genera virtutum 
which was partially anticipated by Augustine and which will become scholastic: politicae, purgatoriae, 
iam purgati animi, and exemplares. 
For a brief but precise reconstruction of the history of the degrees of virtue from Plotinus through the 
Middle Ages containing further references to primary sources, see Catapano (2006, 37–49), to whom I 
owe all but the first reference to Augustine, the reference to Psellus’ Theologica, and those to Marinus 
and Bonaventure. Cf. also Trouillard (1955b, 166–186). 
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 I will try to clarify the meaning of purification and the basic difference 
between the degrees of virtue, in particular the first two (the civic virtues and the 
purifications), by addressing two fundamental issues taken into account by Plotinus in 
treatise I.2 [19] On virtue. First, since the civic virtues alone are not sufficient to reach 
assimilation with the divine, in what sense are they still necessary for it? Second, how do 
the higher virtues or purifications differ from the lower ones?
197
 
Let us begin with the first question. The civic virtues for Plotinus are the four 
traditional virtues found in book IV of the Republic: wisdom (φρόνησις) for the rational 
part of the soul (τὸ λογιστικόν, called τὸ λογιζόμενον in treatise I.2 [19]); courage 
(ἀνδρία) and temperance (σωφροσύνη) respectively for the spirited (τὸ θυμοειδές, called 
τὸ θυμούμενον in treatise I.2 [19]) and appetitive (τὸ ἐπιθυμετικόν) parts understood as 
two distinct manifestations of the part of the soul that lacks reason (τὸ ἄλογον); and 
justice (δικαιοσύνη) as the harmonious condition of soul resulting from the hierarchical 
ordering of the parts of the soul (I.2 [19] 3.17–19) under reason,198 or the situation in 
which each part “minds its own business” (οἰκειοπραγία199). Through these virtues the 
individual soul becomes aware that its attachment to the body, especially bodily 
pleasures, does not belong essentially or originally to its nature. The practice of virtue 
and the acquisition of a virtuous state (διάθεσις) signify a conversion for the soul: it is the 
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 There is a third fundamental issue faced by Plotinus in I.2 [19]: since it is through virtue (primarily the 
higher virtues, but also the lower) that the soul becomes assimilated to the divine, why does Plotinus 
maintain that the divine does not possess these virtues? I already dealt with this problem in the previous 
section in my discussion of the Principle of Participation. 
 
198
 See Chapter Three notes 243–252 for references to all these parts or powers of the soul in Plotinus. 
 
199
 See Plato, Republic IV.434c8; Plotinus I.2 [19] 1.20, 6.20–21, 7.5. 
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beginning of a resolute turn away from merely bodily concerns and toward the 
immaterial realm of Intellect to which the soul is akin (I.2 [19] 3.19–22). It is in this 
sense that Plotinus understands the civic virtues as a reordering of the soul’s priorities or, 
as he puts it, as the measure (μέτρον) and limit (ὅρος) of the unmesuredness (ἀμετρία) 
and unlimitedness (ἀοριστία) which the soul experiences when it is subject to the desires 
and opinions intimately connected with the body. Plotinus writes at I.2 [19] 2.13–22:200 
[13] The [14] civic virtues, which we mentioned above, do genuinely set 
us in order [15] and make us better by giving limit and measure to our [16] 
desires, and putting measure into all our experience; and they abolish false 
opinions, [17] by what in general is better, that is, by [the soul] being 
endowed with limit and lying outside of the unlimited and [18] indefinite 
and being that which has been measured. And having themselves been 
limited, [19] insofar as they are a measure for a matter which is the soul, 
they are made similar to the measure There and [20] have a trace in them 
of the Best There. That which is altogether [21] unmeasured is matter, and 
so altogether dissimilar: but in so far as it participates [22] in form, it 
becomes similar to that [Good] which is formless. 
 
The necessity of civic virtue for the Ascent becomes clear in a passage from the 
so-called Großschrift in which Plotinus criticizes Gnostic “morality” (II.9 [33] 15.18–
40). According to Plotinus the Gnostics, despite their claim of already possessing salvific 
knowledge or gnosis fail to give tangible proof of this in their conduct; instead, they turn 
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 I.2 [19] 2.13–22: [13] Αἱ μὲν τοίνυν [14] πολιτικαὶ ἀρεταί, ἃς ἄνω που εἴπομεν, κατακοσμοῦσι μὲν 
ὄντως [15] καὶ ἀμείνους ποιοῦσιν ὁρίζουσαι καὶ μετροῦσαι τὰς [16] ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ὅλως τὰ πάθη 
μετροῦσαι καὶ ψευδεῖς δόξας [17] ἀφαιροῦσαι τῷ ὅλως ἀμείνονι καὶ τῷ ὡρίσθαι καὶ τῶν ἀμέτρων καὶ 
[18] ἀορίστων ἔξω εἶναι καὶ τὸ μεμετρημένον· καὶ αὐταὶ ὁρισθεῖσαι, [19] ᾗ μέτρα γε ἐν ὕλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ, 
ὡμοίωνται τῷ ἐκεῖ μέτρῳ καὶ [20] ἔχουσιν ἴχνος τοῦ ἐκεῖ ἀρίστου. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάντη [21] ἄμετρον ὕλη 
ὂν πάντη ἀνωμοίωται· καθ’ ὅσον δὲ μεταλαμβάνει [22] εἴδους, κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὁμοιοῦται ἀνειδέῳ ἐκείνῳ 
ὄντι. There is a crux at line 18: (i) most manuscripts read καὶ τὸ μεμετρημένον; (ii) the Addenda at 
textum in both HS1 and HS2, followed by IGAL, write κατὰ τὸ μεμετρημένον. I follow (i) with Catapano 
(2006, 111–112), where one can also find a helpful discussion of this issue. Three points are worth 
noting: first, the first καὶ at line 17 is epexegetical; further, the second τῷ at line 17 rules three infinitives, 
that is, ὡρίσθαι on the same line, εἶναι on the next, and an implied εἶναι, which “funge da copula e forma 
con τὸ μεμετρημένον un predicato nominale” (Catapano 2006, 111–112); finally, all these infinitives 
refer not to the virtues but to the soul. My translation is based on ARMSTRONG but attempts to reflect 
these observations. 
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to pleasure and the satisfaction of their individual bodily needs while showing 
indifference to virtue.
201
 In this perspective, therefore, the practice and acquisition of 
civic virtue, or the habit of the good ordinary moral conduct summed up by the four 
virtues of the Republic, is not itself the end of the journey, but a necessary means to a 
higher end and, secondarily, a way of showing that one is serious about pursuing such an 
end.
202
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 II.9 [33] 15.22–29: “[22] Yet those who already have the gnosis [τοὺς ἤδη ἐγνωκότας] should [23] start 
going after it here and now, and their pursuit should first of all [24] set right their conduct here below, as 
they come from a divine nature; for that nature [25] is aware of nobility and despises the pleasure of the 
body. [26] But those who have no share of virtue [ἀρετῆς μὴ μέτεστιν] would not be [27] moved at all 
toward that higher world. This too is evidence of their [28] indifference to virtue, that they have never 
made any treatise [λόγον] about virtue, but have [29] altogether left out the treatment of these subjects...” 
We will hear Augustine repeatedly voicing a very similar complaint, though from a different perspective, 
against the Manicheans (e.g., De moribus Ecclesiae et de moribus Manichaeorum II.19.67–20.75). For 
an introductory account of the meanings of gnosis see Rudolph (1987, 55–57). 
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 The question of the status of ethics in Plotinus has been the subject of a number of studies yielding 
somewhat different results. Besides the commentaries on treatises dealing explicitly with ethical issues 
(see particularly: Catapano 2006 on I.2 [19] On virtues; Linguiti 2000 and McGroarty 2006 on I.4 [46] 
On well-being [εὐδαιμονία]; Linguiti 2000 and 2007 on I.5 [36] On whether well-being increases with 
time), the following recent studies are worth noting: Plass (1982), Dillon (1983; 1999), Gerson (1994, 
185–202), A. Smith (1999b), Schniewind (2003; 2005), Remes (2006), Song (2009). If we are to trust 
Porphyry’s witness (see note 192 above), there is little doubt that Plotinus was a person who followed a 
moral conduct; he did so, moreover, as a matter of principle, that is, because assimilation to higher 
realities would not be possible without a corresponding dissociation from making the commitment to the 
body and its pleasures a primary matter of concern (his critique to the Gnostics mentioned above is 
particularly telling in this regard). What is likely to bother those contemporary readers of Plotinus who 
study the Enneads not only as a historical relic but also as philosophy, or a possible source of inspiration 
(for better or for worse) on how to live a certain kind of life, is precisely Plotinus’ attitude toward ethics. 
Specifically, there are four aspects of the issue that seem to be worrisome to modern readers: (i) whether 
Plotinus’ ethics is elitist; (ii) whether its focus on transcendence comes at the expense of immanence (i.e., 
as a failure to work at making this world a better place); (iii) whether it values other human beings for 
their own sake; (iv) whether it is realistic. 
(i) If by calling Plotinus’ ethics “elitist” one means that outward ethical behavior is possible only for 
those who are committed to pursuing assimilation to higher realities, I do not think that Plotinian ethics is 
elitist. I see no reason to deny that someone who is unaware of one’s connection to higher realities could 
still behave in accordance with an established code of conduct (e.g., by habituation), although I am not 
sure about the extent to which such behavior would constitute virtue for Plotinus, if at all (it will for later 
Platonists, e.g., Damascius and Olympiodorus, who will refer to this type of virtue as ethical: Damascius, 
Commentary on Plato’s Phaedo I.139; Olympiodorus, Commentary on Plato’s Phaedo VIII.2.7–9). 
Happiness or well-being (εὐδαιμονία), on the other hand, is possible only as the identification with one’s 
higher or ideal self in the noetic realm (see Subsection 4.6.2). But on the basis of the doctrine of the 
undescended part of the soul (see pages 341–345 above), this possibility is in principle open to all human 
souls. Thus, to call Plotinus’ position elitist merely on account of the inability of some individual souls to 
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In the fourth chapter of the treatise on virtues Plotinus explains that the degree 
of virtue varies depending on whether one is in the process of purification (I.2 [19] 4.3: 
ἐν τῷ καθαίρεσθαι) or at the end of this process (I.2 [19] 4.3–4: ἐν τῷ κεκαθάρθαι). It is 
obvious that the process of purification—by which I take that Plotinus means the process 
of becoming wise, temperate, courageous, and just (i.e., the lower virtues), whereby the 
individual soul puts order in its priorities and redirects itself away from the sensible and 
                                                                                                                                                 
be reintegrated in their better part, would be even more unreasonable than qualifying as elitist the 
requirement that in order to be able to play on a professional soccer team, one has to be in possession of 
excellent soccer skills. Desiring the end, one ought to desire to possess the means to that end as well; 
otherwise, the very desire for the end as a truly final end becomes questionable, as Plotinus seems to 
imply in his criticism of the Gnostics. One may object that some souls lack the most basic external 
conditions that would favor the pursuit of εὐδαιμονία. Plotinus seems to have little regard for this 
objection, since in his view every soul occupies its proper place in the universe according to a 
providential plan (cf. for instance III.2 [47] 12). (It is this last idea, I sense, that offends modern 
sensibility—perhaps with good reasons—more than the fact that εὐδαιμονία requires the assimilation to 
higher reality, and hence purification.) 
(ii) Is the sage (σπουδαῖος) less concerned about this world because of his or her focus, or “intent 
concentration” (VP 9.17), on the noetic dimension? If one considers that assimilation is, initially, 
assimilation to that god which is the World-Soul and that the relation of the World-Soul to the sensible 
cosmos is characterized chiefly as Providence (see particularly the long treatise on the subject, split in 
two parts by Porphyry: III.2–3 [47–48]), it seems hard to imagine that the sage should not care for the 
sensible universe. On the contrary, Plotinus consistently promotes a positive attitude toward the cosmos 
(besides the treatise on Providence I just mentioned, see his extensive critique of the Gnositcs’ negative 
attitude toward the sensible world in II.9 [33]). In IV.4 [28] 39 Plotinus argues that even the works of 
virtue are woven in the order of the universe, and from VI.8 [39] 1–6 one can reasonably infer that to be 
truly free as an embodied individual means to cooperate with the World-Soul in the providential ordering 
of the cosmos (see Song 2009, 95–158). The mere fact that Plotinus highlights the necessity even of 
lower virtue for “deification” should at the very least bring us at least heavily to requalify the otherwise 
hard-to-miss otherworldliness of his thought. As I pointed out in the previous section (pages 381–383), in 
ascending, the individual soul cannot skip stages, and lower virtue is one such stage. 
(iii) Based both on (ii) and on Plotinus’ own practice highlighted in note 192 above, it is fair to 
conclude that the Plotinian sage would be genuinely concerned about the welfare of others. However, this 
is different than saying that others are valued for their own sake, and so I believe that the answer to the 
third question remains negative. I also believe that my remarks about Plato’s position on the same issue 
(see Subsection 1.5.5 above) apply all the more sharply to Plotinus (see also Section 5.2 in the Epilogue). 
(iv) Finally, I believe that to ask whether Plotinus’ ethics is realistic means to doubt whether happiness 
(εὐδαιμονία) as he envisions it (on which see pages 409–413 below) can ever be achieved by a human 
being. The doubt is fair and, given the counterintuitive character of some of Plotinus’ views on the 
subject, even natural. However, this doubt should be directed primarily to Plotinus’ metaphysics (and 
psychology), since it is on this that his ethics depends. Only if his metaphysical views are found to be 
untenable does his ethics become questionable. But to be questionable in this context should be taken to 
mean that as human beings we are without doubt incapable of a Plotinian ethics, not that what we may be 
capable of is perceived as unsatisfactory or incredible at the level of the composite. For a lucid exposition 
of this point see Gerson (1994, 185–191). 
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toward the intelligible (I.2 [19] 3.11–22)—cannot itself be the good, since it is a 
means to an end. From the limited perspective of lower virtue, the end is the achieved 
state of purification, or the actual possession of the civic virtues as states of the soul. This 
amounts to the first step of the reintegration into one’s higher self: it is the realization that 
one’s true nature lies in the soul, that the soul is other than the body, and that the soul’s 
attachment to the body and its pleasures as primary matters of concern do not belong 
originally to the soul’s nature but are added on to it as an alien element. The soul in its 
pure state, therefore, is what is left (I.2 [19] 4.10: τὸ καταλειπόμενόν) at the end of the 
process of purification and at the same time the goal of this process, or, as Plotinus puts 
it, already a sort of perfection (I.2 [19] 4.5: οἶον τέλος ἤδη) and something like the good 
(I.2 [19] 4.12: ἀγαθοειδῆ). One could say that what virtue does is simply to reawaken the 
soul to its true nature and resolutely direct it toward Intellect. 
But despite these descriptions of the purified state, Plotinus also argues that this 
condition cannot be the true end of the process of assimilation. And this for one simple 
reason: because the soul is “not a nature capable of remaining in the real good, for it has a 
natural tendency in both directions” (I.2 [19] 4.12–13).203 Lack of stability is part of the 
nature of the individual soul even in its purified state. In order to achieve such stability, 
the purified soul, that is, the soul disengaged from its identification with the desires and 
the opinions derived from its intercourse with body and initially directed toward the 
intelligible, needs something extra, some further training, as it were. It is here that the 
higher virtues or purifications come into the picture. But before this is possible, the soul 
                                                 
203
 I.2 [19] 4.12–13: [19] Ἢ οὐχ ἱκανὴν πρὸς τὸ [13] μένειν ἐν τῷ ὄντως ἀγαθῷ· πέφυκε γὰρ ἐπ’ ἄμφω. 
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ought to be purified. The journey toward Intellect starts where one’s identification 
with soul, or purification, is achieved. 
This stage, the stage of achieved purification, acts as a sort of boundary between 
the process leading up to it, or purification proper, and the process starting from it, or the 
actual knowledge of the intelligibles that follows from a previous conversion to them. As 
a boundary, in a sense it belongs neither to the process that precedes it nor to the one that 
follows it; but in another sense it belongs to both as the link between them that warrants 
the continuity of the Ascent as a single movement. Let us go back, then, to the second 
question asked earlier on page 399: How do the higher virtues differ from the lower 
ones? 
A sketch of the function of the higher virtues is provided at I.2 [19] 4.13–29, 
immediately following the description of soul as that whose nature is incapable of 
remaining in the real good (see note 203). After arguing that for the soul to be purified 
means already to be converted toward the immaterial intelligible realm as that which is 
both contrary to body and akin to soul (I.2 [19] 4.13–18), Plotinus, at I.2 [19] 4.18–25, 
writes about the condition resulting from the purification/conversion in the soul:
204
 
[18] And what is [19] this? A sight and impression of what is seen 
implanted and working in it, [20] like the relationship between sight and 
its object. But did it [viz., the soul] not have the realities which it sees 
[viz., the intelligibles]? Does it not [21] recollect them? It did have them, 
yet not active, but lying apart [22] and unilluminated; if they are to be 
illuminated and it is to know them as present in it, it must [23] thrust 
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 I.2 [19] 4.18–25: [18] Τί οὖν [19] τοῦτο; Θέα καὶ τύπος τοῦ ὀφθέντος ἐντεθεὶς καὶ ἐνεργῶν, [20] ὡς ἡ 
ὄψις περὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον. Οὐκ ἄρα εἶχεν αὐτὰ οὐδ’ [21] ἀναμιμνήσκεται; Ἢ εἶχεν οὐκ ἐνεργοῦντα, ἀλλὰ 
ἀποκείμενα [22] ἀφώτιστα· ἵνα δὲ φωτισθῇ καὶ τότε γνῷ αὐτὰ ἐνόντα, δεῖ [23] προσβαλεῖν τῷ φωτίζοντι. 
Εἶχε δὲ οὐκ αὐτά, ἀλλὰ τύπους· [24] δεῖ οὖν τὸν τύπον τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς, ὧν καὶ οἱ τύποι, [25] ἐφαρμόσαι. 
ARMSTRONG’s translation, slightly modified. 
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towards that which gives them light. It did not have the realities themselves 
but impressions of them; [24] so it must bring the impressions into accord 
with the true realities of which they are [25] impressions. 
 
According to this text, to acquire the higher virtues means to activate a connection 
with the intelligible realm which at this particular stage of the Ascent lies only potentially 
in the soul.
205
 But this activation is not possible unless the soul is already purified or 
converted toward the intelligible through the lower virtues. Thus, it would seem that what 
distinguishes the lower from the higher virtues is that the former lead to the point at 
which the individual soul is aware of its kinship with the intelligible and resolutely turns 
toward pursuing assimilation to it, while the latter are the very practice by which a mere, 
albeit necessary, turning toward the intelligible becomes actual knowledge of it. 
Thus, in a sense the practice and acquisition of the higher virtues is already the 
beginning of the process of assimilation to Intellect. This practice is also a process of 
purification in the sense that in order to become habituated to be effortlessly connected 
with the intelligible, the individual soul ought to master the distractions that come to it 
from its relation to the body (cf. I.2 [19] 5).
206
 In this context, the four virtues of the 
Republic, which at the civic level were ordinary practices leading to good social conduct 
and the realization of one’s kinship with something other than body, are now redefined to 
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 As Catapano (2006, 146–147) rightly points out, Plotinus here loosely borrows from Aristotle the 
principle that knowledge is not, properly speaking, an alteration (ἀλλοίωσις), but a passage from potency 
to act (or rather, from first to second actuality: see pages 180–181 above). See Aristotle, De anima 
II.417b5–12; cf. also Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima 86.4–5. For 
parallels in Plotinus see III.6 [26] 2.34–54, III.9 [13] 5, IV.6 [41] 3.10–16. 
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 Although Plotinus was quite convinced that the soul, being inessentially connected to body, can persist 
even after the dissolution of the composite in physical death (cf. treatise IV.7 [2]), it will be useful to 
remind ourselves once again that both in this and the next stages of the Ascent dissociation from the body 
should not be understood in a literal sense, at least not immediately (see pages 363–364 and note 174 
above). Plotinus makes this clear in chapter 5 of treatise I.2 [19], where the activity of the higher virtues 
or purifications takes place in the context of an embodied existence. 
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fit their higher purpose. Thus, at the superior level wisdom (σοφία μὲν καὶ φρόνησις: 
I.2 [19] 6.12) has no connotation of applied discursive reasoning on the part of the soul, 
but “consists in the contemplation of that which Intellect contains [viz., the intelligibles], 
which Intellect has by immediate contact.”207 The same is true of the other virtues. 
Justice, far from always requiring a plurality of parts each “minding its own business” 
(see note 198 above), belongs to a unitary entity. Something similar can be said of the 
other virtues, as Plotinus explicitly writes at I.2 [19] 6.22–27:208 
[22] True absolute justice is the disposition of a unity to [23] itself, a unity 
in which there are no different parts. So the higher justice [24] in the soul 
is its activity towards Intellect, its [25] being temperate is its inward 
turning to Intellect, its courage is its freedom from affections [26], in the 
likeness of that to which it looks which is free of affections by nature [i.e., 
Intellect], [27] so as to prevent its sharing in the affections of its inferior 
companion [i.e., the part(s) of the soul lacking reason]. 
 
Through achieved purification, the individal soul becomes godlike, joining the 
condition of the World-Soul, which is able to master its body while maintaining its 
concentration intent on Intellect via the Soul-Hypostasis (cf. pages 249–250 and 219 
above). In this way, the individual soul is already on the threshold of Intellect. But what 
does it mean for it to come to abide in Intellect? Or, in the somewhat clumsy expressions 
that I will be using in the next subsection, what does it mean for the soul to achieve 
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 I.2 [19] 6.12–13: [12] Ἢ σοφία μὲν καὶ φρόνησις ἐν [13] θεωρίᾳ ὧν νοῦς ἔχει· νοῦς δὲ τῇ ἐπαφῇ. The 
translation is ARMSTRONG’s, with minor changes. IGAL (I, 217 note 18) rightly observes that the 
technical distinction between σοφία and φρόνησις is Aristotelian (see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 
VI.1139b16–17, 1140a24–b30, 1141a9–b9, 1143b18–a11), but the two tend to be blurred in both Plato 
and Plotinus; so also Catapano (2006, 185–186), who aptly refers us to Enneads VI.6 [34] 18.33, I.4 [46] 
9.17–18. 
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 I.2 [19] 6.22–27: [22] Ἡ γοῦν ἀληθὴς αὐτοδικαιοσύνη ἑνὸς πρὸς [23] αὐτό, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο· 
ὥστε καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ [24] δικαιοσύνη ἡ μείζων τὸ πρὸς νοῦν ἐνεργεῖν, τὸ δὲ [25] σωφρονεῖν ἡ εἴσω πρὸς 
νοῦν στροφή, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρία ἀπάθεια [26] καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ πρὸς ὃ βλέπει ἀπαθὲς ὂν τὴν φύσιν, [27] αὐτὴ 
δὲ ἐξ ἀρετῆς, ἵνα μὴ συμπαθῇ τῷ χείρονι συνοίκῳ. ARMSTRONG’s translation, modified. 
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“intellification” or the be “intellified”? 
4.6.2 Ascent to Nous: Intellification 
Let us take a step back and consider what the embodied individual soul has 
achieved through purification from the vantage point of eros. By the habitual practice of 
virtue the soul has come to realize that its true identity lies away from the body. This does 
not mean that through such a realization the soul abandons the body or stops taking care 
of it, but rather that its affective commitment to the body, or the eros which the soul 
invests in an embodied existence, is not (or no longer) prior.
209
 The care of the embodied 
self for its own sake meant an attachment to something foreign to the soul’s nature, since 
unlike Aristotle, who thought of the soul as the ἐντελέχεια of the body,210 Plotinus 
maintains that the soul is not necessarily connected to the body. Thus, while for the soul 
to be erotically or affectively committed to the body is in a sense natural insofar as it is 
related to a body as the soul of that particular body, in another sense to make of its body a 
primary matter of concern is a kind of alienation, and specifically an erotic alienation: it 
means for the soul to be affectively directed to something that is not only essentially 
other than itself, but also ontologically inferior insofar as it lacks permanence and is only 
the image of a superior kind of unity. Thus, purification reverses the direction of the 
soul’s eros but at the same time it sharpens its sense of alienation as the soul finds itself 
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 Speaking about the relation of the sage to his body, Plotinus writes at I.4 [46] 4.25–30: “[25] What he 
seeks [26] he seeks as a necessity, not for himself but for something that belongs to him [οὐχ αὑτῷ, ἀλλά 
τινι τῶν αὐτοῦ]; [27] that is, he seeks it for the body which is joined to him; and even granting that this is 
a living body, [28] it lives its own life, and not the life which is that of the good man. [29] He knows its 
needs and gives it what he gives it without [30] taking away from his own life.” 
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 See note 37 above and Chapter Two note 105. 
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subject to the “regime of exteriority”211 that is proper to the body. 
Now, in the further process of intellification the individual soul, turned inwards 
and having broken its affective ties to what is other than itself through purification, seeks 
to identify with a higher level of unity, something that is more intimately itself than the 
connection with its particular body: Intellect. In what Hadot indicates as the only 
autobiographical passage in the Enneads,
212
 IV.8 [6] 1.1–11, Plotinus describes what may 
be understood as an experience of
213
 intellification:
214
 
[1] Many times, awakened to myself away from the body, [2] becoming 
outside of myself and within myself, [3] seeing a wonderful and great 
beauty, believing myself then especially to be [4] part of the higher realm, 
in act as the best life, [5] having become one with the divine and based in 
it [6] advancing to that activity, establishing myself above all other [7] 
intelligible beings, then going down from this position in the divine, from 
intellect down to [8] discursive reasoning, I am puzzled how I could ever, 
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 Cf. Trouillard (1955b, 28–46). 
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 Hadot (1993, 25). 
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 I write “may” because interpreters disagree on whether this famous passage from the first chapter of 
IV.8 [6] should be understood as a description of unification with Intellect or with the One. Among the 
authors supporting identification with Intellect, which I also tend to favor, are Trouillard (1955b, 98), 
O’Meara (1974; 1993, 104–105), Hadot (1987, 14–15), Schroeder (1992, 5–6), Gatti (1996, 142), 
Blumenthal (1999, 95); among those supporting identification with the One, see Rist (1967, 56, with 253 
note 4), who refers to the Arabic Plotinus (the so-called Theology of Aristotle), in which the expression 
ὑπὲρ πᾶν τὸ ἄλλο νοητὸν ἐμαυτὸν ἱδρύσας at lines 6–7 is translated as “to be above the entire intelligible 
universe (cf. HS1 ad loc.), and more extensively Ousager (2004, 61–66), where one can also find a 
helpful account of the disagreement and further references. 
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 IV.8 [6] 1.1–11: [1] Πολλάκις ἐγειρόμενος εἰς ἐμαυτὸν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος [2] καὶ γινόμενος τῶν μὲν 
ἄλλων ἔξω, ἐμαυτοῦ δὲ εἴσω, [3] θαυμαστὸν ἡλίκον ὁρῶν κάλλος, καὶ τῆς κρείττονος μοίρας [4] 
πιστεύσας τότε μάλιστα εἶναι, ζωήν τε ἀρίστην ἐνεργήσας [5] καὶ τῷ θείῳ εἰς ταὐτὸν γεγενημένος καὶ ἐν 
αὐτῷ ἱδρυθεὶς [6] εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἐλθὼν ἐκείνην ὑπὲρ πᾶν τὸ ἄλλο νοητὸν [7] ἐμαυτὸν ἱδρύσας, μετὰ 
ταύτην τὴν ἐν τῷ θείῳ στάσιν εἰς [8] λογισμὸν ἐκ νοῦ καταβὰς ἀπορῶ, πῶς ποτε καὶ νῦν καταβαίνω, [9] 
καὶ ὅπως ποτέ μοι ἔνδον ἡ ψυχὴ γεγένηται τοῦ [10] σώματος τοῦτο οὖσα, οἷον ἐφάνη καθ’ ἑαυτήν, 
καίπερ [11] οὖσα ἐν σώματι. The translation of lines 1–9 is by O’Meara (1993, 104); that of lines 10–11 
by ARMSTRONG. I agree with O’Meara that the word Πολλάκις on the first line of this passage should be 
connected to ἀπορῶ on line 8: “Many times... I am puzzled...” This, I believe, stresses what I take to be 
Plotinus’ conviction that the individual soul is fundamentally related to the noetic realm and that the 
intensity of the experience of intellification can only give rise to puzzlement as to why one would ever 
depart from Nous. 
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and now, descend, [9] and how my soul has come to be in the [10] body when 
it is what it has shown itself to be by itself, even [11] when it is in the 
body. 
 
I will limit my summary treatment of intellification to the two sides of this 
experience, one negative and the other positive. The negative aspect is the explication of 
the first general feature of the Ascent at this stage, namely that like in the other stages, 
also in the assimilation to Intellect there occurs not an addition but a subtraction. What is 
left behind or subtracted is not only all that is bodily, but also all that is connected to the 
body, such as memory, anticipation, and consciousness of one’s embodied condition. The 
positive aspect will be a brief account of what it means for the individual soul to come to 
abide or to be reintegrated in the noetic realm, namely εὐδαιμονία. Since these two 
aspects are closely connected, they will be treated jointly. 
The individual soul’s entrance into Intellect coincides with what for Plotinus is 
happiness or well-being (εὐδαιμονία), the subject of treatise I.4 [46].215 Put differently, 
eudaimonia is the life of the individual soul in Nous, or as a member of Nous (see 
references in note 135 above). There is no denying that ordinarily, from the perspective 
of the embodied and yet unpurified individual soul, life in Nous must sound like 
dangerous madness at worst and innocuous fancy at best. For this reason the process of 
reintegration in the noetic realm cannot take place prior to purification, without which the 
individual soul would fail to reform its erotic commitments and in all probability would 
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 On the difficulty of providing a proper rendering of the pregnant term εὐδαιμονία, see McGroarty (2006, 
40–41), the author of a full commentary on treatise I.4 [46] to which I will be referring occasionally in 
this subsection (cf. also ARMSTRONG I, 170–171 note 1), and to which I am indebted for some of the 
extra Plotinian references related to this treatise. Following McGroarty’s lead, from this point on I will 
transliterate the terms εὐδαιμονία (eudaimonia) and εὐδαίμων (simplified without the long quantity: 
eudaimon). 
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not even be able to appreciate noetic life. At the same time, both purification and 
intellification will have to be supplemented by arguments and demonstrations understood 
not so much as mere mental exercises, but as a method of Ascent.
216
 One could read the 
entirety of the Enneads not simply as a series of treatises about topics of philosophical 
relevance, but as an arsenal of arguments and demonstrations aimed at facilitating the 
Ascent. If this is plausible, it can be argued that intellification conceived of as the process 
leading to eudaimonia or life in Nous consists also in the efforts by which we strive to 
familiarize ourselves with all such arguments and demonstrations and become erotically 
committed to what they signify.
217
 
 The kind of life that is eudaimonia is in principle available to every human being; 
the one who succeeds in making it actual is called a sage (σπουδαῖος).218 After having 
spent the first two chapters of I.4 [46] to refute Aristotelian, Epicurean, and Stoic 
doctrines about eudaimonia,
219
 Plotinus offers a sketch of this life in Nous in the next two 
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 I.3 [20] 1.1–5: “[1] What art is there, what method or practice, which will take us [2] up there where we 
must go? That where we must go is to [3] the Good, the First Principle, we take as [4] agreed and 
established by many demonstrations [διὰ πολλῶν δεδειγμένον]; and the demonstrations [5] themselves 
were a kind of means to ascend [καὶ δὴ καὶ δι’ ὧν τοῦτο ἐδείκνυτο, ἀναγωγή τις ἦν]” (ARMSTRONG’s 
translation, slightly modified). Cf. Armstrong (1967, 260), O’Meara (1993, 104). 
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 Becoming erotically committed to what the arguments signify is crucial: without such commitment, the 
arguments would be no different (or perhaps different only in terms of intensity) than entertaining oneself 
by engaging in amusing pastimes—a possibility which, if we are to listen to Rosen (1987, xxx–xxxi), 
Plato himself entertained (cf. Laws VII.803c1–8). 
 
218
 On the notion of σπουδαῖος see Schniewind (2003). 
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 Plotinus’ main contention against Aristotle and those who agree with him is that if eudaimonia is 
equated either to living well (Τὸ εὖ ζῆν: I.4 [46] 1.1) or to the achievement of the end (τέλος: I.4 [46] 
1.10) of the desires which living beings possess by nature (cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.1098b20–
21, Magna Moralia I.1184b22–30, Eudemian Ethics II.1219b1–2), then we will have to admit that even 
animals and plants can be eudaimon. Against the Stoics (and, more obviously, the Epicureans for the 
primacy they assigned to pleasure), Plotinus argues that their denying eudaimonia to plants on account of 
their lack of sensation (I.4 [46] 1.21–23) mistakenly emphasizes the importance of sensation in 
eudaimonia (cf. I.4 [46] 2.1–31; for the Stoics cf. Epictetus, Discourses II.8.5; for the Epicureans, cf. 
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chapters, I.4 [46] 3–4. He insists that eudaimonia should not be understood as life in 
general, or as a feature that is common to all that is living, nor is it rational life as a 
species of the genus life; instead, it is rational life understood as life at its best, or as that 
life of which all other forms of life are traces or images. On this basis, it follows that 
among individual souls in the sensible universe eudaimonia will be available only to 
those souls that are capable of partaking in reason, that is, human souls.
220
 
Another important aspect of eudaimonia is its close connection with the 
distinctively Plotinian doctrine of the undescended (part of the) soul. As we saw earlier at 
pages 341–345 above, Plotinus maintains that our best part never leaves the intelligible 
realm, but as one might infer from the passages from V.1 [10] 12 and IV.8 [6] 1 cited 
above (notes 170 and 215), embodied souls do not seem to be always in touch with this 
part.
221
 Thus, even if it is true that our best part abides in Nous in a permanent status of 
eudaimonia, in our embodied condition we are only potentially connected with it. The 
explanation of this connection in terms of potentiality and actuality is precisely what we 
                                                                                                                                                 
Letter to Menoeceus 127 = EPICUREA 62.8–12; Letter to Herodotus 82.1 = EPICUREA 31.34). And 
although the Stoics recognize the importance of rational life for eudaimonia (SVF III, 687 = Diogenes 
Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers VII.130), their emphasis on primary things according to nature 
(τὰ πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν: I.4 [46] 2.37, 41–42; cf. SVF III, 140 = Stobaeus, Anthologion II, 79.18–80.1; 
SVF III, 141 = Stobaeus, Anthologion II, 82.11–15; SVF III, 181.43.38–44.1 = Gellius, Attic Nights 
XII.5.7) either subordinates reason to the pursuit of these things, or else, if it does not, it still fails to 
provide a satisfactory account of rational life (I.4 [46] 2.31–45) and, as a consequence, of eudaimonia. 
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 I.4 [46] 3.33–40: “[33] We have often said that the perfect [34] life, the true, real life [ἡ τελεία ζωὴ καὶ ἡ 
ἀληθινὴ καὶ ὄντως], is in that intelligible nature [τῇ νοερᾷ φύσει], [35] and that other lives are 
incomplete, traces [ἰνδάλματα] of life, not [36] perfectly or purely and no more life than [37] its opposite. 
And now let us put it shortly; [38] as long as all living things proceed from a single source [ἐκ μιᾶς 
ἀρχῆς], but have not [39] life to the same degree as it, the origin must be the first and [40] most perfect 
life” (ARMSTRONG’s translation, slightly modified). 
 
221
 Cf. I.4 [46] 9.18–30, IV.3 [27] 30.11–16. 
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find in the fourth chapter of the treatise on eudaimonia. We read at I.4 [46] 4.6–17:222 
[6] ...man has perfect life by [7] having not only sense-life, but reasoning 
and true [8] intelligence. But is he different from this [9] when he has it? 
No, he is not a man at all unless [10] he has this, either potentially or 
actually, (and if he has it actually we say that [11] he is in a state of 
eudaimonia). But shall we say that he has this perfect kind of life [12] in 
him as a part of himself? Other [13] men, we maintain, who have it 
potentially, have it as a part, but the [14] man who is already eudaimon, 
who actually is this and [15] has passed over into identity with it, [does 
not have it but] is this. Everything else is just something he wears; [16] 
you could not call it part of him because he wears it without wanting to; 
[17] it would be his if he united it to him by an act of the will. 
 
Here again the gap that exists between oneself at the embodied level and one’s 
better, undescended part can be understood in terms of eros. As Plotinus goes on to 
explain in the rest of the chapter, to actualize one’s connectedness to this part means to 
reintegrate oneself in it, or to achieve a condition of self-sufficiency (I.4 [46] 4.23: 
Αὐτάρκης), in which nothing alien is desired simply because it is not (or no longer) found 
worth desiring in comparison to what one actually has become. The gap between what 
one has come to identify with and one’s desideratum has been reduced to a minimum: 
one is what one used to desire. In Plotinus’s universe this newly achieved identification is 
in fact a re-unification with what each individual human soul always already was in its 
highest part as a member of the intelligible universe. Plotinus puts it clearly in two 
passages, IV.7 [2] 10.32–37 and VI.5 [23] 7.1–8.223 The first passage, IV.7 [2] 10.32–37, 
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 I.4 [46] 4.6–17: [6] ἔχει τελείαν ζωὴν ἄνθρωπος οὐ [7] τὴν αἰσθητικὴν μόνον ἔχων, ἀλλὰ καὶ λογισμὸν 
καὶ νοῦν [8] ἀληθινόν, δῆλον καὶ ἐξ ἄλλων. Ἀλλ’ ἆρά γε ὡς ἄλλος ὢν [9] ἄλλο τοῦτο ἔχει; Ἢ οὐδ’ ἔστιν 
ὅλως ἄνθρωπος μὴ οὐ καὶ [10] τοῦτο ἢ δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ ἔχων, ὃν δὴ καί φαμεν [11] εὐδαίμονα εἶναι. 
Ἀλλ’ ὡς μέρος αὐτοῦ τοῦτο φήσομεν ἐν αὐτῷ [12] τὸ εἶδος τῆς ζωῆς τὸ τέλειον εἶναι; Ἢ τὸν μὲν ἄλλον 
[13] ἄνθρωπον μέρος τι τοῦτο ἔχειν δυνάμει ἔχοντα, τὸν δὲ [14] εὐδαίμονα ἤδη, ὃς δὴ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶ 
τοῦτο καὶ [15] μεταβέβηκε πρὸς τὸ αὐτό, εἶναι τοῦτο· περικεῖσθαι δ’ αὐτῷ τὰ [16] ἄλλα ἤδη, ἃ δὴ οὐδὲ 
μέρη αὐτοῦ ἄν τις θεῖτο οὐκ ἐθέλοντι [17] περικείμενα· ἦν δ’ ἂν αὐτοῦ κατὰ βούλησιν συνηρτημένα. 
 
223
 IV.7 [2] 10.32–37: [32] Ὄψεται γὰρ [33] νοῦν ὁρῶντα οὐκ αἰσθητόν τι οὐδὲ τῶν θνητῶν τούτων, [34] 
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reads: 
[32] For he will see [33] an intellect which sees nothing perceived by the 
senses, none of these mortal things, [34] but apprehends the eternal by its 
eternity, and all the things in the [35] intelligible world, having become 
itself an intelligible universe full of light, [36] illuminated by the truth 
from the Good, which [37] radiates truth over all the intelligibles. 
 
And here is the second passage, VI.5 [23] 7.1–8: 
[1] For we and what is ours go back to real being [2] and ascend to that 
and to the first which comes from it, [3] and we think the intelligibles; we 
do not have images or imprints of them. [4] But if we do not, we are the 
intelligibles. If then we have a part of true knowledge, [5] we are those; 
we do not apprehend them as distinct within ourselves, [6] but we are 
within them. For since the others, and not [7] only ourselves, are those, we 
are all those. So then, being together [8] with all things, we are those; so 
then, we are all and one. 
 
Thus, for the individual soul eudaimonia does not simply mean the complete 
assimilation to Nous understood as something other than soul, as if this state were an 
experience in the radical, etymological sense of attempting or going through (-periri: 
πείρα, περάω) something external to (ex-) or wholly other than the soul; it is rather a re-
integration into something that is most deeply itself. For the soul this is indeed a 
departure, yet not from itself, but form all that in it is less than noetic; therefore, it is a 
departure that is essentially a return to what in the soul is most purely itself. 
                                                                                                                                                 
ἀλλὰ ἀιδίῳ τὸ ἀίδιον κατανοοῦντα, πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ [35] νοητῷ, κόσμον καὶ αὐτὸν νοητὸν καὶ φωτεινὸν 
γεγενημένον, [36] ἀληθείᾳ καταλαμπόμενον τῇ παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὃ [37] πᾶσιν ἐπιλάμπει τοῖς νοητοῖς 
ἀλήθειαν (the emphasis in the translation is mine). VI.5 [23] 7.1–8: [1] Ἀνάγεται γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον 
καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς τὸ ὄν, [2] καὶ ἀναβαίνομέν τε εἰς ἐκεῖνο καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἀπ’ ἐκείνου, [3] καὶ νοοῦμεν ἐκεῖνα 
οὐκ εἴδωλα αὐτῶν οὐδὲ τύπους ἔχοντες. [4] Εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο, ὄντες ἐκεῖνα. Εἰ οὖν ἀληθινῆς ἐπιστήμης [5] 
μετέχομεν, ἐκεῖνά ἐσμεν οὐκ ἀπολαβόντες αὐτὰ ἐν ἡμῖν [6] ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς ἐν ἐκείνοις ὄντες. Ὄντων δὲ καὶ 
τῶν ἄλλων, οὐ [7] μόνον ἡμῶν, ἐκεῖνα, πάντες ἐσμὲν ἐκεῖνα. Ὁμοῦ ἄρα [8] ὄντες μετὰ πάντων ἐσμὲν 
ἐκεῖνα· πάντα ἄρα ἐσμὲν ἕν (ARMSTRONG’s translation, minimally modified; again, the emphasis in the 
translation is mine). Again, at III.4 [15] 3.20–27, Plotinus says quite explicitly that our soul does not 
merely belong essentially to the noetic realm, but that in being in it, it is it: “we are each of us an 
intelligible universe” (III.4 [15] 3.22: ἐσμὲν ἕκαστος κόσμος νοητός). See also the references in note 135 
above. 
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Just like all movement to a higher stage of the Ascent, reintegration in 
Intellect implies a subtraction: one’s statue takes on its full shape only by the chipping 
away of superfluous materials. We ask: What are these “materials” at the level of 
intellification? Certainly they cannot be the individuality or particularity of a given soul 
in its highest part, since this part permanently subsists in Nous as a member of the 
intelligible. At the level of intellification, these materials left behind are the memories 
related to one’s bodily existence. In his treatment of memory, covering twenty full 
chapters of his lengthy treatise On Difficulties about the Soul (IV.3–5 [27–29]), Plotinus 
first establishes that memory belongs to the soul rather than to the composite and that its 
seat is the power of imagination (τὸ φανταστικόν) (IV.3 [27] 25–32). He then goes on to 
argue that when the individual soul has identified completely with its highest part and has 
come to abide purely in the intelligible, memory must be absent there because the way of 
being of Nous is timelessness or eternity (cf. Appendix D): in it everything is present 
wholly at once without any transition, and the highest soul abiding in Intellect has a 
unified apprehension of all its objects (IV.4 [28] 1). 
This view may be related to what Aristotle writes about memory in the first 
chapter of On Memory and Recollection. Aristotle remarks that memory is neither of the 
present nor of the future but only of the past, and that time and the consciousness of time 
are necessary conditions for memory.
224
 For Plotinus Intellect is a totus simul, both as the 
identity of thinker and object of thought, and as the simultaneousness and reciprocal 
implication of the totality of the intelligibles: this is, roughly, what it means for Nous to 
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 Aristotle, On Memory and Recollection 449b15–30. 
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be eternal. But if the way of being of Nous is eternity, it follows that there cannot be 
memory in Intellect nor, consequently, for the soul that has achieved intellification
225
 
(unless this soul decides to reactualize its memories by leaving Nous; cf. IV. 4 [28] 3–5). 
In fact, the soul that has achieved intellification will not even have memory of itself, but 
will be given over completely to its object of contemplation (θεωρία) and will be one 
with it. And since the intellified soul’s object of contemplation is the soul itself as 
belonging to the realm of Nous, in contemplating itself the soul simultaneously 
contemplates the entire noetic dimension (IV.4 [28] 2).
226
 
There is more. Absence of memory in Nous is strictly related to absence of 
consciousness. By consciousness I mean not only the ordinary awareness of one’s 
embodied condition, which as such is obviously foreign to noetic activity, but more 
radically the apprehension (ἀντίληψις) of the very noetic activity taking place in 
intellification. Thus, at IV.3 [27] 30.13–16 Plotinus writes:227 
[13] The intellectual act is one thing and the [14] apprehension of it 
another, and we are always intellectually active, but do not always 
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 On this point, too, Plotinus is fundamentally in agreement with Aristotle, who appears to concede this 
much at De anima I.408b25–30. However, Plotinus, anticipating the medieval disputes on the relation 
between the intellect and the power of the imagination, denies that intellection requires the presence of an 
image (φαντασία, φάντασμα; see I.4 [46] 10.17–21), as Aristotle seems to contend in On Memory and 
Recollection 449b31–450a1 (cf. IGAL II, 369 note 223) and perhaps in De anima III.431a16-17 (but see 
Sachs 2001, 146 note 117). 
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 IV.4 [28] 2.10–14: “[10] But if he is himself in such a way [11] as to be everything, when he thinks 
himself, he thinks everything at once [ὅταν αὑτὸν νοῇ, πάντα ὁμοῦ νοεῖ]; so that [12] a man in this state, 
by his intuition [ἐπιβολῇ] of himself, and when he actually [ἐνεργείᾳ] sees [13] himself, has everything 
included in this seeing, and by his intuition of everything [14] has himself included.” We might borrow 
Gerson’s expression, which he applies to his interpretation of the Form of an individual as a disembodied 
intellect, and say that in intellification the individual soul becomes “cognitively identical with all Forms” 
(Gerson 1994, 75). 
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 IV.3 [27] 30.13–16: [13] Ἄλλο γὰρ ἡ νόησις, καὶ ἄλλο [14] ἡ τῆς νοήσεως ἀντίληψις, καὶ νοοῦμεν μὲν 
ἀεί, ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα [15] δὲ οὐκ ἀεί· τοῦτο δέ, ὅτι τὸ δεχόμενον οὐ μόνον [16] δέχεται νοήσεις, ἀλλὰ 
καὶ αἰσθήσεις κατὰ θάτερα. Cf. also IV.8 [6] 8, I.4 [46] 9–10, V.1 [10] 12.1–8. 
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apprehend [15] our activity; and this is because that which receives it does not 
only [16] receive acts of intellection, but also, on its side, perceptions. 
 
As Armstrong rightly remarks about this passage, “consciousness in the ordinary 
sense, with memory, is thus secondary, dependent on our own physical condition, and 
relatively unimportant. As it appears in an early, a middle-period, and a late treatise, 
Plotinus seems to have held this doctrine consistently throughout his writing period.”228 
From this passage one might infer that we can in fact become reflectively aware of the 
noetic activity of our higher part, but since such awareness implies discursiveness, this 
awareness cannot itself belong to or constitute noetic activity.
229
 
Perhaps more importantly for our topic, what has been said of memory applies 
also to anticipation understood as an intrinsically temporal phenomenon (cf. I.5 [36] 2). 
Due to the way of being of Nous (i.e., eternity) not only is there no memory in Intellect, 
but there is also no anticipation, since as a member of the intelligible the fully intellified 
soul has a simultaneous grasp of the totality of Being and is constantly directed toward 
the One and engaged in the activity of replicating the superior unity of the Principle at the 
noetic level (see Subsection 3.4.1). However, I believe that we would be mistaken if we 
thought that absence of anticipation must imply absence of eros. We should rather say 
that lack of anticipation entails absence of eros only in its appetitive aspect, not absence 
of eros altogether. The reason for this is that the eros of the fully intellified soul is no 
longer directed toward desiderata which, because of their transient nature, will cause it to 
be restless and ultimately are bound to frustrate it. In other words, noetic eros is an eros 
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that is no longer wanting: no longer a need or a lack. Thus, in Intellect eros has the 
character of fulfilled eros, an eros unswervingly directed to and permanently in 
possession of its desideratum, the One, which unfailingly sparkles and sustains it. For the 
same reason, if eudaimonia coincides with the condition of the individual soul fully 
integrated in its higher part in the intelligible realm, it must follow that such a condition 
is complete and nothing can be added to it to increase it or perfect it as that particular 
condition. Thus, in the short treatise I.5 [36] On whether eudaimonia increases with time, 
Plotinus answers the indirect question posed in its title negatively,
230
 for if eudaimonia is 
intellification understood as the soul’s reintegration in the life of Nous, and if the proper 
way of being of Nous is eternity (or timelessness), it follows that the one who is truly 
eudaimon will not become more eudaimon with the passing of time simply because time 
is not of the essence of eudaimonia.
231
 
But the very fact that Nous is in its essence an attempt to replicate the unqualified 
unity of the One already means that Nous is not identical with that unity (cf. Subsection 
3.4.1). Accordingly, that even in the identity of Intellect and intelligibles there is still left 
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 A similar point may be made about memory. In the last three chapters of treatise I.5 [36] Plotinus asks 
whether memory of the past can increase eudaimonia, particularly in the case of memories of virtue and 
intelligence and memories of pleasures and noble actions. Unsurprisingly, his reply to this question is 
negative. Memories of virtue and intelligence do not increase one’s present condition of eudaimonia 
because this condition entails a greater—in fact, the greatest—degree of virtue and intelligence. Nor do 
memories of past pleasures increase eudaimonia, since pleasure is something that is essentially realized 
in the present and according to Plotinus nothing is added to it by a mere memory of it (I.5 [36] 8). As for 
memories of noble actions, they too do not increase eudaimonia, even if one were to have a longer time 
to accomplish a greater number of such actions. The reason for this is that it is not noble actions, however 
many one may happen to perform, that cause eudaimonia and the kind of pleasure connected with it, but 
one’s inner disposition (I.5 [36] 9–10); as Plotinus observes, “[t]o place eudaimonia [τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν] in 
action is to locate it in something outside virtue and the soul” (I.5 [36] 10.20–22). For a commentary on 
I.5 [36] 8–10 see Linguiti (2007, 97–106). 
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a minimum of multiplicity, that is, both the duality of Intellect and intelligibles and 
the plurality of the intelligibles themselves. This is due to the fact that, although Intellect 
(and, in it, the fully intellified soul) is permanently in possession of of its desideratum, 
this possession is of a mediated kind: Nous is not truly united with the One, but possesses 
it reflectively in the activity of thinking the intelligibles toto simul, as a perfectly unified 
totality (cf. V.3 [49] 11). For this reason, its eros is still something other than its essential 
activity (i.e., thought) and in this sense a gap is still open between what Nous essentially 
is (i.e., self-thinking thought) and what it loves (i.e., the One). The fact that Intellect and 
the intelligibles are mutually implicating but really distinct is but an indication of the 
minimal but all-important distance that still separates Intellect from the One, or their 
modes of unity, noetic and unqualified respectively.
232
 
From this it follows that the condition of the fully intellified soul is one in which 
the soul, thoroughly reintegrated in its higher part and a member of the intelligible realm, 
shares in both the activity and the eros of Intellect as two aspects of the same condition. 
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 This view of Intellect is at the same time a criticism of Aristotle, who identifies the best sort of life with 
thinking (νόησις) without admitting or realizing that even this life is not perfectly one, for as Gerson 
(1990, 199) explains, it “possesses a fundamental feature of every other life imperfectly one, namely, 
desire.” Plotinus puts it well at V.6 [24] 5.8–10: “[8] And this is what thinking is, a movement toward the 
Good [9] in its desire of the Good; for the desire generates thought and [10] establishes it in being along 
with itself: for desire of sight is seeing” ([8] Καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι νοεῖν, κίνησις πρὸς ἀγαθὸν [9] ἐφιέμενον 
ἐκείνου· ἡ γὰρ ἔφεσις τὴν νόησιν ἐγέννησε καὶ [10] συνυπέστησεν αὐτῇ· ἔφεσις γὰρ ὄψεως ὅρασις. This 
passage both echoes and modifies Aristotle, Metaphysics XII.1072a29–30. Cf. also Plotinus V.3 [49] 
10.49–52). Desire is a kind of lack of the desired object, which for Intellect is expressed in the fact that 
the intelligibles, themselves already multiple, are one with it and yet are not perfectly identical with it, 
for thinking as such implies a minimal distance from what it thinks. This minimal distance between 
Intellect and intelligibles is indicative of its imperfect unity, or the fact that its eros is not truly one like 
the One, but is a desire “to be perfectly what its own eternal activity shows it to be imperfectly, namely, a 
unity” (Gerson 1990, 199). Perfect unity, by contrast, is the One, which for Plotinus is other than Nous 
(as in V.6 [24] 5.8–10 above) or beyond Nous (V.4 [7] 2.2–3). Gerson (1990, 200) sharply concludes: 
“Desire precedes thinking in the order of explanation. Desire itself defines the relationship between a 
multiplicity and its principle. Since finite being is multiple, there is nothing more fundamental within 
being than desire,” even in the true Being that is Intellect. 
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Its activity is the simultaneous cognitive grasp of all the intelligibles and of itself as 
one of the intelligibles (see note 223), while its eros is fulfilled eros in the sense that it 
permanently possesses its desideratum; it possesses it, however, not by being one with it, 
but in a mediated way, namely as mirrored or reflected in the act of thinking, in the 
permanently unified totality of the intelligibles and that which thinks them. The unity of 
Intellect, therefore, is as perfect a unity as one can envision in a multiplicity, but it is still 
the unity of a multiplicity. If the soul is to overcome this last remainder of multiplicity 
and become eros, purely and simply, in union with the Good, one final step ought to be 
taken and one last stage reached. It is this last stage of the Ascent that we will be 
investigating in the next subsection. 
4.6.3 Ascent to the One: Union 
In this subsection I will confine my exposition to some observations on two 
closely related issues directly pertaining to the question of union: first, whether in union 
the individual soul ceases to be an individual soul as it comes in contact with the Source 
of all things; second, whether in union the eros of the individual soul, understood (like 
the eros of all derived reality) as eros directed to something other than itself, comes to an 
end. I shall argue that Plotinus’ answer is negative on both counts. 
It is evident from several passages that for Plotinus intellification is not the final 
stage of the Ascent.
233
 It is also clear that in intellification the individual soul maintains 
its identity; in fact, it is precisely by dissociating itself from sensible affective 
commitments and rejoining its higher part that the soul is most truly itself. Now, the 
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question is: Does the soul, insofar as it is an individual soul completely reintegrated 
in its higher part and thus having come to abide in the intelligible, continue to exist as this 
particular soul even in union? If it does, what is subtracted and what is left behind in the 
transition from intellification to union? 
In a classification occasionally referenced in Plotinian studies, Zahener is said to 
have distinguished four types of mystical experience: (i) pantheistic or natural (also 
called “panenhenic”), in which the goal of the individual soul is to become one with 
nature; (ii) ascetic, whereby the soul aims at dissociating itself as far as possible from the 
world through the so-called mortification of the flesh; (iii) monistic, in which the soul 
becomes absorbed in the source(s) of all reality; (iv) theistic, whereby the soul achieves 
union with God without thereby becoming identical with it.
234
 That the first two forms of 
mysticism do not correspond to Plotinus’ views (or at least cannot be considered final in 
a properly Plotinian Ascent) should not be hard to establish if one considers that the One, 
which for Plotinus is the truly final end of the Ascent, is neither nature nor all things—
against (i)—and that to detach oneself from the world is only a stage of the Ascent, not its 
end—against (ii). The problem therefore seems to subsist only in regard to the latter two 
kinds of mysticism, monistic and theistic. Rist argues that the so-called mystical union of 
the soul with the Plotinian One is of the theistic kind, and that therefore the individual 
soul is not completely absorbed or annihilated in union.
235
 Without necessarily endorsing 
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mysticism. The fuller fourfold classification of mystical experience is explicitly drawn by Rist (1967, 
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the label “theistic,” a good number of interpreters nonetheless agree that union does 
not entail the obliteration of the soul’s individual existence.236 
An exception to this view is Ousager, who resolutely voices a monistic 
interpretation. More precisely, he argues that unification of the individual soul with the 
One comprises two stages: the first stage is a non-cognitive contact with the Principle in 
which the particularity of the soul is still preserved, while the second stage is where 
unification proper takes place in the form of a complete annihilation of the individual 
soul.
237
 We may postpone the treatment of the (alleged) first stage of unification and deal 
first with the claim that in union with the One the individual soul is completely 
annihilated. Ousager provides a plethora of references to the Enneads (and several 
parallels to Plato) in which he finds support for this claim. It would be impossible to deal 
with all these references here, but I should take into account at least some of the most 
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 See for instance Arnou (1967, 263), Dodds (1928, 141), Burque (1940), O’Daly (1973, 85), Armstrong 
(1977, 59), IGAL (1982–1998, I, 100–101), Seidl (1985, 263), Charles-Saget (1985, 96), Wallis (1995, 
89), O’Meara (1993, 106), Gerson (1994, 292 notes 46–47, 293 note 50), Corrigan (2005, 34, 180–181); 
cf. also Hadot (1987; 1988, 66–67, 339–345), for whom the condition of the individual soul in union is 
analogous to that of Intellect in its incipient phase: Loving Nous or intelligible matter (cf. Chapter Three 
note 221). Mamo (1976) thinks that Plotinus is a monist, but denies that the soul is annihilated in union: 
“what remains is the admittedly strange notion of a mind whose formal and intelligible structure is still 
intact (and still known by all other form-minds) but whose normal awareness is lacking because it is now 
‘a mind senseless and in love’ (νοῦς ἄφρων καὶ ἐρῶν)” (Mamo 1976, 206; the reference to Plotinus in the 
quote from Mamo is VI.7 [38] 35.24). Further sources on the subject can be found in the references to 
Burque and Gerson cited in this note, and in Ousager (2004, 95–104). I believe that Bussanich (1988, 
192) is correct to raise reservations about the appropriateness of the conceptual distinction between 
monistic and theistic mysticism in connection with Plotinian union (however, Bussanich goes on to argue 
in favor of the identification of soul and the One in union, which I am here opposing: Bussanich 1988, 
180–193; 1994, 5325–5328). The text from Mamo (1976) just quoted, for one, shows how the meaning 
of the word “monism” may be rather fluid; the same could be said about “theism” (Rist’s clarification of 
the terms “theistic” and “monistic,” mainly in reply to Mamo 1976, are appropriate: see Rist 1989, 184–
190). I agree with Ousager (2004, 17) that in this particular context, the two terms may be used 
conventionally to indicate no more than annihilation (monism) and persistence (theism) of the self in 
union. If Plotinus is to be called a “theist,” it will be mainly in this qualified sense. 
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significant ones, in the hope that to show how I think Ousager’s interpretation fails to 
apply to these should suffice at least safely to indicate that it may fail to apply to the 
others as well. 
One of these references is VI.7 [38] 22.17–19, where Plotinus writes that “as long 
as there is something higher than that which is present to it [viz. to soul], it naturally goes 
on upwards, lifted by the giver of its love” (see Chapter Three note 213, and note 167 of 
the present chapter for the Greek text of this passage). Ousager takes this text to imply 
that at this stage of the Ascent “the soul can be lifted further only by the One and no 
longer by itself.”238 One need not disagree with this claim in order to realize that it is far 
from evident that either to be lifted or to be lifted further ought to entail complete 
annihilation. 
Ousager goes on to cite II.9 [33] 9.45–54 (in which at line 50 Plotinus qualifies 
assimilation to the divine with the restriction, “as far as the human soul can”: ὅσον ἐστὶ 
δυνατὸν ψυχῇ ἀνθρώπου) as the only passage openly contradicting a monistic 
interpretation of union. However, he rightly observes that this passage was written 
against the Gnostics, who apparently thought that assimilation to the divine was 
immediately available to the soul desiring it. By contrast, at this stage of the Ascent it is 
the One that “takes over and becomes our self,”239 as Plotinus seems to suggests at V.1 
[10] 11.9–10, where he writes that the One is “in each and every one of those capable of 
                                                 
238
 Ousager (2004, 95). 
 
239
 Ousager (2004, 97). 
 
  
423 
receiving it as another self.”240 But again, it is not clear beyond reasonable doubt that 
Plotinus is speaking of annihilation of the self in this text. On the contrary, in the lines 
that follow the passage I just cited, V.1 [10] 11.10–15, Plotinus compares the relation 
between the One and the individual soul taking place in union to that between the center 
of a circle and its radii. He writes that the One abides in itself undividedly while those 
capable of it receive it as another self,
241
 
[10] just as the [11] centre of the circle exists by itself, but every one of 
the radii in the circle has its [12] point in the centre and the lines bring 
their individuality [13] to it. For it is with something of this sort in 
ourselves that we [14] are in contact with god
242
 and are with him and 
depend upon him; and those of us who [15] converge towards him are 
firmly established in him. 
 
It seems to me that there is no mention of annihilation in this text. If anything, 
expressions such as contact, dependence, convergence, and establishment may indicate 
that the soul in its very center (see pages 341–345 above) is still minimally distinguished 
from the One, though in direct contact with it by being wholly and undividedly 
committed to it.
243
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 V.1 [10] 11.9–10: [9] καθ’ ἕκαστον [10] τῶν δυναμένων δέχεσθαι οἷον ἄλλον αὐτόν. This is perhaps an 
echo of Aristotle’s definition of the friend as another self in Nicomachean Ethics IX.1166a31–32: ἔστι 
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ἐκεῖ. For further references on the image of the circle see Chapter Three note 78. 
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 At IV.3 [27] 5.4–5 Plotinus writes of Socrates that “he will cease to be, precisely when he attains to the 
very best” ([4] ἀπολεῖται δέ, ὅταν [5] μάλιστα γένηται ἐν τῷ ἀρίστῳ). Leaving aside the fact that here 
Plotinus seems to be speaking of Socrates’ soul in its embodied condition, Ousager (2004, 101) again 
omits to refer to the very next few words of this passage, IV.3 [27] 5.5–6 (“Now no real being ever 
ceases to be”—[5] Ἢ ἀπολεῖται οὐδὲν τῶν [6] ὄντων), where the reference appears to be the soul of 
Socrates as a denizen of the noetic realm (i.e., most likely the Form of the individual which in its 
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Perhaps the passage that most explicitly appears to support a monistic 
interpretation of union is VI.9 [9] 10.14–21:244 
[14] So then the seer does not see and does not distinguish [15] and does 
not imagine two, but it is as if he had become someone else and not [16] 
himself and does not count as his own there, but has come to belong to 
that and so [17] is one, having joined, as it were, centre to centre. For here 
too [18] when the centres have come together they are one, but there is 
duality when they are separate. This [19] also is how we now speak of 
‘another’. For this reason the vision is hard to put into words. [20] For 
how could one announce that as another when he did not see, [21] there 
when he had the vision, another, but one with himself? 
 
In this case, too, it seems to me that the obliteration of the self is neither stated 
clearly nor again suggested. On the contrary, in this passage Plotinus takes pains to stress 
the difficulty of putting this experience into words (lines 19–21). He is not suggesting 
that the individual soul is indiscernible from the One and completely annihilated in it 
(which would be quite easy to say), but rather that while in unitive vision what is “seen” 
is one thing only, in actuality the soul and the One remain distinct.
245
 Moreover, the 
context of the passage does not seem to be that of the Ascent proper and of final (i.e., 
                                                                                                                                                 
embodied state is called Socrates; see my remarks on the subject in Subsection 4.4.1 above). 
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 VI.9 [9] 10.14–21: [14] Τότε μὲν οὖν οὔτε ὁρᾷ οὐδὲ διακρίνει ὁ ὁρῶν [15] οὐδὲ φαντάζεται δύο, ἀλλ’ 
οἷον ἄλλος γενόμενος καὶ οὐκ [16] αὐτὸς οὐδ’ αὑτοῦ συντελεῖ ἐκεῖ, κἀκείνου γενόμενος ἕν [17] ἐστιν 
ὥσπερ κέντρῳ κέντρον συνάψας. Καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα [18] συνελθόντα ἕν ἐστι, τό τε δύο ὅταν χωρίς. Οὕτω 
[19] καὶ ἡμεῖς νῦν λέγομεν ἕτερον. Διὸ καὶ δύσφραστον τὸ [20] θέαμα· πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἀπαγγείλειέ τις ὡς 
ἕτερον οὐκ ἰδὼν [21] ἐκεῖ ὅτε ἐθεᾶτο ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ ἓν πρὸς ἑαυτόν; Ousager refers to this passage (or 
parts of it, including also the earlier lines 11–13) repeatedly (e.g., Ousager 2004, 66, 70, 84, 102, 107). 
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 In speaking about the differentiation of particular intellects and souls, Ousager (2004, 34) offers an 
impressive list of references to support the claim that Plotinus subscribes to the “Principle of the Identity 
of Indiscernibles” (according to which two indiscernible things are identical “not only subjectively, but 
logically and objectively”), as well as to its inverse, the “Principle of the Non-Identity of Discernibles” 
(for Leibniz’s version of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles” see Discours de Metaphysique 9 
= Leibniz 1875–1890, IV, 433–434; cf. also Monadology 9 = Leibniz 1940, 705). If my non-monistic 
reading of union is correct, in light of this claim we will have to say that the soul’s union with the One is 
an experience in which the two terms are only “subjectively” identical but numerically still distinct. 
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irreversible, like all genuine annihilation should be, I surmise) union, but a 
momentary experience of union while the individual soul is still in an incarnate condition. 
Dodds was probably right when he described this experience as “the momentary 
actualization of a potential identity between the Absolute in man [i.e., the innermost 
center of the soul mentioned earlier at pages 341–345] and the Absolute outside man [i.e., 
the One].”246 
The difficulty of the issue is certainly due to the complexity of Plotinus’ view of 
the self or the individual (on which I touched in Subsection 4.4.1), as well as to what 
Ousager thinks Plotinus understands by “a self” (τις αὐτό). It is clear that from the 
perspective of the individual soul to be a self can mean quite different things depending 
on the stage of the Ascent at which the soul is “located.” But in stricter and almost 
technical terms Ousager believes that for Plotinus to be a self means to be unqualifiedly 
simple or indivisible.
247
 It follows that the only true self in Plotinus’ universe can be the 
One, and that if ascending to the One means to be reintegrated in what is most truly 
oneself, union with the Principle will have to mean annihilation of all that was merely 
called a self at lower stages of the Ascent, and ultimately annihilation of the individual 
soul as such in all its parts, aspects, or manifestations. The main problem with this 
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 This is the thesis of the first part of Ousager’s work (Ousager 2004, 15–120). Ousager (2004, 98) cites 
V.3 [49] 15.10–14 as a key passage in support of this view: “[10] What [Τί (ARMSTRONG writes ‘When’: 
most likely a typographical error)] then is more deficient [ἐνδεέστερον] than the One? That which is not 
one [τὸ μὴ ἕν]; it is therefore many [πολλὰ]; but all the same [11] it aspires [ἐφιέμενον] to the One; so it 
is a one-many. For all that is not [12] one is kept in being [σῴζεται] by the One, and is what it is by this 
‘one’: for if it had not [13] become one, even though it is composed of many parts it is not yet what one 
would call a [14] self [τις αὐτό (ARMSTRONG: ‘itself’)]” (cf. also VI.6 [34] 1.10–20). On the plausibility 
of the translation of the Greek pronoun αὐτός with the noun “self,” see O’Daly (1973, 89–90); cf. also 
Ousager (2004, 99 note 153). 
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interpretation, I maintain, is that while it may be plausible to refer to the One as a self, 
and perhaps even to infer that all other selves are diluted images of this absolute self,
248
 it 
does not follow that these are annihilated in union. More importantly, it remains highly 
questionable whether in Plotinus there is in fact a doctrine of the self conceived of as that 
which is indivisible or unqualifiedly simple.
249
 
But if the self is not effaced in union, what new “form” does it take? What is 
subtracted from it as it transits beyond Nous, and what is left in this final stage of the 
Ascent? Let me first give the short version of the answers to these questions: what is 
subtracted in union is intellection (νόησις), the proper activity of the intellified soul; what 
is left, or the new, final, and exclusive “form” retained by the soul in union is eros, love 
for the One. In trying to offer a slightly fuller account of these brief answers, I will at the 
same time provide a reply to the second question introduced at the beginning of this 
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 As Tornau (2009, 340, note 2) rightly observes, some of the passages from the Enneads through which 
Ousager supports his view of the One as the only self are in fact about Intellect (e.g., V.8 [31] 11 and 
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Ascent (i.e., in our specific case, the annihilation of the individual soul). By contrast, I think that it is not 
even established that the terminology of union is Plotinus’ ordinary way to refer to what occurs at the end 
of the Ascent (let alone that it should be necessarily associated to the annihilation of the individual soul 
in union). Of the thirty-one times that Plotinus uses the words ἕνωσις, ἑνότης, and ἑνοῦν (cf. the relevant 
entries in SP), only once does he seem to employ one of these terms to name the actual experience taking 
place in the last stage of the Ascent (i.e., at VI.9 [9] 11.6: ἡνωμένον); to this we may add the noun 
ἅπλωσις and the related verb ἁπλόω, on which see my remarks in Chapter Three note 206. In spite of 
this, based on traditional usage and on the passages from the Enneads that I have cited in these last few 
pages, I still think it is acceptable to refer to the last stage of the Ascent with such words as “union” and 
“simplification,” provided that we do not immediately associate these words with the annihilation of one 
of the two terms involved in the experience of union. 
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subsection: Does eros come to an end in union? 
As I argued in the previous subsection, in intellification the individual soul comes 
to reintegrate or fully identify itself with its higher part in the intelligible realm. As a 
member of Intellect, the fundamental activity of the intellified soul is the actual cognition 
of all the Forms. This, however, is not its only activity; in fact, although intellection or 
non-discursive thought (νόησις) is the one activity by which Nous constitutes itself in its 
essence, such an activity depends on another factor, without which Nous itself would 
never emerge as a fully formed hypostasis. This factor is what in Subsection 3.4.1 I called 
“noetic eros,” that is, the erotic energy whereby Intellect constitutes itself, qua 
hypostasis, as a replica of the higher unity of the Principle while remaining erotically 
directed toward the One.
250
 
Now, if the fully intellified individual soul is to achieve an even higher degree of 
proximity to the One and be lifted into the final stage of the Ascent, according to Plotinus 
it ought to strip itself of the last feature that prevents it from being completely attuned to 
the universal desideratum, namely intellection. Therefore, the soul has to make its way to 
what in itself is most akin to the One (i.e., the center or highest point of the soul) and 
identify completely with it so as to be able to contemplate the One by that which is most 
like it—like by like: the Principle of Affinity (see Subsection 4.3.2). 
The reason for the necessity of transcending intellection is that intellection is 
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 As Plotinus points out at VI.7 [38] 35.19–25, we find a double direction in the activity of Nous: on the 
one hand, the power of thought (line 20: δύναμιν εἰς τὸ νοεῖν), whereby Intellect is directed toward its 
own contents; on the other, a certain intuition or reception (lines 21–22: ἐπιβολῇ τινι καὶ παραδοχῇ), 
whereby it remains erotically (line 24: νοῦς ἐρῶν) directed outwards, toward the One. Cf. also III.8 [30] 
11.22–25, VI.5 [23] 4.16–20. 
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indeed a mode of relating to the Principle, but one which fails to relate to it as the 
relatum itself requires. In other words, the activity of Nous is a self-enclosed activity by 
which the second hypostasis emerges as the identity of the totality of the intelligibles and 
that which intellects them. As such, noetic activity is a replica of the higher unity of the 
One, but it is not itself of the One, for being unqualifiedly simple, the One escapes the 
intrinsically dividing (and limiting) activity of thought, even the perfect thought of Nous. 
By knowing itself as the identity of knower and object known, Intellect grasps the One 
only indirectly, or as dividedly mirrored in a perfectly unified plurality, rather than in the 
unqualified simplicity that is proper to the Principle. If the intellified soul is to ascend to 
the One and achieve union, it must transcend intellection and meet the Principle on the 
Principle’s own terms, that is, in its pure, unmediated simplicity.251 Intellection is thus the 
last element that needs to be stripped away in the soul’s return to its Source. 
But what is left after this final denudement has taken place? Put differently, to 
what is the soul re-duced (in the etymological sense of the term) in union? As I 
anticipated, it is reduced to eros: all that it is, simply and unswervingly, is love for the 
One. For this reason, I believe that although Plotinus sometimes refers to the experience 
of union as to a kind of vision,
252
 his favorite image to describe the final stage of the 
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 Plotinus touches extensively on the idea that the One, abiding beyond intellection, cannot be grasped 
through intellection and is superior to Intellect (both as Principle and as End). Cf. III.8 [30] 8–11, V.1 
[10] 7, V.3 [49] 11–12, V.4 [7] 2, V.5 [32] 3 and 5, the whole of V.6 [24], V.9 [5] 2, VI.5 [23] 10, VI.7 
[38] 35–41, VI.8 [39] 19, VI.9 [9] 2–4. 
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 The description of union given at VI.9 [9] 11.22–25 is poignant: “[22] But that other, perhaps, was not a 
contemplation, but another kind [23] of seeing, a being out of oneself and simplifying and giving oneself 
over [24] and pressing toward contact and rest and a sustained thought leading to [25] adaptation, if one 
is going to contemplate what is in the sanctuary” ([22] Τὸ δὲ ἴσως ἦν οὐ θέαμα, ἀλλὰ ἄλλος τρόπος [23] 
τοῦ ἰδεῖν, ἔκστασις καὶ ἅπλωσις καὶ ἐπίδοσις αὐτοῦ καὶ [24] ἔφεσις πρὸς ἁφὴν καὶ στάσις καὶ περινόησις 
πρὸς [25] ἐφαρμογήν, εἴπερ τις τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀδύτῳ θεάσεται). The emphasis in the translation is mine. 
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Ascent is related to the sense of touch.
253
 Union is a kind of contact by which the soul 
is finally established in the greatest proximity of its desideratum.
254
 Generally speaking, 
the terminology of vision is used to name either the literal seeing of the sensible eye or 
the metaphorical seeing of the mind occurring in the cognitive relation between knower 
and object known.
255
 However, Plotinus frequently uses terms of vision also to express 
the relation between the soul and the One taking place in union.
256
 Therefore, it would 
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 References to the Enneads can be arranged around the terminology of touch employed by Plotinus: ἁφή 
(VI.9 [9] 11.24), ἐπαφή (VI.7 [38] 36.4, 39.19; cf. also V.3 [49] 10.42), ἐφάπτειν (V.1 [10] 11.14, V.3 
[49] 17.25–26, V.6 [24] 6.35, VI.5 [23] 10.27, 41, VI.7 [38] 30.3, VI.8 [39] 18.4, 8, 21.29, VI.9 [9] 4.27, 
9.55), θιγγάνειν (VI.9 [9] 4.27, 7.4; cf. also V.3 [49] 10.44; see also θίξις at V.3 [49] 10.42). Plotinus also 
uses metaphors derived from the other senses to express the soul’s relation to the One, in particular the 
sense of sight (see note 256 below), but also hearing (cf. V.1 [10] 12.15–21, cited in note 170 above); the 
sense of smell is found apt to describe the second activity (i.e., the activity from the essence) of the One, 
as we saw in the previous chapter (Chapter Three notes 77, 88, 151); I am unaware of illustrations 
regarding the One related to the sense of taste in the Enneads, if there are any. 
 
254
 It will be opportune to remind ourselves that in Plotinus this relation of contact between the soul and the 
One is non-reciprocal, in accordance with the Principle of Participation (see Section 4.5 above). We 
might say that although it is through as strict a contact as we can envision that a relation with the One is 
established, the One is not itself in contact with anything but transcends all (cf. Chapter Three note 18). 
Cf. Beierwaltes (1991, 165–167). For this reason, the relation between the soul and the One is not the 
mutual affair that takes place between lovers, but rather the non-reciprocal rapport between a permanent 
lover and a permanent beloved: the One is a beloved that is never a lover. To this extent even the 
metaphor of human love fails to express what takes place in union, although it should be added that the 
One, unlike some human beloved, is a beloved that does not reject the soul’s love, once this is completely 
purified and directed to the One alone. An objection: Is it not of the essence of love to aim at 
reciprocation or mutuality, at least ideally? I may love someone disinterestedly, but to have my love 
reciprocated would seem to be something that I should desire in principle, even when lucidly aware that 
this will never happen. Is there no reciprocation whatsoever in the unio mystica? We can say that for the 
soul in union reciprocation may be understood precisely as the absence of all hindrance in its love of the 
One: fully purified, the soul’s eros finally meets a beloved that will never leave it wanting. In union, 
reciprocation means simply that the One “allows” the soul to love it because the soul has transformed its 
eros and finally has become capable of loving the Good correspondingly. 
 
255
 See most references in SP’s entries for the terms listed in the next note (to which we should add βλέψις, 
ὅρασις, and ὀφθαλμός), in particular ὁρᾶν (a) and θέα (b). 
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 For references in which union with the One is expressed in terms of vision, see SP, s.v. ὁρᾶν (c) and θέα 
(c). Several other terms of vision are used to describe the soul’s (as well as Intellect’s and everything 
else’s) relation to the One, for instance: βλέπειν (e.g., I.6 [1] 7.10, I.7 [54] 1.14, III.9 [13] 9.7, V.1 [10] 
9.15, V.5 [32] 10.10, V.6 [24] 5.17, VI.7 [38] 17.14, 34.20, VI.8 [39] 19.11), θέαμα (e.g., VI.7 [38] 
35.14, VI.9 [9] 4.17, 10.20, 11.20), θεᾶσθαι (e.g., V.3 [49] 17.35–37, VI.9 [9] 3.24, 27), θεατός (e.g., 
VI.9 [9] 4.30), ὄμμα (e.g., VI.7 [38] 35.13, 36.20, VI.8 [39] 19.10), ὅραμα (e.g., VI.7 [38] 35.13, 36.21), 
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seem that the jargon of touch is used in contrast with that vision only in part. And yet, 
if Plotinus uses touch as a key illustration of the so-called unio mystica to supplement the 
metaphor of vision, I believe it is also because touch, more than vision, is the privileged 
sense of the erotic intercourse, which in turn is the broader metaphor of what the soul 
experiences in the final stage of the Ascent. 
It thus seems to me that the question whether in union eros comes to an end 
should not only be answered negatively, but might also have to be reversed: How, in 
union, could eros come to an end, if what takes place in it is comparable to the contact 
between lover and beloved in the experience of love? As Pigler points out, the greatest 
resemblance to the One is not in the field of thought, but in that of love (see Chapter 
Three note 299); for if the beloved is itself love, and infinite love, in order to come in 
contact with it as what it truly is, not only will knowledge be insufficient and love 
necessary, but the soul will also have to sustain this contact in love, and love of an 
infinite kind, in keeping with the Principle of As-similation (see Subsection 4.3.1).
257
 
Three texts of the Enneads, one from each of the three major periods of Plotinus’ literary 
production (see Appendix A), should suffice to support and illustrate this point and bring 
                                                                                                                                                 
ὁρατικός (e.g., V.3 [49] 10.11), ὁρατός (e.g., VI.7 [38] 35.15), ὄψις (e.g., VI.7 [38] 35.14–15); cf. also 
Chapter Two note 111. The One is also said to be the cause of vision (ὄψις: e.g., VI.7 [38] 16.25–26). 
 
257
 Less than two centuries later, Augustine will write: “Nullumque bonum perfecte noscitur, quod non 
perfecte amatur” (Augustine, De diuersis questionibus LXXXIII 35.2). This idea applies to all goods, not 
only to God qua Good; thus for Augustine to know something perfectly means to love it in accordance 
with its “place” on the hierarchical order of reality. This applies to Plotinus’ universe as well. But since 
the Plotinian One is both ἔρως (see Section 3.3) and ὑπερνόησις (VI.8 [39] 16.32; see Piglers’s remark 
reported in Chapter Three note 299), there is no question of knowing it perfectly, but only of loving it. 
When what is at issue is the supremely lovable, Plotinus seems to say that knowledge will add nothing to 
love, but the pure presence of the beloved will free love of its merely appetitive aspect and will sustain 
the joy that the lover feels (or rather, is) at being lovingly in its presence. See also my remarks on the 
importance of qualifying the contrast between love and knowledge at pages 324–327. 
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the present subsection to a close.
258
 The first text is from the last treatise of the 
Enneads in Porphyry’s order, On the Good or the One, VI.9 [9] 9.38–55. In this text 
Plotinus speaks to the one who has never experienced union, and describes it in terms of 
the more familiar experience of love.
259
 
[38] And if anyone [39] does not know this experience,
260
 let him think of 
it [40] in terms of our loves here below, and what it is like to attain what 
one [41] is most in love with, and that these earthly loves are mortal and 
[42] harmful, and loves only of images, and that they change because it 
was not [43] what is really and truly loved nor our good nor what [44] we 
seek.
261
 But there is our true love, with whom also [45] we can be united, 
having a part in him
262
 and truly possessing him, not [46] embracing him 
in the flesh from outside. But ‘whoever has seen knows [47] what I am 
saying’,263 that the soul has another life and draws near, [48] and has 
already come near and has a part in him, and so [49] is in a state to know 
that the giver of true [50] life is present and we need nothing more. But 
quite otherwise we must put away [51] other things and take our stand 
only in this, and become this [52] alone, cutting away all the other things 
in which we are encased; so [53] we must be eager to go out of here and 
be impatient at being bound to [54] other things, that we may embrace it 
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 Another important text in which union is described in erotic terms is I.6 [1] 7.12–39. 
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 VI.9 [9] 9.38–55: [38] Καὶ οἷς [39] μὲν ἄγνωστον ἐστι τὸ πάθημα τοῦτο, ἐντεῦθεν ἐνθυμείσθω [40] ἀπὸ 
τῶν ἐνταῦθα ἐρώτων, οἷόν ἐστι τυχεῖν ὧν τις [41] μάλιστα ἐρᾷ, καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα μὲν τὰ ἐρώμενα θνητὰ καὶ 
[42] βλαβερὰ καὶ εἰδώλων ἔρωτες καὶ μεταπίπτει, ὅτι οὐκ ἦν [43] τὸ ὄντως ἐρώμενον οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν 
ἡμῶν οὐδ’ ὃ [44] ζητοῦμεν. Ἐκεῖ δὲ τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἐρώμενον, ᾧ ἔστι καὶ [45] συνεῖναι μεταλαβόντα αὐτοῦ 
καὶ ὄντως ἔχοντα, οὐ [46] περιπτυσσόμενον σαρξὶν ἔξωθεν. Ὅστις δὲ εἶδεν, οἶδεν [47] ὃ λέγω, ὡς ἡ 
ψυχὴ ζωὴν ἄλλην ἴσχει τότε καὶ προσιοῦσα [48] καὶ ἤδη προσελθοῦσα καὶ μετασχοῦσα αὐτοῦ, ὥστε [49] 
γνῶναι διατεθεῖσαν, ὅτι πάρεστιν ὁ χορηγὸς ἀληθινῆς [50] ζωῆς, καὶ δεῖ οὐδενὸς ἔτι. Τοὐναντίον δὲ 
ἀποθέσθαι τὰ [51] ἄλλα δεῖ, καὶ ἐν μόνῳ στῆναι τούτῳ, καὶ τοῦτο γενέσθαι [52] μόνον περικόψαντα τὰ 
λοιπὰ ὅσα περικείμεθα· ὥστε [53] ἐξελθεῖν σπεύδειν ἐντεῦθεν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν ἐπὶ θάτερα [54] 
δεδεμένους, ἵνα τῷ ὅλῳ αὐτῶν περιπτυξώμεθα καὶ μηδὲν [55] μέρος ἔχοιμεν, ᾧ μὴ ἐφαπτόμεθα θεοῦ. 
 
260
 The term πάθημα on line 39 refers to the joy (εὐπαθεῖ) just mentioned on the previous line (cf. VI.7 [38] 
34.30, 38), which is in turn an echo of Plato, Phaedrus 247d4. 
 
261
 Cf. Plato, Symposium 212a4–5. 
 
262
 VI.9 [9] 9.45: μεταλαβόντα αὐτοῦ. Hadot (1994, 195) rightly points out that the seemingly paradoxical 
idea of participation in something that is unqualifiedly simple for the soul means to come to resemble the 
One and to direct the whole of its activity toward it (cf. I.7 [54] 1.11–13, I.8 [51] 8.43). And once Nous 
has been transcended, the soul’s activity can only be love, eros. 
 
263
 See note 72 above. 
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with the whole of ourselves and [55] have no part with which we do not touch 
God. 
 
The second text, VI.7 [38] 34.8–28, describes the joy experienced by the soul in 
encountering its beloved, the One. Again, the experience is compared to the encounter 
between lovers (line 15), and the joy is so great that the soul would not exchange it for 
anything in the world. Here is the text of VI.7 [38] 34.8–28: 264 
[8] But when the soul has good fortune with it [viz., with receiving the 
Good alone: cf. VI.7 [38] 34.7–8], and it comes to [9] it, or rather, being 
there already, appears, when the soul turns away from the [10] things that 
are there, and has prepared by making itself as beautiful as possible [11] 
and has come to likeness (the preparation and the adornments [12] are 
clearly understood, I think, by those who are preparing themselves) and it 
sees it in itself [13] suddenly
265
 appearing (for there is nothing between, 
nor are there still two but both are one;
266
 [14] nor could you still make a 
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 VI.7 [38] 34.8–28: [8] Ὅταν δὲ τούτου εὐτυχήσῃ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ἥκῃ πρὸς [9] αὐτήν, μᾶλλον δὲ παρὸν 
φανῇ ὅταν ἐκείνη ἐκνεύσῃ τῶν [10] παρόντων καὶ παρασκευάσασα αὑτὴν ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα καλὴν [11] καὶ 
εἰς ὁμοιότητα ἐλθοῦσα (ἡ δὲ παρασκευὴ καὶ ἡ κόσμησις [12] δήλη που τοῖς παρασκευαζομένοις), ἰδοῦσα 
δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ [13] ἐξαίφνης φανέντα (μεταξὺ γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδ’ ἔτι δύο ἀλλ’ ἓν [14] ἄμφω· οὐ γὰρ ἂν 
διακρίναις ἔτι, ἕως πάρεστι· μίμησις δὲ [15] τούτου καὶ οἱ ἐνταῦθα ἐρασταὶ καὶ ἐρώμενοι συγκρῖναι 
θέλοντες), [16] καὶ οὔτε σώματος ἔτι αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτῷ, [17] οὔτε ἑαυτὴν ἄλλο τι λέγει, οὐκ 
ἄνθρωπον, οὐ ζῷον, οὐκ ὄν, [18] οὐδὲ πᾶν (ἀνώμαλος γὰρ ἡ τούτων πως θέα), καὶ οὐδὲ [19] σχολὴν ἄγει 
πρὸς αὐτὰ οὔτε θέλει, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ ζητήσασα [20] ἐκείνῳ παρόντι ἀπαντᾷ κἀκεῖνο ἀντ’ αὐτῆς βλέπει· 
τίς δὲ [21] οὖσα βλέπει οὐδὲ τοῦτο σχολάζει ὁρᾶν. Ἔνθα δὴ οὐδὲν [22] πάντων ἀντὶ τούτου ἀλλάξαιτο, 
οὐδ’ εἴ τις αὐτῇ πάντα τὸν [23] οὐρανὸν ἐπιτρέποι, ὡς οὐκ ὄντος ἄλλου ἔτι ἀμείνονος οὐδὲ [24] μᾶλλον 
ἀγαθοῦ· οὔτε γὰρ ἀνωτέρω τρέχει τά τε ἄλλα πάντα [25] κατιούσης, κἂν ᾖ ἄνω. Ὥστε τότε ἔχει καὶ τὸ 
κρίνειν καλῶς [26] καὶ γιγνώσκειν, ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν οὗ ἐφίετο, καὶ τίθεσθαι, ὅτι [27] μηδέν ἐστι κρεῖττον 
αὐτοῦ. Οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀπάτη ἐκεῖ· ἢ [28] ποῦ ἂν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀληθέστερον τύχοι; See also the lyrical 
passage from the same treatise cited on the first page of this chapter (VI.7 [38] 22.5–10). 
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 VI.7 [38] 34.13: ἐξαίφνης; see also V.3 [49] 17.29, V.5 [32] 3.13, 7.34, VI.7 [38] 36.18; cf. Plato, 
Symposium 210e4, Letters VII.341c7–d1 (see pages 53–54 above). I do not think that the term ἐξαίφνης 
can be taken as an expression of personal love and care on the part of the One similar to Christian Grace 
(cf. Dodds 1960, 7). The giving of eros by the One is not such an expression (cf. V.5 [32] 12.41–49), but 
a consequence of the nature of a single principle of all reality that is essentially impersonal (cf. 
Armstrong 1977, 78). For a stimulating reflection on the issue of Plotinian love as a love directed toward 
an impersonal beloved, and on the even more fundamental difficulty of distinguishing between personal 
and impersonal love, see J.-L. Chrétien’s brilliant article, L’amour du Neutre (Chrétien 1990, 329–344); 
cf. Chapter One note 272 and Section 5.2 of the Epilogue. On the issue of Grace see Epilogue note 9. 
 
266
 VI.7 [38] 34.13–14: οὐδ’ ἔτι δύο ἀλλ’ ἓν ἄμφω. ARMSTRONG (VII, 192–193 note 1) remarks: “ἓν ἄμφω 
is always used by Plotinus of a perfect union in which the two united retain their distinct natures” (cf. 
IV.4 [28] 2.27–28, V.8 [31] 7.13; see SP, s.v. ἄμφω (b)). 
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distinction while it is present: [15] lovers and their beloved here below imitate 
this in their will to be united), [16] it does not still perceive its body, that it 
is in it, [17] and does not speak of itself as anything else, not man, or 
living thing, or being, [18] or all (for the contemplation of these would be 
something disturbing), and it has no [19] time for them, but it has been 
seeking it, [20] and meets that when it is present, and looks at that instead 
of itself; but [21] it has not even time to see who the soul is that looks. 
There, truly, it [22] would not exchange this for anything in the world, not 
even if someone handed over the whole [23] universe to it, because there 
is nothing still better, and nothing that [24] is more a good; for it does not 
run up higher, and all the other things [25] are on its way down, even if 
they are in the realm above. So then it has the ability to judge rightly [26] 
and to know that this is what it desired, and to establish that [27] there is 
nothing better than it. For there is no deceit there; or [28] where could it 
find anything truer than the truth? 
 
The third and final text brings together the theme of touch (which as I observed 
earlier is the privileged sense of the erotic encounter), the hyper-noetic character of the 
experience of union (which can be put into words only when it is not actually taking 
place), and that of light (a most familiar theme from Plato,
267
 often found in Plotinus and 
the Platonic tradition). The text is V.3 [49] 17.24–38:268 
[24] ...but how can one describe [25] the absolutely simple? But it is 
enough if one touches it intellectually; [26] but when it has done so, while 
the touching lasts, it is absolutely impossible, [27] nor has it time, to 
speak; but it is afterwards that it is able to [28] reason about it. One must 
believe one has seen, when the [29] soul suddenly
269
 takes light: for this is 
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 On this see Beierwaltes (1957, especially 37–97). See also my tentative interpretation of the metaphor of 
light and vision in Plato at pages 68–71 above. 
 
268
 V.3 [49] 17.24–38: [24] ἐν δὲ πάντη ἁπλῷ [25] διέξοδος τίς ἐστιν; Ἀλλ’ ἀρκεῖ κἂν νοερῶς ἐφάψασθαι· 
[26] ἐφαψάμενον δέ, ὅτε ἐφάπτεται, πάντη μηδὲν μήτε δύνασθαι [27] μήτε σχολὴν ἄγειν λέγειν, ὕστερον 
δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ [28] συλλογίζεσθαι. Τότε δὲ χρὴ ἑωρακέναι πιστεύειν, ὅταν ἡ [29] ψυχὴ ἐξαίφνης φῶς 
λάβῃ · τοῦτο γάρ [τοῦτο τὸ φῶς] παρ’ [30] αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός· καὶ τότε χρὴ νομίζειν παρεῖναι, ὅταν [31] 
ὥσπερ θεὸς ἄλλος [ὅταν] εἰς οἶκον καλοῦντός τινος ἐλθὼν [32] φωτίσῃ· ἢ μηδ’ ἐλθὼν οὐκ ἐφώτισεν. 
Οὕτω τοι καὶ ψυχὴ [33] ἀφώτιστος ἄθεος ἐκείνου· φωτισθεῖσα δὲ ἔχει, ὃ ἐζήτει, [34] καὶ τοῦτο τὸ τέλος 
τἀληθινὸν ψυχῇ, ἐφάψασθαι φωτὸς [35] ἐκείνου καὶ αὐτῷ αὐτὸ θεάσασθαι, οὐκ ἄλλου φωτί, ἀλλ’ [36] 
αὐτό, δι’ οὗ καὶ ὁρᾷ. Δι’ οὗ γὰρ ἐφωτίσθη, τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὃ [37] δεῖ θεάσασθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἥλιον διὰ φωτὸς 
ἄλλου. Πῶς ἂν [38] οὖν τοῦτο γένοιτο; Ἄφελε πάντα. The translation is ARMSTRONG’s, with minor 
changes. 
 
269
 See note 265 above. 
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from [30] him and he is it; we must think that he is present when, [31] like 
another god whom someone called to his house, he comes [32] and brings 
light to us: for if he had not come, he would not have brought the light. So 
the unenlightened soul [33] does not see [god];
270
 but when it is 
enlightened it has what it sought, [34] and this is the soul’s true end, to 
touch that light [35] and see it by itself, not by another light, but [36] see 
the light which is also the means of seeing. It must see that light by which 
[37] it is enlightened: for we do not see the sun by another light than his 
own. How then can [38] this happen? Take away everything!
271
 
 
Far from implying disdain for things seen,
272
 both literally and figuratively, the 
stripping away of everything that would hinder a face-to-face encounter with pure light is 
itself a way (in fact, the only way according to Plotinus) to come in contact with that 
which is beyond everything, the One that has nothing and gives what it does not have (cf. 
V.2 [11] 1.8 and VI.7 [38] 17.3–6). Once the soul has reached intellification, none of the 
things it sees in the light of the One—at this point a pleonasm—would contribute to a 
better vision, and that includes noetic activity.
273
 Thus, all that is left for the soul is to 
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 V.3 [49] 17.33: ἄθεος ἐκείνου. The term ἄθεος can mean both “without god” (as rendered by the 
majority of translators) and “without vision” (the translation preferred by MacKenna 1917–1930, and 
MacKenna and Page 1969; Bréhier 1924–1938: “quand’elle ne le contemple pas”; Cilento 1947–1949: 
“deserta della visione di Lui”). However, as Beierwaltes (1991, 248–249; cf. also Ham 2000, 95–96 note 
230) points out, the only occurrence of the latter meaning indicated by LSJ (s.v.) is this line of Plotinus 
(from a conjecture by Volkmann 1883: ἀθέ < ατ > ος). In my translation I follow Beierwaltes (1991: 
“sähe... [Gott] nicht”), who combines the two meanings. 
 
271
 See the opening lines of note 174 above for parallels of this formula in the Enneads; for an excellent 
commentary see Beierwaltes (1991, 165–172, 250–253), to whom I owe most of those parallels. 
 
272
 This is also true of things heard: cf. the text of V.1 [10] 12.15–21, cited at note 170 above. 
 
273
 For a similar conclusion, see Ham (2000, 278). Ham rightly points out that for Plotinus (V.3 [49] 17.1–
5) the thought of clinging to life in Intellect is a kind of temptation for the soul (perhaps the common 
“temptation” of Aristotelians, a few Platonists, and some Christian theologians of Plotinus’ time; cf. 
ARMSTRONG V, 130–131 note 1). Thus, in order to experience union, the soul is called to leave behind 
not only its attachments to the sensible through an ethical ἀφαίρεσις, but also its best accomplishment 
yet, namely, the state of achieved intellification; for in still clinging to this state the soul will fail to meet 
the One on the One’s own terms, which is to say as the ἐρασμιώτατον that one cannot intellect directly, 
but only love. 
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renounce this last possession and, by abandoning itself (VI.9 [9] 11.23: ἐπίδοσις 
αὐτοῦ) to its Good, meet it in the only way it can be truly met, in love.274 
4.7 Conclusive Remarks 
As with the previous chapters of this study, I will reserve this short final section to 
gather the main conclusions of the present chapter in summary form. 
(1) The central contention of this second part of what I have called “Plotinus’ 
metaphysics of love” is that eros proves to be a fundamental concept to understand not 
only the process of derivation of all reality from the One as the Principle of all things (the 
focus of Chapter Three), but also the inverse process of the return of the soul to it, 
otherwise referred to as the Ascent. 
(2) What is capable of Ascent in Plotinus’ universe (i.e., the subject of the Ascent) 
is only the individual rational soul. In the journey of return to the Principle, eros can be 
understood and function as a method of ascent along the methods of music and dialectic, 
but more fundamentally it is, for the soul, the regulative force of all ascending movement. 
(3) The goal of the Ascent is the Good understood as the highest desideratum or 
                                                 
274
 But see again my earlier remarks (pages 324–327) about the inopportunity of starkly contrasting love 
and intellection. I should add that a correct grasp of the concept of union in Plotinus is important also for 
recent philosophical debates in which Plotinian notions are brought to bear on the thought of 
contemporary philosophers. For instance, S. Allen repeatedly hints to the idea that, although one can find 
several analogies between the thought of Plotinus and that of Levinas (see on this the insightful work by 
Narbonne 2006a), what sharply separates the two thinkers is the individual’s relation to transcendence, or 
to the beyond being (S. Allen 2009, 23–24, 32–33, 49–50). Thus, according to Allen Plotinus describes 
this relation in terms of a mystical union or fusion of the soul with the One, which is precisely what 
Levinas wants to avoid through the concept of separation (see particularly Levinas 1969, 102–105, where 
Plotinus is explicitly mentioned in this connection). This reading remains highly debatable, however, if 
union in Plotinus does not mean total fusion or obliteration of individuality, but constant presence in 
love. (This reading of Plotinus, to be sure, is as much a problem for Allen as it is for Levinas, on whom 
Allen seems to rely for her understanding of Plotinus.) The chief difference between Plotinus and 
Levinas, I maintain, does not reside primarily in their respective understandings of the individual’s 
relation to transcendence, but in the fact that in Plotinus one does not find the conceptual tools to speak 
of the Levinasian Other in terms of transcendence. 
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ἐρασμιώτατον: this is nothing else than the One, which while from the perspective of 
derivation was conceived of as the universal efficient cause (the Principle), now from the 
perspective of return is understood as the universal final cause (the End). Principle and 
End are conceptually distinct but actually identical. The main reason for this identity is 
that if the final goal of all eros were not at the same time the primordial giver of all eros, 
eros itself would remain without an explanation. I observed that this idea may be viewed 
as a more or less implicit critique of the Aristotelian understanding of the First Mover, 
which does indeed move by being loved, but which also leaves love’s origin 
fundamentally unexplained insofar as it is not explicitly conceived of at the same time as 
the efficient cause or the giver of this love. 
(4) The actualization of the Ascent is subject to two major preconditions. The 
first, which I called the Principle of As-similation, is that the ascending soul ought to 
attune itself to the goal of the Ascent so as to become able to love the infinitely lovable 
with a love that is itself infinite. The second precondition is that the soul is capable of 
ascending at all because of its inner similarity with higher realities to which it is 
ascending (the Principle of Affinity). This similarity is found in the soul’s higher part or 
intellect, by which reintegration in Nous is possible, and, within this higher part, in the 
so-called center of the soul, whereby the soul is capable of achieving union with the One. 
(5) There are four features that are common to all the stages of the Ascent. The 
first feature is that the passage from a lower to a higher stage entails, not an addition, but 
a subtraction of something that was present on the lower stage. Secondly, each stage 
presupposes the one(s) prior to it, not in the sense that what is lower is still actually 
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present in what is higher, but in the sense that in order to be on a given stage the soul 
must have undergone the “subtraction” of the main feature characterizing the lower 
stage(s). Therefore, what is subtracted cannot be said to be simply absent for the soul that 
has established itself at a higher level; it is rather present precisely qua subtracted. Third, 
just like each stage of the process of derivation implied a decrease of unity and of eros, so 
in the contrary movement of return every stage entails an increase in unity and in the 
intensity of eros. In this way, the subtraction of a lower feature is not a purely negative 
procedure, but the necessary condition for what counts as an ascending movement, 
namely the increase of unity and eros. Finally, the particular feature, practice, or activity 
that assimilates the individual soul to a reality on a higher level is not found necessarily 
in that reality at that level (the Principle of Participation). This, I observed, is probably 
Plotinus’ response to one of the objections to participation raised in the first part of 
Plato’s Parmenides. 
(6) I followed a somewhat traditional scheme in limiting the main stages of the 
Ascent to three and in referring to them as purification (ascent to soul), intellification 
(ascent to Nous), and union (ascent to the One). By means of purification the individual 
soul converts its attention from the sensible and toward immaterial reality; it does this 
first by bringing about a harmonization of its “parts” through lower (civic or political) 
virtue, and then by habituating itself to the newly discovered kinship with the intelligible 
through higher (purificatory) virtue. The practice of higher virtue in a sense already 
coincides with the introduction of the soul to the next stage of the Ascent, intellification. 
Achieved intellification is called eudaimonia and amounts to the soul’s full reintegration 
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in its highest part, its individual intellect. This condition makes of the soul what it 
always already was: a member of the intelligible realm whose activity is the intellection 
of itself and all the other intellgibles within Nous. But although the essential activity of 
Intellect is intellection, Intellect is what it is by permanently being directed erotically 
toward the One, whose unqualified unity it replicates in accordance with its own essence, 
that is, noetically. If the soul is to achieve union with the Good, it ought to strip itself of 
the last element that separates it from its beloved. This element is noetic activity itself, 
whereby the One is grasped only reflectively in the unified totality of the intelligibles. In 
union this reflective distance is overcome and the individual soul comes into contact with 
its beloved directly by becoming fully assimilated to that which in it is most similar to the 
One: the center of the soul. I argued that I find little evidence in the Enneads to support 
the view that in union the soul is completely annihilated. Rather, in its contact with the 
One the soul has taken away all that was alien to its nature and has been transformed in 
one simple reality: love for the One—eros. 
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Table 6. Summary of the Principles of Plotinian Metaphysics Introduced in This 
Study 
Principle of... Basic formulation of the principle Reference 
Affinity 
Assimilation of a lower term to a higher one is possible on 
the basis of a prior affinity between the two terms. 
page 334 
As-similtion 
Assimilation of a lower term to a higher one is possible on 
the basis of a prior attunement of the former to the latter. 
page 320 
Double Activity 
Each thing possesses a double activity: internal (or of the 
essence) and external (or from the essence). 
page 178 
Henologic Giving The One gives what it does not have. page 215 
Likeness of Cause 
and Effect 
A cause communicates something of itself to its effects. page 219 
Participation 
That in which a thing participates is other than that because 
of which it participates in it. 
page 385 
Prior Actuality 
The proper actuality of any given potentiality is prior to that 
potentiality. 
page 195 
Prior Simplicity 
Whatever is composite ultimately derives from something 
simple. 
page 163 
Reversion 
Every hypostasis constitutes itself as that particular 
hypostasis by erotically reverting upon itself and toward its 
generator. 
page 205 
Superabundance 
Whatever has reached perfection in its own kind overflows 
and produces something other than itself. 
page 208 
Superiority of 
Cause to Effect 
A cause is superior to its effects. page 216 
 
 
Notice 
 
• The principles in the left column are listed alphabetically. 
• References in the right column are to the page of this study where each principle is first introduced 
formally; there one will find also references to other loci of this study where the principles are treated 
as well as to the Enneads. 
• These principles are general guidelines rather than rigid formulas. Every time each principle is stated, it 
needs to be qualified on the basis of the hypostatic levels on which it is operative (with the exception 
of the Principle of Henologic Giving, which taken strictly refers exclusively to the One, as the title I 
assigned to it clearly suggests: cf. Chapter Three notes 185 and 187). 
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EPILOGUE 
nec amisit, quod erat, sed coepit esse, quod non erat. 
—Formula “Fides Damasi” 
Comment éviter que l’immanence se réduise à une feinte ou à un détour de 
la transcendence—du sujet transcendental fini ou d’un infini plus ou 
moins “théologisé”? 
—D. Janicaud 
me tamen urit amor; quis enim modus adsit amori? 
—Virgil1 
5.1 The Purpose of This Epilogue 
As differently stated in the Preface, the goal of this study was to provide a 
reconstruction of the notion of eros in Plotinus and its systematic significance for his 
metaphysics: what we might call his erotics (see Preface note 3). I first offered an 
interpretation of Socrates’ speech in the Symposium and other texts that I considered 
closely related to it in which I highlighted some of the themes that would become central 
in the later tradition of Platonism and particularly in Plotinian erotics (Chapter One). This 
was followed by a relatively close reading of Enneads III.5 [50] On eros, which is 
Plotinus’ own interpretation of Plato’s views on eros, with particular focus on the myth 
of Eros’ birth in Socrates’ Symposium speech (Chapter Two). Finally, the explicit 
                                                 
1
 Formula “Fides Damasi” (Denzinger and Schönmetzer 1967, § 72): “[The Son] did not lose what he was, 
but began to be what he was not” (my translation). Janicaud (1998, 117), translated in Janicaud (2005, 
80): “How can we prevent immanence from becoming reduced to a mere pretext or a detour of 
transcendence, of the finite transcendental subject, of a more or less ‘theological’ infinite?” Virgil, 
Eclogae II.68: “Yet love still burns me; for what bound can be set to love?” (H. R. Fairclough’s 
translation, slightly modified). 
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reconstruction of Plotinus’ erotics took place through an analysis of the importance of 
eros for Plotinian metaphysics in two steps: first in the process of derivation of all reality 
from the One understood as the Principle of all things or universal efficient cause 
(Chapter Three), and then in the process of ascent or return of the soul to the One 
understood as the Good or universal final cause (Chapter Four). 
The purpose of the present epilogue is neither to provide a summation of the 
ground covered in these pages (something which I hope to have already accomplished 
prospectively, if partially, in the second section of the Preface) nor synoptically to restate 
some of the main conclusions of this study (something which was done at regular 
intervals in the closing section of each chapter). Nor is my goal here to voice and defend 
the plausibility of the major claims I made in my reconstruction or to provide a detailed 
critique of Plotinus’ position. Whether my claims are plausible is for the competent 
reader to ponder with a less partial eye than that which is normally reserved to the fruits 
of one’s own labor.2 As for a detailed critique of Plotinus’ understanding of eros, even 
hoping that my reconstruction of his erotics might have achieved a sufficient level of 
accuracy, such a thorough critical survey would require much more space than is 
available in an epilogue. 
Nevertheless, I believe it is important to touch briefly on at least some of the 
aspects of Plotinus’ thought on eros that may be or merely appear problematic. In so 
                                                 
2
 One thing I can say. Thinking back critically to what has been accomplished, I believe that if I were to 
rewrite this study, I would like to incorporate three (sub-) sections: the first in Chapter One, in which I 
would give a more extensive reading of Socrates’ second speech in the Phaedrus; the second, either 
between Subsection 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 or perhaps toward the beginning of Chapter Four, in which I would 
attempt to provide a much needed overview of Plotinus’ anthropology, including the issue of the descent 
of soul into body; and the third, probably as a division of Section 4.2, in which I would try to clarify 
more sharply the difference between the Good and Beauty as goals of the Ascent. 
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doing, I will also try to indicate in what sense I think Plotinus’ philosophy may still 
be relevant for the present. For the sake of order and brevity, these problematic aspects 
can safely be gathered around two basic and in many respects opposing criticisms. The 
first criticism (Section 2) is that Plotinus’ conceptualization of the One, both as the 
Principle and as the Good, falls short of what is truly good. In other words, something is 
missing in the notion of the Plotinian One that would make it the first origin and final 
desideratum, truly ἐρασμιώτατον and truly ἀρχή. The second criticism (Section 3) points 
in the opposite direction: not only is there nothing missing in Plotinus’ conceptualization 
of the One qua Good; there is in fact too much. That is, the One as conceived by Plotinus, 
particularly its transcendent character, may certainly be found lovable, but it is either a 
downright illusion, or else it remains inaccessible to human consciousness. 
5.2 Loving the Impersonal 
Historically, the major tradition voicing the first criticism is that of Christianity. 
Christian writers of the fourth and fifth century and beyond certainly appreciate the 
philosophy of Plotinus (or, more broadly, the tradition of pagan Platonism) and put it to 
use for their own purposes.
3
 At the same time, they find it insufficient to explain at least 
two fundamental tenets of Christian doctrine: the personality of God and divine Grace 
                                                 
3
 The example of Augustine of Hippo is probably the most frequently studied in this connection, at least 
among the Latin Church Fathers. Major Greek Fathers heavily influenced by Platonism include the fourth 
century Cappadocians, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa, and the 
enigmatic but extremely influential figure of Dionysius the Areopagite. Typically, Plato and the Platonic 
tradition have been regarded positively within Christianity (as well as within Judaism and Islam). For an 
insightful study of the topic with which I am in fundamental agreement (against the extremism well 
expressed by Tertullian’s “Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis?” in his De praescriptionibus adversus 
hereticos VII = PL 2, 20b), see Beierwaltes (2000); see also Rist (1999). For a short account of the 
influence of Platonism in the Middle Ages and beyond, see Wallis (1995, 160–178); cf. also Corrigan 
(2005, 233–239). 
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(including the issue of the Incarnation), or, perhaps, personality as the very condition 
of possibility of Grace. A similar criticism is implicit in the broad tradition of modernity, 
in which the emphasis on the unconditional worth of the individual person already puts 
into question a mode of thought that gives priority to an impersonal or supra-personal 
Good. 
I believe that this critique is fair but easy to misinterpret. If by person we mean 
either the collection of relatively random traits, both physical and psychological, which 
make up the embodied individual human being, or the unnamable quid in which these 
traits seem to inhere, I do not see how such a view of personality could ever apply to the 
Plotinian Good. But this reply, it will be argued, is beside the point, for the criticism was 
that the One is impersonal, or lacks personality, in principle, and it is precisely this that 
makes it less than superlatively lovable, not truly ἐρασμιώτατον. The point of my 
preliminary reply, however, is not that the One is supremely lovable qua impersonal, but 
that if love of the person amounts either to love of a particular set of accidents with which 
we identify the person or to love of an undetermined quid regardless of any accidents that 
might be attached to it,
4
 then I seriously doubt that love of what is called a person could 
constitute an improvement upon the love for the impersonal One. In the former case, one 
may very well wonder whether what we are talking about is, not love for a person as 
something unconditionally worth loving, but a kind of habitual (and in some cases even 
pathological) attachment to a completely arbitrary combination of accidental traits. As for 
                                                 
4
 One can hear echoes of this understanding of love in certain seemingly paradoxical declarations between 
lovers: “I love you, with and because of all your defects and imperfections”; “I love you because you are 
you and I am I, and we complete each other”; “I don’t know and I don’t care about your past or where 
you come from, but only that I love you.” 
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the latter case, I cannot help wondering how and why the (alleged) personal character 
of the quid devoid of all accidents should be more lovable than the neutral impersonality 
of the One (cf. Subsection 1.5.5 for a summary discussion of the problem in relation to 
Plato). 
Let me make clear that it is not a question of denying that personality might have 
to be part—perhaps even the most important aspect—of our understanding of the Good, 
but rather of noticing that if the criticism of Plotinus on this point is to be meaningful, we 
need a conception of personality different than the ones outlined in the previous 
paragraph. In fact, I would argue that, if personality is conceived of in those ways, not 
only is it very hard to see why a personal entity should be more lovable than the 
impersonal Plotinian Good, but probably Plotinus’ view of the Good is already a 
remarkable improvement on those conceptions of personality. 
I believe that the text of an article by Jean-Louis Chrétien, L’amour du neutre, 
cited in the last note of Chapter One points us in the direction of the doubts I just voiced. 
The author writes that the deadlock of the alternative between the love of something 
beyond the person (such as Plotinus’ One) and “an egocentric idolatry of accidents” 
(egocentric, I take it, mainly because I alone am the judge of precisely which accidents 
should be the object of idolatry) can be broken only if that “beyond” is itself infinitely 
personal, or if love is itself a person.
5
 From the perspective of Christianity, it is because 
                                                 
5
 Chrétien (1990, 344); cf. Chapter One note 272. It follows that expressions such as “I love you no matter 
what, despite or even because of all your shortcomings” (cf. previous note) capture an attitude that takes 
us beyond the love of the impersonal One, but, as Chrétien remarks on the same page, also beyond love 
altogether; and if love is the only proper attitude in which a person can be encountered as a person, such 
an attitude will take us beyond the person as well. The question then becomes: Which of the two kinds of 
impersonal love—i.e., love for the One and love for a given set of accidents (or for the impalpable quid 
in which these accidents are said to inhere)—is better justified? 
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love is a person that God, this very love, can reach out to humans from its 
transcendence and become flesh. For this reason, in another article to which I already 
referred, Le Bien donne ce qu’il n’a pas, Chrétien sketches the difference between the 
Plotinian and the Christian paradigm of donation as the abyss between what I called the 
Plotinian Principle of Henologic Giving (i.e., “The One gives what it does not have”) and 
the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, in which God, while remaining God, assumes a 
condition originally foreign to the divine, that of the flesh.
6
 These are two different 
modes of transcendence; as Chrétien puts it, “if the Good is and remains transcendent 
with respect to what it gives, God transcends by giving himself this very transcendence.”7 
Or again, “God gives by taking, by taking humanity in himself, by assuming the form of 
a slave. But in humbling himself, he lifts up what he takes.”8 
But this, I surmise, is already Grace, and one cannot help but wonder whether and 
how Plotinus’ system could reasonably accommodate such a view.9 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
6
 See the text from the Formula “Fides Damasi” cited on page 440; for further references see Chrétien 
(1990, 269 notes 22–23 and 25–27). 
 
7
 Chrétien (1990, 274): “Si le Bien est et reste transcendant à ses dones, Dieu transcende en se donnant 
cette transcendance même.” 
 
8
 Chrétien (1990, 270): “Dieu donne en prenant, en prenant l’homme à soi, en assumant la forme d’esclave. 
Mais s’abbassant pour prendre il élève ce qu’il prend.” There is a double echo, scriptural and liturgical, 
in this text. The scriptural echo is from the Christological hymn of Paul’s letter to the Philippians: ἀλλὰ 
ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν μορφὴν δούλου λαβών, ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος (Philippians 2:7). The 
liturgical echo is from Antiphon I, O admirabile commercium, of the Vespers of the Octave of Christmas 
in the Breviarium Romanum (1966, I, 169 and passim): “largitus est nobis suam deitatem” (cited by 
Chrétien 1990, 269); similarly in the Missale Romanum (1962, 221, § 1031) we read: “da nobis, per 
huius aquae et vini mysterium, eius divinitatis esse consortes, qui humanitatis nostrae fieri dignatus est 
particeps, Iesus Christus.” 
 
9
 For a critical overview of Plotinus’ relation to Christianity, with focus on the treatise against the Gnostics, 
see Catapano (1996). Modern scholars have noticed that the Plotinian Good, for all its goodness, does not 
provide the kind of assistance and proximity that is expressed in the notion of Grace in the soul’s journey 
of return to the One. Arnou (1967, 229) writes: “rien n’est plus opposé à la pensée de Plotin que la notion 
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5.3 Loving an Illusion? 
The second criticism to Plotinus takes us in a completely different direction: the 
transcendence of the One does not need to be supplemented but rejected, for it is either an 
alienating illusion or something that is bound to remain inaccessible to consciousness. 
The gist of this criticism is well expressed in the opening lines of Bertolt Brecht’s 
song, Gegen Verführung: “Don’t let them seduce you! | There is no return.”10 There is no 
return because there is no One to return to. Thus, to be seduced means to be duped into 
                                                                                                                                                 
de grâce prévenante.” Commenting on Arnou (1967), Andolfo (1999, 634–635) emphasizes the same 
idea. Rist’s formulation is uncompromising: “the return of the soul is dependent on nothing but itself” 
(Rist 1967, 163). And Armstrong, in a footnote to VP 23, writes: “Note that Porphyry attributes his 
master’s achievement predominantly to divine inspiration and guidance. This has little support from the 
Enneads. Plotinus normally thinks that the philosopher can attain to the divine level without this sort of 
special assistance” (ARMSTRONG I, 71 note1). On this point see further references in Wallis (1995, 71–
72); cf. also Beierwaltes (1981, 69–70). 
Three factors may be indicated in the Enneads as possible analogues or loose substitutes of the broad 
notion of Christian Grace: (i) the so-called generosity of the One, well captured by the later dictum, 
bonum diffusivum sui (see Chapter Three note 178), and precisely expressed in the Principle of 
Superabundance (Subsection 3.3.1); (ii) the Principle of Henologic Giving, or the idea that what the One 
gives to what derives from it is an eros always already directed toward the One qua Good and qua other 
(Subsection 3.3.2); (iii) the idea of an undescended part of the soul permanently in contact with higher 
realities (Subsection 4.3.2). Hadot (1993, 50) claims that what causes the soul to love a beautiful object is 
not the object as such, but an unjustified surplus: “grace, or life in its deepest mystery,” which for 
Plotinus is the very trace of the Good, its gratuitousness or its self-diffusiveness (cf. also Chapter Three 
note 213 and Chapter Four note 167). In light of this remark, the One, far from being a distant and 
uninvolved source, is precisely what is most intimate to the soul (see Plotinus VI.9 [9] 7; VI.6 [34] 14), 
so that it would seem unreasonable to ask of it a greater involvement in the soul’s journey of return. 
The main question, however, is whether the three factors I just mentioned, while clear indexes of the 
self-diffusiveness of goodness displaying itself in the hypostatic unfolding of reality, are sufficient 
auxiliaries in the opposite movement, that which through purification and assimilation to Nous leads the 
soul to union. From a Christian perspective, it is obvious that, due to the pervasiveness of sin, they 
cannot be. For Plotinus probably they are, but at the same time he is well aware that not all souls are 
capable of making their way back to the One (see I.8 [51] 5.29–30; cf. Chapter Four note 157); he is also 
aware that it is the very desire for good that “often involves the fall into evil” (see III.5 [50] 1.64–65; cf. 
Chapter Two note 68). Thus, one may wonder whether Plotinus is excessively optimistic about the 
human condition, and whether more than merely human effort is required in order to achieve union; one 
may also see why immediately after Plotinus, the major representatives of Neoplatonism (e.g., Porphyry, 
and later Iamblichus and Proclus), while still devoted to cultivate the theoretical side of philosophy, 
turned resolutely to theurgical practice as the privileged means to union or salvation (cf. Wallis 1995, 
105–110, 120–123, 153–155). 
 
10
 Brecht, Gegen Verführung (= Brecht 1967, VIII, 260): “Laßt euch nicht verführen! | Es gibt keine 
Wiederkehr” (my translation). Cf. Faggin (2000, xxxiv). 
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believing that there is a One (or into trusting the arguments suggesting such a 
conclusion). This criticism is compelling mainly for two reasons: first, because the One 
such as Plotinus describes it remains unavailable to ordinary experience, while those who 
(claim to) have experienced it can offer only very imperfect descriptions of it, and 
wittingly so; second, because more often than not what we call the One or the Good is 
only a projection of something that is not the One, most notably human consciousness.
11
 
Obviously a critique of this sort will be in vain unless it also accounts for the desire of the 
One in the soul. What then is the desire for the Good? From the perspective of this 
criticism, it must be the very bait of the seduction, that which makes the seduction 
possible. Once we get rid of this desire, we will see clearly that what we call the One or 
the Good is something of our own making, an alter ego that we project outside of 
ourselves to objectify our conatus and thus bring it into view. In the process of 
objectification, we literally alienate ourselves: directing our desire to something other 
than ourselves, we make that desideratum, instead of ourselves, our ultimate aim. 
If the sketch of this criticism of Plotinus is itself to be made the object of 
criticism, it should not be through a dismissal of what in it is worth considering, namely, 
the notion that in my conceptualization of a universal final cause, which is at the same 
time the origin of my love for it, there is much of myself which does not strictly belong to 
                                                 
11
 I believe that Feuerbach’s reduction of theology and religion to anthropology, poignantly expressed in his 
1841 work, The Essence of Christianity, can be applied to Plotinus’ view of the One’s transcendence, 
even if for Feuerbach God is “thy highest power of thought [Dein höchstes Denkvermögen],” “the unity 
of the understanding [Die Einheit des Verstandes],” and understanding as “infinite being [das unendliche 
Wesen]” and “necessary being [das Nothwendige Wesen]” (Feuerbach 1957, 38, 41, and 42 = Feuerbach 
1903–1922, VI, 47, 50, 51, and 52), while for Plotinus the One is altogether beyond thinking, including 
the thinking of Nous, in which thinking is identical with Being. 
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that cause.
12
 
But to reduce that cause to myself: is it completely fair? Does this reduction do 
justice to the nature of desire, of Platonic eros? To claim that what Plotinus is really 
doing, when he says that we connaturally desire the infinite One, is simply to project (and 
desire) as transcendent an infinite which is ultimately immanent: would this still be desire 
of the Good? Does the desire of the Good not already include in its concept the 
awareness—at least the distant presentment—that the Good transcends me and my 
conceptualizations of it,
13
 the suspicion that there may be much in me which is lovable in 
many respects but nothing which is, strictly, most lovable? Would I not already misread 
the nature of this desire, my connatural eros, if I failed to see that I can indeed “love” 
myself as if I were most lovable, but that this love is not love for what is most lovable, 
universally ἐρασμιώτατον? Can it be that what should be reversed is not so much the 
process by which I envision something immanent as if it were transcendent (projection), 
but the procedure by which I represent something transcendent as if it were immanent 
(introjection)? Can it be that the error lies not so much in alienation (thinking of the One 
as other than myself) as in identification (thinking of the One as the same as myself), a 
reduction of transcendence to immanence? 
Or is this crude reversal of the initial criticism already a way to betray immanence 
and a pretext to avoid the objection? 
                                                 
12
 Emilsson (1999, 288) puts it sharply: “So if you have something that you know you think may be the 
One, be sure that it isn’t!” 
 
13
 This is true also of a “monistic” view of union, in which the soul is annihilated in the One as something 
that transcends the soul (see Subsection 4.6.3). 
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An answer to these questions is possible only through an adequate analysis of 
desire—of eros. For if it is through desire that the Good is said to have left an 
immemorable trace of itself in the soul while remaining itself transcendent, it will be only 
through a radical questioning of this very desire that the seduction might be revealed and 
the ruse exposed. 
Thus, it may very well be that what I call desire of the Good is in most cases a 
desire for surrogates of the Good. It may very well be that frequently, by displacing in 
transcendence something that is primarily immanent, we not only create an illusion, but 
in doing so we also fail to grasp the very nature of immanence. But does this have to be 
the case always and necessarily, methodologically even? Can we not admit of a desire 
that longs for more than mere combinations of immanent goods, that is, a desire whose 
desideratum is more than a projection of consciousness originating in consciousness? In 
other words, can I envisage an eros which is found in consciousness, in the soul, but 
whose origin is other than consciousness, irreducible to an operation of consciousness, or 
initiated by consciousness?
14
 
We may convince ourselves that we are content with what we have, that all our 
desires are just needs to be satisfied cyclically; but by doing this, are we not already 
                                                 
14
 Cf. Levinas (1981, 101): “not everything in consciousness would be posited by consciousness.” What 
Levinas has in mind in this passage is not the One, but the other human being (Autrui). At the risk of 
oversimplifying the matter, I believe that the entire issue of the possibility of finding something in 
consciousness whose origin transcends consciousness boils down to a fundamental and perhaps incurable 
disagreement about the nature of the desire of the Good in us, a disagreement that is not exhausted in 
Platonism but is carried over into the history of (Western) philosophy, for instance in the controversy 
over Anselm’s ontological argument, in the discussion about the origin of the Cartesian idea of an infinite 
substance (“idea substantiae infinitae”) in the third of the Meditations of First Philosophy (cf. also the 
second of Malebranche’s Dialogues on Metaphysics: Malebranche 1958–1976, XII, 49–62), in the 
critical reception of Feuerbach’s claim that God is a projection of human consciousness (see note 10 
above), or in the relatively recent debate over the legitimacy of a “theological turn” in French 
phenomenology (Janicaud et. al. 2000; Janicaud 2005). 
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failing to notice that we in fact desire more than the satisfaction of needs and that 
once life will have made its course, we will still want more (and better)?
15
 To deny that 
we desire something like the Good: is this not already to settle for less? And settling for 
less: is this not already to recognize that we desire more?
16
 Can we envision a desire 
whose desideratum shatters the intentionality of need? How will this desideratum awaken 
consciousness to its absence (that is, to its presence precisely qua desideratum)? And how 
could the soul respond to this awakening? 
If wondering about these questions is already a way to foster the predicament of a 
Good that is an illusion or remains at best inaccessible, then Plotinus’ thought, heavily 
laden with the philosophical jargon of late antiquity, is but a relic of the past that will 
have little or no relevance for the present. But if asking these questions may legitimately 
be considered more than a rhetorical exercise, could it be that Plotinus’ reflection on eros 
still nests something of universal significance, an indication and an invitation still 
relevant for our time? 
 
                                                 
15
 Brecht does not fail to see this in the second stanza of his Gegen Verführung (Brecht 1967, VIII, 260), 
the continuation of the text I cited at page 446: “Laßt euch nicht betrügen! | Das Leben wenig ist. | 
Schlürft es in vollen Zügen! | Es wird euch nicht genügen | Wenn ihr es lassen mußt!” 
 
16
 In Terence’s words (Andria 305–306), often quoted by Augustine, an author in whom the theme of desire 
figures prominently: “Quoniam non potest id fieri, quod vis, | id velis, quod possit” (“Since what you will 
cannot happen, you will what can [happen]”—my translation). Augustine always writes possis rather 
than possit (cf. Augustine, De beata vita 4.25, De Trinitate XIII.10, De civitate Dei XIV.25; see 
Hagendahl 1967, 628); thus: “Since what you will cannot happen, you will what you can.” 
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Orders and Dates of the Treatises of the Enneads 
Porphyry’s order and thematic division (VP 24–26) * 
 
Ennead I: Ethics 
I.1 [53] What is the living being, and what is man? 
I.2 [19] On virtues 
I.3 [20] On dialectic 
I.4 [46] On well-being 
I.5 [36] On whether well-being increases with time 
I.6 [1] On beauty 
I.7 [54] On the primal Good and the other goods 
I.8 [51] On what are and whence come evils 
I.9 [16] On going out of the body 
 
Ennead II: Physics 1 
II.1 [40] On heaven [On the universe] 
II.2 [14] On the movement of heaven 
II.3 [52] On whether the stars are causes 
II.4 [12] On matter 
II.5 [25] On what exists potentially and what actually 
II.6 [17] On substance, or on quality 
II.7 [37] On complete transfusion 
II.8 [35] On sight, or how distant objects appear small 
II.9 [33] Against the Gnostics 
 
Ennead III: Physics 2 
III.1 [3] On destiny 
III.2 [47] On providence 1 
III.3 [48] On providence 2 
III.4 [15] On our allotted guardian spirit 
III.5 [50] On love 
III.6 [26] On the impassivity of things without body 
III.7 [45] On eternity and time 
III.8 [30] On nature and contemplation and the One 
III.9 [13] Various considerations 
 
Ennead IV: Soul 
IV.1 [21] On the essence of the soul 2 
IV.2 [4] On the essence of the soul 1 
IV.3 [27] On difficulties about the soul 1 
IV.4 [28] On difficulties about the soul 2 
IV.5 [29] On difficulties about the soul 3, or on sight 
IV.6 [41] On sense-perception and memory 
IV.7 [2] On the immortality of the soul 
IV.8 [6] On the descent of the soul into bodies 
IV.9 [8] If all souls are one 
 
Ennead V: Intellect 
V.1 [10] On the three primary hypostases 
V.2 [11] On the origin and order of the beings which come 
after the First 
V.3 [49] On the knowing hypostases and that which is 
beyond 
V.4 [7] How that which is after the First comes from the 
First, and on the One 
V.5 [32] That the intelligibles are not outside Intellect, and 
on the Good 
V.6 [24] On the fact that that which is beyond being does 
not think, and on what is the primary and what the 
secondary thinking principle 
V.7 [18] On the question whether there are ideas of 
particulars 
V.8 [31] On the intelligible beauty 
V.9 [5] On Intellect, the forms, and being 
Ennead VI: Various and the One 
VI.1 [42] On the kinds of being 1 
VI.2 [43] On the kinds of being 2 
VI.3 [44] On the kinds of being 3 
VI.4 [22] On the presence of being, one and the same, 
 everywhere as a whole 1 
VI.5 [23] On the presence of being, one and the same, 
 everywhere as a whole 2 
VI.6 [34] On numbers 
VI.7 [38] How the multitude of the forms came into being, 
and on the Good 
VI.8 [39] On free will and the will of the One 
VI.9 [9] On the Good or the One 
 
Chronological order (VP 4–6) 
 
1 I.6   28 IV.4 
2 IV.7   29 IV.5 
3 III.1   30 III.8 
4 IV.2   31 V.8 
5 V.9   32 V.5 
6 IV.8   33 II.9 
7 V.4   34 VI.6 
8 IV.9   35 II.8 
9 VI.9   36 I.5 
10 V.1   37 II.7 
11 V.2   38 VI.7 
12 II.4   39 VI.8 
13 III.9   40 II.1 
14 II.2   41 IV.6 
15 III.4   42 VI.1 
16 I.9   43 VI.2 
17 II.6   44 VI.3 
18 V.7   45 III.7 
19 I.2   46 I.4 
20 I.3   47 III.2 
21 IV.1   48 III.3 
22 VI.4   49 V.3 
23 VI.5   50 III.5 
24 V.6   51 I.8 
25 II.5   52 II.3 
26 III.6   53 I.1 
27 IV.3   54 I.7 
 
 
Dates of the treatises ** 
 
1–21 from 254 (when Plotinus was about fifty, ten years 
after he had settled in Rome) to 263 (the year 
Porphyry joined Plotinus’ circle in Rome) 
22–45 from 263 to 268 (the year Porphyry left Rome for 
Sicily, encouraged by Plotinus to do so) 
46–50 from 268 to 269 (the year Plotinus left Rome for 
Campania due to illness) 
51–54 269 (the year Plotinus retired to Campania, where 
he died in 270) 
 
 
* Translation of titles of individual treatises: ARMSTRONG. 
 
** Sources: Porphyry, VP 4–6; Igal (1972, especially 124–
126); Brisson (1992). 
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APPENDIX B: 
THE NECESSITY OF THE ONE 
AS BOTH THE PRINCIPLE AND THE END OF ALL REALITY 
AS PRIMARILY AN EXPLANATORY KIND OF NECESSITY 
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Plotinus repeats often that what in Chapter Three I have described as the 
process of derivation of reality from one single source, the One, occurs of necessity,
1
 and 
therefore that the One itself is necessary. There is no doubt that Plotinus was convinced 
of the existence of the One,
2
 certainly owing also to his personal experience, whatever 
one might think of this. But as I pointed out in Subsection 4.6.3, even if this experience 
occurred at all, to claim that it did is already problematic in at least two respects. First, 
given the non-discursive nature of this experience (which in Subsection 4.6.3 I have 
described minimally as an experience of union or unification), the descriptive and 
thematizing means by which we try to communicate this experience to others, most 
notably those who did not have it, are bound to betray its nature in one way or another. 
Secondly, but along the same lines, since this experience takes place at an extra-ordinary 
level, its occurrence cannot be made widely available in the manner of a publicly 
verifiable ordinary fact. Why, then, speak of necessity at all in reference to the process of 
derivation and, ultimately, with regard to the One? What does Plotinus mean by 
                                                 
1
 I limit my references to the passages on the Principle of Double Activity cited in Chapter Three note 87; 
in parenthesis I provide the terms used by Plotinus to indicate necessity, whether expressly (e.g., as with 
ἔδει) or otherwise (e.g., as with πάντα and ἕκαστον—terms indicating universality, from which I assume 
that necessity may be easily inferred): II.9 [33] 8.22–26 (line 22: Ἔδει; cf. also Ἀναγκαῖον at line 20, and 
ἀνάγκη at line 27), III.2 [47] 4.13–16 (line 13: Ἔδει), III.5 [50] 3.3–5 (cf. line 2: οὐ προσήκει), IV.3 [27] 
10.31–41 (lines 34–35: κοινὸν δὴ τοῦτο παντὶ τῷ ὄντι), IV.5 [29] 6.23–31 (line 30: τί ἂν κωλύοι), 7.13–
20 (line 17: ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων), IV.8 [6] 6.6–15 (line 6: ἔδει; lines 7–8: ἑκάστῃ φύσει τοῦτο ἔνεστι; line 
12: οὐκ ἔδει; line 14: τὰ πάντα, πάντα), V.1 [10] 6.25–39 (line 25: Δεῖ οὖν; lines 30–31: πάντα τὰ ὄντα, 
ἀναγκαίαν; line 38: πάντα; cf. also οὖν χρὴ at line 39, πᾶν at line 50, and ἐξ ἀνάγκης at line 52), V.2 [11] 
1 (the whole passage, much like V.1 [10] 6, seems to be cast in the form of an argument, whose 
unfolding is marked by terms indicating consequentiality: e.g., ὅτι, διὰ τοῦτο, and ἵνα at lines 5–6; γὰρ at 
lines 7 and 17; οὖν at lines 12 and14; διὸ at line 22), V.3 [49] 7.19–25 (line 21: Ἔδει γὰρ), V.4 [7] 2.26–
37 (lines 28–29: ἑκάστου and ἕκαστον; line 29: ἐξ ἀνάγκης; line 33: πολὺ), VI.8 [39] 18.46–52 (in this 
passage, the One itself is described as what it is and what it ought to be—δέον—wishing what ought to 
be). 
 
2
 The same is true of Aristotle in regard to the Unmoved Mover of Metaphysics XII and, I surmise, of Plato 
with respect to the Good (see next note). 
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“necessity” in this context? 
I believe that the kind of necessity Plotinus has in mind here can be understood as 
an explanatory one,
3
 that is, a necessity required by (human) reason understood in the 
narrow Kantian sense of a regulative aspiration to form a (complete) system of principles, 
and hence ideally aiming at grasping the unconditioned ground of all conditions.
4
 What I 
mean by this is that if we wish, not to take (or, for that matter, dismiss) at face value, but 
to explain or justify the relative unity which we ordinarily experience in reality (e.g., one 
rock, one tree, one fish, one human being, one table, etc.), on the basis of the Principle of 
Prior Simplicity (see page 163) eventually we will have to postulate a primordial level of 
unqualified unity (or several subordinate levels of increasing unity, until such level is 
reached) which will account for the plurality of qualified unities we ordinarily 
experience.
5
 
                                                 
3
 I take this to be the case also of Forms or Ideas in Plato (see the opening pages of Subsection 1.5.2), 
although the respective roles of Platonic Ideas and of the Plotinian One as explanatory entities differ (not 
so, arguably, in the case of that highest Idea which is Plato’s Idea of the Good: see Chapter Three note 
12). I also maintain that what I here called “unconditioned” may be linked to what Plato calls 
“unhypothetical” (ἀνυπόθετον: Republic VI.510b7, 511b6; cf. pages 61–62 above): unhypothetical not in 
the sense that from our limited perspective it is no longer a hypothesis (i.e., a hypothesis for us), but in 
the sense that conceptually it does not itself depend on any further hypothesis. Precisely qua 
unconditioned, the unconditioned cannot be a part or element of the totality of the conditions which it 
conditions, much like a true ἀρχή is other than that of which it is the ἀρχή (see Chapter Three note 134; 
cf. Gerson 1990, 5–14, 15). 
 
4
 See in particular Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A298/B355–A302–B359. Kant writes: “the proper 
principle of reason in general (in its logical use) is to find the unconditioned for conditioned cognitions of 
the understanding, with which its unity will be completed (Critique of Pure Reason A307/B364: “der 
eigentümliche Grundsatz der Vernunft überhaupt (im logischen Gebrauche) sei: zu dem bedingte 
Erkentnisse des verstandedes das Unbedingte zu finden, womit die Einheit desselben vollendet wird.” Cf. 
also Bxxiv, A642/B670–A668/B696; cf. Prolegomena IV, 331–332). In a more general sense, for Kant 
“reason is the faculty that provides the principles of cognition a priori” (Critique of Pure reason 
A11/B24: “ist Vernunft das Vermögen, welchen die Prinzipien der Erkenntnis a priori an die Hand 
gibt”). Translations from the first Critique are by P. Guyer and A. W. Wood (in Kant 1999). 
 
5
 It may be worth restating that I have no doubts concerning Plotinus’ firm conviction about the existence 
of the One; his personal experience testified to that for him. One can still wonder whether the 
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This is not to say that this level of unqualified unity (or even some of the 
intermediary levels) should itself become an object of ordinary experience, not merely 
because what reason requires is a system of principles (rather than of objects of ordinary 
experience), but more fundamentally because ordinary experience is always an 
experience of unity in multiplicity, not of unqualified unity. Thus, for Plotinus it is quite 
the opposite: in order to come in contact with this primordial level of itself (i.e., alone, or, 
as the author of the Enneads would put it, μόνος πρὸς μόνον: cf. VI.9 [9] 11.51), ordinary 
experience ought to be transcended, if possible,
6
 or else redescribed (although a merely 
                                                                                                                                                 
explanatory character of the necessity of the Principle contributed to form his conviction and was 
conducive to his experience. The fact remains that reason itself demands an explanation (to give up all 
desire for explanation is, in a sense, to give up reason); Plotinus’ solution can be read as such an 
explanation. Whether Plotinus’ explanatory solution (i.e., the One as the level of unqualified unity) is the 
correct one or it should be improved upon or replaced by an alternative explanation (e.g., the Aristotelian 
Unmoved Mover, the ipsum esse subsistens of Christian natural theology, Spinoza’s substantia, Hegel’s 
Geist, Heidegger’s Ereignis, the Buddhist pratītyasamutpāda, etc.) are questions which, for obvious 
reasons, I will not be able to address here. In any event, if any of these alternative explanations is to 
function as an improvement upon, or a replacement of what I believe is Plotinus’ solution, the first step is 
to attempt to clarify that which they are employed to improve upon or replace, which is part of the 
purpose of this study. 
 
6
 What this “transcendence” of experience implies is partly accounted for in my description of the last step 
of the Ascent, namely union (see Subsection 4.5.3). One might be tempted to revert to Kant and call this 
transcendence “intellectual, pure, or original intuition” (intellektuelle, reine, or ursprunglich 
Anschauung; intuitus originarius), as opposed to “sensible, empirical, or derivative intuition” (sinnliche 
or empirische Anschauung; intuitus derivativus), which is the only kind of intuition available to human 
beings and which occurs in accordance with the a priori forms of sensibility (i.e., space and time) and the 
categories of the understanding (cf. Critique of Pure Reason B71–72, A230/B283, B307–309, 
A286/B342–A287/B343). I see three main difficulties with an identification of mystical union and 
Kantian intellectual intuition. First, intellectual intuition for Kant refers to noumena in general, and not to 
that particular kind of noumena which are the ideas (let alone to the sole theological idea); for Plotinus, 
instead, union is union with the One and only with the One. Second, even if the union with the One, 
understood as the absolutely unconditioned ground of all conditions (see notes 4 and 11 of this 
appendix), could be called intellectual intuition, for Kant this kind of intuition is simply not available to 
sensible rational beings such as humans are; Plotinus, by contrast, is said to have “experienced” union 
with the Principle some four times during his lifetime (cf. VP 23.17–19; cf. also Chapter Four notes 118 
and 175), that is, while he was an embodied (sensible) being (although it will be argued that sensation 
had no part in this experience). Lastly, and most importantly, Kant ascribes intellectual intuition of 
noumena to God conceived of as the absolutely unconditioned; in the Enneads, instead, the One is said to 
have a kind wakefulness or introspection, and this is not directed to things themselves but is limited to 
the One itself (and even so, it is likely meant primarily as a way to deny that the One is inert and 
unintelligent in the way a stone is; see Chapter Three note 164). 
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redescriptive exercise sometimes may turn into a vapid quibble about terms). In the 
event that this transcending step were not possible (or, alternately, while it has not yet 
been taken), if we are to provide reasons for the possibility of the qualified unities that we 
come in contact with in ordinary experience, the positing of a level of unqualified unity is 
explanatorily necessary, even while never becoming of itself an object of ordinary 
experience. 
The same reasoning applies to the identification of the One qua Principle of all 
with the One qua End of all or universal final cause which I introduced in Section 4.2. Or 
rather, the same reasoning applies to the very phenomenon of desire. First, if desire is not 
to be considered pointless, it must aim at something which is not desired in view of 
something else, but purely for its own sake: the Aristotelian ἀνάγκη στῆναι, endorsed by 
Plotinus. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly for the present argument, the Plotinian 
addition to Aristotle’s point: if desire is not to be left unexplained, its aim, though 
conceptually distinct from its origin, is of necessity identical with it. However, the kind of 
necessity at work both in this identification and in the necessity to find a truly final 
desideratum can be understood, once again, as primarily explanatory; that is, the final 
desideratum and its identification with the Principle of all things never become objects of 
ordinary experience, but are postulated of necessity for explanatory reasons. Thus, in the 
remainder of this appendix I will try to clarify the concept of explanatory necessity as it 
applies to the One qua Principle of all, but on the basis of my brief remarks in the present 
paragraph I trust that it should not be excessively difficult to clarify that the same kind of 
necessity equally applies to the One qua End of all. 
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As I already have suggested in the opening paragraph and in some of the notes 
of this appendix, the perspective from which I approach the question of the necessity of 
one single source of all reality (which in Plotinus’ system, likewise necessarily, coincides 
with the universal final cause) does not differ altogether from Kant’s. More precisely, 
what I have in mind is Kant’s treatment of the (cosmological) antinomies of pure reason, 
particularly the fourth (the dynamical antinomy of modality), concerning the idea of a 
necessary being either within the world
7
 or transcending the world as its cause.
8
 This 
necessary being is identical with God, the third or theological idea, the Ideal of pure 
reason.
9
 Kant points out that within the antinomies the position he calls the thesis (i.e., in 
the fourth antinomy, that there is such a necessary being) has the advantage of 
popularity.
10
 Whether this is still the case today, in philosophy popularity (or lack of 
popularity) is of no consequence to what the truth of the matter might be. Kant knows 
this, and yet he explicitly recognizes what I called the explanatory necessity of the 
unqualified level of unity (in Kantian jargon, the absolutely unconditioned), both in 
principle and for pragmatic reasons. In principle: “if the conditioned is given, then the 
                                                 
7
 Obviously, neither Plotinus’ (see Chapter Three note 18) nor Kant’s view (Critique of Pure Reason 
A617/B645). 
 
8
 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A452/B480–A461/B489, A559/B587–A565/B593 (cf. also 
Prolegomena IV, 438–439, 447). The fourth antinomy as given at A452/B480, A453/B481 of the first 
Critique reads: “Thesis: To the world there belongs something that, either as a part of it or as its cause, is 
an absolutely necessary being [ein schlechthin notwendiges Wesen]. [...] Antithesis: There is no 
absolutely necessary being existing anywhere, either in the world or outside the world as its cause.” 
Obviously Kant would reject the view of someone dogmatically espousing either the thesis or the 
antithesis (i.e., according to Kant, respectively Plato and Epicurus: see Critique of Pure Reason 
A471/B499–500), since these are never available theoretically to rational sensible beings. 
 
9
 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A571/B599–A583/B611; cf. Prolegomena IV, 348. 
 
10
 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A467/B495. 
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whole sum of conditions, and hence the absolutely unconditioned, is also given.”11 
Pragmatically: “The presupposition of a supreme intelligence, as the sole cause of the 
world-whole, but of course merely in the idea, can therefore always be useful to reason 
and never harmful to it.”12 
Are there viable alternatives to recognizing this explanatory kind of necessity, 
which is naturally invoked by reason in dealing with the qualified unities encountered in 
ordinary experience (or, in Kantian language, with the conditional character of 
phenomena)? So far as I can tell, there are two alternatives, neither of which, however, I 
find viable: positive dogmatism, of which fideism is a militant form, and dogmatic 
skepticism, whose extreme practical form is universal relativism (these labels are mine, 
not Kant’s nor Plotinus’). Positive dogmatism, instead of recognizing the explanatory 
character of the necessity at work in the ordinary experience of unity, speaks 
apodictically of necessity tout-court, though unable to provide indubitable justification 
for its claim. Dogmatic skepticism, by contrast, apodictically assumes that all 
“experience” ought to be ordinary, thus leaving the qualified kind of unities encountered 
in ordinary experience unexplained, and thereby discrediting, also without indubitable 
justification, the very idea of an explanatory kind of necessity (and thus of reason itself). 
                                                 
11
 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A409/B436: “wenn das Bedingte gegeben ist, so ist aus die ganze Summe 
der Bedingungen, mithin das schlechthin Unbdingte gegeben.” Surely enough, the modes of givenness of 
the conditioned and of the unconditioned differ, as Kant himself had just stated on the same page (cf. also 
A670/B698): the former is “phenomenal,” or given in experience (Erfahrung) according to space, time, 
and the categories; the latter, by contrast, is a merely regulative idea of reason, and as such is never met 
within experience. 
 
12
 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A687/B715: “Die Voraussetzung einer obersten Intelligenz, als der 
alleinigen Ursache des Weltganzen, aber freilich bloβ in der Idee, kann also jederzeit der Vernunft nutzen 
und dabei doch niemals schaden” (cf. also A697/B625–A698/B626). 
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It should be evident that to the extent that Plotinus accepts to discuss 
rationally the “entities” which he finds explanatorily necessary, he does not belong to the 
first branch of the alternative (positive dogmatism). Moreover, Plotinus maintains that in 
order to experience unification with the Principle one must have gone through a 
considerable process of purification, without which this experience is not possible (cf. the 
entire Chapter Four, particularly Section 4.6). In this perspective, the very explanatory 
necessity of the One may become truly evident only to those who have completed this 
process. In this sense, too, Plotinus does not fall under the heading of positive 
dogmatism. 
As for the second alternative (dogmatic skepticism), there is no necessity that the 
one single source of all reality should “appear,” that is, display itself phenomenally. As I 
already mentioned in this appendix, for Plotinus the necessity is rather reversed, since 
what appears, or what we experience ordinarily, is always a relative unity (i.e., a unity in 
multiplicity), while the unity pertaining to the One is absolute, and as such never given in 
ordinary experience. Moreover, the Kantian object of sensible experience, the 
phenomenon, is subject to spatio-temporal conditions. If the One were to display itself by 
itself phenomenally, it could not be the (remote) origin of time (see Appendix D).
13
 
 
                                                 
13
 It will be objected that Kant’s and Plotinus’ respective views of time are not the same: Kantian time is an 
a priori condition of sensibility, while Plotinian time is the replica of the intelligible at the sensible level. 
My point is simply that the One as such—in itself by itself—never becomes available in time regardless 
of the view of time one espouses. 
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It was suggested that I turned what was originally a lengthy footnote (Chapter 
Three note 212) on Plotinus’ usage of the term ἴχνος (trace) into a short separate 
appendix due to the relevance that the topic might have for the interpretations of the 
concept of trace found in secondary literature on such authors as Levinas and Derrida. I 
maintain that moving this material from the context in which I first introduced it will not 
detract from the argument in the main text. 
Hadot writes apropos of the term ἴχνος that it “means precisely the trace of a step, 
but in Plotinus’ language it designates the image of itself that a superior reality throws on 
an inferior reality.”1 We might add that the term is never quite used explicitly in this 
sense by Plato. Pigler interprets ἴχνος precisely as the self-love of the One systematically 
surfacing at each hypostatic level, and shows how this love constitutes the very structure 
of the intelligible world.
2
 Plotinus’ use of the term ἴχνος can be organized around the 
following five clusters of references. 
(1) The trace of the One: 
(a) on Nous (or Nous as a trace of the One): III.8 [30] 11.19–23, V.5 [32] 
5.11–14, 6.17, VI.7 [38] 17.13, 39, 33.30, VI.8 [39] 18.15, 23; 
(b) on all derived reality: III.3 [48] 3.34, V.5 [32] 10.1, VI.7 [38] 18.3, 23.2. 
(2) The trace of Nous: 
(a) on soul (or soul as a trace of Nous): I.2 [19] 2.20, I.8 [51] 11.17, II.3 [52] 
                                                 
1
 HADOT (125 note 194): the term ἴχνος “signifie précisement la trace d’un pas, mais, dans le langage 
plotinien, il sert à désigner l’image d’elle-même qu’une réalité supérieure projette dans une réalité 
inférieure” (cf. also HADOT 209–210). In this general sense the notion of trace is closely linked to that of 
λόγος (see Chapter Three notes 275, 281, and 290). 
 
2
 PIGLER (21, 267–276). 
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18.16, III.6 [26] 18.32, V.1 [10] 7.44, V.3 [49] 3.12, 6.27, 7.21–34, 
8.25, 36, V.8 [31] 13.13, VI.7 [38] 17.39, 20.12 VI.9 [9] 9.16; cf. also 
Chapter Four note 85. 
(b) on things ontologically posterior to Nous: VI.6 [34] 18.48, VI.7 [38] 18.2–
8. 
(c) Concerning other intelligible traces: I.6 [1] 2.9, III.6 [26] 18.4, VI.7 [38] 
7.13–14, 11.7. 
(3) The trace of soul on the sensible (or rather, on matter, which by receiving a 
trace of soul emerges as a sensible cosmos and living body): II.3 [52] 9.22, 33, III.5 [5] 
6.25 (daimons as traces; cf. VI.7 [38] 6.28, where the term used is μίμημα), IV.4 [28] 
20.16, 27.3, 11, 28.8–19, 52–59, 66, 74, 29.50, 36.7, VI.4 [22] 15.15. 
(4) The term ἴχνος is also used to indicate a lower or derived kind of reality as 
contrasted with its archetype or source (IV.4 [28] 18.30, 44.26, V.3 [49] 9.27, VI.7 [38] 
15.8, 22.28). In this sense, the notion of trace is closely associated with the concepts of 
image (εἴδωλον: e.g., V.5 [32] 2.7; εἰκών: e.g., I.6 [1] 8.7–8, II.6 [17] 3.18, V.3 [49] 
7.30–34, 13.28–31; ἴνδαλμα: e.g., I.4 [46] 3.35, IV.4 [28] 13.2–7), likeness or similarity 
(ὁμοιότης: e.g., V.1 [10] 7.3, V.3 [49] 8.56; ὁμοίωμα: e.g., IV.5 [29] 7.18, V.3 [49] 8.48, 
V.6 [24] 5.13, VI.9 [9] 11.43), shadow (σκιά: e.g., I.6 [1] 8.7–8, II.6 [17] 3.18), 
impression (τύπος: e.g., IV.4 [28] 13.2–7, VI.7 [38] 18.2–5), copy or imitation (μίμημα: 
e.g., II.4 [12] 4.8, V.3 [49] 16.40, VI.7 [38] 6.28), and appearance (φάντασμα: e.g., V.8 
[31] 12.14; cf. also φαντασία used in this sense at V.6 [24] 5.15). See VI.2 [43] 22.33–46, 
where several of these terms are used almost synonymously; cf. Chapter Four notes 62 
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and 85 for related references in Plotinus. See Chapter One note 207 for references to 
an analogous use of these terms in Plato. 
(5) On other kinds of traces see IV.3 [27] 28.17 (traces of events in memory), 
VI.1 [42] 22.29 (footsteps: the literal meaning; cf. also I.3 [20] 1.15). 
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Pigler writes that “in temporalizing itself, the lower Soul makes itself similar 
to the superior Soul, which however is not temporal; by imitating eternity, the lower Soul 
produces something different, a way to think of the model.”1 This means that the proper 
realm of the higher soul is not time, but eternity (αἰών) minimally understood as “that 
which is always,” according to Plotinus’ etymology at III.7 [45] 4.42–43: αἰὼν γὰρ ἀπὸ 
τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος.2 This etymology of αἰών is already found in Aristotle,3 but as Beierwaltes 
remarks, its philosophical sense is different in Plotinus, for it does not mean infinite time 
as in Aristotle, but, more in tune with Plato’s novel use of the term (cf. Timaeus 37d3–7), 
a complete simultaneity.
4
 The eternal is a completeness of life in which there is neither 
past nor future since in it everything is already beheld or possessed toto simul (ὁμοῦ τὸ 
ὅλον: Plotinus III.7 [45] 2.18) and as if always in the present (ὄντος δ’ ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἀεί: 
Plotinus III.7 [45] 3.21–22).5 Beierwaltes also shows that “always” (ἀεί) means both 
always already and always again: not in the extensive sense of an infinity of time, but in 
the a-temporal or detemporalized intensive (Platonic) sense of being truly or authentically 
                                                 
1
 PIGLER (159): “En se temporalisant, l’Âme inférieure se rend semblable a l’Âme supérieure, qui n’est 
pourtant pas temporelle ; en imitant l’éternité, elle produit quelque chose de différent, un moyen de 
penser au modèle” (my emphasis). At III.7 [45] 11.29–30 Plotinus explicitly writes that in the first place 
soul temporalizes itself (πρῶτον μὲν ἑαυτὴν ἐχρόνωσεν). 
 
2
 In the context of Plotinus III.7 [45], the meaning of αἰών does not seem to differ from that of ἀίδιος and 
ἀιδιότης (see Beierwaltes 1995, 164–166). 
 
3
 Aristotle, On the Heavens I.279a25–28; see also Crysippus in SVF II, 163 (= Varro, De lingua Latina 
VI.11); John of Scythopolis, Scholia to the Corupus Areopagiticum II.10 and V.4 (= PG 4, 229a and 
313c). 
 
4
 Beierwaltes (1995a, 155, 193). 
 
5
 See especially Plotinus III.7 [45] 4.28–43, 5.19–30; cf. I.5 [36] 7.24–30, VI.5 [23] 11.14 ad fin. 
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(ἀληθῶς εἶναι: Plotinus III.7 [45] 6.13).6 Eternity is thus not Nous tout-court, but the 
proper way of being of Nous manifested through Nous and, one might add, strictly only 
through Nous, hence the ease with which some thinkers (e.g., the Pythagoreans) 
identified the two,
7
 but also the similarity of the descriptions of the two in Plotinus 
himself.
8
 The eternity of Intellect is the actuality of an unchangeable condition that is not 
mere immobility or rest (στάσις; see Plotinus III.7 [45] 2.21–36)—otherwise eternity 
would be simply identical with rest, one of the five great genera of Plato’s Sophist 254b–
255e—but a life in which the difference of thought and the multiplicity of reciprocally 
interpenetrating intelligibles dynamically sustains itself in an inseparable, immanent 
identity.
9
 
Now, it would appear that to claim that the higher soul (as well as the purified 
individual soul) resides among eternal realities should entail a rejection of its dianoetic 
nature, for discursiveness implies succession. But Plotinus does not think so (see Plotinus 
IV.4 [28] 1.14 ad fin.). In fact, he states explicitly that not only the Soul-Hypostasis, but 
also the World-Soul and, strictly, even individual souls (Plotinus IV.4 [28] 15; cf. V.1 
[10] 11.1–4) are not in time. What is in time are only the affections and actions of 
embodied souls. The reason for this is that time is ontologically posterior to the World-
                                                 
6
 Beierwaltes (1995a, 69–71, 206–207). 
 
7
 Plotinus III.7 [45] 2.4; cf. Aristotle, Physics IV.218b1. 
 
8
 E.g., eternity as ὁμοῦ τὸ ὅλον at Plotinus III.7 [45] 2.18; Nous as ὁμοῦ... πᾶς at VI.4 [22] 4.26, and as 
ὁμοῦ ἐν ἑνὶ πάντα at VI.6 [34] 7.4. Cf. Parmenides, DK 28.B8.5 (= Simplicius, Commentary on 
Aristotle’s Physics 145.5): ὁμοῦ πᾶν. 
 
9
 See Plotinus III.7 [45] 3.15–23. For a classic treatment of the problem see Beierwaltes (1995a, 59–72); cf. 
also Subsection 3.4.1. For a concise treatment of Plotinus’ views of time and eternity see A. Smith 
(1999a). 
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Soul, which generates it. The proper realm of all soul, therefore, is not time but 
eternity. But then, if equivocation is to be avoided, two distinctions ought to be 
maintained. 
(1) The first distinction is between intelligible-noetic eternity and psychic-
dianoetic eternity. While Nous always is and thinks the intelligibles all at once without 
interval (ἀδιάστατος),10 soul in its pure state can think all of them (and in fact it does so 
for Plotinus), but (a) only as other than itself (see Chapter Three note 273) and (b) only 
successively and separately.
11
 As for the One, we may venture to call it eternal or to 
speak of a henologic eternity, but as usual this is to be understood not as meaning that the 
One is eternally (i.e., is in the way that Nous is), but that it is the cause or foundation of 
eternity (see Plotinus III.7 [45] 2.35, 6.1–4; cf. Plato, Timaeus 37d6; see Chapter Three 
note 74). Strictly, therefore, eternity applies only to Nous, although it can be predicated 
loosely of soul as the pre-temporal generator of time and, perhaps, to the One as the cause 
of eternity. Similarly, temporal coordinates (e.g., before and after) are predicated of the 
discursiveness of soul in its pure form, although what they mean is not temporal 
succession but rather separation (τὸ χωρίς) or an intensified otherness (ἑτερότης) with 
                                                 
10
 See Plotinus I.5 [36] 7.24–30, III.7 [45] 2.31–34, 3.15, 37, 6.35, 11.53, 13.63; cf. also V.8 [31] 9.20, VI.5 
[23] 5.7, 10.40, 11.1 
 
11
 See Plotinus IV.4 [28] 16, V.1 [10] 4.19–22, V.9 [5] 8.15–22. Terms occasionally used to indicate this 
kind of succession are ἐφεξῆς (III.2 [47] 1.15, III.7 [45] 11.55, 13.40, IV.4 [28] 1.33, IV.8 [6] 4.38) and 
ἑξῆς (I.3 [20] 5.3). Terms occasionally indicating this kind of separation are διάστασις (III.7 [45] 11.42, 
VI.5 [23] 11.16) and the related διάστημα (III.7 [45] 12.34) and διίστημι (III.5 [50] 9.26, III.7 [45] 6.15, 
13.62). These terms for succession are usually used to indicate spatial extension; to limit our list to III.7 
[45], for διάστασις see 8.64; for διάστημα see chapter 8 of the same treatise, in which the term is used 
eighteen times, and III.7 [45] 9.4; for διίστημι see 8.52. Spatial extension, in turn, occurs in time but is 
not identical with the essence of time, as Plotinus shows in his critique of some philosophical theories 
about time at III.7 [45] 7–10. See Beierwaltes (1995a, 219–225, 258–260); Pigler (1999, 41–48). 
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respect to the simultaneousness of Nous.
12
 
(2) The second distinction, closely related to the first, is that between the kinds of 
discursiveness (διάνοια) that belong to the various levels of soul. For the sake of clarity, 
we may agree to introduce some “tags” that are not found in Plotinus (though the 
conceptual classifications are) and call (a) temporal discursiveness the discursiveness of 
the operations of embodied individual souls. Instead, I will call (b) eternal discursiveness 
the discursiveness of the undescended (part of the) soul, of the World-Soul, and of the 
Soul-Hypostasis (while mindful of what I just said above in (1) about predicating eternity 
of soul). Eternal discursiveness is further subdivided in (i) primary discursiveness (i.e., 
the discursiveness of the Soul-Hypostasis) and (ii) derivative discursiveness (i.e., the 
discursiveness of the undescended soul and of the World-Soul). 
The basic difference between (a) and (b), temporal and eternal discursiveness, is 
that temporal discursiveness occurs through reasoning (λογισμός, λογίζεσθαι),13 inference 
(συλλογισμός),14 and deliberation (βούλευσις, βουλεύεσθαι),15 and often is expressed in 
language through debate (διαλέγεσθαι, διαλογίζεσθαι, διαλογισμός);16 cf. in particular 
Plotinus V.8 [31] 6–7, VI.2 [42] 21.28–38, VI.7 [38] 1–3. Eternal discursiveness, by 
                                                 
12
 See Plotinus IV.4 [28] 16.1–16, V.9 [5] 8.19–22. 
 
13
 See especially Plotinus IV.3 [27] 18; cf. also I.1 [53] 7.21–23, IV.4 [28] 28.44, IV.8 [6] 1.8, V.1 [10] 
11.4 ff., V.3 [49] 3.14 ff., 8.44, VI.9 [9] 5.9, VI.7 [38] 3.4–6. 
 
14
 See Plotinus I.3 [20] 4.19, IV.4 [28] 5.5, 6.13, IV.5 [29] 4.45, V.8 [31] 7.40, VI.5 [23] 2.19. 
 
15
 See Plotinus IV.4 [28] 11.4–5, IV.8 [6] 8.16, V.8 [31] 6.9, 7.38, 12.21, VI.7 [38] 3.4, VI.8 [39] 6.12. 
 
16
 For διαλέγεσθαι see Plotinus IV.3 [27] 18.16, IV.4 [28] 5.22; for διαλογίζεσθαι and διαλογισμός see V.3 
[49] 3.3, VI.9 [9] 10.6. 
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contrast, is free of all these.
17
 Thus, the contents of Nous, while not completely 
present at once to the Soul-Hypostasis, the World-Soul, and the undescended soul, are 
wholly and effortlessly (ἀπόνως)18 available to them without any need of deliberation and 
inferential reasoning; they are available successively, however, and succession here is the 
key feature that characterizes all discursiveness and the very life of the soul (Plotinus 
III.7 [45] 11.20 ad fin., IV.4 [28] 1.14 ad fin.). This is not the case for the temporal 
discursiveness, which, besides being successive, requires the extra effort of inferential 
reasoning and deliberation in order to access the contents of Intellect.
19
 
As for the difference between (b.i) and (b.ii), primary and derivative 
discursiveness, as the names I assigned to the two distinct phenomena might indicate, it 
consists of the fact that the former is dependent upon the latter (e.g., Plotinus III.5 [50] 
3.38; see pages 244–245), while the latter, primary discursiveness, is the very activity 
through which soul constitutes itself as the third hypostasis by erotically reverting toward 
its generator and thus dianoetically replicating the noetic unity of Nous. 
 
                                                 
17
 See Plotinus IV.4 [28] 11–17, V.8 [31] 7–8; cf. also II.3 [52] 17.11. 
 
18
 See Plotinus II.9 [33] 18.17, IV.3 [28] 4.26, 10.26, IV.8 [6] 8.14. 
 
19
 For a helpful treatment of this distinction see Emilsson (2007, 181–185). 
 
 471 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX E: 
COMPLEMENTARY BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ANNOTATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
472 
This appendix comprises seven short sections or “annotations,” each dealing 
broadly with the main thesis of a book or a part of a book. These annotations were 
originally footnotes (all but one from Chapter One) whose proper place is indicated in 
each of their headings. With the exception of Annotation 4, in general their tone is 
critical, if to varying degrees. I decided to bring them together in an appendix mainly due 
to their size, which is conventionally considered excessive for a footnote. As with 
Appendix C, I trust that removing them from what was their original setting should ease 
rather than impede the flow of the argumentation in the main text. References within each 
annotation are to the work cited in the heading of that annotation and are given in the text 
by a simple indication of the page number(s) in parentheses. References to other sources 
are provided typically in the footnotes. 
Annotation 1 (Chapter One note 28 (2)): 
J. A. Corlett (2005), Interpreting Plato’s Dialogues 
Corlett defends a radically aporetic approach to Plato which he calls “Socratic 
interpretation” or “Anti-Mouthpiece interpretation” (the “Mouthpiece interpretation” 
being the one in which the dialogues communicate the actual views of their author, Plato: 
in other words, the doctrinal or dogmatic approach in its various forms). Two major 
features of this interpretation need to be highlighted to understand in what sense this 
approach is radically aporetic and, in my view, radically questionable: first, the denial 
that “Plato’s theories, doctrines, and/or beliefs are able to be deciphered from Plato’s 
works as we have them” (11); second, the claim that the dialogues “serve as examples of 
philosophical dialectic from which readers are to learn to emulate and continue further 
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down the road of critical inquiry” (12).1 Corlett also tells us what he takes the 
Socratic method to look like: analytic philosophy. In his own words, “I assume that the 
basic analytic method of doing philosophy is in line, generally speaking, with the way in 
which Socrates is portrayed by Plato as doing philosophy” (12 note 29). 
The interplay of these two features raises a twofold problem. In the first place, 
Corlett does not doubt his own ability to grasp at least the idea that the dialogues are 
written to draw us into the activity of philosophy (as he himself admits on page 11 
immediately after the first citation I reported in the previous paragraph). The second 
aspect of the problem is more fundamental and can be formulated interrogatively: If it is 
true that Plato’s dialogues are “examples of philosophical dialectic” aimed at the readers’ 
growth “down the road of critical inquiry,” is it not likewise true that one already 
understands, albeit imperfectly, not only what “philosophical dialectic” means, but also 
that what takes place in the dialogues is good (i.e., beneficial to the readers’ critical 
growth) philosophical dialectic? If this is not the case, one is obviously in no position to 
argue further. If, on the contrary, this is (at least partially) the case, Plato—even Corlett’s 
Plato—might actually have more “theories, doctrines, and/or beliefs” than Corlett 
concedes or realizes. It remains to be determined whether these theories, doctrines and/or 
beliefs are Plato’s or Corlett’s; that is, it remains to be established whether what Corlett 
understands by “philosophical dialectic,” “critical inquiry,” and “Socratic method” is 
what Plato would understand by these or like expressions. This, however, cannot be 
                                                 
1
 This second feature should suffice to prove the general point I stated at pages 12–13—that dogmatic and 
aporetic readings of the dialogues share the view that Plato wrote in order to draw his readers to 
philosophy in the conviction that this would benefit their lives. 
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derived from the dialogues, unless Corlett were to admit that something in the 
dialogues can in fact emerge as Plato’s own doctrine, which is precisely what he 
strenuously denies. What we are left with, therefore, is Corlett’s own understanding of 
these expressions and the assumption that this understanding mirrors Plato’s views on 
them, views which Plato intentionally staged in the dialogues for the sake of his readers’ 
critical growth. Whether I agree with the content of this assumption and take it to be, not 
an assumption, but a matter of fact is irrelevant for the assessment of Corlett’s position; it 
is precisely on the basis of the hermeneutic parameters established by Corlett (which is 
what is in question here) that the assumption is an assumption.
2
 
In fairness to Corlett, he candidly admits that his position makes no claim to be 
unfalsifiable, mentioning the possibility that some new archeological evidence may one 
day solve the riddle of Plato’s intentions (13). But precisely this admission reveals the 
instability of the ground on which he founds his approach, to which he refers as “the only 
interpretive approach to Plato that can render the meaning of the dialogues’ content 
accurately by not committing fundamental attribution errors concerning Plato” (96). One 
need only try the following thought experiment: if the archeological evidence of which 
Corlett speaks were one day to become available (say, a non-spurious Letter XIV) and if 
                                                 
2
 Let me notice that if all that Corlett is claiming is that what he understands by “philosophical dialectic,” 
“critical inquiry,” and “Socratic method” can be derived safely from the dialogues without having to be 
attributed directly to Plato (i.e., without our having to maintain that Plato positively endorsed such an 
understanding), it seems to me that Corlett is pointing out the obvious (perhaps not without good 
reasons), since his claim can easily be applied to every piece of writing whatsoever and, for that matter, 
to spoken words and actions as well. The reason for this is that, to my mind, the intention of the 
writer/speaker/performer never lends itself to view beyond all possible doubt. Thus, for example (and 
again, if all that Corlett is claiming is...), from Corlett’s book, Interpreting Plato’s Dialogues, I can 
safely derive the view that the dialogues are essentially aporetic without my having to maintain that 
Corlett himself positively endorses such a view (i.e., the view that the dialogues are essentially aporetic). 
I seriously doubt, however, that Corlett would assent to this. 
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what this evidence revealed were that Plato wrote dialogues in order to deceive his 
readers by ingenious discussions containing fallacious arguments, Corlett’s claim that the 
dialogues are examples of philosophical dialectic to be emulated would immediately 
dissolve and prove to be (again, according to his parameters) an assumption. It matters 
little if this scenario is completely fictitious and its realization highly improbable; in fact, 
it matters little if this scenario is completely reversed (i.e., if our imaginary Letter XIV 
told us that Plato’s mind perfectly matches Corlett’s reading). The mere fact that many 
such scenarios are possible shows that Corlett’s overall position is based on a 
multifaceted and tightly knit assumption, namely, that Plato’s mind is utterly shrouded in 
mystery and yet Corlett knows (i) that the Socratic method is fundamentally in agreement 
with analytic philosophy, (ii) that Plato, who was fond of this method, wrote dialogues as 
exercises of philosophical dialectic to be imitated by readers eager to grow as 
philosophers on the road of critical inquiry, and, I surmise, (iii) that Plato himself 
intended our critical growth to be in line with the agreement assumed in (i). 
I felt it was important to state my case concerning Corlett’s approach, for if I did 
not misunderstand him, I found it emblematic of readings in which one is told that the 
veil shrouding Plato’s mind is impenetrable (not in principle, but at least presently and 
perhaps for merely accidental reasons), only to find out that those who assured us of this 
were (allegedly, if not admittedly) able to peek behind that veil. 
I fear that by now my tone will have been perceived as eristic, which was not my 
intention and, in addition, would be unfair to Corlett, who presents his ideas without 
polemical overtones and while mastering a wealth of information. 
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Annotation 2 (Chapter One note 29 (2)): 
J. A. Arieti (1991), Interpreting Plato: The Dialogues as Drama 
Arieti approaches the issue of Platonic interpretation from what we may call a 
radical version of the dramatic setting theory (see page 5 above), namely by turning (one 
might say “reducing”) Plato into a comic dramatist who writes in prose, whose interest in 
arguments is only secondary, and who makes whatever point he needs to make 
dramatically rather than discursively. As Arieti clearly states, “I think [...] that the 
dialogues are dramas and that, as in plays generally, the philosophical arguments in them 
are subordinated to the drama” (5). 
I will only hint at the question of the (alleged) subordination of arguments to 
drama and then move on to my main criticism of Arieti’s views. What does it mean that 
Plato makes his point “dramatically, not discursively” (5)? Is it that the arguments in the 
dialogues are not meant to be taken seriously as arguments, so that the dialogue as a 
comic drama will be hopelessly misinterpreted if arguments in it are read seriously (i.e., 
they are read as genuine arguments)? Does this mean that the Platonic dialogue, 
conceived of as comic drama, can be understood only if one disavows the arguments of 
the dialogue precisely qua arguments? Why should it be implausible to take the 
arguments of the dialogues seriously qua arguments and at the same time be able to 
appreciate Plato’s comic talent? More importantly, what kind of philosophical argument 
is the one which, in order to be grasped, ought to be dismissed precisely qua argument 
and be “subordinated” to the dramatic dimension in which it is set? Would it still be an 
argument at all? 
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What fails to convince me in a view such as Arieti’s is precisely its radical or 
subversive character, which I find rather unreasonable when applied to Plato. That the 
dialogues are also dramas, comic or otherwise, is beyond doubt; but are they primarily 
dramas? One is not altogether immune to the pleasure of subverting a well-established 
hermeneutic tradition, but I wonder whether subversion is called for in this case. Plato 
himself, I take it, was subversive in his own way, but I seriously doubt that to read him as 
primarily a writer of comic dramas who did not intend his arguments to be taken 
seriously qua arguments does him any justice. I believe Arieti is correct to emphasize that 
there is “much to be learned about philosophical issues in literature” (5), but I find it hard 
to admit that this can be the case of Plato’s dialogues only if one basically dismisses the 
philosophical arguments in them as irrelevant precisely as arguments. It is not so much 
that Arieti openly denies that the dialogues have a philosophical dimension (although at 
page 248 he does state that they “aim at an emotional reaction and not at discursive 
learning,” which I take to be an essential aspect of philosophy), as that he never tells us 
how this dimension, if present, interacts with their dramatic aspect.
3
 
Moreover, from the point of view of form, which is the basis of his interpretive 
comparison of Platonic dialogue and Aristophanic comedy, Arieti is well aware that 
Plato’s dialogue is a new breed of comic drama, most notably because it is not a comedy 
to be performed on the stage.
4
 But then one may ask whether the Platonic dialogue is a 
comic drama at all. I am unprepared to insist further on this point, but I wonder whether 
                                                 
3
 For a similar criticism see Gonzalez (1998, 278 note 15). 
 
4
 Arieti and Barrus (2010, 10). 
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excising from a dramatic piece the intention of its author to have it performed on 
stage does not already essentially infringe on the nature of the drama.
5
 The same 
objection could be raised about other important features of the dialogues that do not 
match those of the old comedy (e.g., the language of poetry in comedy vs. the language 
of prose in the dialogues). 
However, these reasons for finding Arieti’s views problematic are relatively 
marginal. The most questionable aspect of his approach, I believe, is that he offers no 
evidence that his views were even vaguely familiar within the Academy, and wittingly 
so, as he calls his approach “new” (9). Instead, he minimizes evidence to the contrary, as 
in his refusal to credit Aristotle’s testimony for a more traditional (i.e., doctrinal and 
argumentative) reading of the dialogues on the premise that “[u]nfamiliar with the ironic 
youthful Plato, he would have taken literally Plato’s playfulness.” Moreover, the age 
difference between Plato and Aristotle (reportedly, Aristotle joined the Academy in 367, 
when he was 17 and Plato was 61) “would in all likelihood have made their relationship a 
very formal one” (10). Now, that Aristotle might have misinterpreted Plato on some 
issues, even important ones, is not in principle unthinkable,
6
 but in this specific context 
regrettably Arieti fails to mention that Aristotle left the Academy some 20 years later (in 
347 or 348, the year of Plato’s death), when he was no longer a teenager but a 37 year-old 
man. Is it really so unreasonable to think that perhaps in all these years Aristotle did 
                                                 
5
 Thesleff (1982, 56–67, 83–88) actually argues that some of the dialogues were written to be performed, 
but Arieti (1991, 16 note 23) declares himself unconvinced by Thesleff’s arguments. 
 
6
 Plato’s much talked about lecture on the Good could be one of these issues (see Chapter One note 17). On 
the question whether Aristotle misinterpreted Plato see the still useful Watson (1909) and Reale (2004, 
IV, 19–34) for a moderate view; for a positive answer to the question see Cherniss (1945; 1962). 
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understand something of substance about what was playful in Plato and what was not 
(if not directly from Plato, at least from someone close to him, able to bridge the 
generational gap separating the two)? 
Annotation 3 (Chapter One note 48): 
R. Robinson (1953), Plato’s Earlier Dialectic 
In a handful of lucid pages, Robinson (1–6) outlines five common types of 
misinterpretation one may come across in the reading of a text, particularly a dialogue by 
Plato. The first type is what he calls (i) mosaic interpretation, or the tendency to isolate a 
single text, whether a few words, a sentence, or a longer passage, and assign it an 
importance (or lack thereof) that is not granted by the broader context in which the text 
occurs. The second type is (ii) misinterpretation by abstraction, which consists of taking 
something an author says—‘x’—as what I think is a case of ‘y’, only to infer, wrongfully, 
that since I abstracted ‘y’ from ‘x’, my author must have done so too. The third type is 
(iii) misinterpretation by inference, namely: since an author says ‘p’ and ‘p’ implies ‘q’, 
that author said ‘q’; it is clear, instead, that this conclusion does not follow of necessity. 
Fourth comes (iv) misinterpretation for the sake of insinuating the future, namely the 
practice of reading into an author something that was made explicit only later. Lastly, we 
have (v) the misinterpretation of going beyond a thinker’s last word, which consists of 
attributing to an author a step further than he or she took on a given subject. 
Now, all these types of interpretation are what Robinson says they are, that is, 
misinterpretations; the serious reader must be constantly aware of them as such. 
Moreover, if Plato meant to be read in accordance with the “unusual severity” prescribed 
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by Robinson (5), Plotinus is hardly innocent of any of these misinterpretations.—And 
there’s the rub. For when we admit that, although Plato never explicitly spoke for himself 
in the dialogues (excluding the likely genuine Letters), something of his intention can 
nevertheless be derived safely from them, (ad ii) does it strictly follow that since Plato 
never formally stated that ‘x’ is a case of ‘y’, he was not aware that ‘x’ is in fact a case of 
‘y’, as Robinson seems to suggest? Similarly, (ad iii) should we infer without doubt that 
Plato did not mean to say or to have his readers infer ‘q’ simply because he did not 
explicitly say that ‘p’ implies ‘q’? And (ad iv) is it in principle unthinkable that, if some 
distinction explicitly elaborated only later in the history of thought (e.g., arguably, that of 
essence and existence, on which see pages 19–22 above) proves fruitful to shed 
significant light on more than one Platonic text, can it be not so much that the (mis-) 
interpreter is necessarily insinuating such a distinction, as that perhaps Plato was distantly 
adumbrating it? Finally, (ad v) even if one were able to determine Plato’s last word on a 
given issue, are we so sure that he did not take a further step in the text, not because he 
did not take it absolutely, but because he might have wished his readers to take it for 
themselves instead of him taking it for them? That is, isn’t the purpose of the dialogues 
also to lead us to take (justifiable) steps for ourselves which by ourselves we would not 
ordinarily take? I have no reply proper to (i), other than noting that in many cases 
disagreement occurs precisely on what constitutes “isolation.” 
I believe that the main problem with Robinson’s view is that he is already 
operating (coherently, we must admit) in accordance with his ‘evolutionist’ assumption, 
“that each element of our thought has come into existence at some period of our history, 
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so that at some previous period none of our ancestors possessed it” (page vi). But by 
simply assuming this, isn’t Robinson falling prey to a rather strange form of 
misinterpretation (which one might want to add to his list), that is, the misinterpretation 
of consciously reading Plato through a presupposition that clearly was not Plato’s own, 
nor, more importantly, is it evidently applicable to Plato? 
A final disclaimer, at the risk of repeating myself: my objections to Robinson’s 
five types of misinterpretation are more a matter of emphasis than, I hope, a 
misrecognition of these misinterpretations as misinterpretations. Moreover, where 
Robinson seems to take explicitness as the sole criterion for judging what Plato had in 
mind (with all the problems that this presupposition implies for writings like the 
dialogues), I emphasize implicitness as at least a serious possibility. As I write in the 
opening lines of this annotation, it is the task of the historian of philosophy to try to 
determine whether later developments in the history of thought are legitimate 
explications of a given doctrine or fanciful, if speculatively creative, constructions (in the 
awareness that to determine this beyond doubt is very hard and oftentimes probably 
impossible). 
Annotation 4 (Chapter One note 56): 
D. O’Brien (1995), Le Non-Être. Deux Études sur le Sophiste de Platon 
The two studies by Denis O’Brien collected in this 1995 volume7 focus on the 
notion of non-being (τὸ μὴ ὄν) in Parmenides, Plato’s Sophist, and Plotinus. O’Brien 
                                                 
7
 Cf. also O’Brien (1999a). 
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shows that the concept of non-being, which for Parmenides
8
 meant total non-being 
(Sophist 237b7–8: τὸ μηδαμῶς ὂν; 238c9: τὸ μὴ ὂν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτό), or absolute 
nothingness (which throws mortals into contradiction as soon as they try to say that this 
non-being is), is not so much refuted as problematized further by Plato (Sophist 256e5–
259d8). Plato introduces a new distinction which was absent in Parmenides, to wit, the 
distinction between non-being as contrary to being (i.e., Parmenidean non-being, or total 
non-being) and non-being as other than being (i.e., the non-being of motion and rest, 
which by participating both in being and in otherness are, not being tout-court, but other 
than being without thereby being total non-being). Plotinus (I.8 [51] 3, II.5 [25] 5, III.6 
[26] 7) goes a step further and on the basis of the language of the Sophist (258d6, e3, 
263d4) introduces a third kind of non-being, that is, the form of non-being, or the non-
being which truly is not or which is truly false (see Chapter Three note 324 for precise 
references; cf. also note 335 in the same chapter). Plotinus identifies this third kind of 
non-being with (lower) matter, which in its utter lack of definition, or in its complete 
otherness, is opposed both to total non-being (Parmenides) and to what is other than 
being (Plato). What should be noted is that these oppositions are operative, not between 
the conclusions of Parmenides, Plato, and Plotinus, but only between notions whose 
(clear) distinction took about eight centuries to be formulated explicitly (and almost 
another eighteen centuries to be rediscovered, if no one before O’Brien ever noticed it). 
The fact is that on the basis of a problem and a distinction inherited from Parmenides, 
Plato was able to ask new questions and to formulate a new distinction; in turn, Plotinus, 
                                                 
8
 Parmenides: DK 28.B2.5–8 (= Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 116.30–117.1). 
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reflecting on Plato’s distinction (and mindful of Aristotle’s speculation on matter), 
introduced yet another distinction, thus taking the reflection on non-being a step further. 
Therefore, to ask if Plato refuted Parmenides (and Plotinus Plato) is legitimate but 
possibly misguiding if one does not take into account that Plato was not necessarily out to 
get Parmenides by refuting him or correcting him; he was rather offering fresh insight 
into a problem which he had inherited from his predecessors (or, said otherwise, he was 
lending his voice to a relatively metaphorical conversation which started before him and 
would continue well after him). To see the connection between ideas across the centuries 
is a difficult task which, as O’Brien (3) remarks, neither one who is only a historian nor 
one who is only a philosopher can accomplish, but for which a historian of philosophy is 
needed. 
Even so, in approaching a philosophical text, the historian genuinely ought to ask 
whether the author of that text would have recognized a distinction that is either absent or 
not fully explicit in the text but which is plausibly related to it and may help us to clarify 
at least some important aspects of it. Failing to ask this question and seriously consider 
whether the answer to it could be positive may result in a reductive understanding or, 
worse, in a misunderstanding of the philosophical significance of the text. 
Annotation 5 (Chapter One note 63): 
F. J. Gonzalez (1998), Dialectic and Dialogue. 
Plato’s Practice of Philosophical Inquiry 
In contrast with both developmental and esoteric views, Gonzalez (1–16) argues 
that we should not understand Plato’s philosophy as a more or less hidden and developed 
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system of doctrines whose method, dialectic, is not essential to the essence of his 
thought, but as both non-doctrinal and non-systematic. Gonzalez writes that “what 
reveals the truth, though without ever arriving at a ‘final result,’ is the process of dialectic 
itself, the discursive activity of ‘rubbing together’ our defective means of inquiry with the 
goal of sparking an insight that barely transcends them” (273). Thus, dialectic is not a 
method at all, but rather “the exchange of question and answer” (2), and a Platonic 
dialogue is “simply a dramatic portrayal of dialectic at work” (2), or a re-creation of “that 
dialectical process which alone can reveal the truth” (274). In his reading of Plato’s 
Seventh Letter Gonzalez concludes that “the goal of dialectic is nonpropositional insight,” 
and yet “the only means of attaining (and I would add, sustaining) this insight is a form 
of discursive reasoning” (272, emphasis in the text). 
I believe that Gonzalez’s suggestion has the great merit of drawing attention to 
the fact that philosophy in Plato cannot be reduced to logic (as against Robinson 1953, 
whose main thesis is discussed in Annotation 3 above and to which Gonzalez 1998 is 
partly a response), and that discursive reasoning seems to be a necessary and yet 
ultimately insufficient means to truth or insight. Moreover, Gonzalez refuses to espouse a 
purely skeptical reading of Plato (274). Yet, I cannot fully agree with him. 
Now, that the dialogues depict discursive reasoning as necessary for insight but 
also as ultimately non-identical with insight, I find highly probable; that they appear to 
fulfill a protreptic function is seldom doubted; and that they do not explicitly present a 
system more geometrico hardly needs to be restated. While granting this, however, I 
wonder if Gonzalez goes a little too far in assuming a non-systematic intention in Plato 
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on the premise that this would preclude a harmonization of form (dialogue) and 
content (system) in Plato’s philosophy (4). A system for Gonzalez is possible on the basis 
of two assumptions, which he submit to criticism: first, “that the knowledge which 
philosophy strives to obtain is a knowledge of propositions” (7), and second, “that 
philosophical method is subordinate to, and terminates in some final result” (9). We may 
note that Gonzalez himself is not completely immune to the second of these assumptions, 
since dialectic (which in this context I believe he takes to be coextensive with 
philosophy), although not aiming at establishing a system of propositional knowledge, 
does in fact lead to something other than itself, namely insight.
9
 As for Gonzalez’s 
critique of the first assumption, I believe it is stronger than that of the second, but also 
rather partial when applied indiscriminately to all the representatives of the esoteric and 
developmental approaches. For example, I think a “second-generation” champion of the 
“esoteric” thesis like Szlezák would find the claim that philosophy strives for a 
propositional kind of knowledge as all too partial (although he does argue that there is 
nothing in principle that makes a thing like, say, virtue ineffable).
10
 For Szlezák Platonic 
philosophy is also a condition of the soul, so that in order to grasp Plato one needs to 
become attuned to what the dialogues are trying to communicate.
11
 This process of 
attunement obviously includes more than knowledge of propositions. Thus, to make 
propositionally explicit the presuppositions of one’s lifestyle (in some exceptional cases 
                                                 
9
 The fact that dialectic is necessary for “sustaining” insight does not seem completely to erase its status of 
a means to an end. Alternately, I am not sure what the distinction between “means” and “goal” with 
reference to dialectic and nonpropositional insight respectively is meant to signify. 
 
10
 See Szlezák (1993, 61–65). 
 
11
 See Szlezák (1993, 4–11). 
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perhaps even to the point of claiming to have systematized them) is part of the 
activity of philosophy; but this does not mean that it is the whole of it (cf. Chapter One 
notes 31 and 64) nor even that it is its highest end. For this reason, although I am not 
prepared to espouse the esoteric thesis in its entirety, I believe that to claim, against the 
supporters of this thesis, that Plato is neither systematic nor doctrinal is to presuppose too 
much if by this one means that Plato positively avoided even aiming at having a system 
of doctrines (which is what I think Gonzalez is arguing). Put generally, the fact that Plato 
wrote dialogues instead of poems (like his predecessors) or treatises (like his successors) 
is not, of itself, sufficient to exclude his intention to be systematic and doctrinal. Of 
course, this fact is not sufficient to include such an intention either, but unlike Gonzalez, 
who thinks that “[w]e can accept Aristotle as an authority for what Plato said while at the 
same time suspecting his ability and willingness to remain faithful to the spirit and 
context in which Plato said it” (283 note 47), I think that Aristotle’s testimony provides 
enough evidence for reading Plato as at least aiming at constructing a system, and as very 
likely doctrinal. 
Gonzalez asks: “Can there be any form of writing less suited to presenting a 
systematic philosophy than Plato’s dramatic dialogues?” (4). Despite its rhetorical ring, 
this question might not have to be answered with a straightforward “no.” In fact, it may 
be countered by another question, whose tone, in its turn, I wish to be as little rhetorical 
as possible: “Can there be any form of writing more suited to introducing us to the 
difficulty of both constructing and defending a system than Plato’s dramatic dialogues?”12 
                                                 
12
 A marginal remark. Gonzalez (1998, 279–280 note 23) appeals to Heidegger (2002, 76 = Gesamtausgabe 
5, 93; 1985, especially 25–33 = Gesamtausgabe 42, 44–57) to support his idea that Plato’s philosophy 
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Annotation 6 (Chapter One note 269): 
M. C. Nussbaum (2001), The Fragility of Goodness. 
Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy 
I think that Nussbaum’s position about the Symposium in general and the figure of 
Alcibiades in particular is worth considering here, if nothing else for the popularity that 
her book enjoyed since it was first published in 1986 (fifteen reprints plus the 
substantially unaltered 2001 edition with a new preface). In chapter 6, one of the three 
chapters dedicated to Plato in her book, Nussbaum argues that in the Symposium there is 
a basic tension between two different notions of value, or two fundamentally antithetic 
objects of love, namely the universal Forms and the individual body, respectively 
supported by Diotima-Socrates and Alcibiades. Nussbaum writes: 
We see two kinds of value, two kinds of knowledge; and we see that we 
must choose. One sort of understanding blocks out the other. The pure 
light of the eternal form eclipses, or is eclipsed by, the flickering lightning 
of the opened and unstably moving body. You think, says Plato, that you 
can have this love and goodness too, the knowledge of and by flesh and 
good-knowledge too. Well, says Plato, you can’t. You have to blind 
yourself to something, give up some beauty. ‘The sight of reason begins to 
see clearly when the sight of the eyes begins to grow dim’—whether from 
                                                                                                                                                 
(as well as Aristotle’s) is not systematic in the modern sense that it constructs a knowledge demonstrated 
more geometrico, but rather in the restricted sense that it is “directed and supported by a quite definite 
inner jointure and ordering of questions [geleitet und getragen von enier ganz bestimmen inneren Fügung 
und Ordnung des Fragens]” (Heidegger 1985, 27 = Gesamtausgabe 42, 47). This is correct, but in the 
first source cited by Gonzalez (i.e., Heidegger’s 1938 essay Die Zeit des Weltbildes from the 1950 
collection Holzwege = Gesamtausgabe 5, 73–113), Heidegger also points out that it was Plato’s 
understanding of “the beingness of beings [die Seiendheit des Seinenden] as εἶδος” that “predestined the 
world’s having to become picture [Bild]” (Heidegger 2002, 69 = Gesamtausgabe 5, 91), which in the 
context of Heidegger’s essay means: the world as the entirety of beings is grasped representationally by a 
representing subject (Subjekt: ὑποκείμενον as “that which lies before [das Vor-Liegende]”), and as such 
“it stands together with what belongs to and stands together with it as a system” (Heidegger 2002, 66 and 
67 = Gesamtausgabe 5, 88 and 89; my emphasis). What is at issue here is not whether Heidegger’s claim 
about Plato is correct, but, given Gonzalez’s appeal to Heidegger, whether such a claim would make a 
difference for Gonzalez’s denial of any trace of a system (including the intention of building a system) in 
Plato’s philosophy. 
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age or because you are learning to be good. (198) 
 
Leaving aside whether the terms “kinds,” “values,” and “knowledge” are entirely 
appropriate in this context, one need not deny that the tension between these “two kinds 
of values” and “knowledge” is perceived as real in order to disagree with Nussbaum’s 
analysis of the Symposium. (In fact, one need not even disagree with what in her reading 
of the dialogue will eventually emerge as her views in order to disagree that the words 
she loosely attributes to Plato do not coincide with Plato’s views.) If I read her correctly 
(and, of course, if my interpretive notes on the Symposium in Chapter One are not 
completely off the mark), I think that Nussbaum’s claim is based on a misreading of the 
speech by Alcibiades, which is there to show us, not an alternative to Socrates’ views on 
eros, but a (fairly obvious?) failure to live out these views. This misreading, in turn, is 
grounded in what I take to be three more fundamental misconceptions on Nussbaum’s 
part. 
The first misconception, of a narrower scope than the other two, is that in order to 
love Beauty one must become aloof and cold-hearted and give up love for lower beauties; 
as Nussbaum writes of Socrates: 
He might also have had a sexual relationship with Alcibiades while 
remaining inwardly aloof. But Socrates refuses in every way to be 
affected. He is stone; and he also turns others to stone. Alcibiades is to his 
sight just one more of the beautifuls, a piece of the form, a pure thing like 
a jewel. (195) 
 
That this is not the case seems clear to me from the fact that Socrates, far from 
turning others to stone, makes them fall in love with him; in fact, it is obvious that 
Alcibiades is still in love with Socrates at the time of his speech, or so it seems to the 
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other guests at Agathon’s gathering (Symposium 222c1–3). Moreover, what 
Alcibiades loves is not Socrates’ individual body, but his wisdom, which he assumes will 
become available to him if he will throw himself into Socrates’ arms. Socrates firmly 
declines the offer, but his rejection need not be read as aloofness, or a refusal to be 
affected; it is rather a genuine concern for the health of Alcibiades’ soul (cf. Chapter One 
note 271), a concern which, again, is all but comparable to a stone-like condition. 
The second misconception is broader in scope than the first and emerges in 
connection with Nussbaum’s comments on what I earlier referred to as the first rung(s) of 
the ladder of love, that is, the beauty of body (Symposium 210a4–b6: steps 1.a and 1.b at 
page 49 above). Nussbaum claims that “Socrates’ argument depends on a strong hidden 
assumption: that all beauty, qua beauty, is uniform, the same in kind” (179). She adds on 
the same page: 
All manifestations of the kalon must be sufficiently like one another that if 
you lack one kind it is natural to conclude that you lack them all. The 
beauty of Alcibiades must be distinct from the beauty of Socrates not 
qualitatively, but only in terms of contingent spatio-temporal location (and 
perhaps in quantity as well). 
 
This “natural” conclusion, I suspect, is not so natural after all. In fact, it is itself an 
assumption, and misses the point about the possibility of qualitative differentiation in 
kind within beauty, which in turn is precisely what makes the notion of an ascent to 
Beauty possible in the first place (and which I take to be Socrates’, or Plato’s, genuine 
views in the Symposium). So, for instance, to claim that all shapes, in order to be shapes, 
must belong to the same genus is different than claiming that if a given shape lacks one 
manifestation of the genus “shape,” it must lack all such manifestations. Nussbaum seems 
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to confuse the two claims. Thus, in the case of beauty, Alcibiades’ physical beauty is 
not different from Socrates’ “interior” beauty (e.g., Symposium 216c4–217a2) “only in 
terms of contingent spatio-temporal location” (and probably also not “in quantity,” since 
the kind of beauty proper to Socrates, in order to be quantifiable, should possess either 
the measurability and potential divisibility of magnitude into non-continuous parts or the 
numerability and potential divisibility of a plurality in discrete parts;
13
 but it is not clear 
how this could be the case, unless one takes “quantity” metaphorically). Rather, the two 
kinds of beauty, Alcibiades’ and Socrates’, are qualitatively different kinds of beauty, 
that is, they belong to different rungs of the same ladder of love.
14
 
The third misconception is what I take to be a more pervasive assumption 
concerning one of the central theses of Nussbaum’s book, of which her opposition 
between Socrates and Alcibiades is a major illustration, namely that often the pursuits of 
rational beings conflict with desires that are not rational. (The other theses, which we find 
outlined in the first chapter of Nussbaum’s book, are that often such pursuits are in 
conflict with each other and/or are overwhelmed by factors that we do not control). What 
I take to be an assumption is not the obvious fact that all such conflicts are real, but 
Nussbaums’s notion that on this point philosophy is in agreement with tragedy in 
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 On quantity (ποσός) and its two basic kinds, magnitude (μέγεθος) and plurality (πλῆθος), see Aristotle, 
Categories 4b20–6b35, Metaphysics V.1020a7–32. See also these entries in Peters (1967). 
 
14
 Thus, Nussbaum (unwittingly?) reads Socrates’ position on beauty in the Symposium as analogous to 
Protarchus’ initial claim about pleasure at the beginning of the Philebus (12c–13c). For Protarchus 
pleasure is a homogeneous phenomenon resisting all qualitative differentiation. By contrast, in the same 
passage of the Philebus Socrates argues for a qualitative differentiation of pleasures (e.g., based on the 
difference of their motives and consequences, as in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics X.5) and mentions 
color and shape as exemplary instances of such a differentiation (cf. Frede 1993, xviii–xix). It is not 
implausible that Socrates implies a similar kind of differentiation for beauty in the Symposium. Cf. also 
Chapter One note 158. 
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portraying these conflicts as being beyond resolution. A quotation from an early 
critical review of Nussbaum’s book from which I took a cue for both this and the 
previous criticism (a review with which I am generally in agreement) should suffice to 
justify my claim in the context of this annotation: 
the tragedians seem not to think there is any question about whether the 
conflicts happen; they assume that all the conflicts happen, and display 
how they happen. Greek philosophers, however, think there is a serious 
question about whether the conflicts actually arise once we straighten out 
our moral principles, and about whether they arise in just the ways 
assumed in tragedy. In claiming that philosophy is continuous with 
tragedy, Nussbaum overlooks this apparently important discontinuity.
15
 
 
Thus, Plato, as a philosopher, does not portray Alcibiades as the embodiment of a 
set of values irreparably opposed to those of Socrates (to which Plato gives preference, 
according to Nussbaum), but rather as the epitome of the wealthy, handsome, and 
intelligent Athenian who, despite his good qualities, failed to join Socrates on the path of 
philosophy (cf. Chapter One note 37). In doing so, Plato is not telling us that, whether we 
opt for Alcibiades’ stance or for Socrates’, we have “to blind” ourselves to something or 
“to give up some beauty” (198, cited in the first paragraph of this annotation), but rather 
that by choosing Alcibiades’ stance we will inevitably get stuck at a lower level of beauty 
and blind ourselves to Beauty itself and to the reason(s) for which lower or qualified 
beauties are beautiful (and desirable). Thus, to choose Alcibiades’ stance means to treat, 
whether deliberately (if possible at all) or against one’s best judgment (i.e., out of one’s 
inability to overpower one’s habitual tendency toward the worse: ἀκρασία), a 
qualitatively inferior kind of beauty as if it were ultimate, thereby missing out on Beauty 
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 Irwin (1988, 382–383). 
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itself (see my previous criticism). It is such a choice, not an alleged contrast between 
“two kinds of values” or objects of love, that causes tension. In fact, for Socrates there is 
one and only one proper object of love, that is, Beauty or the Good, and this is the case 
even when one fails to realize that if beautiful things are beautiful, it is because they 
participate in Beauty. Thus, tension occurs, not because we love beautiful things which 
are merely quantitatively different (i.e., “the pure light of the eternal form” vs. “the 
flickering lightning of the opened and unstably moving body”: 198), but because 
something which, by participating in Beauty, is qualitatively different from Beauty, is 
loved (wrongfully, for the Socrates of the Symposium) as if it were lovable ultimately, or 
as if it were Beauty itself. 
Annotation 7 (Chapter Four note 66): 
P. Moser (2010), The Evidence for God: Religious Knowledge Reexamined 
In the context of my discussion of Plotinus’ Principle of As-similation, I pointed 
out that in an earlier publication Moser suggests that in order to see the plausibility of the 
evidence of the Judeo-Christian God, one ought to be receptive or properly attuned to this 
evidence.
16
 The suggestion is compelling and deserves careful consideration. What I find 
problematic in Moser’s approach, however, is the critical reading of the tradition of 
natural theology, for instance of Thomas Aquinas (142–184, especially 153–165), which 
we find in this later book. 
Moser contends that the arguments of natural theology are unable to account for 
the God acknowledged by Jews and Christians, a God who is personally interactive, 
                                                 
16
 Moser (2008, 83–143, especially 113–123). 
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morally perfect, deserving of worship, and cognitively elusive.
17
 It is not difficult to 
see how a criticism of this kind could easily be applied to Plotinus, if not with respect to 
God’s cognitive elusiveness, at least for what concerns God’s personality (cf. Section 5.2 
in the Epilogue) and the fact that God deserves worship, although Plotinus would hardly 
be bothered by such a criticism. In fact, if this is all that Moser’s critique amounts to, it is 
certainly true of every argument of what may broadly be understood as belonging to the 
tradition of natural theology, Jewish, Christian, Muslim or otherwise. But Moser goes a 
step further when he writes about the arguments of natural theology (152): 
Characterized generally, these arguments seek to establish, or at least 
confirm, God’s existence on the basis of natural sources of human 
knowledge, without an appeal to any revelation from God. [...] In effect, 
the history of natural theology has been the history of attempting to secure 
knowledge of God’s reality without acknowledging evidence of God’s 
authoritative call to humans. 
 
My contention is that these claims by Moser are at least problematic because 
when the arguments of natural theology are understood for what they are meant to 
accomplish by their authors, they are not pieces of evidence that precede faith (i.e., what 
here I take to be, if not simply identical with what Moser calls “acknowledging evidence 
of God’s authoritative call to humans,” at least an essential element of such an 
acknowledgment), but natural aids for a faith that ought to be already in place in order 
for these arguments to fulfill their purpose. It is not hard to see that if faith is not already 
present, no matter how weakly and tentatively, these arguments will hardly aid anyone.
18
 
                                                 
17
 It is God’s cognitive elusiveness, I surmise, which makes for the necessity of attunement, of which faith 
(or what Moser more often refers to as trust in God) is a fundamental element. 
 
18
 This is not to say that the arguments of natural theology have no appeal whatsoever for a habitually 
reflective person. However, I have yet to find someone who has assured me of having turned from 
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The fact that all the major representatives of the tradition of natural theology often 
preface their arguments with prayer is no mere formality. I maintain that what prayer 
accomplishes in this context is the very acknowledgment, in faith, of God’s authoritative 
call, that is, a fundamental attunement which is prior to argumentation.
19
 But when the 
scope and purpose of these arguments is either passed under silence or misrepresented, 
their very nature radically changes and is bound to be misunderstood. Therefore, the so-
called proofs of God’s existence are expressions of the (Anselmian) fides quaerens 
intellectum,
20
 not substitutes for faith nor the proclamation of an intellectus sine fide. If 
                                                                                                                                                 
unbelief to faith on the mere basis of one or more of these arguments. 
 
19
 See for instance Augustine, Soliloquia I.1–6; Anselm, Proslogion 1; Bonaventure, Itinerarium mentis in 
Deum, Prologue 1. Thomas Aquinas, on his part, is known to have been in the habit of preparing himself 
with prayer for the activity of study and teaching (cf. Torrell 2005, 321); a particular expression of this 
was Thomas’ habitual recitation of the prayer, Creator ineffabilis, by which he would ask for God’s 
assistance in his intellectual work (the text of this prayer can be found in Alarcón 2011). Augustine (De 
doctrina Christiana IV.32) recommends prayer also before preaching, an activity in which persuasion is 
often aimed less at reason by means of arguments than at emotion by means of rhetoric. And although the 
context is that of attempting to understand a strictly revealed Christian doctrine such as that of the 
Trinity, Augustine (De Trinitate XIV.49) insists that given our present sinful condition, understanding of 
the mystery will become possible only if preceded by faith, prayer, and a sound (i.e., morally sound) life 
conduct. 
Although the milieu is not that of Christianity, it is significant that invocation to the divinity before 
undertaking a study or investigation is a practice endorsed already by Plato (Timaeus 27c1–d4, 48d4–e1, 
Laws X.893b1–4; cf. also Philebus 25b8–12, 61b11–c2; for a prayer after a discussion, see Phaedrus 
279b8–c3) and through the Neoplatonic tradition—e.g., in Plotinus (V.1 [10] 6.8–11, V.8 [31] 9.13–14), 
and most prominently in Iamblichus (On the Pythagorean Way of Life I.1–2; for a prayer after an 
investigation, see On the Mysteries X.8.293.16–294.6) and Proclus (Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 
I.617.1–618.20, Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus II, 207.21–214.12). For an account of Plotinus’ attitude 
toward prayer and overall religiosity, see Rist (1967, 199–212); for further references and an exposition 
of Iamblichus’ theory of prayer in relation to the respective views of Porphyry and Proclus, see Dillon 
(1973, 405–411); for an introduction to the understanding and practice of prayer in the Platonic tradition, 
see Dillon (2002); on the broader issue of piety and prayer in late antiquity, see Saffrey (1986). 
 
20
 Anselm, Proslogion, Preface. Anselm also writes in his Letter on the Incarnation of the Word 1 (my 
translation): “the one who does not believe will not understand. For the one who does not believe will not 
have the experience; and the one who has not had the experience will not know” (“qui non crediderit, non 
intelliget. Nam qui non crediderit, non experietur; et qui expertus non fuerit, non cognoscet”). This text is 
an echo of a Biblical text from the prophet Isaiah, often quoted by Augustine (e.g., De fide et Symbolo 1, 
De Trinitate VII.12, XV.2, De doctrina Christiana II.17; cf. also Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super 
Sententiis III.d23.q2.a2.qc1.ad2): καὶ ἐὰν μὴ πιστεύσητε, οὐδὲ μὴ συνῆτε (Isaiah 7:9, Septuaginta). 
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this very important point is kept in mind and if I did not miss something of substance 
in Moser’s interpretation, I think that his critique of natural theology loses most of its 
force. 
I think Moser is correct, however, when his critique is directed, not to the major 
authors or systematizers of the arguments themselves, but to their popular reception, in 
which often these arguments have been conceived of precisely as he describes them. Yet 
again, I believe that the critique remains unwarranted when applied to the major medieval 
representatives of so-called natural theology such as Anselm, Aquinas, and Bonaventure. 
As I hinted above, the case is different with Plotinus. Even if we might consider 
ourselves justified in detecting elements, in the Enneads, of what in later centuries will 
develop as the tradition of natural theology,
21
 he would hardly have been worried by 
Moser’s critique for one simple reason: because in line with the tradition of Greek 
intellectualism, his starting point was not faith, but reason.
22
 Whether and to what extent 
he was justified in his attitude is an issue that transcends the limits of this study. 
                                                 
21
 See for example Gerson’s inclusion of Plotinus in his study on the history of natural theology (Gerson 
1990). 
 
22
 For a range of opinions about Plotinus’ rationalism or intellectualism see Dodds (1928, 142; 1965, 26), 
Randall (1969), Moreau (1970, 13–16), Schiller (1978); for a concise account of Plotinus’ attitude toward 
religion see Armstrong (1967, 203–210). 
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